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Dorky
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April 15, 2017, 06:08:38 AM
 #281

No, my math is not incorrect.

You're math is incorrect.

My math is correct.


     
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April 15, 2017, 06:09:35 AM
 #282

You're (lack of) comprehension of the math I showed, is incorrect.

And the same can be said of yours.


     
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iamnotback
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April 15, 2017, 06:09:40 AM
 #283

No, my math is not incorrect.

You're (lack of) comprehension of the math I showed, is incorrect.

My math is correct.

Nope.

Listen idiot, don't argue with me about math.

You're (lack of) comprehension of the math I showed, is incorrect.

And the same can be said of yours.

Lol. You still suffer from Dunning-Kruger delusions.
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April 15, 2017, 06:12:39 AM
 #284

Nope.

Listen idiot, don't argue with me about math.

My comment: Only a greater idiot would argue with an idiot. Much like a shadow elite playing sand castle with a beggar.

Lol. You still suffer from Dunning-Kruger delusions.

My comment: And you are suffering from Ultimate Supreme Intelligence syndrome? Anything ultimate, supreme, or intelligent, you deserve not. No, you are suffering from basic delusion.


     
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April 15, 2017, 06:13:38 AM
 #285

*** mumbo jumbo jet ***


     
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April 15, 2017, 06:22:13 AM
 #286

However, I think whales will end up demanding a kickback from miners for their transaction fees, so that miners can jack up fees on non-whales. Whales can make this demand because they can refuse to send their transactions to miners which won't deal. Yet non-whales can't make a credible threat, because miners who generally offered lower fees would end up losing hashrate relative to those miners who didn't defect from the fee market. Thus I think you will probably see miners colluding to extract the maximum fees that gouge non-whales.

"I think" is not acceptable.
Either you know, or you don't.


     
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April 15, 2017, 06:36:28 AM
 #287

However, I think whales will end up demanding a kickback from miners for their transaction fees, so that miners can jack up fees on non-whales. Whales can make this demand because they can refuse to send their transactions to miners which won't deal. Yet non-whales can't make a credible threat, because miners who generally offered lower fees would end up losing hashrate relative to those miners who didn't defect from the fee market. Thus I think you will probably see miners colluding to extract the maximum fees that gouge non-whales.

"I think" is not acceptable.
Either you know, or you don't.

Whales will do what makes the most economics sense, i.e. that which is most profitable. Thus they will do what I wrote.

Math and economics game theory isn't something you can argue with. It is either stated correctly, or you must point out the error. There was no valid error pointed out by anyone about my logic.

I wrote "I think" as a way of saying I am open to reading anyone valid errors in my logic. So far, I have seen no such valid errors pointed out.
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April 15, 2017, 07:00:11 AM
 #288

Whales will do what makes the most economics sense, i.e. that which is most profitable. Thus they will do what I wrote.

Math and economics game theory isn't something you can argue with. It is either stated correctly, or you must point out the error. There was no valid error pointed out by anyone about my logic.

I wrote "I think" as a way of saying I am open to reading anyone valid errors in my logic. So far, I have seen no such valid errors pointed out.

The future has not yet come to prove (or disprove) anyone's logic.

To say one's logic of the future is correct as of today, is to suggest self-fulfilling prophecy.

Spiritually, that is akin to handing one's creative power to a 3rd-party that does not have one's interest at heart.


     
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April 15, 2017, 07:08:51 AM
 #289

You could just remove the reward, any one can mine new block out of the mem pool, if two blocks or tx are in common, a determinstic algorithm could be used to select between the two.

Seriously you do not understand Byzantine fault tolerance and the FLP impossibility theorem.

I dont think you understand where I want to get at. If you want to build a réputation of the forum, please do it with someone else. If you want to add to my point of view, dont just claim I dont understand.

But I wont go in the full détails of it, the detail are annecdotic and it's not even the main point of the discussion, which you dont even seem to catch.

Maybe ill work on the full détails of how it would work with this idea, but in the context it's just annecdotic to show Pow only motivation is not necessarily only consensus

But for the moment all this topic is just curiousity for me Smiley

It's not really what im into, and if you want to even go at critic it, at least pick all the elements.
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April 15, 2017, 08:06:55 AM
 #290

Whales will do what makes the most economics sense, i.e. that which is most profitable. Thus they will do what I wrote.

Math and economics game theory isn't something you can argue with. It is either stated correctly, or you must point out the error. There was no valid error pointed out by anyone about my logic.

I wrote "I think" as a way of saying I am open to reading anyone valid errors in my logic. So far, I have seen no such valid errors pointed out.

