We should stop recommending Multibit on bitcoin.org, NOW

[R2D221]

A mobile device could potentially be stolen/lost, even if the point of the theft of the device is not to steal the bitcoin they would be significant risk.

Online wallets carry their own risk that is separate from using MultiBit in this manner. More risk? I am not sure

Everything in life has a risk. Even if someone secures their bitcoins in the most effective way, they can't rule out that they might have an accident tomorrow, leaving the coins unspendable if only they know about how to retrieve them (passwords, cold storage location, etc).

The problem with online wallets is when they actually know your private keys. They could one day just decide to spend them without your consent. As far as I know, Blockchain.info encrypts the keys so that they are only known in the browser at the time the user logs in, and never by Blockchain.info themselves.

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[jim618]

I think R2D221 is right - it's about knowing the risks of the different wallet solutions.

For example, desktop wallets can all be compromised by malware and a key logger (which is why we want to support Trezor in MBHD as that's a tougher target for attackers to compromise).

If you are storing _serious_ amounts of money then I'd suggest using an offline solution such as Armory rather than MultiBit and having a dedicated computer with the offline data that is ONLY used for that.

[sed]

I think R2D221 is right - it's about knowing the risks of the different wallet solutions.

For example, desktop wallets can all be compromised by malware and a key logger (which is why we want to support Trezor in MBHD as that's a tougher target for attackers to compromise).

If you are storing _serious_ amounts of money then I'd suggest using an offline solution such as Armory rather than MultiBit and having a dedicated computer with the offline data that is ONLY used for that.

Well if I had "serious" amounts of money, I wouldn't want to trust my keys to potential hardware failure.  So I have a printout of my keys which I can then use to import to any wallet I feel like using.

I really feel like this is the most "secure" solution.  Having a couple of hard-copies of your keys means they're safe from online theives, and let's be honest, even if you had a problem with burglary, it's unlikely that the burglers are going to recognize the value of a bitcoin private key even if they do run across the paper, they are looking for other types of stuff.

[f3tus]

If you are storing _serious_ amounts of money then I'd suggest using an offline solution such as Armory rather than MultiBit

Why is Armory better in this case?

[ShakyhandsBTCer]

A mobile device could potentially be stolen/lost, even if the point of the theft of the device is not to steal the bitcoin they would be significant risk.

Online wallets carry their own risk that is separate from using MultiBit in this manner. More risk? I am not sure

Everything in life has a risk. Even if someone secures their bitcoins in the most effective way, they can't rule out that they might have an accident tomorrow, leaving the coins unspendable if only they know about how to retrieve them (passwords, cold storage location, etc).

The problem with online wallets is when they actually know your private keys. They could one day just decide to spend them without your consent. As far as I know, Blockchain.info encrypts the keys so that they are only known in the browser at the time the user logs in, and never by Blockchain.info themselves.

My post was about trying to minimize risk, not eliminate it.

[virginiallorca]

Yes I bailed on multibit months ago.  It is just too flawed and got tired of it losing my BTC, even though I eventually recovered it.

[sed]

Yes I bailed on multibit months ago.  It is just too flawed and got tired of it losing my BTC, even though I eventually recovered it.

It happened more than once?  Are you just trolling or is this for real?