[ANN][DASH] Dash (dash.org) | First Self-Funding Self-Governing Crypto Currency

[arielbit]

I'm going to sum up this loooooooooooooooong discussion alright?

masternodes are miners (don't use the technical crap on me )

masternodes get the majority of the rewards

masternodes are the majority of the network with special powers to vote.

masternodes will decide to reduce their rewards? --not gonna happen. END OF STORY!! 

masternodes want Dash to 1k again or not? simple yes or no......

1k, 10k, 100k, 1$, 10$....all the same as long as they get the majority.

[robertrodriguez]

I'm going to sum up this loooooooooooooooong discussion alright?

masternodes are miners (don't use the technical crap on me )

masternodes get the majority of the rewards

masternodes are the majority of the network with special powers to vote.

masternodes will decide to reduce their rewards? --not gonna happen. END OF STORY!! 

masternodes want Dash to 1k again or not? simple yes or no......

1k, 10k, 100k, 1$, 10$....all the same as long as they get the majority.

got it! that's a NO/don't care answer! good to know

[arielbit]

I'm going to sum up this loooooooooooooooong discussion alright?

masternodes are miners (don't use the technical crap on me )

masternodes get the majority of the rewards

masternodes are the majority of the network with special powers to vote.

masternodes will decide to reduce their rewards? --not gonna happen. END OF STORY!! 

masternodes want Dash to 1k again or not? simple yes or no......

1k, 10k, 100k, 1$, 10$....all the same as long as they get the majority.

got it! that's a NO/don't care answer! good to know

It is staying on top of the food chain because "you can" so "you will".

[jdmcg]

As I've presented before, I believe trustless shared masternodes would go a long way to alleviate the concerns toknormal continues to bring up. So not sure why it has been dismissed out of hand.

This could very well push the masternode count to 7000, forcing non-shared masternode owners to consider the risk of having such a large number of coins tied up for only 4% too much and moving out as they are replaced by shared masternodes. A slow, controlled way to increase masternodes while increasing community involvement.   

Another thing to seriously consider is lowering the collateral required to run a masternode. I may be wrong, but I thought Evan Duffield once said that once DASH is $100, the collateral should be reduced to 500. This simple change could go a long way in spreading out the masternode rewards to more people as well...

Trustless masternodes doesn't address the discussed issue as long as the split for MNs remain the same.

There is also no technical need for more masternodes and there would be no (service) benefit to end users.

More masternodes, more people are invested. 5000 masternodes was a great milestone to reach but it was essentially reached last bull run...

If one masternode costs $25/mth to run, two masternodes would cost $50/mth to run. If collateral requirements were lowered/trustless shared masternodes introduced, perhaps 20000 masternodes could be reached.

At that number the masternode costs would 4x, the return in DASH would be 1/4th of what it is now.

DASH should strive for greater decentralization.

More masternodes means less reward per masternode as well as more total cost to run all the masternodes throughout the network.

That's only the reward "share" you're alluding to. The actual reward at an aggregate level is a constant and independent of the number of nodes. It's essentially the proportion of the chain mined at "zero difficulty". Thats the bottom line and you can slice it up any way you like within that overall constraint obviously. The actual number of nodes is not the problem, it's rather profitability dynamics between the two groups and their increasing asymmetry as price rises. It's simply an unstable model for all the reasons I outlined in previous posts.

But costs do increase if by decreasing collateral, more masternodes result. The reward in DASH also decreases per masternode owner to a more reasonable compensation (or at least it moves it in the right direction). Once 20000 is reached perhaps a further adjustment would be needed.

Your thesis is entirely based on equating a masternode to a 0% difficulty miner which conveniently ignores the $25/mth hosting cost.

Anyways, I guess one point I was trying to make was that if you were to reduce the percentage of rewards going to masternodes, you'd need to also reduce the collateral required.

I don't see how this follows. The collateral is arbitrary as it is. If running a masternode is more profitable than not running one then the network will get populated. As previously mentioned masternodes churn so lots of them have ALREADY been sold. It's in fact possible for the entire compliment of 5000 nodes to be sold and for the network to still be populated at a steady count of 5000 because they simply change hands at different times.

The problem is measuring returns in Dash. It looks profitable when in fact is isn't because the return needs to be measured in dollars taking into account the capital gain/loss of the entire holding. ROI in Dash would only be meaningful if we were a stablecoin.

There's a reason it's plateauing around 5000. Think risk/reward.

Who's measuring ROI in DASH? The Dash network can only pay in DASH to both masternodes and miners.

