1) The coin value should be directly pegged to the issuance of the coins. Which means the coin base transaction should be equal to the difficulty factor of the target that's met.
For eg. If the target should be less than 100,000 - then one coin shall be issued.
If the target is less than 50,000 - then two coins shall be issued in the coin base.
This way multiple chains are equal. Given this. People can move accounts and transfer money between different chains.
Any chain with a proof of work chain is valid and it's easy to estimate the amount of value in them.
It seems to me a kinda
chaotic version of my own proposal PoCW. I say chaotic because it is more deconstructional and we should deal with a whole new data structure which is more complex than what is used in legacy blockchain. This is definitively a disadvantage: More sophisticated the model less predictable and more error prone it is.
As of the basic idea, rewarding miners proportional to their blocks' difficulty which is relatively similar to what I suggested in PoCW, obviously I admire it.
Few questions by the way:
1- How is it possible to keep track of difficulty and total coin supply?
2- Full nodes should validate all chains for inter-chain transactions. How this is handled?
3- Immutability of a confirmed transaction on the blockchain is not guaranteed only by the work done on the containing block it is achieved by total work of all of the next blocks in the chain. Dividing work between sub-chains escalates re-write attacks on weak chains. What's your mitigation?
As of the basic idea, rewarding miners proportional to their blocks' difficulty which is relatively similar to what I suggested in PoCW, obviously I admire it.
The purpose of technology is to help mankind and not the other way around. So, if it has to come down to redoing the entire data structure or coming up with a fresh perspective, as long as it solves the problem of scaling transactions in an immutable and decentralized way, it should be fine. Nothing is Chaotic.
As of the basic idea, rewarding miners proportional to their blocks' difficulty which is relatively similar to what I suggested in PoCW, obviously I admire it.
Interesting, I would like to look more deeply into your proposal if you can share with me the links to your concept.
1- How is it possible to keep track of difficulty and total coin supply?
You don't need to. You simply set it as a hardcoded value as part of the consensus protocol. Let's say the base target is 1,000,000 which requires 1 Th/s to compute a hash lower than 1,000,000.
Then, let's say: a hash generation for base target achievement rewards 100 coins.
If someone computes a hash lesser than a target of 500,000, assuming it takes 2 Th/s, then you simply reward them 200 coins.
This way just by looking at the hashes, you can compute the difficulty of the chain and the total coin supply. Also, you can add uncle features like in ethereum so that you can have lesser block times and more ways of calculating the heaviest chain.
To briefly answer your question, you can keep track of difficulty from the adjusted targets. You can keep track of the coin supply simply by figuring out how difficult of a hash was found. If the hash is a multiple of a base target, issue them x number of coins.2- Full nodes should validate all chains for inter-chain transactions. How this is handled?
It's not needed.
Let's say we both have to transfer funds. As long you are getting paid by a transfer agent on your own chain, you don't really need to be worried about how the transfer agent is managing his risk. As long as the transfer agent has a copy of the mother chain and a copy of the daughter chains ( 1- from where he is transferring payments and 2- from where he's transferring payments to) (OR) payment channels between the different parties involved - he doesn't need to know any more information about any further chains.
The transfer agent simply accepts the heaviest chain as valid (and the most valuable in case of a tie) in his subnetwork (indicated by a separate network ID on the broadcasted messages).
To briefly answer your question, No one needs to verify all the chains. Every block on the daughter chains simply link to the next blockhash of the mother chain in their headers. Hence, everyone just needs a copy of the mother chain and their respective daughter chain to find out the truth in a decentralized fashion. The heaviest, most valuable chain which is time valid (validated by checking the sequence of motherchain block hashes mentioned in the daughter chain) in a subnetwork is assumed to be the true chain.3- Immutability of a confirmed transaction on the blockchain is not guaranteed only by the work done on the containing block it is achieved by total work of all of the next blocks in the chain. Dividing work between sub-chains escalates re-write attacks on weak chains. What's your mitigation?
Proof of Work is not reusable.
What is stopping 51% attacks on bitcoin? It's simply because miners find more value in writing new blocks and creating coins for themselves instead of distorting an existing system and hence leading to a value in the currency - Not to mention the madness it will take to waste that kind of resources just to rewrite a few blocks with a not so certain outcome. It's called a free market.
Based on my above statement, the root of trust of bitcoin or anything that has to deal with linking to the checksum of blocks from the past comes down to people acting with honesty for profit.
Simply assume that there are a lot of systems out there like Bitcoin Cash, Bitcoin, Ethereum etc. and imagine if anyone could say just looking at their block-hashes, how many coins each miner and hence the entire system would have. That would effectively make all the coins of equal value because they are underwritten by an exact amount of CPU power (given that we also allow uncle blocks). Now, one could make an argument like yours that longer chains and chains with more hash rate are more trusted and their valuations could be higher than the weaker chains. In a free market this simpy means that it's a high risk payment and the transfer agent may charge higher fees for such a transfer. The main person at risk here is the payment transfer agent and this would amount to business risk in a free-market and the respective entities would resolve this. Maybe, the top miners would choose to act as transfer agents.Note: Give me until the end of this month. I will have a working proof of concept which you can fork and run and stress test the system for yourself.
