A legitimately novel idea for a new crypto.

[Anon136]

the problem that causes this idea to be broken is that transaction block creators could include only their own keys in the block inorder to increase their chances of winning the right to mint new blocks in the future.

I see... #nods

As I understood, if a miner have to endorse a transaction block, people have to wait for miners blocks to trust the transaction block?

Thats right. You could think of it like miners are minting empty containers and only the lottery winner can fill that container with transactions. If entries into that lottery could consist of every person who ever made a transaction than it would be HUGELY decentralized and you could literally trust a 2 confirmation transaction since it would be so unlikely that the winning miners and lottery winners could all be colluding with each other for any length of time. additionally since miners are not the ones authoring transactions a high orphan rate would very marginally reduce the security of the network meaning that you could have blocks coming in MUCH faster. it would be the holy grail of a decentralized crypto with trustworthy confirmations in seconds.

unfortunately like i said idk how to handle the problem of transaction block creators entering in a huge list of their own public keys instead of processing real transactions. im just going to have to keep thinking about it and in the mean time im going to work on learning how to actually make a crypto staring out with something much simpler. Im just going to work on trying to make my own hashcash implementation for now.

[1713428259]

1713428259

[Anon136]

Issuance:
This part is going to get a lot of my fellow libertarians in a tizzy but please bear with me until i finish the argument. The block reward for miners would never be lowered, it would be a constant amount for ever. This would not lead to endless inflation i promise. You have to remember that each new issuance would represent a smaller rate of inflation of the over all money supply than the previous issuance. So for example the second block doubles the money supply, but the third only increases it by 1/3 and the fourth by only 1/4. This is much less inflationary than a scheme that, for example, increases the money supply at a rate of 1% of outstanding issuance. Furthermore at some point in the future an equilibrium would be reached where the marginal value of a unit of currency would be less than the marginal value of taking the necessary precautions to secure it from loss. In other words, at some point in the future, the amount of currency lost due to carelessness would match almost 1 for 1 the rate of new currency being issued.

I'm late to this thread, but I wanted to comment that this is a good insight.  It's funny the thing that originally attracted me to Bitcoin was the finite supply.  Now I don't see that as being as big of an issue due to the phenomenon you are describing here.  It's analogous to slowly increasing the gold supply (through mining, nuclear transmutation, space exploration and mining, etc.) - not enough to destabilize the currency.

I was reviewing part of the original Bitcoin whitepaper this morning and noticed that Satoshi actually referred to each block as generating "a coin."  That would've been an interesting way for things to run: 1 BTC generated every 10 minutes, indefinitely.

this argument i made is i think correct, but it is rather abstract, i fear that it would be lost on most people. Due to strategic considerations, for the first crypto ever, perhaps satoshi made the right choice. like you said it was the finite supply that got you into it.

[t3a]

Seems like instead of people spending electricity on mining, they would be spending it on making as many transactions as possible to mine the coins. If there is a 1% chance of earning a block reward by making 100 transactions, and the block reward is more than the cost of 100 transactions, then the users will make those transactions to earn money.

In the end, the sum of the transaction fees will be close to the price of a transaction block.

If a transaction block reward is $50, and you look back at the past day, someone could pay for the majority of the days transactions and 51% attack. Much more feasible than paying for 51% of the hardware used to mine.

[Anon136]

Seems like instead of people spending electricity on mining, they would be spending it on making as many transactions as possible to mine the coins. If there is a 1% chance of earning a block reward by making 100 transactions, and the block reward is more than the cost of 100 transactions, then the users will make those transactions to earn money.

In the end, the sum of the transaction fees will be close to the price of a transaction block.

If a transaction block reward is $50, and you look back at the past day, someone could pay for the majority of the days transactions and 51% attack. Much more feasible than paying for 51% of the hardware used to mine.

People who author transaction blocks would be compensated with transaction fees only. But as it says in the title, this idea is broken for other reasons.

[Etlase2]

the problem that causes this idea to be broken is that transaction block creators could include only their own keys in the block inorder to increase their chances of winning the right to mint new blocks in the future.

From a game theory perspective, there is very little incentive to do this other than to generically attack the chain. Quick and dirty fix suggestions would be to provide half of the tx fees to the miners or to pay the tx fees of the current tx block forward to the next so that there is a cost, or some other distributive method. This should probably be done regardless so that tx block creators do not get free transactions.

[readerbtc]

Thats right. You could think of it like miners are minting empty containers and only the lottery winner can fill that container with transactions.

As I see the general idea, you are splitting bitcoin block mining in two: a miner for the hashes and a miner for the tx data. It is just a simple split with the increase of the complexity that brings and I can't see many benefits.

I would be interesting to modify the idea "somehow" in such way  several tx blocks are created for each PoW block. It would increase tx confirmation rate. I mean, the current idea is symmetrical, 1-to-1, right?

