bitcoin "unlimited" seeks review

[brg444]

Sorry for stepping in.

If someone tries to sybill the networks and sets up 2,000 nodes with a blocklimit of 200 MB, no responsible miner would take this as a reason to set his own limit to 200 MB.

When one of the miners was corrupted too, he could release a 200 MB block and 2,000 Nodes would propagate it. All the other nodes with lower limits would reject the block untill it reaches some depth. For that to happen the majority of miners has to be corrupted.

The attack is a lot more complex than that. I think you're on the BU forum? Taek had a nice explanation of the centralization pressure enabled by BU. Someone could leverage a sybil attack to effectively do just what he proposed: slowly but surely prune nodes out of the network until it gets consolidated into a few more controllable hands.

If you are a miner, and you know a block of size X can be processed by 85% of the network, but not 100%, do you mine it? If by 'network', we mean hashrate, then definitely! 85% is high enough that you'll be able to build the longest chain. The miners that can't keep up will be pruned, and then the target for '85% fastest' moves - now a smaller set of miners represents 85% and you can move the block size up, pruning another set of miners.

If by 'network', you mean all nodes... today we already have nodes that can't keep up. So by necessity you are picking a subset of nodes that can keep up, and a subset that cannot. So, now you are deciding who is safe to prune. Raspi's? Probably safe. Single merchants that run their own nodes on desktop hardware? Probably safe. All desktop hardware, but none of the exchanges? Maybe not safe today. But if you've been near desktop levels for a while, and slowly driving off the slower desktops, at some point you might only be driving away 10 nodes to jump up to 'small datacenter' levels.

And so it continues anyway. You get perpetual centralization pressure because there will always be that temptation to drive off that slowest subset of the network since by doing so you can claim more transaction fees.

I countered the criticism of Taek and so did many other people on the bitco.in forum, here is a link to my response:

https://bitco.in/forum/threads/gold-collapsing-bitcoin-up.16/page-203#post-7395
https://bitco.in/forum/threads/gold-collapsing-bitcoin-up.16/page-208#post-7550

Your responses to him addressed none of his arguments and mischaracterized the rest of them, as usual.

Nothing to see here.

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[sAt0sHiFanClub]

Your responses to him addressed none of his arguments and mischaracterized the rest of them, as usual.

brg - the English language was on and left you a message:

"Please stop torturing me!!"

[Bergmann_Christoph]

Sorry for stepping in.

If someone tries to sybill the networks and sets up 2,000 nodes with a blocklimit of 200 MB, no responsible miner would take this as a reason to set his own limit to 200 MB.

When one of the miners was corrupted too, he could release a 200 MB block and 2,000 Nodes would propagate it. All the other nodes with lower limits would reject the block untill it reaches some depth. For that to happen the majority of miners has to be corrupted.

The attack is a lot more complex than that. I think you're on the BU forum? Taek had a nice explanation of the centralization pressure enabled by BU. Someone could leverage a sybil attack to effectively do just what he proposed: slowly but surely prune nodes out of the network until it gets consolidated into a few more controllable hands.

If you are a miner, and you know a block of size X can be processed by 85% of the network, but not 100%, do you mine it? If by 'network', we mean hashrate, then definitely! 85% is high enough that you'll be able to build the longest chain. The miners that can't keep up will be pruned, and then the target for '85% fastest' moves - now a smaller set of miners represents 85% and you can move the block size up, pruning another set of miners.

If by 'network', you mean all nodes... today we already have nodes that can't keep up. So by necessity you are picking a subset of nodes that can keep up, and a subset that cannot. So, now you are deciding who is safe to prune. Raspi's? Probably safe. Single merchants that run their own nodes on desktop hardware? Probably safe. All desktop hardware, but none of the exchanges? Maybe not safe today. But if you've been near desktop levels for a while, and slowly driving off the slower desktops, at some point you might only be driving away 10 nodes to jump up to 'small datacenter' levels.

And so it continues anyway. You get perpetual centralization pressure because there will always be that temptation to drive off that slowest subset of the network since by doing so you can claim more transaction fees.

I countered the criticism of Taek and so did many other people on the bitco.in forum, here is a link to my response:

https://bitco.in/forum/threads/gold-collapsing-bitcoin-up.16/page-203#post-7395
https://bitco.in/forum/threads/gold-collapsing-bitcoin-up.16/page-208#post-7550

Your responses to him addressed none of his arguments and mischaracterized the rest of them, as usual.