The future has not yet come to prove (or disprove) anyone's logic.

To say one's logic of the future is correct as of today, is to suggest self-fulfilling prophecy.

Spiritually, that is akin to handing one's creative power to a 3rd-party that does not have one's interest at heart.

The only way I can see that the fees won't rise egregiously on BTC on chain (with $trillionaire/$billionaire whales free riding on the rest of us) is if something can compete with Bitcoin such that the whales feel they are losing control of the blockchain (and eventually global) economy, and/or if fungible money can be removed as important from civilization.

Neither of those two caveats are likely to come true in the near-term. TPTB already have their master plan underway for collapsing the global economy in sovereign debt collapse with $quadrillions of derivatives, war, and pestilence. This will accelerate this May 2017 and even more egregiously accelerate in 2018.

Such caveats might start to become competitive with the plans of the global elite after another decade or so. In the meantime, such caveats will be nascent fledging saplings that are growing very fast, but not yet large enough to compete with TPTB.
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April 15, 2017, 08:13:07 AM
 #291

You could just remove the reward, any one can mine new block out of the mem pool, if two blocks or tx are in common, a determinstic algorithm could be used to select between the two.

I agree with you.  The error in most crypto is the reward, which gives rise to strategies that do not necessarily induce the desired properties.  I also think that the only viable kind of crypto currency is where the validation/consensus decision is taken on a voluntary basis, the "reward" being that the system in which you are invested, keeps running correctly.

However, you still need a kind of deterministic decision *that is hard to game* (because you can do "proof of work" like calculations to get the deterministic solution in your advantage).  This is why a kind of PoS signature scheme is necessary in my opinion.

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With the hash of previous block in the header including timestamp for me it's enough to prevent sybil attack. Checkpoint could be made every 100 blocks and hashed in the chain.

Checkpoints are no solution, because they are just another consensus problem.  If you have two conflicting check points, which one is the "right" one ?  You've just transposed the block consensus to the check point consensus.

Yes, you can *individually* decide that you won't allow any old modification of consensus.  But there is no guarantee that the rest of the network will follow you.

But mainly, yes, PoW is a bad idea, and rewarding (with fees or coin creation) consensus deciders/maintainers is also a bad idea.
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April 15, 2017, 08:36:56 AM
 #292



You could just remove the reward, any one can mine new block out of the mem pool, if two blocks or tx are in common, a determinstic algorithm could be used to select between the two.

I agree with you.  The error in most crypto is the reward, which gives rise to strategies that do not necessarily induce the desired properties.  I also think that the only viable kind of crypto currency is where the validation/consensus decision is taken on a voluntary basis, the "reward" being that the system in which you are invested, keeps running correctly.

However, you still need a kind of deterministic decision *that is hard to game* (because you can do "proof of work" like calculations to get the deterministic solution in your advantage).  This is why a kind of PoS signature scheme is necessary in my opinion.

Quote
With the hash of previous block in the header including timestamp for me it's enough to prevent sybil attack. Checkpoint could be made every 100 blocks and hashed in the chain.

Checkpoints are no solution, because they are just another consensus problem.  If you have two conflicting check points, which one is the "right" one ?  You've just transposed the block consensus to the check point consensus.

Yes, you can *individually* decide that you won't allow any old modification of consensus.  But there is no guarantee that the rest of the network will follow you.

But mainly, yes, PoW is a bad idea, and rewarding (with fees or coin creation) consensus deciders/maintainers is also a bad idea.


The thing is, ok it's easy to game, but then, there is nothing to win either Wink

The whole problem of sybil attack become almost nothing.

Because even let say you have a whole new blockchain of 1 millions tx, vs the local blockchain.

Either

1 All the tx are identical, and it's just about reordering them to end with the same block header, which just involved sorting them on any kind of value that can be the same for every node, could be based on the hash or something else, even only the timestamp, and that just involve recomputing the merkle root and the block header hash, period.

2 One of the blockchain contain tx that the other doesn't have, and in the end, it's same than 1, just need to insert the transaction in the good block and recomputing merkle root and block header hash.

3 One of the blockchain contain a double spent for the other, and it's only in this case that there is any kind of need for a hard consensus, either via POW or other.


For all the other cases than 3, all the nodes can already know how to get the tx and block hash in the same manner than all the other node, if an algorithm is made in sort than given a set of N tx, it always end up with the same chain of block headers, then they just have to know they are on the same set of tx, and they have naturally the same blockchain.

Looking into what they are doing with the XThin block with bloom filters and that sort of things is intersting in this regard.

