The Barry Silbert segwit2x agreement with >80% miner support.

[mindrust]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjZk7N7RXfA

"Miners' work only has value if users value it."

It is coming. I suggest you Bitmain's paid shills to accept the reality. UASF is far more superior to Cartel's HF agreement because they have no base. They are only miners. They are not special snowflakes. Users make bitcoin valuable not miners.

UASF > Cartel HF

I think most real users want bigger blocks and the benefits that come with it (lower fees, faster confirmations).

UASF support is fake/astroturfing.

But maybe there will be a network split if some miners insist on it.

Segwit comes with a bigger block size but since you are a paid shill of Jihad BU, you won't mention it.  

Anything, but anything comes out of your mouth is a lie. You and your kind is being paid by JPM in order to destroy bitcoin.

[1714010952]

1714010952

[1714010952]

1714010952

[ComputerGenie]

Segwit comes with a bigger block size...

Yeah, no.
If you have 1 pound of crap in a box, 1/4 of which is dry, and say "I'm only going to weigh how much crap is dry and put it back in the box", you still have 1 pound of crap in a box (even if you pretend to take away that 1/4 pound).
Segwit gives the illusion of "bigger block size" by redefining what "size" is, not by actually adding size. At some point, one would hope you'd stop being a Core fanboy long enough to at least understand what you're a fanboy of. 

[CoinCube]

What I really don´t get.

Shouldn't avoiding a chain split be the absolute top priority?

I cannot really see a scenario where both coins combined (after a split) will be worth the same as the single coin before.

So users and miners should do everything to avoid that.

Yes this is not only true but utterly obvious.
However, we are dealing with human nature here.

We are currently at the chest beating stage of the consensus process (see link below for details)

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=EAkxix31aJI

[CoinCube]

Thanks. As I said earlier I've already predicted what I believe will be the outcome, it's just how we're going to get there that's left to determine.

The halfway point is core agreeing to their current segwit implementation AND a 2MB base blocksize hard fork that they implement - it's my gut feeling that's what we'll end up with but there needs to be a lot of rhetoric, chest thumping and circle jerking in the interim.

-ck as one of the few grounded people involved in this dispute I select you as my representative to the to the rarified circle of pool operators and developers.

You have my support in whatever measures are needed to move us to a halfway point we can build consensus around.

Thank you for your efforts.

[jbreher]

They are only miners. They are not special snowflakes. Users make bitcoin valuable not miners.

pot. kettle. black.

slush. groppel. snowflake.

[jonald_fyookball]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjZk7N7RXfA

"Miners' work only has value if users value it."

It is coming. I suggest you Bitmain's paid shills to accept the reality. UASF is far more superior to Cartel's HF agreement because they have no base. They are only miners. They are not special snowflakes. Users make bitcoin valuable not miners.

UASF > Cartel HF

I think most real users want bigger blocks and the benefits that come with it (lower fees, faster confirmations).

UASF support is fake/astroturfing.

But maybe there will be a network split if some miners insist on it.

Segwit comes with a bigger block size but since you are a paid shill of Jihad BU, you won't mention it.  

Anything, but anything comes out of your mouth is a lie. You and your kind is being paid by JPM in order to destroy bitcoin.

unfortunately no one is paying me for my efforts.  but if you check my post history i was calling for bigger blocks for years.  long before Mr Jihan was a public figure.

[25hashcoin]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjZk7N7RXfA

"Miners' work only has value if users value it."

It is coming. I suggest you Bitmain's paid shills to accept the reality. UASF is far more superior to Cartel's HF agreement because they have no base. They are only miners. They are not special snowflakes. Users make bitcoin valuable not miners.

UASF > Cartel HF

I think most real users want bigger blocks and the benefits that come with it (lower fees, faster confirmations).

UASF support is fake/astroturfing.

But maybe there will be a network split if some miners insist on it.

Segwit comes with a bigger block size

You Lukejr kool-aid drinkers really don't know how stupid you literally sound when you spew this Corestream propaganda. We appreciate the warning, however, so we know when not to engage with people who have no idea what they're saying.

[Creepings]

They are only miners. They are not special snowflakes. Users make bitcoin valuable not miners.

pot. kettle. black.

slush. groppel. snowflake.

" They are only miners"? then you're into UASF? We all know miners are so important, except you. If they are not important why do they still need to confirm our transactions, with that one proof, miners is really important.

[ComputerGenie]

" They are only miners"? then you're into UASF? We all know miners are so important, except you. If they are not important why do they still need to confirm our transactions, with that one proof, miners is really important.

With the new, ASIC-free, non-Bitcoin altcoin that they're wanting to turn Bitcoin into, wallets would go back to being "miners" (i.e, low diff and gen=1 in config). It's kinda sad that they don't even know that what they "don't want" is actually exactly what they want. 

