MIner Question

[BrewMaster]

IMO if someone attempt to make double-spend attack, most likely they would try to fool multiple parties and using multiple identity (e.g. deposit smaller amount of Bitcoin with multiple account on exchange rather than make a huge Bitcoin deposit to smooth the attack).

splitting millions of dollars into smaller sizes is so hard and it also needs to ge as many people involved as the victims. not only finding that many victims accepting such still large amounts is hard but also it means more legal action against the attacker. nowadays with all tracking that is done specially in exchanges it is not easy to get away with that kind of scam.

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[Dabs]

Any attack will be short lived. People will forget about it in a few days and only the affected parties will have something to complain about. Unless of course, the attack is done on a multitude of people or of such a scale that it affects entire groups or populations or accounts.

Again, anyone who actually gets to control 51% would much rather keep the coins mined honestly than risk losing it to some attack they're not sure will have any effect anyway. If I had 60% of bitcoin hashing power, I'd make it look like I had 6 different mining pools or something so no one else knows, and just keep the coins.

[squatter]

A potential attacker would need to act economically irrationally to successfully launch a 51% attack, when only looking at the attack in terms of bitcoin.

That "economically irrational attacker" would be wasting resources. The network is made of people, capable of coming to consensus if there was a direct threat.

What the troll said was that the miners could collude. But would they? They would be opening a strong debate for a POW change.

As PrimeNumber7 pointed out, they would be economically irrational with regard to Bitcoin's incentive system.

That doesn't rule out incentives external to Bitcoin. Let's say the Chinese government simply wanted to crush Bitcoin with a sustained 51% attack. They could systematically co-opt mining farms, threaten pool admins with imprisonment if they don't cooperate, etc.

Not that I think it would be successful long term -- I'm just pointing out a situation where a majority of miners might be incentivized to collude against the network. Indeed a POW change could eventually thwart the attack, but it's interesting to ponder what kind of damage they could do in terms of market confidence and adoption.

[Wind_FURY]

^^ the thing about  51% attack is that it can only be considered an attack and also be profitable if it is accompanied by an actual double spend otherwise just replacing an already mined block with a block the attacker mines has no benefits with the same exact transactions has no benefits.

when speaking of profit you first have to factor in the cost. and since the cost of 51% attack is in the millions of dollars the transaction that is being double spent must be worth millions of dollars.

now that we establishes the tx value we have to think of a trade that involves a transaction worth millions of dollars and the other party doesn't ask for a high number of confirmation such as at least 30. such trade does not exist in real world. nobody has ever made such a transaction and only accepted low number of confirmations ever.
with that kind of high confirmation requirement the cost of performing a successful 51% just shot up into billions of dollars instead.

IMO if someone attempt to make double-spend attack, most likely they would try to fool multiple parties and using multiple identity (e.g. deposit smaller amount of Bitcoin with multiple account on exchange rather than make a huge Bitcoin deposit to smooth the attack).

That "economically irrational attacker" would be wasting resources. The network is made of people, capable of coming to consensus if there was a direct threat.

What the troll said was that the miners could collude. But would they? They would be opening a strong debate for a POW change.

How about scenario mentioned by @BrewMaster?

I already said it, that the Bitcoin network is composed of people. They would be wasting resources. POW change to hard fork the network away from bad acting miners would be strongly debated.

[PrimeNumber7]

Somewhere in the troll's post, is part of the answer on WHY anyone who can afford a 51% attack will never dare actually do it.

A potential attacker would need to act economically irrationally to successfully launch a 51% attack, when only looking at the attack in terms of bitcoin.

This means that bitcoin, or crypto in general would need to be an immediate threat to whoever is launching the attack. I don't see bitcoin being this much of a threat to any entity with the resources to pull off a 51% attack.

That "economically irrational attacker" would be wasting resources. The network is made of people, capable of coming to consensus if there was a direct threat.

What the troll said was that the miners could collude. But would they? They would be opening a strong debate for a POW change.

