DECENTRALIZED crypto currency (including Bitcoin) is a delusion (any solutions?)

[iamnotback]

I do believe my design is a Bitcoin killer any way, in the sense that I think microtransactions are the big enchilada of the near future despite them being maligned up until now:

http://hackingdistributed.com/2014/12/17/changetip-must-die/

The reason is that most of what people do online is for fun. And the earnings that some companies make now online derives typically in the pennies per user. When you've only got to extract a few pennies from each user, the users don't care what it cost especially if they don't have to do a damn thing to pay. The low hanging fruit for crypto-currency is not replacing high valued transactions, since everyone already has a well entrenched option for that called fiat.

I think we are moving to a collaborative economy (e.g. open source) where we want to throw a few pennies towards each thing we use each day, then these get aggregated (funneled in) on projects and fan back out as salaries and commissions in morsels that enable people to pay rent, buy food, etc.. I don't think the majority of our Knowledge Age economy will be large ticket item sales, because most of what we will be producing will not be one-off creations with high effort for one user/customer (we may have customization per user but it will be automated). Economies-of-scale will continue to increase (as they did for factories in the Industrial Age), although customizability will also increase due to technological innovation, e.g. 3D printers and software (which was not possible in one-size-fits-all factories).

This is sort of the economy I have envisioned ever since I wrote the seminal essays that appear in the OP of the Economic Devastation thread.

And microtransactions may be the only plausibly reasonable security cost model?

I spent some time on DAG based designs and this one reminds me of something that I rejected early.

As far I understand, the level of security against double-spends basically depends on the total amount spent on fees on the legit DAG.  If so, an attacker just secretly builds a subDAG that includes a few double-spends, spends more on fees in the subDAG than was spent in the legit DAG, then publishes his subDAG.  Now everybody should switch to the subDAG as it has burnt more fees.  As long as the total amount of double-spends exceeds the fees, the attack succeeds.

Smart, sorry, I'd missed that from your original post. But it seems like V. Buterin's argument from the link in the OP still applies:

"This seems weak, but in reality it isn’t; we know that in the case of Bitcoin, once the currency supply stops increasing mining will rely solely on transaction fees, and the mechanics are exactly the same (since the amount that the network will spend on mining will roughly correspond to the total number of txfees being sent in); hence, fee-based TaPoS is in this regard at least as secure as fee-only PoW mining."

@TomHolden, I agree that Satoshi's PoW has the same potential vulnerability in that if double-spends exceed the value of what was burned to provide security, then a 51% lie-in-wait attack is possible funded by the value of the double-spends (possibly also shorting the exchange value in case the successful attack craters the price).

Thus, @tonych's concern applies to every consensus design (including Satoshi's) which is based on burning some resources as the metric of the longest-chain-rule (regardless whether multiple branches are merged to form the longest-chain, e.g. a DAG).

We really don't want a crypto-currency that is too liquid into fungible monetary equivalents, as it would not be secure except by overpaying for security. This points to future of crypto-tokens more for micropayments as a more viable reasonable security cost paradigm. As block rewards wind down for Bitcoin, then this may become more apparent.

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[iamnotback]

Seems I am banned from Reddit, because the following posts have been removed:

Afaics, Byzcoin can't possibly fix the most fundamental flaw in Satoshi's design when block rewards come predominantly from transaction fees, which is that the transaction fees either decline to mining costs or the throughput must be limited (e.g. by block size) so that transaction fees must rise to those the larger valued transactions are willing to pay.

One might argue that some transactions are willing to pay a higher transaction fee to be included sooner in a block, yet without any restriction on throughput (e.g. block size), this merely means one has to pay a transaction fee that makes the marginal miner profitable. But there is no such fee, because the marginal miners aren't just one level of cost. Thus gradually the most marginal miners go bankrupt, which proceeds until the lowest cost miners control 51% of the network and can raise fees to what ever level the market will bear.

