Proof of Work is the right consensus mechanism for exchanging value trustlessly

[bitmover]

Proof of Stake in some altcoin might maintain more value because of interest (Stake) earned... if the company is trustworthy and has a good plan.

You must have a different definition of the word "value" to me. 

The earned stake may be illusionary profit if your stake lost value. This is what happen to a lot of PoS projects.

When the price of Bitcoin goes down, Proof of Work is a guaranteed loss.

I dont think this is true. The miner doesn't need to hold the earned bitcoin, he can just sell it. If there was a profit when he was mining, he can just sell the BTC to pay for his operation costs and take out the profit.

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[HeRetiK]

Proof of Stake in some altcoin might maintain more value because of interest (Stake) earned... if the company is trustworthy and has a good plan.

Interest earned is unlikely to even remotely compensate for a bear market, ie. 5% interest are a drop in the bucket in the face of a 50% downturn. Of course stakers like miners don't necessarily need to realize their losses, but still... if I'd wanted to invest in a company... I'd invest in a company.

[franky1]

here is the thing
having the main economic nodes of exchanges and merchant services also being the main stake custodians is a huge risk which regulators can poke at..
even if they HAD a algo to slash exchange stake if 1 exchange changed things the fantasy is that.. however.. if all economic nodes(many exchanges grouped together like the UAHF/NY agreement style). they can just remove code parts that threaten their stake/hoard)

it is more of a network protocol risk because there is no financial loss/risk/cost to those custodians/services because they would be the ones still accepting those new style blocks as valid.. thus not 'slashing' their own reward. thus no risk/no cost


in a PoS state..
if the major exchanges and merchants were the main Stake pools.. and they VIA REGULATOR INSTRUCTION done a UAHF (NY agreement comparable)
where some main custodians agree on a new path..
DUE TO REGULATORS mandating that exchanges perform a change..

guess what
those exchanges/merchants most people use continue to accept the blocks of their mandated new regulatory approved change. and reject the old paradigm.

the new paradigm/feature/direction activates and the regulated exchanges/services continue to trade on that chain as if it is the main chain.. and because they are both the main economic nodes (exchanges/merchant tools) and the block creators... users not supporting the UAHF(NY agreement comparable) end up being rejected by the most popular services(exchanges)

its not a simple idea of  users not supporting a change 'lets reject those new blocks and destroy/slash coins of those support it"
its actually the opposite way round those not wanting the new feature get rejected by the main regulated(economic node) exchanges.. where the new feature opposers are left as a altcoin. destroying coins on their altcoin. and also detached from being recognised by the main exchanges/services.. thus end up as a useless alt

in the end those rejecting the new feature have then a choice.. be left to follow some useless altcoin that has no exchange/merchant support.. or re establish themselves with the (USAF/NY/mandate activated comparison) feature chain to be then be re established to have value on the chain that exchanges are accepting..

compare that to the FUD spoke about bitcoin risks of "51% attack"
bitcoins decentralisation talks about the FUD fear of a 51% attack that only causes
1. a empty block risk for prolonged period which doesnt benefit the attacker in the long run(cant spend if they are empty blocking the potential spends)
or
2.redoing old blocks to do a chain re-org to double spend certain tx they control (but that is only worth performing if the value they want to re-unconfirm to respend are not worth the attack cost amount of value..
thus not worth trying.)

[dezoel]

I disagree. It is not the system or mechanism that is the best or worst in any situation, it is the blockchain and its code. I could write a proof of work that is horrible and I could write a proof of stake that is better, or I could write a great proof of work and a horrible proof of stake. Both are possible and people who do not understand it are people who have no idea how things work.

I personally believe that ETH becoming proof of stake is not easy, it is taking a lot of work and effort to turn it into POS but the reality is that we are talking about something that is a bit more difficult to handle so it is going to be a bit longer to adjust to this new life.

[franky1]

I disagree. It is not the system or mechanism that is the best or worst in any situation,

signing a block. requires no work/cost
thus its simply a game of who has decision power (who do people follow)

EG

if people decide to follow a block the main thing is the why.
in PoW its the not just
a block that reaches most nodes the quickest
a block that follows the rules that is the quickest
a block that everyone then agrees they seen first thats valid

but also in PoW that block has to have done X work, which:
is not just about cost. but also an extra layer of puzzle complication, which not any random/chosen person can do in milliseconds(unlike PoS)

PoS does not have this extra layer which means chain re-orgs are both cheap and easy to perform.
heck PoS is just a 2 layer of "fastest first" they are always in a constant state of re-org. they have several possible blocks that are quickest seen. and then confirm when one of them gets far enough ahead of a threshold height.

on a PoS chain it becomes easy to perform them by, for instance easily changing code to have the initial peer connections to connect to specific DNS which then tell peers to follow certain nodes. which then control which relayed data to see first

where as in PoW if a certain DNS listed certain peers. those peers data that connect to selected pool(s). still need to perform expensive work to even have a block thats acceptable to the network. thus cant be easily manipulated to just accept some "quickest first" peer of their choosing