The mining operation would lose money, however a potential attacker would not be trying to be making money via mining, but rather would be trying to profit by harming bitcoin, or maybe would be trying to avoid losses by harming bitcoin.

A potential attacker would be one with a lot of resources, and a lot to lose if bitcoin were to succeed. A potential attacker could either buy up mining equipment, or if it was a government entity, could seize miners physically located within the country.

[Wind_FURY]

Somewhere in the troll's post, is part of the answer on WHY anyone who can afford a 51% attack will never dare actually do it.

A potential attacker would need to act economically irrationally to successfully launch a 51% attack, when only looking at the attack in terms of bitcoin.

This means that bitcoin, or crypto in general would need to be an immediate threat to whoever is launching the attack. I don't see bitcoin being this much of a threat to any entity with the resources to pull off a 51% attack.

That "economically irrational attacker" would be wasting resources. The network is made of people, capable of coming to consensus if there was a direct threat.

What the troll said was that the miners could collude. But would they? They would be opening a strong debate for a POW change.

The mining operation would lose money, however a potential attacker would not be trying to be making money via mining, but rather would be trying to profit by harming bitcoin, or maybe would be trying to avoid losses by harming bitcoin.

A potential attacker would be one with a lot of resources, and a lot to lose if bitcoin were to succeed. A potential attacker could either buy up mining equipment, or if it was a government entity, could seize miners physically located within the country.

OK. But first explain how a bad actor could off-set the potential wasted resources from a 51% attack, and would that it be better to profit through honest mining.

[figmentofmyass]

OK. But first explain how a bad actor could off-set the potential wasted resources from a 51% attack, and would that it be better to profit through honest mining.

he just explained how:

A potential attacker could either buy up mining equipment, or if it was a government entity, could seize miners physically located within the country.

the government threat is the reason why china's share of the hash rate is concerning. they could take control of all the major mining farms, pools, even the chip manufacturers.

i'm also paranoid about stuff like antbleed (the backdoor bitmain built into antminer firmware) which could play a role in this kind of theoretical attack.

[Wind_FURY]

OK. But first explain how a bad actor could off-set the potential wasted resources from a 51% attack, and would that it be better to profit through honest mining.

he just explained how:

A potential attacker could either buy up mining equipment, or if it was a government entity, could seize miners physically located within the country.

the government threat is the reason why china's share of the hash rate is concerning. they could take control of all the major mining farms, pools, even the chip manufacturers.

i'm also paranoid about stuff like antbleed (the backdoor bitmain built into antminer firmware) which could play a role in this kind of theoretical attack.

Then that's where we might be underestimating the fact that the Bitcoin network/protocol is composed of people. I believe if there was that direct threat from the Chinese government, a POW change is in the discussion.

[squatter]

I believe if there was that direct threat from the Chinese government, a POW change is in the discussion.

Such a POW change is not a cut and dried decision. To some, it would indicate the ultimate failure of Bitcoin's economic model. And ousting SHA256 miners would effectively pull the rug out from underneath the economy. A blockchain split would be inevitable and the security of the forked chain would be highly questionable.

It'd be interesting to see how that would play out, but it's not something I hope for. In that sense, maybe it's a good thing that local authorities are pressuring Sichuan miners to scale down.

[Wind_FURY]

I believe if there was that direct threat from the Chinese government, a POW change is in the discussion.

Such a POW change is not a cut and dried decision. To some, it would indicate the ultimate failure of Bitcoin's economic model. And ousting SHA256 miners would effectively pull the rug out from underneath the economy. A blockchain split would be inevitable and the security of the forked chain would be highly questionable.

It'd be interesting to see how that would play out, but it's not something I hope for. In that sense, maybe it's a good thing that local authorities are pressuring Sichuan miners to scale down.

How would mitigating a direct catastrophic threat be an "ultimate failure" if the mitigation is what would actually save the network/protocol?

But, ultimately, I believe the threat/fear of a POW change will cause miners to sort themselves out. Their interests are tied directly to the network/protocol.

