I'll summarize some of the points of these recent posts, because mainstream and
most alt-media reporting seems to skip over important background details.
Bucket shops were banned in 1929 because they were fraudsters. It was too easy
to suck clients in on a momentum trade, and at an appropriate moment, to short
the stock, causing a crash and wiping out clients trading on margin.
The Savings and Loan Crisis (1986-1995) sent many bankers to jail. There were two
other outcomes:
the US government seized toxic loans, and as a consequence of attempting to sell
these at a profit, forced unsafe practices onto the financial sector, and forced
the Ratings Agencies to underestimate risk.
the financial sector moved to protect itself from prosecution, seeking "deregulation"
and "light touch regulation". Besides the removal of Glass-Stegall, the prohibition
on "bucket shops" was removed. Fraud was now legal (again!).
While the deregulation issue was broadly internationally understood, the repricing
of risk and its effects was hidden. Financial instruments rated 'AAA' are
expected to default once in 10,000 years. That number suggests that it is pointless
to insure against default because your counterparty is more likely to fail than the
bond. Initially, there was no market for that insurance (CDO's) because the risk
was correctly priced. That changed, in part because of US government pressure,
beginning with sub-prime.[1]
In 2004 the FBI was warning that mortgage fraud in America was endemic.
In 2005, Washington Mutual was reducing its mortgage lending, and in doing so,
its profits suffered, weakening the bank.
"More backers piled in with time, and by May 2005, Mr. Burry closed the first deal on
subprime credit default swaps with Deutsche Bank."
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/michael-burry-the-man-who-shorted-subprime/In 2006 John Paulson took an artisan industry and industrialised it. Goldman Sachs,
satisfied itself with its cut of the trade between the buyers and the sellers of CDO's.
The lack of risk of going to jail, and the mispricing of risk mandated by US
government pressure and practice meant that the more toxic the debt, the greater
the likely profits all down the food chain.
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2015/12/debunking-the-big-short-how-michael-lewis-turned-the-real-villains-of-the-crisis-into-heros.html"So it wasntt just that these speculators were harmful, and Lewis gave them a free pass.
He failed to clue in his readers that the actions of his chosen heroes drove the demand
for the worst sort of mortgages and turned what would otherwise have been a "contained"
problem into a systemic crisis."
"Both market participant estimates and repeated, conservative analyses indicate that
Magnetar's CDO program drove the demand for between 35% and 60% of toxic subprime bond demand."
"For the most part, the dealers themselves. Without going into mind-numbing detail, the apparent
risklessness of an AAA instrument hedged by an AAA counterparty (in this case, a monoline)
substantially reduced the capital a dealer needed to support a position. As a result,
holding AAA CDOs hedged by AAA guarantors was treated, on a profit and loss basis on the
relevant dealing desks, as vastly more attractive than finding investors to take the other
side of the trade. In other words, this was massive gaming of the banks' own bonus systems."
Think of it like this: If the government mandated fitting faulty brakes to cars, and then
repealed all the laws relating to speeding and traffic violations, would you be surprised
when a few accidents occur in good weather? followed by massive pileups on motorways when
winter sets in? (It's not just the US Government BTW, they had help).
[1] The Ratings Agencies agreed to change their models in 1997. Within ten years, problems
began to appear:
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech374.pdfThe sort of problem that, according to statistics, as Haldane comments "To provide some context,
assuming a normal distribution, a 7.26-sigma daily loss would be expected to occur once every
13.7 billion or so years. That is roughly the estimated age of the Universe."
In good times failure rates can be fitted to a normal, gaussian distribution. That model
would seem to be optimistic by a factor of four when the hard times reappear - the "fat tail"
or power law distribution.