Please answer this question that you continue to side step. Why, if someone is willing to spend so much money (and time) to mine, wouldn't they spend the same or even less money to just purchase the coin and sell it at a profit later?

Because mining is a business. It's income oriented whereas speculative trading is capital gain oriented. They compliment each other. Mining is a competitive thing so if nobody else is doing it there's enormous profit to be made for you. As more join in it reaches an equilibrium point of diminishing returns and that's your prevailing network hashrate level.

Most jurisdictions view trading as a business too... if you're buying and holding long term, then maybe it's capital gains.

Your (and other's) claim is that by reducing the proportion of the supply that's mined we become more competitive and improve our store of value.

This has never been my claim. The abstract notion of what or what is not a store of value is not something I care to proclaim.

What I did say, and you well know, is that the implementation that's to change the reward split from 50/50 to 60/40 over the next 5 years is negligible. Anything you're arguing now would have to be just as true for DASH back in 2015 because this change substantially changed nothing.

[toknormal]

Anything you're arguing now would have to be just as true for DASH back in 2015 because this change substantially changed nothing.

Mining and masternode operating profitability was far closer to parity back then than it is today, let alone when we hit our heady highs.

You avoided the point of asymmetric profitability completely.

If one company A makes widgets at a manufacturing cost of $100 a pop and company B makes exactly the same specification widget at a cost of $1 a pop what do you think will happen ? They are 2 markets with distinct dynamics. Company B can afford to outbid company A and they end up with a price somewhere between $1 and $100.

How does this situation reconcile itself ? Company A buys shares in company B and then uses some of its dividends to subsidise its manufacturing process.

I think you are in denial of this basic concept.

[birdonthewire]

So prove it by creating a new altcoin, like a testnet for DASH, much like LTC supposedly is for BTC. Then you can freely experiment and see what really works in the real world.

That interests me.
What limitations would it have to fork DASH? Would it keep its properties? (ChainLocks, Instant Send, Private Send, etc).
  I remember reading that there are several patents on the project's technology.
I extend the query to anyone who can provide criteria in that regard, of course.
Thank you.

[T15K6]

can i start mining dash on server computers?

[jdmcg]

Anything you're arguing now would have to be just as true for DASH back in 2015 because this change substantially changed nothing.

Mining and masternode operating profitability was far closer to parity back then than it is today, let alone when we hit our heady highs.

You avoided the point of asymmetric profitability completely.

If one company A makes widgets at a manufacturing cost of $100 a pop and company B makes exactly the same specification widget at a cost of $1 a pop what do you think will happen ? They are 2 markets with distinct dynamics. Company B can afford to outbid company A and they end up with a price somewhere between $1 and $100.

How does this situation reconcile itself ? Company A buys shares in company B and then uses some of its dividends to subsidise its manufacturing process.

I think you are in denial of this basic concept.

Since you've exaggerated the problem, you are forced to present an exaggerated solution.

Ignoring masternode costs, no matter how small they might seem to you does not mean they don't exist. Ignoring the collateral requirement for a masternode likewise does not make it go away or not somehow part of the equation.

My solution takes a more cautious approach to shrink a masternode's reward gradually all while still incentivizing new masternodes to be set up to create a better and more inclusive and decentralized network.

I might be more on board with your approach if you could remove the collateral requirement altogether (without opening the DASH network up to malicious masternodes who have nothing at stake). Then perhaps you'd be comparing apples to apples.

So, I just don't see how your sledge hammer approach doesn't fundamentally break DASH's masternode network.

[toknormal]

Ignoring masternode costs, no matter how small they might seem to you does not mean they don't exist.

It's not a question of them existing or not, it's that they're fixed. That is the significant factor here. I don't think you've once addressed this so permit me to conclude that you've "ignored" it.

Ignoring the collateral requirement for a masternode likewise does not make it go away or not somehow part of the equation.

How does this affect anything exactly ? It's not a component of the operating cost which is what affects profitability.

[jdmcg]

Ignoring masternode costs, no matter how small they might seem to you does not mean they don't exist.

It's not a question of them existing or not, it's that they're fixed. That is the significant factor here. I don't think you've once addressed this so permit me to conclude that you've "ignored" it.

Ignoring the collateral requirement for a masternode likewise does not make it go away or not somehow part of the equation.

How does this affect anything exactly ? It's not a component of the operating cost which is what affects profitability.

Costs are fixed per masternode, yes, not once ignored by me. When you say masternodes are miners with 0% difficulty, that is what most would call ignoring the reality that masternodes have costs.

