Wasabi Wallet 1.0 Is Released

[layer1gfx]

some retweets in may on https://twitter.com/wasabiwallet

WasabiWallet Retweeted @PurseIO May 3

If you're going to be making online purchases @PurseIO has some good advice

You can achieve privacy on your Amazon purchases, today:

1. Use @wasabiwallet to secure your coins anonymity
2. Sign up on http://Purse.io  and use a P.O Box or package forwarder address
3. Get 20% off on your Amazon purchases.
4. Enjoy

---

WasabiWallet Retweeted Hajdú Gergely @gergely_hajdu May 2



Since August 1, 2018. @wasabiwallet made over 30 000 BTC fungible!
Over 3210 successful mixing rounds!

[1714017093]

1714017093

[layer1gfx]

Retweeted by @WasabiWallet

Wasabi Wallet FAQ
https://github.com/6102bitcoin/FAQ/blob/master/wasabi.md


Day 2 Videos for #UnderstandingBitcoin:     

DEMO - @wasabiwallet by @nopara73

https://t.co/M4ZgHIPfuf

[layer1gfx]

congratulations to wasabi wallet, it is well deserved!

Code:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

Hello all,

this is to announce that we're awarding:
* 10 BTC to JoinMarket, for the first practical CoinJoin solution, and continued research into progressing this domain.
* 10 BTC to Wasabi, for building a more end-user accessible solution and larger adoption.

The remainder of the funds is left for future solutions with more ubiquitous impact on the ecosystem.

For those watching, 822f559df14894bd57bdd1ef0ab983228b7816a69d035cc1c5d18fb569ee5e94 is the payout transaction, crediting
several individual contributors directly as requested by the winning projects, and aggregating the remaining bounty funds
into a single UTXO. It is (obviously) a joined transaction, mixed with other transfers.

Congratulations!
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Congratulations to the Wasabi and JoinMarket developers! JoinMarket pioneered a lot of CoinJoin science (and BTW, belcher wrote an excellent & comprehensive wiki article on privacy), while Wasabi is the first wallet that implements CoinJoin in both a highly-usable and sound way. As both a signer and a donor to the CoinJoin bounty fund, I'm thrilled that these two pieces of software exist!

For everyone looking to improve their privacy, I highly recommend checking out Wasabi, especially over centralized "mixers".


Further work is still necessary toward achieving default-fungibility, which is IMO the end goal. Even with Wasabi, you need a fair bit of expertise to maintain privacy, and the vast majority of people are using wallets that are terrible privacy-wise. Without intending to say that the bounty fund will reward people for these specific things, I'd personally like to see:

 - Improvements to make Wasabi more of a complete wallet.
 - CoinJoin integration in other wallets, especially Bitcoin Core.
 - Research on doing CoinJoin in decentralized ways. (Wasabi's method is pretty secure, but requires a centralized coordinator.)
 - Other research (and, perhaps more importantly, usable products) for improving day-to-day privacy.

[Dancing_Coin]

Hi guys!

Don't you have a mobile wallet?

[TryNinja]

Hi guys!

Don't you have a mobile wallet?

No. But AFAIK it is (or at least it was) planned: https://github.com/zkSNACKs/Meta/issues/9

[Dancing_Coin]

Hi guys!

Don't you have a mobile wallet?

No. But AFAIK it is (or at least it was) planned: https://github.com/zkSNACKs/Meta/issues/9

Ok let's take a look
thnx

[logfiles]

The YouTube video shared here was deleted. Is there any other explainer video about Wasabi wallet features and how to use it available?

This video explains more about this specific Wasaby Wallet
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdRXVZ0IOu

[DireWolfM14]

Can I recover a seed generated by Electrum with an extension?

[nopara73]

> Can I recover a seed generated by Electrum with an extension?

Only if it's a bech32 wallet.

[BitMaxz]

> Can I recover a seed generated by Electrum with an extension?

Only if it's a bech32 wallet.

No, if it's generated from Electrum even it's bench32 (bc1) addresses it will give you different addresses after you recover with a seed generated from Electrum.

I already tested it and it gives me different addresses.

[nopara73]

> No, if it's generated from Electrum even it's bench32 (bc1) addresses it will give you different addresses after you recover with a seed generated from Electrum.

Oh really? Is this some configuration issue? I only tested the other way around. 

There's one trick you have to pay attention that comes to my mind. In Wasabi we use password as the passphrase, so you cannot arbitrarily choose your password in the recovery tab, because it'll act like a passphrase, too. You will want to leave the password empty in case you don't have a passphrase in Electrum. 

[Chris!]

I've recommended wasabi to so many people at this point but never thought to look for posts on bitcointalk. It came at just the right time with all centralized mixers getting pwned in one swipe. I'll be following along to see what else comes up down the road!

[OmegaStarScream]

I was browsing reddit & saw this tweet

If you are using wasabi, you need to read this thread: https://t.co/FL7f30nWeC

"With Wasabi if you are mixing 10 BTC, I can trivially track that 10 BTC as it is peeled down into smaller utxos. The left over change is part of the mix tx, and thus creates a determinstic link"

I have concern about part where Wasabi CoinJoin output is ordered by registration/enqueue time, i checked few of CoinJoin history & apparently most of them have behavior mentioned on twitter/telegram. Any thoughts?