The marginal miners rejoin the network if the cartel raises the level of transaction fees accepted but this is only stable if there remains a 51% cartel to raise fees. Due to the economics of Satoshi's design (e.g. minority mining on the wrong block during propagation delay, selfish mining, and even stubborn mining), those with more hashrate earn more profit than their proportional hashrate should, thus the 51% cartel over time trends towards 100% and so as their percentage of the systemic hashrate rises, the cartel can raise transaction fees to higher levels up to what the market can bear. So eventually we will be right back at Visa and Mastercard levels of centralized control and fees.

The "greedy mining attacks" are essentially a manifestation of the same underlying economic problem which is that given no restriction on throughput, then game theory incentives cause transaction fees to decline to the mining costs. Byzcoin may fix some of these attacks, but it can't fix the fundamental problem with Satoshi's proof-of-work, because it is insoluble. And no, Monero didn't fix this problem as TPTB_need_war explained to ArticMine earlier this year.

I (as @AnonyMint) had pointed out back in 2013 that transaction fees are the Achilles heel of Satoshi's design.

Ultimately what this all means is that mathematically and microeconomically for Satoshi's design to survive, a cartel must control a monopoly on mining (e.g. 51% of the hashrate) so that it can dictate a level of fees which is profitable. This is potentially why the Chinese mining "cartel" has been afaik resisting block size increases, because at least this is more obfuscated and more immediate than a battle of attrition or 51% attack to rid the blockchain of miners not in the cartel for the purpose of increasing profit from transaction fees. And there may be other vested interests in preference for Lightning Networks.

There can't ever exist any solution for Satoshi's proof-of-work design that will prevent a devolution into a mining cartel.

The only way to improve on this might be to shift to a design which doesn't use proof-of-work with blocks.

I have not yet studied in detail about those "greedy mining attacks" but here is another attack I was contemplating which I presume wouldn't be fixed by Byzcoin. However, I conclude this attack is probably not rational.

Currently the average Bitcoin transaction is roughly $100 with roughly 200,000 transactions per day which is fractionally more than 2 transactions per second throughput. That is roughly $200 million of transaction value per day. The minted mining reward is roughly (rounded down) $1 million per day, which is thus roughly 0.5% of transaction value minted reward per transaction. At this time transaction fees are insignificant.

Mathematically it should be possible to double-spend more than $50,000 in transactions (split perhaps into numerous smaller valued transactions) by spending $50,000 on mining for 6 blocks, with the excess being profit. The argument against this being as easy as it seems mathematically is that who will rent to you equivalent of 100% of the network hashrate? Assuming you could rent 51% of the existing hashrate, then you'd only need to spend $25,000 for 6 blocks. But again those who have invested in mining hardware probably have an incentive to not rent out 51% of the network hashrate so as to not enable such attacks on the value of their investment.

If transaction fees will end up being significantly lower such as 0.05% when minted block rewards decline to 0, then unless transaction volume multiplied by average transaction value has increased commensurately (e.g. 10X in my example), then the overall capital invested in the security will be commensurately lower.

Note I wrote recently that I presumed a rational entity or cartel that controls 51% of the mining hashrate would not have an incentive to short the market while 51% attacking for double-spends, because of insufficient market liquidity to extract all the value of their capital investment. Perhaps there is another strategy which might be rational. The 51% attacker could double-spend to drive the price down, extracting profits both on the double-spent theft and the shorting (which are much less than their capital investment) which they can then reinvest by buying more coins at the low prices. Pause their attack and let the market price recover, then repeat. They would need to hide their tracks very well or do this from a country where it is not illegal to do so, which may or may not be realistic at that scale? In this way they could keep the market price relatively depressed while they wait for a technical solution to the problem, or they later announce that 51% of the network has been acquired and will now sign every block with a public key and this public key is committed to a reputation that it will never allow a double-spend. Although that attack (and any subsequent commitment to a reputation not to attack) would admit 51% control of the network, which would probably have motivated a technical replacement for Bitcoin that doesn't use proof-of-work.

Thus it seems I am probably correct and this attack is probably not in the rational interest of any entity that can control 51% of the network hashrate, which is what Satoshi also thought:

If a greedy attacker is able to assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.

[hv_]

Seems I am banned from Reddit, because the following posts have been removed:

Afaics, Byzcoin can't possibly fix the most fundamental flaw in Satoshi's design when block rewards come predominantly from transaction fees, which is that the transaction fees either decline to mining costs or the throughput must be limited (e.g. by block size) so that transaction fees must rise to those the larger valued transactions are willing to pay.