[-ck]

Segwit comes with a bigger block size...

Yeah, no.
If you have 1 pound of crap in a box, 1/4 of which is dry, and say "I'm only going to weigh how much crap is dry and put it back in the box", you still have 1 pound of crap in a box (even if you pretend to take away that 1/4 pound).
Segwit gives the illusion of "bigger block size" by redefining what "size" is, not by actually adding size. At some point, one would hope you'd stop being a Core fanboy long enough to at least understand what you're a fanboy of.  

Why must you debate semantics in a biased manner? Yes the core block size doesn't change, but with segwit it will fit up to 4x as many segwit transactions as we can currently fit legacy transactions. Pedantry over defining block size and papering over that fact at the same time is hypocritical. Be pedantic but be consistent.

This endless debate over definitions is a complete waste of time and has been done to death on every other thread already and I'm not interested in yet another fucking discussion regarding why everyone's side is better than everyone else's. Can we stick to the miner agreement for this thread at least and how the fuck we'll come to an agreement? I want to see no fork and both sides mildly satisfied and mildly dissatisfied at the same time if that's what it takes, provided we end up with one good bitcoin blockchain only.

As for the UASF graph showing over 40% support that seemed to be an anomaly and it's back around 11% so it remains unconvincing for now.

[ComputerGenie]

Why must you debate semantics in a biased manner? Yes the core block size doesn't change, but with segwit it will fit up to 4x as many segwit transactions...

Because, sadly, semantics matter (especially when it comes to dispelling myths. I don't deny that segwit would produce more transactions per block; however, when the sticking point is more and bigger, what constitutes "bigger" maters. Without that distinction, I fear it becomes sewit, 1 MB continued, and a year or two from now we go through this all over again (except with the claims that "we gave you 'bigger' blocks already" from one side and "see, segwit didn't help anything" from the other). There's no reason that a broad compromise can't lead to a new starting point, rather than something that will put us right where we are now.

But, what do I know, I'm still stuck on trying to explain the difference between a client and a protocol to people (just as I did back in the MSNChat/IRCX days).  

[-ck]

Why must you debate semantics in a biased manner? Yes the core block size doesn't change, but with segwit it will fit up to 4x as many segwit transactions...

Because, sadly, semantics matter (especially when it comes to dispelling myths. I don't deny that segwit would produce more transactions per block; however, when the sticking point is more and bigger, what constitutes "bigger" maters. Without that distinction, I fear it becomes sewit, 1 MB continued, and a year or two from now we go through this all over again (except with the claims that "we gave you 'bigger' blocks already" from one side and "see, segwit didn't help anything" from the other). There's no reason that a broad compromise can't lead to a new starting point, rather than something that will put us right where we are now.

For what it's worth, I quite like the combo of 2MB base size and segwit, just not the miners' agreement's alleged planned execution of it. It still only smells of a bargaining tool to me and hopefully that's all it will end up being (see chest thumping.)

[Wind_FURY]

That did not really answer the question. I was asking if Core 0.13.1 would have been good as a general "upgrade" rather than a scaling solution.

My bad, even though I quoted it, I think misread it as "would it still have been". I think not only was it marketed wrong, the idea was wrong, and a lot of the resentment comes from the fact that segwit is forced on people (even if you don't want it, you're stuck with it if you want to use a version of Core that's more efficient than the older versions and contains bug-fixes). If you want Core, your only 2 options are something that Core knows is shit or forced segwit.

But was it not always the situation since the past releases? What has changed now and why is there a portion of the community afraid to get Segwit activated?

I ask you personally, without the politics, just the technicals. Do you think Core 0.13.1 is a good version of Bitcoin?

[dinofelis]

But, what do I know, I'm still stuck on trying to explain the difference between a client and a protocol to people (just as I did back in the MSNChat/IRCX days).  

This is an extremely important observation.  The difficulty resides in the fact that if there is a de facto software monopolist, his software (his client) is at the same time the protocol definition.  What we are observing, is that this monopolist is losing its ability to dictate the protocol and its changes.  The protocol being confused with the software written by one entity, and hence, entirely centralized, is becoming detached from it, and hence, is slowly gaining some form of decentralisation.   Not quite yet, because for the moment, there seems to still be only one *trusted* piece of software out there, but the deciders in bitcoin (the mining pools) seem to have decided not to follow blindly the implicit protocol changes any more that the software monopolist is shoving them up with.

I like to compare bitcoin to a parliamentary monarchy, where the King is the only entity able to propose and modify laws (the software monopolist is the only one able to propose modifications to the protocol, by including it in a new version of the software) and the parliament (the mining pools) can vote over it (by adopting them or not: that is: by signalling for it, if the King has foreseen this, or by upgrading/not upgrading if the King didn't leave an option in the new version).