[Etlase2]

It is just a simple split with the increase of the complexity that brings and I can't see many benefits.

 

[t3a]

Seems like instead of people spending electricity on mining, they would be spending it on making as many transactions as possible to mine the coins. If there is a 1% chance of earning a block reward by making 100 transactions, and the block reward is more than the cost of 100 transactions, then the users will make those transactions to earn money.

In the end, the sum of the transaction fees will be close to the price of a transaction block.

If a transaction block reward is $50, and you look back at the past day, someone could pay for the majority of the days transactions and 51% attack. Much more feasible than paying for 51% of the hardware used to mine.

People who author transaction blocks would be compensated with transaction fees only. But as it says in the title, this idea is broken for other reasons.

Yes, I was speaking of a $50 average transaction block reward.

[FrictionlessCoin]

Very nice!  Very nice indeed.

[Anon136]

It is just a simple split with the increase of the complexity that brings and I can't see many benefits.

 

if it could work it would have huge benefits. with bitcoin someone with sufficient hashing power can save up a longer chain and then publish it thus reversing the transaction. with the split in responsibilities this would become highly unlikely since the miner would have to be in collusion with the winner of the transaction. it would make for secure transactions in one or two confirmations. additionally it could work well even with really fast block times. not to get too technical but the reason why very fast block times would be a bad idea for bitcoin is the shorter the block time the more advantage is gained from low latency relative to hashing power. This would encourage centralization. With a scheme like this the miners could be much more centralized without it creating a problem for reasons mentioned earlier in this paragraph.

[Anon136]

Seems like instead of people spending electricity on mining, they would be spending it on making as many transactions as possible to mine the coins. If there is a 1% chance of earning a block reward by making 100 transactions, and the block reward is more than the cost of 100 transactions, then the users will make those transactions to earn money.

In the end, the sum of the transaction fees will be close to the price of a transaction block.

If a transaction block reward is $50, and you look back at the past day, someone could pay for the majority of the days transactions and 51% attack. Much more feasible than paying for 51% of the hardware used to mine.

People who author transaction blocks would be compensated with transaction fees only. But as it says in the title, this idea is broken for other reasons.

Yes, I was speaking of a $50 average transaction block reward.

ah ok well thats actually really simple to account for. In a market when people are bidding for a scarce resource the person who wins the bid is the person who values it most. A person who wanted to buy up transaction space just for the sake of increasing his chances of authoring a block in the future would not value that space as highly as someone who wanted to use it for a legitimate transaction in addition to increasing his chances of authoring a block in the future.

[readerbtc]

It is just a simple split with the increase of the complexity that brings and I can't see many benefits.

 

if it could work it would have huge benefits. with bitcoin someone with sufficient hashing power can save up a longer chain and then publish it thus reversing the transaction. with the split in responsibilities this would become highly unlikely since the miner would have to be in collusion with the winner of the transaction.

I see. Thanks.

...

Except collusion would be easier in that case you mentioned before, of people creating hundreds of addresses to increase the odds they are both miners at the same time?

[Anon136]

It is just a simple split with the increase of the complexity that brings and I can't see many benefits.

 

if it could work it would have huge benefits. with bitcoin someone with sufficient hashing power can save up a longer chain and then publish it thus reversing the transaction. with the split in responsibilities this would become highly unlikely since the miner would have to be in collusion with the winner of the transaction.

I see. Thanks.

...

Except collusion would be easier in that case you mentioned before, of people creating hundreds of addresses to increase the odds they are both miners at the same time?

yes but even if the miner owned 100% of all of the addresses it would still only be the same as bitcoin at that point

[t3a]

1

Seems like instead of people spending electricity on mining, they would be spending it on making as many transactions as possible to mine the coins. If there is a 1% chance of earning a block reward by making 100 transactions, and the block reward is more than the cost of 100 transactions, then the users will make those transactions to earn money.

In the end, the sum of the transaction fees will be close to the price of a transaction block.

If a transaction block reward is $50, and you look back at the past day, someone could pay for the majority of the days transactions and 51% attack. Much more feasible than paying for 51% of the hardware used to mine.

People who author transaction blocks would be compensated with transaction fees only. But as it says in the title, this idea is broken for other reasons.

Yes, I was speaking of a $50 average transaction block reward.

ah ok well thats actually really simple to account for. In a market when people are bidding for a scarce resource the person who wins the bid is the person who values it most. A person who wanted to buy up transaction space just for the sake of increasing his chances of authoring a block in the future would not value that space as highly as someone who wanted to use it for a legitimate transaction in addition to increasing his chances of authoring a block in the future.

Reversing transactions can gain you much more than the sum of the transaction fees spent.