I'm 100% convinced if the goal is only to get to some sort of distributed ledger that protect against double spent, there are much much less expansive / risky manner to reach consensus than the game theory of reward & mining.



It's not that the mining is a 'bad idea', but it's clearly not made in sort to be an efficient distributed ledger system. It's made to induce game theory.

When you think about it, the only thing that make reward / mining game interesting is the speculative value on the other side, because if there is no speculative value, the block reward worth nothing.

In the end there is necessarily a direct connection between the speculative value of the coin on one side, and the cost invested in the mining risk taking. The two balance each other out.

And then it need some kind of 'clock' to be connected to real time economy, and it's how you get the fixed block time emission. Like this the whole thing is 'hard pegged' to real time economy, with the predictible inflation rate etc.

Remove all this problematic of speculation from the equation, and it become much simpler as a simple open distributed ledger. And the pow become overkill if it's just to solve double spend or sybil attack.
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April 15, 2017, 09:12:12 AM
 #293

You could just remove the reward, any one can mine new block out of the mem pool, if two blocks or tx are in common, a determinstic algorithm could be used to select between the two.

Seriously you do not understand Byzantine fault tolerance and the FLP impossibility theorem.

If you want to add to my point of view, dont just claim I dont understand.

I am sorry but you don't understand. Your subsequent comments arguing with @dinofelis about checkpoints further confirms you have not studied the research I mentioned.

Please don't construct a Dunning-Kruger asshat for yourself. Just admit to yourself that you have not done the research. Its better to be honest.

If you want to build a réputation of the forum, please do it with someone else.

I hope you don't take it personally that I correct people when they are making factual errors and/or if it clear they are not knowedgeable about what they are writing about.

I expect others to do the same when I state errors. And I thank them.
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April 15, 2017, 09:28:34 AM
 #294

Sell all crypto-currency to fiat IMMEDIATELY. BTC will dive -30%. Altcoins will decline even more. SegWit and scaling has been defeated on both Bitcoin and (at least near-term) also Litecoin. Also there are macroeconomics things going on which will also hit gold and every asset except USD. Store your money in USD or altcoin USDT (dollar peg) temporarily until this dip has concluded

I posted about this the other day.  Wondering what people's opinions are on the value of cryptocurrency during geopolitical issues (ie war, financial markets crash etc).  It is an interesting subject... it seems you're of the opinion crypto will crash heavily.  That is one possibility, but it also could potentially be unaffected due to the decentralized nature and perhaps even grow as people look for alternatives to store their money in times of crisis?  Just a thought... I'm a glass half full kind of guy :-)

Either way, it's a good topic for people to get involved with as an overall market drop would be a bummer for everyone!

Crypto is not long-term affected by geopolitical noise.

The crypto market is undergoing a painful Scalepocalypse metamorphosis as n00bs come to understand their idol Satoshi was an evil motherfucking genius.

So this cognitive dissonance is causing them to rail against Bitcoin (USAF nonsense, etc), and so they will be served up some event which steals their tokens to silence them so Bitcoin can move forward without the deadweight.
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April 15, 2017, 09:40:48 AM
 #295

You could just remove the reward, any one can mine new block out of the mem pool, if two blocks or tx are in common, a determinstic algorithm could be used to select between the two.

I agree with you.  The error in most crypto is the reward, which gives rise to strategies that do not necessarily induce the desired properties.  I also think that the only viable kind of crypto currency is where the validation/consensus decision is taken on a voluntary basis, the "reward" being that the system in which you are invested, keeps running correctly.

However, you still need a kind of deterministic decision *that is hard to game* (because you can do "proof of work" like calculations to get the deterministic solution in your advantage).  This is why a kind of PoS signature scheme is necessary in my opinion.

@dinofelis, how many times do I have to repeat to you that voting is not free.

Ethereum's Casper shit is more of the same proof-of-stake (nothing-at-stake or centralization by economic weight, e.g. DPoS) nonsense. The betting stuff enables what Vitalik refers to as "dark uncles" or "dunkles", which Vitalik incorrectly thinks will solve the nothing-at-stake problem. Also Casper has the problem that all deterministic finality PoS and Byzatine agreement systems have, which is a 33% liveness threshold which if that many validators balk or stop processing, then the chain can't move forward without a hard fork.

The only way to replace PoW is with an Inverse Commons consensus protocol, which is my new invention.
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April 15, 2017, 10:07:04 AM
 #296

You could just remove the reward, any one can mine new block out of the mem pool, if two blocks or tx are in common, a determinstic algorithm could be used to select between the two.