One might argue that some transactions are willing to pay a higher transaction fee to be included sooner in a block, yet without any restriction on throughput (e.g. block size), this merely means one has to pay a transaction fee that makes the marginal miner profitable. But there is no such fee, because the marginal miners aren't just one level of cost. Thus gradually the most marginal miners go bankrupt, which proceeds until the lowest cost miners control 51% of the network and can raise fees to what ever level the market will bear.

The marginal miners rejoin the network if the cartel raises the level of transaction fees accepted but this is only stable if there remains a 51% cartel to raise fees. Due to the economics of Satoshi's design (e.g. minority mining on the wrong block during propagation delay), those with more hashrate earn more profit than their proportional hashrate should, thus the 51% cartel over time trends towards 100% and so as their percentage of the systemic hashrate rises, the cartel can raise transaction fees to higher levels up to what the market can bear. So eventually we will be right back at Visa and Mastercard levels of centralized control and fees.

The "greedy mining attacks" are essentially a manifestation of the same underlying economic problem which is that given no restriction on throughput, then game theory incentives cause transaction fees to decline to the mining costs. Byzcoin may fix some of these attacks, but it can't fix the fundamental problem with Satoshi's proof-of-work, because it is insoluble. And no, Monero didn't fix this problem as TPTB_need_war explained to ArticMine earlier this year.

I (as @AnonyMint) had pointed out back in 2013 that transaction fees are Achilles heel of Satoshi's design.

Ultimately what this all means is that mathematically and microeconomically for Satoshi's design to survive, a cartel must control a monopoly on mining (e.g. 51% of the hashrate) so that it can dictate a level of fees which is profitable. This is potentially why the Chinese mining "cartel" has been afaik resisting block size increases, because at least this is more obfuscated and more immediate than a battle of attrition or 51% attack to rid the blockchain of miners not in the cartel for the purpose of increasing profit from transaction fees.

There can't ever exist any solution for Satoshi's proof-of-work design that will prevent a devolution into a mining cartel.

The only way to improve on this might be to shift to a design which doesn't use proof-of-work with blocks.

I have not yet studied in detail about those "greedy mining attacks" but here is another attack I was contemplating which I presume wouldn't be fixed by Byzcoin. However, I conclude this attack is probably not rational.

Currently the average Bitcoin transaction is roughly $100 with roughly 200,000 transactions per day which is fractionally more than 2 transactions per second throughput. That is roughly $200 million of transaction value per day. The minted mining reward is roughly (rounded down) $1 million per day, which is thus roughly 0.5% of transaction value minted reward per transaction. At this time transaction fees are insignificant.

Mathematically it should be possible to double-spend more than $50,000 in transactions (split perhaps into numerous smaller valued transactions) by spending $50,000 on mining for 6 blocks, with the excess being profit. The argument against this being as easy as it seems mathematically is that who will rent to you equivalent of 100% of the network hashrate? Assuming you could rent 51% of the existing hashrate, then you'd only need to spend $25,000 for 6 blocks. But again those who have invested in mining hardware probably have an incentive to not rent out 51% of the network hashrate so as to not enable such attacks on the value of their investment.

If transaction fees will end up being significantly lower such as 0.05% when minted block rewards decline to 0, then unless transaction volume multiplied by average transaction value has increased commensurately (e.g. 10X in my example), then the overall capital invested in the security will be commensurately lower.

Note I wrote recently that I presumed a rational entity or cartel that controls 51% of the mining hashrate would not have an incentive to short the market while 51% attacking for double-spends, because of insufficient market liquidity to extract all the value of their capital investment. Perhaps there is another strategy which might be rational. The 51% attacker could double-spend to drive the price down, extracting profits both on the double-spent theft and the shorting (which are much less than their capital investment) which they can then reinvest by buying more coins at the low prices. Pause their attack and let the market price recover, then repeat. They would need to hide their tracks very well or do this from a country where it is not illegal to do so, which may or may not be realistic at that scale? In this way they could keep the market price relatively depressed while they wait for a technical solution to the problem, or they later announce that 51% of the network has been acquired and will now sign every block with a public key and this public key is committed to a reputation that it will never allow a double-spend. Although that attack (and any subsequent commitment to a reputation not to attack) would admit 51% control of the network, which would probably have motivated a technical replacement for Bitcoin that doesn't use proof-of-work.

