Deepbit hopping

[deepceleron]

Pool hopping is detectable by the pool op. If a user's per-share reward value over time is consistently higher than average, they are gaming the payout system. In aggregate data like the total per-share reward vs round time, observation by outsiders will be masked by the total pool size and the modest counter-measures, but on a per-user basis, there will be users who earn the average expected per-share reward, and hoppers that stick out like a sore thumb with higher earnings.

Hoppers will also submit a consistent number of shares per round even when they are long (or shares per block if just hopping on new network block information), and by quitting long rounds, are identifiable.

The time scale of the graph in the first post should be logarithmic, so there is an even spread of round quantiles over time.

[1713554781]

1713554781

[1713554781]

1713554781

[P4man]

Pool hopping is detectable by the pool op. If a user's per-share reward value is consistently higher than average, they are gaming the payout system. In aggregate data like the total per-share reward vs round time, observation by outsiders will be masked by the total pool size and the modest counter-measures, but on a per-user basis, there will be users who earn the average expected per-share reward, and hoppers that stick out like a sore thumb.

Agreed. But since I made the post, Deepbit has linked to their own thread were is shown that hoppers are not only detected, but also labeled as such. Just no action is being taken against them - for now.

I hadnt seen that when I made my analysis, I just tried proving deepbit can be and is being hopped. That much is beyond doubt now.

I do agree because of deepbits size, the current impact on non-stop miners by hoppers is trivial and statistically noise, that was never my concern.

[PatrickHarnett]

For interest I added another five days data to try to increase the size of the dataset (a few over 600 blocks) because Deepbit has had a few 2-3 hour solves recently (including a 184 minute monster).

Distribution is still very noisy with an average solve time of 26 minutes (Sd of 27 minutes) and average hash rate 51,440 shares/minute (s.d. 3246).  Testing different regression fits gave less than 5% R^2.

[Jack of Diamonds]

Pool Ops that offer PPS to their members and hop with their hash power should be exposed.  

Hopping proportional pools and exploiting their resources is a natural step in the evolution process of bitcoin pools.

Large proportional pools have been on the decline for ages & will eventually die out completely once the core miners realize they are working for someone else;
They are paying out of their own pocket so that somebody else may profit.

I think Inaba on page 2, the master of Eclipse pool, has put it eloquently in the last sentence:

A new block starts and they will jump to 700 - 900 GH/s, then like clockwork at ~40% their hashrate plummets to 100 - 150 GH/s.  
Those poor miners making up the 150 GH/s are getting raped like a two bit whore.

Of course, those 101+% pools will disappear too, but only once the proportional model disappears first. Right now, non-hopping, perpetual proportional miners are the suckers of the system, the prey. Through either lack of knowledge or sheer ignorance, they distort the balance of pools so as to create an incentive for predators.
True equality in mining rewards will exist, but only when these miners finally understand they are damaging their own earnings.

(This model relies on the rational assumption miners' main motive is profit;
It does not take in account irrational motives such as supporting a pool for ideological reasons, or wanting to give free money to pool hoppers out of generosity etc., so it is still possible there could be proportional miners 3-5 years down the road)