Google has come up with quantum supremacy through which calculations can be performed in a very short time and the same can't be cracked by the conventional conputer used all around.
This serves to be a tool in the hands of hackers, criminals to crack blockchain based cryptocurrencies like bitcoin ans others to be the targets. Also it is stated to crack the encryption upon which the internet is built on. Later news revealed it isn't that powerful to crack bitcoin. Right now it has got only 53 qbits, to crack the bitcoin there is need for at least 1500 qbits. This way no nees to fear about the encryption of the algorithm.
LOL, do you think that quantum computers will be mass produces if ever they successfully crack 2^256 code? so it will not be for everyone's used. And for the record, there are a lot of development from behind. So far the following are candidates.
[1] Lamport Signature - (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lamport_signature#Public_key_for_multiple_messages)
[2] Multivariate cryptography - (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multivariate_cryptography)
[3] Lattice-based cryptography - (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lattice-based_cryptography)
for the record though, bitcoin addresses are not at risk to attack not unless the attacker know your public key. The only way to attack us is that if the QC is fast enough to obtain our public key in a few minutes based on our private key.
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When you talk about a 256-bit key, it’s only, exclusively, in a symmetric cryptographic system — this code can and should be sorted out completely. In other words, the key can be any of the possible values of 256 bits (in fairness, it should be noted that not every single option can be a key even in a symmetric system, there are weak keys that are unacceptable, but there are an insignificant number of them).
If we are talking about asymmetric cryptography, then not all options from two to the power of 256 can be keys.
If you are afraid of quantum computers, then this is not the danger that you should pay attention to.
Although, it is asymmetric systems that can easily be opened with the Shore algorithm in the presence of quantum computing.
I persistently draw your attention to the danger of elliptical cryptography in the case of cryptanalysis, or in other words, a mathematical attack, rather than brute force attack.
Check the facts:
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The American mathematician and cryptographer Neil Koblitz, is (along with Victor Miller) one of those two people who in 1985 simultaneously and independently came up with a new public-key crypto scheme, called ECC (this, we recall, is an abbreviation for Elliptic Curve Cryptography , that is, "cryptography on elliptic curves").
Without going deep into the technical details of this method and its difference from the RSA cryptographic scheme that appeared earlier, we note that ECC has obvious advantages from the point of view of practical operation, since the same theoretical stability of the algorithm is provided with a much shorter key length (for comparison: 256-bit ECC operations are equivalent to working with a 3072-bit module in RSA). And this greatly simplifies the calculations and significantly improves the system performance.
The second important point (almost certainly related to the first) is that the extremely secretive NSA in its cryptographic preferences from the very beginning began to lean in favor of ECC. (!)
In the early years and decades, this reached the academic and industrial circles only in an implicit form (when, for example, in 1997, an official of the NSA, Jerry Solinas, first spoke at the Crypto public conference - with a report on their modification of the famous Koblitz scheme).
Well, then, it was already documented. In 2005, the NSA published its recommendations on cryptographic algorithms, in the form of the so-called Suite B (“Set B”) - a set of openly published ciphers for hiding secret and top-secret information in national communication systems.
All the basic components of this document were built on the basis of ECC, and for RSA, the auxiliary role of the “first generation” (!) Was assigned, necessary only for a smooth transition to a new, more efficient cryptography on elliptic curves ... (!)
Now we need to remember about Alfred Menezes, the second co-author of the article about "Puzzle, shrouded in a riddle." The Canadian mathematician and cryptographer Menezes has been working at the University of Waterloo, one of the most famous centers of open academic cryptography, all his scientific life since the mid-1980s. It was here that in the 1980s, three university professors created Certicom, a company that developed and commercialized cryptography on elliptic curves.
Accordingly, Alfred Menezes eventually became not only a prominent Certicom developer and author of several authoritative books on ECC crypto circuits, but also a co-author of several important patents describing ECC. Well, the NSA, in turn, when it launched its entire project called Suite B, previously purchased from Certicom a large (twenty-odd) package of patents covering “elliptical” cryptography.
This whole preamble was needed in order to explain why Koblitz and Menezes are precisely those people who, for natural reasons, considered themselves knowledgeable about the current affairs and plans of the NSA in the field of cryptographic information protection.
However, for them, the NSA initiative with a sharp change of course to post-quantum algorithms was a complete surprise. (!)
Back in the summer of 2015 (!) The NSA “quietly”, without explaining absolutely to anyone, removed the “P-256” ECC algorithm from its kit, while leaving it with its RSA equivalent with a 3072-bit module. Moreover, in the NSA's accompanying statements it was quite clearly said that all parties implementing the algorithms from Suite B now no longer make any sense to switch to ECC, but it is better to simply increase the RSA key lengths and wait until new post-quantum ciphers appear ...
But why? What is the reason for such a sharp rollback to the old RSA system?