Thus it seems I am probably correct and this attack is probably not in the rational interest of any entity that can control 51% of the network hashrate.

No freedom of speech.
No freedom of transaction.
No freedom of fees.
No freedom of blocksize.

[iamnotback]

No freedom of speech.
No freedom of transaction.
No freedom of fees.
No freedom of blocksize.

I believe there are solutions. I am writing the white paper. Of course nothing should be assumed until any solution is published and peer reviewed.

[iamnotback]

I wrote the following quote before knowing that the Byzcoin research existed (which I just became aware of a couple of hours ago):

A key design decision distills down to mitigating that Satoshi's design has aliasing error due to taking point samples on the continuous domain of partial orders.

And that is exactly what Byzcoin attempts to solve by employing an anti-aliasing filter comprising a sliding windowed sampling of the partial orders, thus the outlier point (e.g. Goose Egg) is not manifested as aliasing error.

Btw, I had (privately) considered a very similar design to the Byzcoin design in early 2016 as one of my candidate designs along the way of my process of finalizing my choice for an optimum design. It of course occurred to me that I could use proof-of-work to elect a group of delegates. Even Dash (Evolution) was pointing to that sort of design.

However, in addition to the insoluble problem of relying only on transaction fees for any design that employs blocks (and proof-of-work) which I explained in my prior comments today, I think there may also be other game theory vulnerabilities of Byzcoin dealing with the ability to jam the Byzantine consensus of the consensus group (it apparently requires 67% agreement) and then mine on a hidden consensus group with more hashrate. It is a variant of selfish mining reconstructed (invented only in my head in about 30 seconds) to apply to this new sliding window concept, but I need to think this out in more detail (and read the Byzcoin white paper!) to be sure.

[iamnotback]

...I think there may also be other game theory vulnerabilities of Byzcoin dealing with the ability to jam the Byzantine consensus of the consensus group (it apparently requires 67% agreement) and then mine on a hidden consensus group with more hashrate. It is a variant of selfish mining reconstructed (invented only in my head in about 30 seconds) to apply to this new sliding window concept, but I need to think this out in more detail (and read the Byzcoin white paper!) to be sure.

It seems perhaps the 33% selfish mining vulnerability perhaps remains in Byzcoin, by shifting the attack to jamming.

http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/08/04/byzcoin/#byzcoin-s-design

So if the attacker applies 33% of the systemic hashrate for holding a position in the consensus group, then attacker can block the consensus group from adding any transactions for mining revenue from fees (and forming any blocks although I presume that any minted block reward would still be split amongst all in the group).

The attacker can make his own hidden grouping and mine it releasing it periodically. Although it has less hashrate difficulty (thus is not the longest chain) than the jammed branch, the rational majority will choose to abandon the jammed branch and mine on the attacker's branch because they are gaining no revenue at all on the attacked branch. The attacker will allow them some revenue on his branch, thus educating the miners what their rational decision must be. Attacker will periodically repeat forking off the branches he forks periodically. Note this only applies when the minting block reward has declined to (near) 0.

The 2/3 can't pull out of the main grouping without making it hidden, but they aren't so coordinated because if they were then it wouldn't be hidden. And if it isn't hidden, then the attacker can also take 1/3 of the group and jam it.

Note even when the minting block reward hasn't declined to (near) 0, the attacker gets 33% of that revenue and blocks all transactions, so those who need transactions will refer to his chain as the correct one, even if it is not the longest, because it is the longest with any transactions.

Unless I have a mistake in my haste, seems I just blew up Byzcoin. Sorry. Don't let me play for a few minutes with explosives.


Edit: it doesn't appear that the authors have considered this sort of attack in the sections Selfish and Stubborn Mining Attacks and also the Defenses Against 33%+ Attacks.