Nothing to see here.

Wrong. I read it some seconds ago. You can combat his responses, you can try to destroy them, but if you try to make people think they are no responses and don't adress the problem, you obviously aren't trying to communicate the issue well and objective but to spread things that are not true. Play fair.

Here are the quotes:

. In conclusion however I think that you are mistakenly equating pool centralization with mining centralization.

--> he says that there is nothing like mining centralization, but only pool centralization. Criticize this argument, but don't pretend it is none.  Bitcoins natural game theory is that there are more honest miners than dishonest miners.

The incentive mechanism acts upon the miners, if the underlying game theory is correct, miners would not consciously undermine the value proposition of Bitcoin and therefore their own investment, they would not allow a pool to act maliciously in such a way for a sustained period of time ...  Increasing the blocksize would not effect mining centralization however. You are correct in pointing out this hypothetical attack vector, however this is only true for pool centralization and ultimately it is the people that control the hashing power that determine the size of the pools.

--> he says that an increase in the blocksize doesn't centralize mining. I made a similar objection in this discussion on page 3, but you didn't respond it.

Other than you taek followed the discussion and took the response serious. He claimed that the pool owner can force the miners to accept things they don't like, since they are a centralized source of power.

The response was:

More then seventy percent of the hashpower is currently in public pools, if we want there to be more decentralization we would want the pools to have more of this hashpower, since the other thirty percent is represented by companies like Bitfury, KNC, 21inc, which are the only type of mining operations that do not need to pool their hashpower in order to counter variance ... It is true that a pool is a centralized form of power, however when the hashpower is represented by 10-20 pools like it is today then that power is in effect distributed.

--> If there are 10-20 pools cumulating the hash power of hundreds, it is distributed. We experienced what happened to ghash when they nearly reached 51 percent for some time. If miners don' like what a pool does, they leave. In the case of ghash they even left when ghash just had the chance to do something evil but claimed they won't do.

[johnyj]

The limit I see with BU's market driven block size is that it supposes that every market participant is so poor that they have to be a rational economist. In fact the richer you are, the less you care about efficiency and profit, and you start to care about those higher level concerns

For example, the BU suggests that miners are willing to take a larger block when the fee is enough high to compensate for the orphaning risk. As a result, we would have many orphaned large blocks chasing for 50+ btc fee in each block. And transactions will often take longer time to confirm even if you paid lots of fee. This is the result of trying to squeeze every juice from the blockspace resource, an environmental hazzard

In comparison, if we have super fast block propagation and extremely low orphan rate, the network is much more healthy, and the value for this can not be measured by market, it is an environmental bonus on every user of the entire ecosystem

[VeritasSapere]

The limit I see with BU's market driven block size is that it supposes that every market participant is so poor that they have to be a rational economist. In fact the richer you are, the less you care about efficiency and profit, and you start to care about those higher level concerns.

I do think this is true, and if it was it would render rule by the economic majority non viable. The more invested a person is the more incentivized they will become in order to do what is best for the network and inform themselves, overall.

For example, the BU suggests that miners are willing to take a larger block when the fee is enough high to compensate for the orphaning risk. As a result, we would have many orphaned large blocks chasing for 50+ btc fee in each block. And transactions will often take longer time to confirm even if you paid lots of fee. This is the result of trying to squeeze every juice from the blockspace resource, an environmental hazzard

If there where fifty plus BTC of fees with high volume I would consider this a great success, large blocks are a consequence and a necessary condition for Bitcoins success, that is if we define success as greater mass adoption of the Bitcoin blockchain. It seems like you are more interested in running an extremely efficient network like a good engineer should, however there is more at stake then that.

In comparison, if we have super fast block propagation and extremely low orphan rate, the network is much more healthy, and the value for this can not be measured by market, it is an environmental bonus on every user of the entire ecosystem

The value of this can be measured by the market, and if you do not think so then you are disconnected with the reality. The market capitalization of Bitcoin directly influences the security of the protocol, when the price goes up the protocol pays the miners more for security, bringing more people in further distributing the hashpower.

I suppose according to your definition of a well running network there should not be many people using it and cloging up the blockspace. Since lots of people wanting to use the Bitcoin blockchain is an "enviromental hazzard"? This is why we need to limit blockspace and price most use cases and bussiness out of the ecostystem? I see it completly differently, when more people join Bitcoin it strenghtens the network, adds value, and brings about profound change in our civilization. I think we should allow that to continue to happen, keep the fees low and transactions reliable with an increased blocksize.