[Anon136]

1

Seems like instead of people spending electricity on mining, they would be spending it on making as many transactions as possible to mine the coins. If there is a 1% chance of earning a block reward by making 100 transactions, and the block reward is more than the cost of 100 transactions, then the users will make those transactions to earn money.

In the end, the sum of the transaction fees will be close to the price of a transaction block.

If a transaction block reward is $50, and you look back at the past day, someone could pay for the majority of the days transactions and 51% attack. Much more feasible than paying for 51% of the hardware used to mine.

People who author transaction blocks would be compensated with transaction fees only. But as it says in the title, this idea is broken for other reasons.

Yes, I was speaking of a $50 average transaction block reward.

ah ok well thats actually really simple to account for. In a market when people are bidding for a scarce resource the person who wins the bid is the person who values it most. A person who wanted to buy up transaction space just for the sake of increasing his chances of authoring a block in the future would not value that space as highly as someone who wanted to use it for a legitimate transaction in addition to increasing his chances of authoring a block in the future.

Reversing transactions can gain you much more than the sum of the transaction fees spent.

even if you had all of the keys, the process of reversing transactions at that point would become the same as bitcoin, so it still wouldn't be easy by any stretch of the imagination. still there might be reason for the authors of transaction blocks to only include their own keys in their blocks which would definite be a problem.

[t3a]

even if you had all of the keys, the process of reversing transactions at that point would become the same as bitcoin, so it still wouldn't be easy by any stretch of the imagination. still there might be reason for the authors of transaction blocks to only include their own keys in their blocks which would definite be a problem.

Reversing a transaction doesn't involve having any keys.

[FrictionlessCoin]

"The thing to understand about the pow is that its just a contrivance for creating a never ending string of varafiable unpredictable numbers that can be used as a means to reach consensus in the network. What you would do as a miner is hash the genesis block + the address you wanted your reward to be payed to + a series of random nonces. the first person to come up with a hash that it below a certain threshold wins the competition, everyone starts trying to hash his block plus the address they want to be payed too. Its just like bitcoin, except the blocks contain no transactions, only the address you want to be payed out too. "

So, if the hashes do not include the transactions, then how do we verify that the block chain we are looking at it the legit one?

Any system can create very quickly another block chain that is longer than the current one and we can't verify if it is the legit one.

[Anon136]

"The thing to understand about the pow is that its just a contrivance for creating a never ending string of varafiable unpredictable numbers that can be used as a means to reach consensus in the network. What you would do as a miner is hash the genesis block + the address you wanted your reward to be payed to + a series of random nonces. the first person to come up with a hash that it below a certain threshold wins the competition, everyone starts trying to hash his block plus the address they want to be payed too. Its just like bitcoin, except the blocks contain no transactions, only the address you want to be payed out too. "

So, if the hashes do not include the transactions, then how do we verify that the block chain we are looking at it the legit one?

Any system can create very quickly another block chain that is longer than the current one and we can't verify if it is the legit one.

just ignore this thread and go check out NextCoin (NXT). Its basically the same idea i was trying to outline here only better.

[FrictionlessCoin]

"The thing to understand about the pow is that its just a contrivance for creating a never ending string of varafiable unpredictable numbers that can be used as a means to reach consensus in the network. What you would do as a miner is hash the genesis block + the address you wanted your reward to be payed to + a series of random nonces. the first person to come up with a hash that it below a certain threshold wins the competition, everyone starts trying to hash his block plus the address they want to be payed too. Its just like bitcoin, except the blocks contain no transactions, only the address you want to be payed out too. "

So, if the hashes do not include the transactions, then how do we verify that the block chain we are looking at it the legit one?

Any system can create very quickly another block chain that is longer than the current one and we can't verify if it is the legit one.

just ignore this thread and go check out NextCoin (NXT). Its basically the same idea i was trying to outline here only better.

There aren't any spec for NXT.... so I can't tell if it even is legit.

[Anon136]

"The thing to understand about the pow is that its just a contrivance for creating a never ending string of varafiable unpredictable numbers that can be used as a means to reach consensus in the network. What you would do as a miner is hash the genesis block + the address you wanted your reward to be payed to + a series of random nonces. the first person to come up with a hash that it below a certain threshold wins the competition, everyone starts trying to hash his block plus the address they want to be payed too. Its just like bitcoin, except the blocks contain no transactions, only the address you want to be payed out too. "

So, if the hashes do not include the transactions, then how do we verify that the block chain we are looking at it the legit one?

Any system can create very quickly another block chain that is longer than the current one and we can't verify if it is the legit one.

just ignore this thread and go check out NextCoin (NXT). Its basically the same idea i was trying to outline here only better.

There aren't any spec for NXT.... so I can't tell if it even is legit.

There are specs you just have to dig around for them. For starters check out my conversation with come-from-beyond https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=345773.msg4063478#msg4063478