Seriously you do not understand Byzantine fault tolerance and the FLP impossibility theorem.

If you want to add to my point of view, dont just claim I dont understand.

I am sorry but you don't understand. Your subsequent comments arguing with @dinofelis about checkpoints further confirms you have not studied the research I mentioned.

Please don't construct a Dunning-Kruger asshat for yourself. Just admit to yourself that you have not done the research. Its better to be honest.

If you want to build a réputation of the forum, please do it with someone else.

I hope you don't take it personally that I correct people when they are making factual errors and/or if it clear they are not knowedgeable about what they are writing about.

I expect others to do the same when I state errors. And I thank them.

The thing is ultimately I dont even care about this lol

Im into doing application for blockchain, and with the script thing im doing ill be able to kick start test net with experiment like this to see if they fly or not.

The only thing im concerned with in short term about coins is that they can keep windows of 10-30 min of non extreme volatility, the rest ultimately I can do with it Smiley

Im more concerned about the currency side rather than the consensus / speculation / pow aspect, and for distributed application data data, the problematic is much simpler than this.

So ultimately for me it's just curiousity, and if I have time maybe ill do test with a blockchain like this without block reward, and using other way to solve double spent and resolve sybils "non attack" ( merging of the tx ).

And all together your comment also show that you dont see my perpective, and why the thing you point doesnt matter, and what I meant with checkpoint is that you would only need real pow consencus on this checkpoint to "harden" The chain if you want to enforce a particular order on the tx/block, but that would just be about one packet saying this block height is this block hash, and having a pow once in a while on this checkpoint instead of every block.

But even this is not even my main concern for the moment, and I wont speak more about it because anyway I know it's not complete at this point, and if I want to put time in making a blockchain like this and resolving all the issues, ill do it easily with the script.

And other than this for the moment I dont need this to be error free, and you dont seem to really read or understand my own thinking before to cherry pick a sentence out of context and making some kind of strawman arguments out of it, to counter some implication I didn't make to begin with.

In the same time it's also my bad because I dont do welling constructed posts to explain my thinking clearly, but to really do this i would need to really dig some math, layout some equation, and restating a whole lot of things on blockchain seen mostly as distributed ledger, rather than speculative coins or ideal currency.

And I dont have time for this and it's not my focus for the moment Smiley

I have put my father on it lmao he is retired so he has time and he is super good in math and economics lol

I showed him the pdf you sent me, he said it's the old notation and there are much better math to do this now, and the heart of the pb with modern math is simple. It's from 1929  Shocked he said there are much better book for this sort of stuff now Smiley

Then I talked to him about Nash and this stuff , he looked interested, and said he would look into it lol

But other than this, other than getting in the math myself which I dont have the time for, and I dont see the interest for me for the moment, I dont see how to reach conclusion about the whole math model that can be behind bitcoin.

And again im mostly interested in the currency aspect from app side, I dont specially plan on holding lot of coin to sit on them waiting that they Hatch with the invisible hand Cheesy

So all this side is most irrelevant for me, and for the part it matter for running a coin with value today I would stick to already well tested protocols Wink

The rest would be for pet toy or distributed application data, which is different logic all together.

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April 15, 2017, 10:15:44 AM
 #297

Re: How do you stop someone forcing you to hand over your private key and taking all

If they know for sure that you have a lot of Bitcoins and are willing to torture you to get them, you are pretty much screwed.

This kind of thing happens to bank managers/rich people where they are forced to withdraw money from banks etc, it's called tiger kidnapping.

If you're worried about something like this happening. Step up your personal security. Get a gun etc.

The government has more guns than you do...

no, you will not be tortured if you own BTC

Will you guarantee that no one will be imprisoned/tortured for "financial crimes"1 if they fail to comply with government orders to turn over their private keys?

I want you to make an asshat for yourself so we can enshrine your post later when it is proven that you were incorrect.

1 Read more about this here.

I am like so Lolz when I read the below and remember how I (as @AnonyMint) was telling everyone that Tor was compromised back in 2013 and everyone thought I was a kook.

Re: Trezor security

Regarding the privacy I believe that unless there is a way to detach/decouple the physical world with the cripto world there is no way to protect you against being tracked on block chain.
in the end of the day if you spend your bitcoin you connect yourself with somebody else. Tumblers/Mixers do not help. TOR has been hacked by the NSA so what for.
There are ATMs but as long as I can see they have all sort of tracking for your real Identity (even finger tips) which in my opinion is completely insane.
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April 15, 2017, 10:26:19 AM
 #298

And all together your comment also show that you dont see my perpective, and why the thing you point doesnt matter, and what I meant with checkpoint is that you would only need real pow consencus on this checkpoint to "harden" The chain if you want to enforce a particular order on the tx/block, but that would just be about one packet saying this block height is this block hash, and having a pow once in a while on this checkpoint instead of every block.