[VeritasSapere]

It seems to me like you are missing the point. The advantages that BU brings are primarily political, empowering the participants of the Bitcoin network. From a purely technical perspective BU is not that different from Core or from the protocol today as a whole. Considering that you are not interested in discussing the political implications only further proves to me that you are completely missing the point.

That you think that a flexcap is similar to BU in regards to the blocksize only further highlights this misunderstanding. Flexcap if introduced by Core is a form of centralized economic planning, which history has shown us is ill advised. Flexcap will be charging miners for creating bigger blocks, this can be seen as a type of "taxation" or "fine", which would then be payed out to the next miner if they create a smaller block, forever adding a new incentive structure to Bitcoin mining in order to keep the blocks small fundamentally changing the economic policy of Bitcoin.

Almost all of the blocksize proposals so far have been forms of centralized economic planning. Since we are free to choose alternative implementations, these alternative have their own proposals and policies. We are limited in our choice however by the options that are giving to us by developers. This is like a form a representative democracy, with some of the accompanying problems that this creates. Singular implementations must decide on the vision and path for Bitcoin into the future, this is where some implementations have now diverged. Bitcoin Unlimited in many ways is different since it has transcended this debate, both small blockists and big blockists can arguably use BU, instead of dividing up into political camps and fighting over what the vision of Bitcoin should be, which would most likely lead to a split. Many of us can choose instead to allow the free market to decide what the blocksize should be in a more distributed and emergent fashion. Bitcoin Unlimited helps to further remove any barriers to this free market. Bitcoin Unlimited is also about disempowering developers from having a disproportionate influence over the economic policy of Bitcoin.

I can see why you might think that developers having more control over the protocol is a good thing. I can bite the bullet and say that this would most likely also slow down development, as I did in my conversation with Greg Maxwell. This can be percieved as being a positive thing however, making development in Bitcoin more conservative. It can also be argued that many developers are not well equipped to decide on the future of Bitcoin, considering that many of them have engineering and computer science backgrounds, these questions have a very large scope where the humanities also become important. I would argue that it is better that the market decides, I think that the wisdom of the crowd will always be better compared to any other form of centralized authority deciding for us. We can only lose our freedom by allowing others to decide for us.

The only way to destroy freedom, is to convince people they are safer without it.

[YarkoL]

The limit I see with BU's market driven block size is that it supposes that every market participant is so poor that they have to be a rational economist. In fact the richer you are, the less you care about efficiency and profit, and you start to care about those higher level concerns

For example, the BU suggests that miners are willing to take a larger block when the fee is enough high to compensate for the orphaning risk. As a result, we would have many orphaned large blocks chasing for 50+ btc fee in each block. And transactions will often take longer time to confirm even if you paid lots of fee. This is the result of trying to squeeze every juice from the blockspace resource, an environmental hazzard

Even if miners got so rich that they started to revel in luxurious
irrationality, the "ordinary" users will have to count their pennies.
If the price discovery is allowed to happen unhindered, the fees will
not be exorbitant, but reflect the actual demand & supply.

Also there will be in all probability advanced tools to calculate the right fee,
similar to the current fee estimation functionality.
 

In comparison, if we have super fast block propagation and extremely low orphan rate, the network is much more healthy, and the value for this can not be measured by market, it is an environmental bonus on every user of the entire ecosystem

Advances in propagation will translate to increased supply of
block space, and that will be measured by the market.

[LovelyDay]

This bitcoin-dev post from 2012 by Stefan Thomas explains the philosophy behind BU exceptionally well:

http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2012-June/001551.html

The real limits are the bandwidth, computing and memory resources of participating nodes. For the sake of argument suppose a 1 TB block was released into the network right now and we'll also assume there was no block size limit of any kind. Many nodes would likely not be able to successfully download this block in under 10-30 minutes, so there is a very good chance that other miners will have generated two blocks before this block makes its way to them.

What does this mean? The miner generating a 1 TB block knows this would happen. So in terms of economic self interest he will generate the largest possible block that he is still confident that other miners will accept and process. A miner who receives a block will also consider whether to build on it based on whether they think other miners will be able to download it. In other words, if I receive a large block I may decide not to mine on it, because I believe that the majority of mining power will not mine on it - because it is either too large for them to download or because their rules against large blocks reject it.