[iamnotback]

I thought I was dreaming them I realized I was awake:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTz93Y-qeq0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VPUhWZLeO5g

[iamnotback]

Dropping this here as a 'Heads Up' because I know you bright folks like reading, reviewing, etc. such stuff:

https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/5cjdcd/viper_a_new_total_functional_strongly_typed/


Let's see if it will end up in the Paradox thread!   

I know you don't know this, but that has nothing to do with Decentralization.

That is a programming language for Ethereum's VM. Should go in an Ethereum thread. Please don't discuss it further in this thread as it is off-topic.

[iamnotback]

I know you don't know this

Thus, the mention/joke about the Paradox thread.  Relax.  I can delete it if it gets your panties in a twist.  Just let me know.

No worries her panties are fine right where they are on my head with the fishy crotch draped over my nose. Smelling salts for coping with the delirium.

[twinkletoes007]

10 years, 20 years from now we will look at 1s1 gen crypto the way we look at old cars. When we finally have quantum computing it will open a whole new level of development. Thats less than 5 years away.

[iamnotback]

When we finally have quantum computing ... Thats less than 5 years away.

Proof 

[iamnotback]

Seems I am banned from Reddit, because the following posts have been removed:

Afaics, Byzcoin can't possibly fix the most fundamental flaw in Satoshi's design when block rewards come predominantly from transaction fees, which is that the transaction fees either decline to mining costs or the throughput must be limited (e.g. by block size) so that transaction fees must rise to those the larger valued transactions are willing to pay.

One might argue that some transactions are willing to pay a higher transaction fee to be included sooner in a block, yet without any restriction on throughput (e.g. block size), this merely means one has to pay a transaction fee that makes the marginal miner profitable. But there is no such fee, because the marginal miners aren't just one level of cost. Thus gradually the most marginal miners go bankrupt, which proceeds until the lowest cost miners control 51% of the network and can raise fees to what ever level the market will bear.

The marginal miners rejoin the network if the cartel raises the level of transaction fees accepted but this is only stable if there remains a 51% cartel to raise fees. Due to the economics of Satoshi's design (e.g. minority mining on the wrong block during propagation delay, selfish mining, and even stubborn mining), those with more hashrate earn more profit than their proportional hashrate should, thus the 51% cartel over time trends towards 100% and so as their percentage of the systemic hashrate rises, the cartel can raise transaction fees to higher levels up to what the market can bear. So eventually we will be right back at Visa and Mastercard levels of centralized control and fees.

The "greedy mining attacks" are essentially a manifestation of the same underlying economic problem which is that given no restriction on throughput, then game theory incentives cause transaction fees to decline to the mining costs. Byzcoin may fix some of these attacks, but it can't fix the fundamental problem with Satoshi's proof-of-work, because it is insoluble. And no, Monero didn't fix this problem as TPTB_need_war explained to ArticMine earlier this year.

I (as @AnonyMint) had pointed out back in 2013 that transaction fees are the Achilles heel of Satoshi's design.

Ultimately what this all means is that mathematically and microeconomically for Satoshi's design to survive, a cartel must control a monopoly on mining (e.g. 51% of the hashrate) so that it can dictate a level of fees which is profitable. This is potentially why the Chinese mining "cartel" has been afaik resisting block size increases, because at least this is more obfuscated and more immediate than a battle of attrition or 51% attack to rid the blockchain of miners not in the cartel for the purpose of increasing profit from transaction fees. And there may be other vested interests in preference for Lightning Networks.

There can't ever exist any solution for Satoshi's proof-of-work design that will prevent a devolution into a mining cartel.

The only way to improve on this might be to shift to a design which doesn't use proof-of-work with blocks.

Byzcoin is also flawed because the splitting of the fees between all of those in consensus block can be subverted by offering lower fees to transactions which pay a well-entrenched miner out-of-band, thus the blockchain doesn't know that those fees were supposed to be split up. Paul Sztorc is correct here, and Emin Gün Sirer is incorrect.

