Thank you for the help. I appreciate it.
When you say, "you need to up the trust level" what exactly does that mean? Can you point me in the right direction for upping the trust level?
Thanks Again!
Since GPG has no certificate authorities who check IDs, GPG is especially paranoid about making sure you trust the source of the public keys. The idea was to have a huge web of trust of people checking each others' IDs, so that you always have a trusted signature on a new key for someone you don't know. If there are no trusted signatures, then it complains that it doesn't trust it, and it could've been replaced by an attacker's key. Or rather, before it trusts it, you have to explicitly tell GPG that you trust it and have verified it's the correct key.
Of course you don't know that for sure, except that it would've been tough for an attacker to replace all instances of the key and fingerprints you are exposed to, and all the downloads/installers that are signed with it. In general, for most users, getting the key from the keyserver is sufficient. If you are holding millions of dollars and consider yourself to be a target, you might do more paranoid checks.
So the real answer to your question is: you actually already did it. It says:
gpg: Signature made Tue 26 Nov 2013 01:31:01 PM EST using RSA key ID
98832223gpg:
Good signature from "Alan C. Reiner (Offline Signing Key) <
alan@bitcoinarmory.com>"
...
It verifies the signature matches the key, it's just complaining that you've done nothing to identify you actually trust that key. If you want to set the trust explicity, you can do so from the command line:
$ gpg --edit-key 98832223
...
gpg> trust
...
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly verify other users' keys
(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from different sources, etc.)
1 = I don't know or won't say
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
5 = I trust ultimately
m = back to the main menu
Your decision? 5
Do you really want to set this key to ultimate trust? (y/N) y