[squatter]

Such a POW change is not a cut and dried decision. To some, it would indicate the ultimate failure of Bitcoin's economic model. And ousting SHA256 miners would effectively pull the rug out from underneath the economy. A blockchain split would be inevitable and the security of the forked chain would be highly questionable.

It'd be interesting to see how that would play out, but it's not something I hope for. In that sense, maybe it's a good thing that local authorities are pressuring Sichuan miners to scale down.

How would mitigating a direct catastrophic threat be an "ultimate failure" if the mitigation is what would actually save the network/protocol?

Bitcoin's entire model is based on rationally incentivizing honest mining. This case would prove that the existing incentives are insufficient to actually achieve that. It would be a catastrophic blow to confidence in the system.

Do you really think we can just brick all existing mining hardware without consequences?

[Wind_FURY]

I believe if there was that direct threat from the Chinese government, a POW change is in the discussion.

Such a POW change is not a cut and dried decision. To some, it would indicate the ultimate failure of Bitcoin's economic model. And ousting SHA256 miners would effectively pull the rug out from underneath the economy. A blockchain split would be inevitable and the security of the forked chain would be highly questionable.

It'd be interesting to see how that would play out, but it's not something I hope for. In that sense, maybe it's a good thing that local authorities are pressuring Sichuan miners to scale down.

How would mitigating a direct catastrophic threat be an "ultimate failure" if the mitigation is what would actually save the network/protocol?

But, ultimately, I believe the threat/fear of a POW change will cause miners to sort themselves out. Their interests are tied directly to the network/protocol.

Miner's interests are tied to the ASIC infrastructure they have built,
their are at least 3 major coins, they can support or switch too.
Thinking they have any loyalty to any coin is a opinion not a fact.
Their loyalty lies with their personal hardware infrastructure and whichever coin provides the highest profit margin in their own opinion.
Due to the reward drop this year and the majority of fees moving to LN, Bitcoin status as the most profitable could decline verses the others.
As in any conflict, best interests and support will change with different conditions.

That debate I can accept, and say "we can only leave it to the market, the miners, the users". But the assumption that the majority of fees will be moving to LN this year, no it won't.

Plus ask you yourselves, "Will miners, developers, and users truly leave Bitcoin for Bitcoin Cash or SV"?

Such a POW change is not a cut and dried decision. To some, it would indicate the ultimate failure of Bitcoin's economic model. And ousting SHA256 miners would effectively pull the rug out from underneath the economy. A blockchain split would be inevitable and the security of the forked chain would be highly questionable.

It'd be interesting to see how that would play out, but it's not something I hope for. In that sense, maybe it's a good thing that local authorities are pressuring Sichuan miners to scale down.

How would mitigating a direct catastrophic threat be an "ultimate failure" if the mitigation is what would actually save the network/protocol?

Bitcoin's entire model is based on rationally incentivizing honest mining. This case would prove that the existing incentives are insufficient to actually achieve that. It would be a catastrophic blow to confidence in the system.

Do you really think we can just brick all existing mining hardware without consequences?

The debate started from "the miners are stopped from being rational". If they continued to be rational, no problem.

[squatter]

The debate started from "the miners are stopped from being rational".

No, it was about a situation where incentives external to the protocol might override block rewards. All game theory assumes that miners will be rational.

Hypothetical situation: The Chinese government pays miners to attack the network, and threatens those who don't comply with prison time. Wouldn't it be rational for Chinese miners to engage in the attack? I think so...

[Wind_FURY]

The debate started from "the miners are stopped from being rational".

No, it was about a situation where incentives external to the protocol might override block rewards. All game theory assumes that miners will be rational.

Hypothetical situation: The Chinese government pays miners to attack the network, and threatens those who don't comply with prison time. Wouldn't it be rational for Chinese miners to engage in the attack? I think so...

NO, that would show the Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, and SV communities that the miners that accepted payment can be irrational, and can never be trusted. POW change, their attack would cost them everything.

I believe it might bring the Bitcoin community together again, maybe for a short time.