Emin Gün Sirer is trying to argue that other mines won't mine on the block (or will reject its transactions) which doesn't fully share fees, but there is no way to objectively determine this since the offending transactions can still include a small fee (that is shared) in addition to the (discounted!) fee paid in the side band. Also Emin Gün Sirer is referring to Bitcoin-NG there, but the discussion is really about Byzcoin. In Byzcoin a miner with for example 25% of the hashrate is going to be in the consensus group 25% of the time (i.e. 10 out of every 40 minutes approximately). It will be worthwhile for users to establish an account with this large miner and send an offending transaction when that miner is in the current consensus group (and send non-offending transactions the other 75% of the time, but note there may be another 10% miner offering the same and so then it is 35% of the time, etc).

So this means the minority miners are starved of income and go bankrupt. This is yet another example of why profitable proof-of-work will in every conceivable design variant always be a power vacuum winner-take-all non-equilibrium.

Sorry profitable proof-of-work can never be stable.

[iamnotback]

Teaser from my white paper:

Proposed Improvement Overview

The key design innovations are:

1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]
3. [redacted]
   a) [redacted]
   b) [redacted]
   c) [redacted]
   d) [redacted]
4. [redacted]

This design rectifies all the major flaws of DPoS and Satoshi's proof-of-work.

----|-PoW-|-DPoS-
 #1 | #2  |  #2
 #2 | #1  |  #1
 #3 | #3a |  #3a
 #4 | #3d |  #3d
 #5 | #1  |  #4
 #6 | #3b |  _
 #7 | #3  |  _
 #8 | #3  |  _

[thejaytiesto]

Well unfortunately im not smart enough to understand the technical intricacies of all of this stuff, at the end of the day im just an investor seeking for something profitable in the crypto world that actually doesn't end up stagnating in price just like 99.9999% of altcoins out there after the ICO's.

So I will keep an open mind about this and see if you really deliver something anywhere near a "bitcoin killer". I am skeptical and think bitcoin 80% market dominance is not going anywhere, but we'll see.

[Piston Honda]

this is why the BEST SYSTEM you can have in place is a HYBRID system!  

WBB dev (soon to be name change) and ecosystem is doing this now and it's about to be implemented in its first stage!

WATCH AND LEARNS NIGGAZ

[iamnotback]

Well unfortunately im not smart enough to understand the technical intricacies of all of this stuff, at the end of the day im just an investor seeking for something profitable in the crypto world that actually doesn't end up stagnating in price just like 99.9999% of altcoins out there after the ICO's.

So I will keep an open mind about this and see if you really deliver something anywhere near a "bitcoin killer". I am skeptical and think bitcoin 80% market dominance is not going anywhere, but we'll see.

I am skeptical also.

You'll start with the whitepaper, which I think will shock people the same that Satoshi did, and they will say, "why didn't I think if that?".

Then we will move on the naming, marketing concepts, and most important the implementation.

My skepticism is most significant on the last two items: marketing concepts and implementation. We are trying to do a major coup with marketing (referring to mass adoption by the millions, not marketing to investors) and that is not easy to do successfully. And implementation worries me most especially while I continue to suffer from a health ailment which restricts my cognitive energy and productivity. But I do go to Singapore in the 2nd week of January to get an expert diagnosis. Then I will know. And then make decisions based on that, for example as to whether if i am not capable of leading on implementation, then finding someone who can. But of course I am hoping for good news in January. And also fighting very intensely every day, e.g. running 3X a day, fasting 12 - 16 hours a day, etc..

Also the skepticism because the project is bigger than what one healthy person can do. So I have to find a way to transition it to others being more involved and resources, i.e. a larger ecosystem. Any way, I plod along on my plans...


Edit: I am not skeptical about the consensus ordering system technology I have written down already in the white paper. I understand very well the taxonomy of possible designs and I can see where mine fits into that general model. And I know its weaknesses. Nothing is perfect, but this I believe has much better qualities than both Delegated Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake. I say DPoS is much closer to my design than PoW is.

[kiklo]

Opinion of your Design
[redacted]   

Teaser from my white paper:

Proposed Improvement Overview

The key design innovations are:

1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]
3. [redacted]
   a) [redacted]
   b) [redacted]
   c) [redacted]
   d) [redacted]
4. [redacted]

This design rectifies all the major flaws of DPoS and Satoshi's proof-of-work.