Decentralized, not at all.  You can hardly think of something more centralized than this.  That said, it worked well, because the King was "good".  Nothing works better than a monarchy where the King is an enlightened being with good intentions.

The troubles we are seeing, is that this entirely centralized monarchy is losing its grip and decentralisation is slowly gaining field, and the King doesn't know any more how to restore his absolute power.

If the system is truly decentralized, the protocol should become entirely immutable.

[CoinCube]

If the system is truly decentralized, the protocol should become entirely immutable.

I disagree with this last point. A truly decentralized system is not entirely immutable to change it is just immutable to controversial and contentious change. It becomes immutable to change without true and honest consensus.

To argue for immutability is to argue that it is impossible to achieve consensus at all in a decentralized system. I see no basis to make this claim.

Consensus is achievable in a decentralized system if the interest of all participants broadly align in favor of change or more abstractly if the organizing principles of the participants are harmonious.

[dinofelis]

If the system is truly decentralized, the protocol should become entirely immutable.

I disagree with this last point. A truly decentralized system is not entirely immutable to change it is just immutable to controversial and contentious change. It becomes immutable to change without true and honest consensus.

To argue for immutability is to argue that it is impossible to achieve consensus at all in a decentralized system. I see no basis to make this claim.

That's not the argument.  The argument is as follows.  Once upon a time, there was a centralized system that had a certain protocol to which all new incoming entities participating in it had to agree because if they didn't, the system would reject their disagreement.  Every system starts out as a centralized system, because one entity proposes it.  If that system becomes decentralized, that means, if there is no central authority any more that decides and is the unique entity proposing collective changes, then the participating entities are STILL adhering to the protocol they used up to then.  Now, I take decentralization as the fact that entities don't collude, but take their decisions individually and that no central entity has authority/power over any large set of entities.  In other words, I take a decentralized system as one where game theory is valid and entities behave as "free participants" that only decide for themselves, and are not bound by "collective agreements" ; however, they undergo also the consequences of their own strategies.  If such a system falls into a Nash equilibrium, then it can normally not leave it.
A Nash equilibrium is defined as a set of entities of which each entity applies an individual strategy, and is such, that for any given entity, if that entity is the ONLY one deviating from the Nash equilibrium strategy, the outcome for said entity is worse than if it kept to its equilibrium strategy.

Well, "keeping to the existing protocol" for all entities in a decentralized crypto like bitcoin, is a Nash equilibrium. If all the others keep to that strategy, and one single entity deviates from it, then this single entity will be in a worse position, no matter what it will pick as a deviating strategy, than if its strategy were "following the existing protocol".

Of course, there are MANY Nash equilibria.  There are as many Nash equilibria as there are thinkable protocols ! But ONCE you are in ONE Nash equilibrium the system cannot leave it.  It is only if there is a concerted effort that makes MANY entities decide TOGETHER to jump to another equilibrium, that this new equilibrium becomes the active Nash equilibrium ; however, BY DEFINITION, "a large part of all entities colluding" is exactly what is the end of decentralization, which, by hypothesis, means that entities don't collude.

So, a decentralized system (one in which entities don't collude and have no central leadership) where game theory is hence applicable, that finds itself in a Nash equilibrium, will remain in that Nash equilibrium for ever.  The Nash equilibrium being the protocol, it means that the protocol will remain the same for ever, hence is immutable.

QED.

Note that in bitcoin speak, Nash equilibrium is called consensus and defines implicitly a block chain protocol.

The only initiative a single entity can make, is to hard fork.  This kills potentially the Nash equilibrium if the hard fork is successful and has other entities joining it ; it remains the original Nash equilibrium if nobody follows and the fork dies: the forking entity made a wrong decision and lost, proving the Nash equilibrium of the original protocol.  If the fork is successful, the Nash equilibrium is gone, until a new one settles: one with the new chain, one with the old chain, or one with both, becoming distinct "ecosystems".

The only way the protocol can change, is through centralization (software monopoly, cartel formation of miners. ....) with central authority deciding and no alternative.  This was the state of bitcoin until recently, and maybe still somewhat, with Core the software monopolist and hence the central authority deciding with no alternative.

[dinofelis]

Follow-up on the game theory aspect of changing protocol:

Core had set up a very, very smart game-theoretical way of modifying the protocol that gave the impression that it was happening in a decentralized way: the signalling system.   Indeed, this seemed to solve the problem of individual entities needing to leave a Nash equilibrium for another one, which is game-theoretically impossible.  So how did Core defeat game theory (at first sight) ?