I invented that already in collaboration with @jl777 for Komodo in 2016. It is named dPoW (delayed proof-of-work).

CounterParty does something somewhat analogous as well.

And really it isn't a secure and sound solution, but more of a gimick. Because the local consensus still have to decide what to submit for checkpoints because the PoW system isn't validating every thing and can't resolve conflicting double-spending orderings that occurred between checkpoints.
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April 15, 2017, 12:43:16 PM
 #299

I understand @dinofelis wasn't able to assimilate this information, so I think by putting it all organized concisely in one post will help him and readers to understand. And hopefully he will stop lying.

I don't lie, and I'm only here to acquire rational arguments of which I can learn.  I will try to limit my comments to purely technical and rational comments, because as you really need Satoshi to be an evil genius in order for your work to have sufficient sensible meaning, I know that I have no way to convince you of anything else, nor do I have any incentive to do so (apart from the fact that it is going to perturb, of course, the logic of your arguments).

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@dinofelis claims that since it is known that the true security of Bitcoins 256-bit ECDSA (elliptic curve digital signature algorithm, i.e. a form of ECC aka elliptic curve cryptography) is only 128-bits, then if we hash the ECDSA public key, then we only need a 128-bit hash. Thus he claims that Satoshi was wasteful and not genius. Although Satoshi's long-term priorities were not prioritized on not consuming too much block size given 1 MB was deemed more than sufficient for Bitcoin's planned future as block chain for the $billionaires only, Satoshi did minimize the length of the hash function by choosing 160-bit RIPE160 instead of SHA256 for the final hash of Bitcoin addresses (as they appear on the blockchain, but note that publicly distributed addresses also have a checksum for eliminating user typos but afaik this checksum is or could be discarded from what is stored on the blockchain). He did this minimization because it is good design sense, it is sufficient security and collision resistance, it provides an extra layer of protection against any unknown cryptanalysis interaction between SHA256 (or RIPE160) alone and ECDSA, and it helps to market the product to the n00bs as scalable (even though Satoshi was deception in this regard) in Bitcoin's nascent stage. Also SHA256 before RIPE160 provides an extra layer of protection against any unknown cryptanalysis breakage on collisions for RIPE160 alone. For example, SHA256 has a Merkle-Damgard length extension weakness when not doubled with itself or another hash, which tangentially btw would provide someone with a strong hint as to where to look for inventing the AsicBoost to make SHA256 mining 30% more efficient.

All this falls apart of course, because there are contradictory elements.  This is what I wanted to outline.  I'm not saying that bitcoin's crypto design is erroneous in the sense of disfunctional.  It is simply incoherently designed.  It is like removing two of the four screws that hold the bicycle bell to win some weight, and adding a wheel made of lead or something.
You are perfectly right that hashing the public key protects the signature scheme in the case that the ECDS scheme becomes broken.  The problem is that at a certain point, you will need to expose that broken system.  Now, the question is: HOW broken will it be, and can the broken system still resist for the functionality that is needed ?

This is why in crypto, you never "protect a broken system", because it implies that 1) you didn't need that broken system in which case, there's no reason to use it or 2) you need it, and as it is broken, this is where your overall design will fail.  And this is exactly what I was pointing out: if ECC is considered broken (partially or totally), then no matter how well we protect it with superior hash protection, when we are going to have to use that broken ECC, our crypto system breaks down.  Now, maybe it is still "surviving long enough ?"  is it ?

This is where we come to the "time scales of resistance" of both systems.  The address, on chain, will need to survive for centuries.  The signature will need to survive AT LEAST 10 minutes, and most probably of the order of days.  The ratio between both is about 12 bits of security.  Not more.  So anything that has *SUFFICIENT* security at the 128 bit level (ECC), will have enough security at the 140 bits level long term.  Or, vice versa, if you NEED 160 bits security in the long term, you NEED at least 148 bits security in the short term, and 128 bits is TOO SMALL.  But given, on top of that, moreover that the chances are higher that ECC will be broken SOMEWHAT before hash functions get broken, you would need somewhat more, vastly more, or infinitely more security for the ECC (so more than 148 bits).

In other words, if you could crack the 160 bit address in a century, then you can crack the signature in less than a second (classically).

You cannot deny this, it is simple math.

==> again, my obvious conclusion is that the address is overprotected, or the signature scheme is very very vulnerable.