The developer responded about that accusation yesterday: https://medium.com/@nopara73/wasabileaks-is-wasabi-wallet-deanonymized-5e3f679d866e

[layer1gfx]

i prefer wasabi, to be honest.
good article by nopara73, great he took the time to talk through all of the allegations.

[layer1gfx]

Dávid Molnár published a new article on medium: PROTECTING PRIVACY WITH WASABI WALLET
there he explains why we need privacy, fungibility and how to improve on privacy.



here is the youtube video of david's presentation at the Bitcoin2019 conference on this topic:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLOMcU8MhWM

[Wind_FURY]

I found this while doing some research on JoinMarket, Wasabi, and Samourai. It's a PSA/blog made by Samourai's team, of all people.

nopara73, can you comment?

https://medium.com/samourai-wallet/updated-psa-wasabi-wallet-is-the-target-of-ongoing-behavior-that-appears-to-be-a-sybil-attack-6674a322e187

On July 22nd we disclosed that an unknown entity was engaging in a strange pattern of address reuse within Wasabi Wallet transactions created since June 1, 2019. The disclosure focused on a single entity (ANON-2300390908). This entity was easy to discover due to very uncommon behavior, such as using the same address on both sides of a mix transaction. Our claim was that this behavior could indicate an attempt to de-anonymize users of the platform as well as highlighting an incomplete implementation of the ZeroLink protocol as coded by Wasabi Wallet.

Our continued investigations have revealed systematic and ongoing patterns of behavior resembling a Sybil attack within the Wasabi platform. There are a small number of entities (perhaps a small group of users, or a single user) that represent a large part of the UTXOs active in Wasabi mix transactions. This activity has been ongoing in various waves of intensity since January 2019.

[layer1gfx]

I found this while doing some research on JoinMarket, Wasabi, and Samourai. It's a PSA/blog made by Samourai's team, of all people.

nopara73, can you comment?

https://medium.com/samourai-wallet/updated-psa-wasabi-wallet-is-the-target-of-ongoing-behavior-that-appears-to-be-a-sybil-attack-6674a322e187

Few concerns are answered on https://medium.com/@nopara73/address-reuse-in-wasabi-ef9e308c9175 which written on same day as Samourai's article.
I'm not sure whether it's response to Samourai's article or written after Samourai's article posted though

we had this situation before and i start to believe samourai does this all on purpose to pick a fight with wasabi.
maybe... some of their concerns are even legit... but their presentation is a tiny bit too dramatic to be considered as just a friendly criticism.
i am with team wasabi. go debunk that shite!

[nopara73]

A Sybil attack is when one party participates in a coinjoin with most of the peers. For example Samourai knows everyone's past and future wallet addresses, except the few Dojo users. In this case Dojo users are Sybil attacked by Samourai by design. In Wasabi, the participant who reuses 2 addresses in many rounds only participates as one peer in a round. This party participated in 10% of the coinjoins only as one peer. 99% of us in a round are not affected. Then they go on to talk about other kind of address reuses, like donations and coordinator address and such and somehow want to extend the logic of the first case, which was flawed to begin with to these too. The fact of the matter is that no other address reuse types reuse addresses in both the input and in the output side, so Sybil is not even a question here. But also, getting back to their first example, if someone would want to Sybil, then that someone wouldn't modify Wasabi's code to reuse 2 addresses in the first place, because a successful Sybil attack needs to be unnoticed. The only thing that address reuser achieved is for Samourai to build a carefully engineered media lie campaign. Only they benefited from this and nobody's privacy has been ruined by this. Based on their scammer history, chances are they're doing that in the first place.

[Wind_FURY]

A Sybil attack is when one party participates in a coinjoin with most of the peers. For example Samourai knows everyone's past and future wallet addresses, except the few Dojo users. In this case Dojo users are Sybil attacked by Samourai by design. In Wasabi, the participant who reuses 2 addresses in many rounds only participates as one peer in a round. This party participated in 10% of the coinjoins only as one peer. 99% of us in a round are not affected. Then they go on to talk about other kind of address reuses, like donations and coordinator address and such and somehow want to extend the logic of the first case, which was flawed to begin with to these too. The fact of the matter is that no other address reuse types reuse addresses in both the input and in the output side, so Sybil is not even a question here. But also, getting back to their first example, if someone would want to Sybil, then that someone wouldn't modify Wasabi's code to reuse 2 addresses in the first place, because a successful Sybil attack needs to be unnoticed. The only thing that address reuser achieved is for Samourai to build a carefully engineered media lie campaign. Only they benefited from this and nobody's privacy has been ruined by this. Based on their scammer history, chances are they're doing that in the first place.

But then, is there any other reason for "why" the address reuse by that particular "participant"? The question not intended as a challenge, but out of curiousity.

[layer1gfx]

“Use CoinJoin, but learn about it and don’t assume you are private. Always mix.”

Coindesk: A Battle Between Bitcoin Wallets Has Big Implications for Privacy