[Dabs]

Someone could be shorting bitcoin, and to make sure that happens, they attack it. They'd have to spend an ungodly amount for the attack, keep it sustained, watch the price go down to whatever level they need it to go to, and profit.

In order to make it worth their while, they'd have to at least double what they spent on the attack, so we're looking at millions at stake.

POW change is very unlikely as currently this is the most secure it's ever been.

[Stedsm]

--snip--

Plus ask you yourselves, "Will miners, developers, and users truly leave Bitcoin for Bitcoin Cash or SV"?

I don't really think that anybody would leave or divert or shift (whatever you call it) their mining power to any shit coins unless BTC's security becomes questionable and encounters the possible attacks OP started talking about. It's not just the 51% attack alone that could destroy BTC but the interest of miners is one another major consensus that could leave you, me and everyone empty handed as well as scratching our heads off if they ever decide to drop this Bitcoin thing right there because of their personal (possible) losses that they may face because of lower prices and not being able to even break even, and as many miners mine for economic gains too, if they see more profits while mining other 2 coins you talked about (and even any other coin they think to be the next Bitcoin and what not), it will literally do a lot of harm to the economy of BTC and may slide it down from its (1^st) position that it has been holding since a decade.

[Dabs]

If you were a miner, and not just any small home hobby miner, but someone who has maybe at least 1% of the network OR otherwise has significant investments = such as renting a warehouse or other building and have a whole floor or shelf of equipment... and suppose you mined enough to pay all relevant bills, electricity mostly with some change leftover, or enough to make it worth your while ...

Would you do anything else that could possibly harm your source of income?

The ones I hear about, a lot of them are legit miners who don't want any attention, have basic physical security, and just mine quietly in their little buildings, paying all their bills, pretending to be some other type of business with almost no other social interaction. Just enough not to be noticed.

[squatter]

The debate started from "the miners are stopped from being rational".

No, it was about a situation where incentives external to the protocol might override block rewards. All game theory assumes that miners will be rational.

Hypothetical situation: The Chinese government pays miners to attack the network, and threatens those who don't comply with prison time. Wouldn't it be rational for Chinese miners to engage in the attack? I think so...

NO, that would show the Bitcoin [community] that the miners that accepted payment can be irrational, and can never be trusted.

That's not irrational behavior given the circumstances.

In any case, you're conceding my point -- if we can't depend on miners to be honest, how can we have confidence in the system's ability to secure our money? Even if the community rallied around a hard fork, what is the basis for user confidence in the new (and much less secure POW-wise) fork? What is to stop this from happening again?

[Wind_FURY]

The debate started from "the miners are stopped from being rational".

No, it was about a situation where incentives external to the protocol might override block rewards. All game theory assumes that miners will be rational.

Hypothetical situation: The Chinese government pays miners to attack the network, and threatens those who don't comply with prison time. Wouldn't it be rational for Chinese miners to engage in the attack? I think so...

NO, that would show the Bitcoin [community] that the miners that accepted payment can be irrational, and can never be trusted.

That's not irrational behavior given the circumstances.

In any case, you're conceding my point -- if we can't depend on miners to be honest, how can we have confidence in the system's ability to secure our money? Even if the community rallied around a hard fork, what is the basis for user confidence in the new (and much less secure POW-wise) fork? What is to stop this from happening again?

IT IS irrational. Sacrificing the fundamental nature of their business, ending it, and all potential future profits by being corrupted is rational? Jihan Wu would be the first to call for a POW change if he saw it. Hahaha.

[squatter]

Hypothetical situation: The Chinese government pays miners to attack the network, and threatens those who don't comply with prison time. Wouldn't it be rational for Chinese miners to engage in the attack? I think so...

IT IS irrational. Sacrificing the fundamental nature of their business, ending it, and all potential future profits by being corrupted is rational?

Are you just trolling?

We're talking about a situation where the government is physically co-opting mining farms and threatening miners with prison time. Business concerns went out the window a long time ago...