But bitcoin's design is even worse.   Bitcoin's design allows you to re-use addresses in several UTXO. This re-use not only makes for a mess in indicating WHICH output you mean when you specify an address, it also renders the above protection scheme totally moot.  Why ?  Because if you spend ONE of the UTXO with a given address A, you have exposed the public key of that address LONG TERM for all the other UTXO that have the same address.  So by allowing the re-use of addresses, bitcoin's design totally destroyed, IN ANY CASE, the "protection by the hash function long term" of the public key.

On top of that, it is true that a single use of a hash protocol in a Merkle-Damgard construction is open to the extension attack, and that a good idea is to do a double hash IF YOU USE THE MERKLE-DAMGARD construction, that is, if you need to hash more than 512 bits.  However, in this particular case, this is ridiculous, because the key doesn't NEED the Merkel Damgard construction, given that SHA-256 takes data blocks of 512 bits, so the whole key fits in a single SHA-256 primitive.  As such, the double hash utilisation is again to protect against a non-existent threat.

Now, the succession of a SHA-256 hash, and a RIPEM160 hash, can be funny, but don't serve any purpose.  You could just take the first 160 bits of the SHA-256 hash ; if you think that SHA-256 is broken, first of all, it doesn't matter much, because with address re-usage, the hash only "protects" the supposedly not broken ECC public key only for the first address that is going to be used, so the importance of this hash is not so large ; but on top of that, one can always reduce a hash length by just taking the first n bits of a hash.  Transforming a 256 bit hash in a 160, 128 or whatever hash is easy: take only the n first bits.

The super-over-protected public key by a double SHA-256 and a RIPEM-160 hash, is given out when the first appearance of an address is signed.

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Yet @dinofelis is incorrect to claim that 128-bits would have been sufficient for the hash function, because of at least two reasons:

Reducing 160-bits by 16 bits only saves 10%, and for that miniscule size reduction you are not factoring the exponential loss in randomized collision resistance.

Then, reducing from 256 bits which was possible, to 160 bits, sounds even sillier, doesn't it ?

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Insufficient collision resistance of 128-bits. Even if we assume that all attacks on collision resistance of SHA128 are intractable, even the equation for random chance says that if we generation more than a trillion addresses then we have a near certainty of production one random collision.

==> this looks like a smart and correct argument, but it isn't, for several reasons.

The first reason is that the security level is the security level of a single address.  If there are many addresses, of course the probability to break one of them diminishes proportionally to their number, but that doesn't change the individual security level of an address.  In other words, if your probability to die in a car accident is 1/10000, then that is not influenced by how many people run that risk.  If there are 1 million people, then there will be 100 death due to car accidents, but your individual security level to die of a car accident, remains 1/10000.

So the fact that there are trillions of addresses, and that there is hence a trillion times higher probability to find ONE of those addresses than if there were only one, doesn't alter the security of a single address to be found.

Another way of saying this, is to say that the security of using, say, AES-256, isn't diminished because MANY PEOPLE use AES-256, and hence, that the chance to find ONE of the secret keys of ANY ONE of the users of AES-256, is increased, and hence, the security is diminished. 

--> the security level of an individual address is not influenced by the fact that there are many addresses, and hence, that the probability to find one is increased.

But let us assume that Satoshi wanted an OVERALL security level of 128 bits, and not just the single address security. What does it mean, to have a security level of 128 bits ?  It means that it takes 2^128 trials to find it.  Now, suppose that there are N possible addresses on the block chain (trillions = 42 bits, say).  What is the probability to find ONE of them ?  That is, an attacker wants to find AN address, no matter which one, on the block chain.

It is simply one in 2^160 / N = 2^160 / 2^42 = 2^118.  That is still a very small probability !  The "near certainty" is essentially a very rare happening !    In the case of original 2^128 hash bits, it would lead to one out of 2^86.

To what kind of security risk does this correspond ?  It corresponds to an attacker wanting to find JUST AN ADDRESS on the chain.

==> note, however, that the 128 bit level security is not reached with "trillions of addresses" on the chain, with a 160 bit hash.  He would at least need a 170 bit hash if that were the case.

But is that all ?  The confusion is here between collision resistance of a hash (bits / 2) and the probability of finding one of the hashes in a GIVEN SET.    When you have a 160 bit hash, you need on average about 2^80 hashes to have a reasonable probability that two of them are equal (birthday paradox).  However, if you have a 160 bit hash, and you HAVE 2^42 hashes given, then the probability that a next one will be equal to one of them is only 1/2^118.  That said, the probability that ANY two of them in the set are equal, is rather 1/2^76, which is still very small.  In the case of 128 bits, this will bring us down to 1/2^44.