It seems the idea was not really explored further until now.

The counter-argument given by GMaxwell in that thread?

By itself letting the size float has non-trivial existential risk. A Bitcoin with expensive transactions due to competition for space in blocks can be front-ended with fast payment systems and still provide the promised decentralized currency. Bitcoin with a very large blockchain and blocks does not.

Funny that would be at the top of his mind.

[brg444]

This bitcoin-dev post from 2012 by Stefan Thomas explains the philosophy behind BU exceptionally well:

http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2012-June/001551.html

The real limits are the bandwidth, computing and memory resources of participating nodes. For the sake of argument suppose a 1 TB block was released into the network right now and we'll also assume there was no block size limit of any kind. Many nodes would likely not be able to successfully download this block in under 10-30 minutes, so there is a very good chance that other miners will have generated two blocks before this block makes its way to them.

What does this mean? The miner generating a 1 TB block knows this would happen. So in terms of economic self interest he will generate the largest possible block that he is still confident that other miners will accept and process. A miner who receives a block will also consider whether to build on it based on whether they think other miners will be able to download it. In other words, if I receive a large block I may decide not to mine on it, because I believe that the majority of mining power will not mine on it - because it is either too large for them to download or because their rules against large blocks reject it.

It seems the idea was not really explored further until now.

The counter-argument given by GMaxwell in that thread?

By itself letting the size float has non-trivial existential risk. A Bitcoin with expensive transactions due to competition for space in blocks can be front-ended with fast payment systems and still provide the promised decentralized currency. Bitcoin with a very large blockchain and blocks does not.

Funny that would be at the top of his mind.

Quite the foresight by good ol gmax.

[alp]

This bitcoin-dev post from 2012 by Stefan Thomas explains the philosophy behind BU exceptionally well:

http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2012-June/001551.html

The real limits are the bandwidth, computing and memory resources of participating nodes. For the sake of argument suppose a 1 TB block was released into the network right now and we'll also assume there was no block size limit of any kind. Many nodes would likely not be able to successfully download this block in under 10-30 minutes, so there is a very good chance that other miners will have generated two blocks before this block makes its way to them.

What does this mean? The miner generating a 1 TB block knows this would happen. So in terms of economic self interest he will generate the largest possible block that he is still confident that other miners will accept and process. A miner who receives a block will also consider whether to build on it based on whether they think other miners will be able to download it. In other words, if I receive a large block I may decide not to mine on it, because I believe that the majority of mining power will not mine on it - because it is either too large for them to download or because their rules against large blocks reject it.

It seems the idea was not really explored further until now.

The counter-argument given by GMaxwell in that thread?

By itself letting the size float has non-trivial existential risk. A Bitcoin with expensive transactions due to competition for space in blocks can be front-ended with fast payment systems and still provide the promised decentralized currency. Bitcoin with a very large blockchain and blocks does not.

Funny that would be at the top of his mind.

Quite the foresight by good ol gmax.

The real question is where did Blockstream find a time machine to go back and bribe him then?

[BitUsher]

I tried really hard to have a healthy and technical discussion at the reddit forum that Adam directed us to continue the conversation but was met with a lot of groupthink , trolls , and some dishonesty. I suppose that exists a bit in the other reddits too so have given up wasting time in all those social platforms or that other forum as they are a bit toxic IMHO.

Bitcoin Unlimited seems somewhat interesting so I will still follow up looking into it some more independently .

Technically, the best things I like about Bitcoin Unlimited is the incentivization it places upon node operators. Recently BTCC decided to spin up 102 AWS nodes which they assumed would help the ecosystem but made the mistake of forgetting that you need an active human on the other side verifying txs and check for bugs... meaning you can't just spin up node instances and not use them as their action, albeit well intended, is slightly harmful to the ecosystem. BU incentivizes "economic full nodes" run by individuals on different /16 ranges which is exactly what we need . The incentive isn't enough to have much of an impact but it has got me thinking .... What other gamification techniques can be used to encourage economic node use?

[smooth]

Technically, the best things I like about Bitcoin Unlimited is the incentivization it places upon node operators. Recently BTCC decided to spin up 102 AWS nodes which they assumed would help the ecosystem but made the mistake of forgetting that you need an active human on the other side verifying txs and check for bugs... meaning you can't just spin up node instances and not use them as their action, albeit well intended, is slightly harmful to the ecosystem. BU incentivizes "economic full nodes" run by individuals on different /16 ranges which is exactly what we need. The incentive isn't enough to have much of an impact but it has got me thinking .... What other gamification techniques can be used to encourage economic node use?