Masternode collateral is part of the equation. Not the operating cost but still part of the equation. You have conveniently ignored this in presenting your solution. I believe if you kept the collateral at 1000 DASH and reduced the masternode share from 60% to 20%, that masternode count would sharply decrease initially (destroying any perceived store of value theory you have) and bounce back (if the price would recover) and settle around 1600 to restore the approximate 6% return in DASH that the network seems to have settled with now.

You wouldn't have fixed the problem at all. Instead DASH would become more centralized with 2/3rd's fewer masternodes that still only have fixed costs while still enjoying rewards above costs much higher than the miners.

[toknormal]

Masternode collateral is part of the equation. Not the operating cost but still part of the equation.

It isn't really. It's what entitles you to operate a node and receive a reward that makes the activity profitable but it's not part of the accounting equation. Mining reward is, masternode reward is, mining cost is and masternode hosting costs are but the collateral isn't.

I believe if you kept the collateral at 1000 DASH and reduced the masternode share from 60% to 20%, that masternode count would sharply decrease initially (destroying any perceived store of value theory you have) and bounce back (if the price would recover) and settle around 1600 to restore the approximate 6% return in DASH that the network seems to have settled with now.

You wouldn't have fixed the problem at all. Instead DASH would become more centralized with 2/3rd's fewer masternodes that still only have fixed costs while still enjoying rewards above costs much higher than the miners.

None of that is a problem. Also you've missed the biggest gain - the single objective of the whole exercise which is that we'd have attracted a huge amount of mining back to the chain and secured (in a monetary sense) a far larger portion of the supply. The point of doing that is to raise the opening price of far more blocks in the so called "primary market". It isn't the masternode count that supports the marketcap it's the price of a coin mined at "source".

[jdmcg]

Masternode collateral is part of the equation. Not the operating cost but still part of the equation.

It isn't really. It's what entitles you to operate a node and receive a reward that makes the activity profitable but it's not part of the accounting equation. Mining reward is, masternode reward is, mining cost is and masternode hosting costs are but the collateral isn't.

Right, it's not part of the accounting equation. It is part of the network equation and what makes it work. I hope you're innocent in this nitpicking and not just pretending to be pedantic.

I believe if you kept the collateral at 1000 DASH and reduced the masternode share from 60% to 20%, that masternode count would sharply decrease initially (destroying any perceived store of value theory you have) and bounce back (if the price would recover) and settle around 1600 to restore the approximate 6% return in DASH that the network seems to have settled with now.

You wouldn't have fixed the problem at all. Instead DASH would become more centralized with 2/3rd's fewer masternodes that still only have fixed costs while still enjoying rewards above costs much higher than the miners.

None of that is a problem. Also you've missed the biggest gain - the single objective of the whole exercise which is that we'd have attracted a huge amount of mining back to the chain and secured (in a monetary sense) a far larger portion of the supply. The point of doing that is to raise the opening price of far more blocks in the so called "primary market". It isn't the masternode count that supports the marketcap it's the price of a coin mined at "source".

Ok, finally maybe we've come to some kind of consensus.

I already see DASH dangerously close to being too centralized especially as the price increases.

If your position were ever to be implemented it would cause so much initial damage to DASH, there'd be a serious question of whether the coin could ever recover. And if it did, then you'd have managed making it even more centralized than it is now. These are the 2 main reasons I'm against your position.

If you could actually garner enough support for a modified position, which instead is phased in over time (gradually reduce masternode reward percentage while gradually increasing miner reward percentage) and lower the collateral to 100 (also gradually phased in) I'd be inclined to support it. At 100 DASH collateral and with the reward percentage reduced to 20%, maybe you'd get between 15000 and 20000 masternodes.

But, I'm a realist... The majority has already spoken regarding the reward split and doesn't appear to have the appetite to revisit it again so early. I think it's far more likely that after Dash Platform (DashPay) is released there's a chance to either introduce trustless shared masternodes and/or reduce the collateral requirement.

Even then, I'm not getting the sense there's a lot of support for that... so maybe StakeHound is the only hope for some kind of increased decentralization.

[birdonthewire]

... what is relevant is how much of the blockchain new supply capital is wasted and how much is invested back into the chain.

That has been assumed in the thread for a long time, but mining is not. Not in the proportions you defend.

An important key is whether the DIF structure is properly designed to receive wealth without negative repercussions from the regulator.

It isn't the masternode count that supports the marketcap it's the price of a coin mined at "source".