To what kind of security risk does this correspond ?  It corresponds to ALL users being attackers, and trying to find a collision with a previously existing address.  Then ALL of them need to try about 2^76 addresses in the 160 bit hash case, and 2^44 addresses in the 128 bit case, in order for ONE OF THEM to succeed in finding ONE other address.

If we consider this a security risk, then we see that 160 bits is BY FAR not good enough.

==> so in as much as this "overall security level" was required to be 128 bits, the 160 bit hash is WAY WAY TOO SMALL.

In fact, if you want a non-collision probability of 1/2^128 for "trillions of hashes", then you need to add 2^(42 x 2) = 2^(84).

You'd need a hash length of 128 + 84 = 206 bits !

Note that in no way, even with a 128 bit hash, there is "almost certainty" that a collision occurs.  The probability is still of the order of picking the right molecule in a glass of water of this happening without being an "attack".  So the chance that 128 bit address hashes are going to screw up the block chain because of address collision with almost certainty, is wrong.  It remains a very tiny probability.

==> in any case, 160 bits doesn't make sense.  If we look at the security of individual addresses, this is not influenced by the amount of other addresses in the chain (and this is the true "security level" concept).  Then 160 bits is too large.

If we consider an attacker wanting to find a single collision with just any address, the security level should be higher than 170 bits.  And if we want to require a probability of non-collision less than 1/2^128, the hash length should be 206 bits.

Note that this problem goes away if we publish directly the full 256 bit public key (which, with address re-usage, is in any case published when the first appearance of address is spend).

If we have trillions of 256 bit public keys, the collision probability within a set of trillions of keys, is less than 1/2^172.

Note that all this is when we erroneously consider "overall" security levels, and not individual address security levels.  The overall security of bitcoin is however, way, way smaller than this.  In fact, you can render unspendable an address by simply reversing the transaction that had this address as an output, by redoing the block chain from that point on.

The acctual PoW security of the entire block chain, and hence of every single address, is much, much, much smaller than any of these numbers in any case.  So all this is theory in any case.

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Satohi was prescient in his prudence because since Bitcoin's launch in 2009, a collision attack against SHA128 has been discovered which reduces the collision security to 60-bits which is approaching the realm of tractability.

Collision attacks are of no importance in bitcoin.  It is pre-image attacks that are of importance.  Being able to generate two well-designed inputs that hash to the same hash doesn't help anything.  You need to find a hash that is in a GIVEN TABLE (the existing addresses).  That's pre-image, not collision. 

Moreover, the "protection" of the public key is silly, if bitcoin addresses can occur in several outputs: once the first one is spend, the public key, so well protected by a hash, is published !

It is also this address re-usage that obliges one to specify the transaction, to know WHICH of the different UTXO with the same address, one is meaning.  If address reusage was prohibited, there could only be one single UTXO with a given address, and that would be unique: no more transaction hashes, positions within a transaction and so further ; including the transaction malleability problem.

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Additionally since the attacker can control the message being signed

this has no influence on the public key itself, or its hash, it only influences the signature.

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@dinofelis claims that quantum computing resistance with the hash is futile because if the ECDSA is broken via Shor's algorithm, because he claims the attacker can crack the transaction signature and double-spend it when it is published before the bonafide signature becomes final in the blockchain. I already refuted this argument based on two reasons.

If you argue that it doesn't matter if we have the hashes when ECC is broken by quantum computing, because the transactions can be intercepted and cracked by the attacker before they are confirmed in the network, you would not be thinking clearly. Because quantum computing would at its inception (nascent stages) likely be only able to break long-term security but not short-term. So there would be a period to transition as I already stated in the above quote from my prior post.

That's a faulty rebuttal.  A full quantum computer (that is, a general purpose quantum computer with sufficient qubits) cracks an ECC IMMEDIATELY (only a few 1000 clock pulses needed).  My "not thinking clearly" is rebutted with a "not so very clear argument that has no ground".   

Any partial quantum computer is equivalent to a seriously sped up classical machine.  My point was that if you can crack a 160 bit security level in 50 years, you can crack a 128 bit security level in 0.3 seconds with the same machine.  Your rebuttal doesn't address this.  In any case, if you NEED 160 bits of security to be centuries-safe, then a 128 bit security level is cracked in a matter of seconds, classically.  Quantum is even worse, because even though quantum computers still face a 2^80 bits security level for the hash, the ECC is TOTALLY GONE.  In a blink of an eye, a quantum computer solves your ECC problem, no matter its initial security level, if the quantum computer has enough qubits.