Please be more specific about how it does that.

[BitUsher]

Technically, the best things I like about Bitcoin Unlimited is the incentivization it places upon node operators. Recently BTCC decided to spin up 102 AWS nodes which they assumed would help the ecosystem but made the mistake of forgetting that you need an active human on the other side verifying txs and check for bugs... meaning you can't just spin up node instances and not use them as their action, albeit well intended, is slightly harmful to the ecosystem. BU incentivizes "economic full nodes" run by individuals on different /16 ranges which is exactly what we need. The incentive isn't enough to have much of an impact but it has got me thinking .... What other gamification techniques can be used to encourage economic node use?

Please be more specific about how it does that.

I am claiming that one should assume a slight psychological incentive to run a full node as the maxBlockSize GUI within the BU full node wallet empowers the end user and encourages them to use an economic full node. The consequence of this is that it very slightly dis-empowers any developers as the decision with maxBlockSize(and in the future some BU supporters claim other BIP's) now is made principally between the nodes and miners instead of the developers(which is a slight negative consequence IMHO). I don't know if the incentives are strong enough to have a profound impact but at least it has started me thinking of ways we can encourage more economic full nodes besides the normal methods-

More features, better privacy, better UI, more secure, more reliable, ect...

All these represent obvious things we can improve to encourage more economic full nodes which is a large cost which will continue to grow as blocks size increases.

Some other methods to incentivize full nodes would be to cut them in on some of the LN, fraud proof server,  or payment channel fees by acting as a hub for these.

Than there is the other more complex incentives like gamification techniques that psychologically rewards the user in multiple ways or makes running a full node fun that can be explored.

[iCEBREAKER]

I tried really hard to have a healthy and technical discussion at the reddit forum that Adam directed us to continue the conversation but was met with a lot of groupthink , trolls , and some dishonesty.

Good.  Let's hope Dr. Back has learned a valuable lesson about flittering between forums just because (heaven forfend) a mod does their job when Peturd Rizun insists on shitposting in a Serious Thread.

The idea that the grass is greener and free of Sensor Ships on /r/btc (of all places) is asinine.

For one (exorbitantly obvious) thing, posts here cannot be hidden by brigading Gavinistas or (charitably pretending there's a functional difference) Buttcoiners.

You'd think Dr. Back would know better after Bitcoin Judas's pet sub threw Drak under the bus.

Perhaps this is simply an extension of his admirably subtle strategy to counter-troll Unlimiturd's Redditard Army....   

[smooth]

Technically, the best things I like about Bitcoin Unlimited is the incentivization it places upon node operators. Recently BTCC decided to spin up 102 AWS nodes which they assumed would help the ecosystem but made the mistake of forgetting that you need an active human on the other side verifying txs and check for bugs... meaning you can't just spin up node instances and not use them as their action, albeit well intended, is slightly harmful to the ecosystem. BU incentivizes "economic full nodes" run by individuals on different /16 ranges which is exactly what we need. The incentive isn't enough to have much of an impact but it has got me thinking .... What other gamification techniques can be used to encourage economic node use?

Please be more specific about how it does that.

I am claiming that one should assume a slight psychological incentive to run a full node as the maxBlockSize GUI within the BU full node wallet empowers the end user and encourages them to use an economic full node. The consequence of this is that it very slightly dis-empowers any developers as the decision with maxBlockSize(and in the future some BU supporters claim other BIP's) now is made principally between the nodes and miners instead of the developers(which is a slight negative consequence IMHO). I don't know if the incentives are strong enough to have a profound impact but at least it has started me thinking of ways we can encourage more economic full nodes besides the normal methods-

More features, better privacy, better UI, more secure, more reliable, ect...

All these represent obvious things we can improve to encourage more economic full nodes which is a large cost which will continue to grow as blocks size increases.

Some other methods to incentivize full nodes would be to cut them in on some of the LN, fraud proof server,  or payment channel fees by acting as a hub for these.

Than there is the other more complex incentives like gamification techniques that psychologically rewards the user in multiple ways or makes running a full node fun that can be explored.

Thank you. I understand your perspective now. It is interesting.