Neither one nor the other.

[Tungi17]

Dash Podcast 160 with Dash Core COO Robert Wiecko

https://youtu.be/ND-Xgu_e_5o

[espressodelisi]

can i start mining dash on server computers?

No, you can not.
There are special ASIC devices mining dash. Do you have millions of servers?

[toknormal]

If you could actually garner enough support for a modified position, which instead is phased in over time (gradually reduce masternode reward percentage while gradually increasing miner reward percentage) and lower the collateral to 100 (also gradually phased in) I'd be inclined to support it.

My jaw is on the floor.   So you're now saying you'd support it in principle ?

I thought you just didn't accept the whole concept that mining was a wealth preserver.

I certainly wouldn't be against implementing it in the way you describe if that was the price of making everyone feel more comfortable about it. The problem I have more than anything with the current protocol change is that it's going in the wrong direction.

[birdonthewire]

Dash Podcast 160 with Dash Core COO Robert Wiecko

https://youtu.be/ND-Xgu_e_5o

Probably the biggest active intoxicator in DASH's flawed information-manipulation system, Joel Valenzuela, in his umpteenth session of communicative juggling licking DCG's ass, as usual.

Now, whitewashing, by dramatizing absolutely out-of-time modesty and self-criticism for tens or hundreds of thousands of RUINED people, the "miscommunication" about Evolution (evident, intentional and supported by infamies paid for and blessed by the DAO as DASH NEWS, with its strategy situated between reports of candy & rainbow worlds avoiding highly damaging events for token buyers ... and direct marginalization of dissidents through unilateral and unfounded bans and even groups of subsidized trolls like the author of this interview-fellatio .. .Strategy destined to submerge in the confusion and manipulate every DASH follower to continue receiving capital both for the financing of the project and for private drainage in the rewards of the insider whales perfectly informed of the precarious real situation. Almost six years of camouflage before buyers from all over the world or economic condition, from a roadma p impossible to fulfill by communicators, producers and funders At the expense of deceived investors - calling them "community" would be an invitation to vomit -) fully aware of this and of the enormous damage created.If you really believe drivers of bad communication, no problem: Annotation of the damage generated ... and compensation for the people who have paid for their negligence in sound money.


A scam also finished off by blocking all those investors deceived by the "rewards accounts" (Shared Mnodes) who were deprived, probably forever, of their promised integration into the
 "hospitable" structure. Which makes the abusive intention very clear, such as the assumption of harm from the group that financed this entire assault ... even face to the less savvy judge or regulator, which is where they should be. (And not for not achieving adequate performance in a job, which can happen to anyone ... but for knowing about it and hiding it, amplifying the damage to trusted third parties in their commitments).The pretended pose of self-criticism, when in little more than 20 days we entered the SIXTH year of Evolution ... it could be shoved directly up the ass, it no longer serves to repair any damage (unfortunately, surely to continue parasitizing the benefits achieved of his privileged positionalso, with their faces washed ... and let the party continue!   ).


Then you read their wacky political antics or watch their interviews and they look like Teresa of Calcutta. Amazing. What a band.

[xkcdd]

got it! that's a NO/don't care answer! good to know

Crawl back into your pitt, wench!

[robertrodriguez]

got it! that's a NO/don't care answer! good to know

Crawl back into your pitt, wench!

keyboard bruce lee...bitch, in real life i'll whip your ass until you scream for your hoe mother

[jdmcg]

If you could actually garner enough support for a modified position, which instead is phased in over time (gradually reduce masternode reward percentage while gradually increasing miner reward percentage) and lower the collateral to 100 (also gradually phased in) I'd be inclined to support it.

My jaw is on the floor.   So you're now saying you'd support it in principle ?

I thought you just didn't accept the whole concept that mining was a wealth preserver.

I certainly wouldn't be against implementing it in the way you describe if that was the price of making everyone feel more comfortable about it. The problem I have more than anything with the current protocol change is that it's going in the wrong direction.

Mining is a wealth preserver? Well, it's a theory and I can see how and why it might be but I still think you over-exaggerate its importance.

I'm more on board with the idea that masternodes are over compensated for what they do, at least for now. Maybe Dash Platform changes that enough, hard to say. But just reducing the reward for masternodes would simply reduce the number of masternodes there are and I think this would hurt DASH more. Reducing the collateral would reduce the risk that would allow for a reduced reward.

If DASH is supposed to be decentralized, 5000 or so masternodes shouldn't be the ceiling. Everything in the network should continue to grow.