But I already said that.  I hope you see that your "rebuttal" is totally empty of arguments.

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But you're analogy does not apply, because Shor's algorithm (a form of cryptanalysis) is already known! It is not a future unknown.

Also (and this is a minor point which isn't really necessary for my slamdunk) you are conflating the breakage of discrete logarithm math theoretic security with the security of permutation algorithms of hash functions. I repeat the distinction between the two which you have failed to assimilate:

You are arguing against your own position !  My claim is that if Satoshi feared that ECC was going to be broken, there's no reason to use it and try to protect it, because if that happens, the moment you USE the ECC part of the system, your system breaks down.  And now you argue in the same sense, that the hash protects the broken ECC, because we know already how to break it if ever we can build a quantum computer.  Yes.  I agree, and that's exactly what it was a bad design !  And why you don't protect systems of which you think they are broken.

I'm not going to explain this another time.

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--> if we assume that ECC will be broken one day, bitcoin's crypto scheme is IN ANY CASE not usable.

Not only are you failing to assimilate the fact that Shor's breakage is already known (not a future thing not knowable as you are arguing) which is sufficient slamdunk on why you are incorrect, but you are also claiming that hash functions can typically be entirely broken in one swoop which afaik not the case (and I studied the cryptanalysis history on past SHA submissions from round 1 to final rounds).

You are totally missing my argument, by making your point worse.  Shor's algorithm is known, but the computer on which it can run is not known.  The whole question is whether one day one will be able to make such a machine. The day that we have that computer, an ECC signature doesn't survive 100 milliseconds.  So your hash protected public key is worthless.  That's my point.  You can't do bloody shit with your protected address, because the day that you want to sign a transaction, one can IMMEDIATELY fake another one.

And again, the inconsistency is to allow multiple usage of the same address.  Once THE address key is given out to spend one single UTXO, all other UTXO with the same address are entirely compromised if this hash protection was needed.

This address re-use is also what makes a lot of other things difficult, like having to refer to a transaction as a whole, needing transaction hashes and so on.

I repeat:

1) If the hash was to protect the ECC, have collision resistance etc....
then
1a) this was silly, don't protect a broken system
1b) if you insist, use maximal protection, that is, a 256 bit hash of the key (maximal key entropy preserved).
1c) don't allow, OBVIOUSLY, address re-usage, which makes the protection of the public key entirely moot.

2) if the hash was to reduce block chain bloat, then, there are 2 possibilities:

A: hash the public key to 128 bits, to win room
B: publish the public key directly (and avoid all collision discussions)

but also:

2b) don't allow address re-usage. As such, the signature will reveal the public key, which indicates directly the single UTXO which corresponds --> no need for a silly 256 bit transaction hash, with 32 extra bits of transaction output number: there's only one corresponding UTXO possible.
2c) don't publish a second time the public key, it can be derived from the signature !

These two actions reduce the transaction block chain room by two.

Hashing to 160 bits "to win room on the chain" (and not hashing to 256 bits, and hence loosing out on collision security, if this is an argument), but using transaction hashes of 256 bits, and publishing the public key which is not needed (it can be derived from the signature if some precaution is taken), is totally contradictory.  Claiming that a 160 bit hash is needed to counter whatever attack on the public key, but allowing address re usage and hence exposing all those second and third.... UTXO with the same address, is incoherent.
alkan
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April 15, 2017, 01:26:50 PM
 #300

I agree with you.  The error in most crypto is the reward, which gives rise to strategies that do not necessarily induce the desired properties.  I also think that the only viable kind of crypto currency is where the validation/consensus decision is taken on a voluntary basis, the "reward" being that the system in which you are invested, keeps running correctly.

However, you still need a kind of deterministic decision *that is hard to game* (because you can do "proof of work" like calculations to get the deterministic solution in your advantage).  This is why a kind of PoS signature scheme is necessary in my opinion.

One alternative incentive scheme might look like this:

- Nodes have to do certain tasks in order to stay alive. In my Proof-of-Membership proposal for example, minting accounts are required to make "heartbeat" transactions every now and then, otherwise the accounts are downgraded and lose their priviledge (interest rate that is paid with every block built by anyone).

- Now, running a node the whole time (or turning it on regularly) will be tedious to most end-users. That's why you can offer them as a block reward the the temporary or permament exemption from their obligation do make heartbeats.

Such a reward mechanism there's no incentive to own multiple accounts as users are trying to get emancipated from hearbeating as soon as possible.
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