Miners do not have veto power, they vote on protocol changes with their processing power in accordance with bitcoin white paper.
So you don't think what large miners groups are doing with Segwit actually is a kind of veto power? There is the option of an UASF to "overrule" that veto, but it's not a trivial thing, because if miners stay stubborn this would provoke a contentious hard fork.
It is up to the developers to propose and implement changes that the overwhelming majority of miners will accept. The fact that the developers have gone ahead for years spending money and time on a solution that the miners do not want does not give them credibility.
That's in line with what I wrote actually. Developer groups (be they called "Core" or others) have only the power to influence miners and economic nodes to use their implementation, no formal power granted by Bitcoin's protocol.
The point is that if you don't want a power equilibrium of this kind (devs-miners-economic nodes) then you shouldn't use proof of work for your coin. In Proof of Stake, for example, the power structure is simpler, as validators and economically important nodes are the same people. That can make the development of the currency software more straight-forward, but even there could be stalemates if the largest stakeholders become too powerful and have the intention to conserve status quo.
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