Well, the difficulty to leave a Nash equilibrium is that as individual entity, "changing strategy on your own" is a losing proposition (as by definition of Nash equilibrium).  However, "changing together with the others" can be a winning proposition, but that supposes collusion which is absent in a decentralized system (by definition).   In other words, every single entity needs to be SURE that a lot of other entities are going to switch to the new equilibrium in order for him to do this also, which is normally a catch-22 in a decentralized system ; moreover, this switch has to be simultaneous.  This is where the "signalling" comes in: signalling is not a change in strategy (you can stay in the current equilibrium) but you can express your "engagement" to switch at a given moment in the future.  If a very large majority engages itself into switching, then at that date, one can presume that the new equilibrium will be the one the system is in, and "remaining in the old equilibrium" is then the deviant position.

However, the caveat in this thing is that you need an *engagement* not just a *signal*.  Because at the given moment, you STILL don't know if the other entities will actually do what they signalled.  You might signal for something to trick some others in changing position, so that their loss is your gain.  But this is where Core's monopoly comes in: their software is such that the signal also triggers the switch, and most people are USING their software, so they have no choice but to switch.

==>  the signalling + engagement comes from the central authority of the software monopolist.  Other software might just as well signal but not switch.

Moreover, changing something can always be done in different ways, according to different variations of the protocol: if different competing propositions are out there, none will signal an overwhelming majority, and even less will assure the engagement behind the signalling, which brings us back to the original Nash equilibrium.

[hv_]

Follow-up on the game theory aspect of changing protocol:

Core had set up a very, very smart game-theoretical way of modifying the protocol that gave the impression that it was happening in a decentralized way: the signalling system.   Indeed, this seemed to solve the problem of individual entities needing to leave a Nash equilibrium for another one, which is game-theoretically impossible.  So how did Core defeat game theory (at first sight) ?

Well, the difficulty to leave a Nash equilibrium is that as individual entity, "changing strategy on your own" is a losing proposition (as by definition of Nash equilibrium).  However, "changing together with the others" can be a winning proposition, but that supposes collusion which is absent in a decentralized system (by definition).   In other words, every single entity needs to be SURE that a lot of other entities are going to switch to the new equilibrium in order for him to do this also, which is normally a catch-22 in a decentralized system ; moreover, this switch has to be simultaneous.  This is where the "signalling" comes in: signalling is not a change in strategy (you can stay in the current equilibrium) but you can express your "engagement" to switch at a given moment in the future.  If a very large majority engages itself into switching, then at that date, one can presume that the new equilibrium will be the one the system is in, and "remaining in the old equilibrium" is then the deviant position.

However, the caveat in this thing is that you need an *engagement* not just a *signal*.  Because at the given moment, you STILL don't know if the other entities will actually do what they signalled.  You might signal for something to trick some others in changing position, so that their loss is your gain.  But this is where Core's monopoly comes in: their software is such that the signal also triggers the switch, and most people are USING their software, so they have no choice but to switch.

==>  the signalling + engagement comes from the central authority of the software monopolist.  Other software might just as well signal but not switch.

Moreover, changing something can always be done in different ways, according to different variations of the protocol: if different competing propositions are out there, none will signal an overwhelming majority, and even less will assure the engagement behind the signalling, which brings us back to the original Nash equilibrium.

Sorry - could you pls elaborate a bit on that 'catch-22 in a decentralized system' ? What is the clou here?

I found this here but don't know much about the red line in it:

http://ascelibrary.org/doi/10.1061/%28ASCE%290733-9372%282006%29132%3A2%28149%29

Tx!

[classicsucks]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjZk7N7RXfA

"Miners' work only has value if users value it."

It is coming. I suggest you Bitmain's paid shills to accept the reality. UASF is far more superior to Cartel's HF agreement because they have no base. They are only miners. They are not special snowflakes. Users make bitcoin valuable not miners.

UASF > Cartel HF

I think most real users want bigger blocks and the benefits that come with it (lower fees, faster confirmations).

UASF support is fake/astroturfing.

But maybe there will be a network split if some miners insist on it.

Trace is a chuckle-head - he's the last guy you want explaining bitcoin forks to anyone. He's trying, but he doesn't really get it. Notice his banter about the bitcoin price at the beginning of the video? He suggests SPV wallets are "more secure because they run on top of bitcoin core"? Mmmmkayyy...

TLDR; UASF will never work

[dinofelis]

Sorry - could you pls elaborate a bit on that 'catch-22 in a decentralized system' ? What is the clou here?

You mean, the expression "catch-22" ?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catch-22_(logic)

Jumping to another Nash equilibrium is such a case.  Are you aware of the prisoners dilemma ?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma

It illustrates a kind of non-trivial Nash equilibrium.  "tragedy of the commons" is another game-theoretical catch-22 situation.

I don't know if this helps ?