[spartacusrex]

[ I really like the concept of BU - mainly because it is the most decentralised approach ]

I am curious as to what people think will happen, IF people started running BU, and the CORE said ' USE THESE SETTINGS ' , would the majority of people use them ?

I think they would.

In fact I think the CORE boys are doing themselves a disservice, by not realising that 'almost' everyone would still follow their lead. Easily the majority.

AND - importantly - even though we would still be using the settings CORE feels is right, because we were given a choice and not forced, there would be no animosity. win win.

People are funny like that.

[alp]

[ I really like the concept of BU - mainly because it is the most decentralised approach ]

I am curious as to what people think will happen, IF people started running BU, and the CORE said ' USE THESE SETTINGS ' , would the majority of people use them ?

I think they would.

In fact I think the CORE boys are doing themselves a disservice, by not realising that 'almost' everyone would still follow their lead. Easily the majority.

AND - importantly - even though we would still be using the settings CORE feels is right, because we were given a choice and not forced, there would be no animosity. win win.

People are funny like that.

And you would be surprised by how easy it would be to manipulate a small number of people to change a few settings to cause chaos for them, then have them have a really bad experience, then get press about how bad it is and how they lost their money.  This is a clear intent to break everything and make it too chaotic to be usable.

[VeritasSapere]

[ I really like the concept of BU - mainly because it is the most decentralised approach ]

I am curious as to what people think will happen, IF people started running BU, and the CORE said ' USE THESE SETTINGS ' , would the majority of people use them ?

I think they would.

In fact I think the CORE boys are doing themselves a disservice, by not realising that 'almost' everyone would still follow their lead. Easily the majority.

AND - importantly - even though we would still be using the settings CORE feels is right, because we were given a choice and not forced, there would be no animosity. win win.

People are funny like that.

And you would be surprised by how easy it would be to manipulate a small number of people to change a few settings to cause chaos for them, then have them have a really bad experience, then get press about how bad it is and how they lost their money.  This is a clear intent to break everything and make it too chaotic to be usable.

Actually because of the defaults set in BU it is more likely to follow the longest chain regardless of what the blocksize will be. Therefore it can be argued that BU is better for end users since if they where using Core instead they would be forked off the network when the blocksize is increased. BU allows for continued compatibility with the Bitcoin blockchain regardless of what blocksize proposal is adopted, unlike both XT and Core which will need to be upgraded and or patched in order to maintain consensus with the economic majority depending on the blocksize proposal that is chosen. Bitcoin Unlimited on the other hand maintains compatibility with other proposals out of the box from day one using the default settings.

[Peter R]

...
This is a clear intent to break everything and make it too chaotic to be usable.

Actually because of the defaults set in BU it is more likely to follow the longest chain regardless of what the blocksize will be. Therefore it can be argued that BU is better for end users since if they where using Core instead they would be forked off the network when the blocksize is increased. BU allows for continued compatibility with the Bitcoin blockchain regardless of what blocksize proposal is adopted, unlike both XT and Core which will need to be upgraded and or patched in order to maintain consensus with the economic majority depending on the blocksize proposal that is chosen. Bitcoin Unlimited on the other hand maintains compatibility with other proposals out of the box from day one using the default settings.

Indeed.  For people who want to track consensus regardless of the who/what/where/when/why of the eventual block size limit increase, Bitcoin Unlimited is the best choice.  

[JackH]

...
This is a clear intent to break everything and make it too chaotic to be usable.

Actually because of the defaults set in BU it is more likely to follow the longest chain regardless of what the blocksize will be. Therefore it can be argued that BU is better for end users since if they where using Core instead they would be forked off the network when the blocksize is increased. BU allows for continued compatibility with the Bitcoin blockchain regardless of what blocksize proposal is adopted, unlike both XT and Core which will need to be upgraded and or patched in order to maintain consensus with the economic majority depending on the blocksize proposal that is chosen. Bitcoin Unlimited on the other hand maintains compatibility with other proposals out of the box from day one using the default settings.

Indeed.  For people who want to track consensus regardless of the who/what/where/when/why of the eventual block size limit increase, Bitcoin Unlimited is the best choice.  

Why are you posting that picture? Is the RED supposed to induce a negative emotion? Is RED supposed to be wrong?

BU is full of flaws and allows for Sybil attacks.

The crowd here are capable of thinking for themselves, this is not some political campaign where you just utter the same words over and over and show us 4 colored boxes. It means absolutely nothing that you draw those boxes. Its insulting how you present your option.