----|-PoW-|-DPoS-
 #1 | #2  |  #2
 #2 | #1  |  #1
 #3 | #3a |  #3a
 #4 | #3d |  #3d
 #5 | #1  |  #4
 #6 | #3b |  _
 #7 | #3  |  _
 #8 | #3  |  _

 

[iamnotback]

Lol.

Yes of course. Nonsense to share an excerpt of a technical topic redacted. I am just a bit overexcited to see it explicitly written down concisely. Can't share because the damn implementation isn't ready.

[iamnotback]

Whether it be the key insight I found to retain decentralization in consensus ordering systems or some key design decision that will enable a platform similar to Steem(it) cross the adoption chasm, the BIG IDEAS are always simple and obvious in hindsight.

For example, the BIG IDEA of a Wiki is that it can link to pages that don't even exist yet:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/transcoded/3/31/Ward_Cunningham%2C_Inventor_of_the_Wiki.webm/Ward_Cunningham%2C_Inventor_of_the_Wiki.webm.480p.webm

Yes that is BIG innovation idea of a Wiki. Bet most of you all never thought about that or realized that. And you may not still understand after watching the above video.

In my opinion, the ability to distill to the generative essence is the generative essence of genius:

http://unheresy.com/Essence%20of%20Genius.html

[iamnotback]

I am refining the cited references section of my whitepaper, so I prefer to compose the following here and refer to it, than to dump the following all into whitepaper.

Because the genesis of my current technical+human engineering decentralization solution (which is in my whitepaper) was written by myself on Bitcointalk on Christmas 2014.

For example, the BIG IDEA of a Wiki is that it can link to pages that don't even exist yet:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/transcoded/3/31/Ward_Cunningham%2C_Inventor_of_the_Wiki.webm/Ward_Cunningham%2C_Inventor_of_the_Wiki.webm.480p.webm

Yes that is BIG innovation idea of a Wiki.

A page that is linked to but doesn't exist yet (i.e. will be displayed as empty) is one example of a flaw.

In that video, Ward Cunningham explains the “Linus law”¹ of publicly releasing the flaws as soon as possible to the most eyeballs is the optimum way to solve the most flaws. Even more saliently is this principle of release often, release flawed, open source doesn't require all the participants to be equally expert on every issue. Each person may be expert on some issues, but no one is expert at everything. The key point is that this enables us to push democracy out to the ends of the network where the voters are so we can make the network dumb and impotent so it can't impinge on us (the End-to-end principle), because we only have to make their votes adhere to the open sourced perspective of truth rather than attempt the impossible of making everyone equally astute and motivated to be diligent on all issues. Whereas, the normal mode of democracy is a power vacuum because voting is an altruistic-prime incentive on an undersupplied public good, because each individual will vote for their individual interest rather than an objectivity of the collective best interest.

Also the point that the topics and pages of a Wiki are unbounded, so that there is unbounded degrees-of-freedom on how issues are segregated, combined, and organized. Whereas, in elections for representatives, there is no possible collaborative Nash equilibrium because the politician will promise everyone everything that isn't conflicting of individual interests of the majority and use conflicts of individual interests to divide-and-conquer the votes of the opposition. Whereas, with unbounded degrees-of-freedom, everyone finds the Nash equilibrium strategy of contributing to be more productive than the strategy of conflicting. And that is the essence of how I found a way to reorient the Byzantine agreement technical challenge with a paradigm-shit. To be more concrete, even if you have the most power in the world, sabotaging (with untruths) individual pages of a decentralized Wiki won't help you if you can't limit the pages that others can add to Doxx your pages.

Unbounded doesn't mean without any cost, because costs are necessary to squelch spam. When we attempt to give away for free, that which is not free, we end up either with spam or with a power vacuum (which is the case for DPoS with its zero transaction fees and the power vacuum control over funding for witness, which is one of the flaws of DPoS I fix).

P.S. my technical solution for decentralized Byzantine agreement is not a Wiki, lol. I am referring to a Wiki as an example of an applicable analogous concept.


¹ First summarized or at least widely promulgated by Eric S. Raymond as “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow” or alternatively stated “Half amateur programmers randomly banging on the code is sufficient to find all the bugs”.