Coin mixing vs coin joining vs Monero converting

[Flyingbeaver]

Which method is the most effective?

[1715519630]

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[1715519630]

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[sheenshane]

You can include a P2P exchange for this which I believed it's safe and effective to cover your anonymity.  
As long as you're using a decentralized exchange no one can track your identity.

theymos created this thread [Guide] Decent mixing methods which I think will give you an insight into anonymity comparison between monero and coinjoin or mixing coin.

However, not only a single transaction will make your transactions becomes anonymous which is my choice IMO in Monero converting.
Just sell your Bitcoin to Monero multiple times using different amounts or split your Bitcoin into different transactions with different (x) amounts and buy Monero and when you have Monero, just sell it for Bitcoin.  It might that would be solved the anonymity case, IMO.

[DaveF]

That link he is still has wasabi. Read here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.0;all  and here: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5419000.0
There are other places but depending on your opinion they can no longer be fully trusted.

It also depends on the amounts and how much time and effort you want to put in and so on.
Ignoring that fact that I am wearing a chip mixer signature and they do a fairly good job of protecting your identity a good way is.

BTC -> a non KYC exchange use a free / disposable email -> convert to XMR -> withdraw -> send to another non KYC exchange with a different free / disposable email -> convert to BTC -> withdraw. And you can go to places that offer free wi-fi for every step so you are even more difficult to track.

Or use another coinjoin service or JoinMarket

Many options.
Or just don't worry about it and spend you BTC

-Dave

[BitcoinGirl.Club]

I will go with coin joining and monero converting but as DaveF said it's hard to trust anything. If you are in bitcoin then only risk the amount you want to sell instead of doing all at once. Take x portion and convert them in monero using any swap site. Then sell the monero for cash.

[BlackHatCoiner]

There are no privacy solutions. Only tradeoffs. That's my list:

CoinJoin
Pros:

• You don't lose custody of your coins.
• It can be very cheap.
• It can be effective, provided there's a lot of liquidity.

Cons:

• You might get some privacy, but it's comparably easy to trace, by following the outputs.
• It might take time to find some partners.
• Authorities can buy up a lot of liquidity, and coinjoin. As a result, it's a lot easier to trace later.

Reputable mixers
Pros:

• Mixing can be free.
• There's a lot more liquidity.
• It's more effective than coinjoin, because the coins have no input-output connection.
• It's easy to do.

Cons:

• You forfeit the ownership of your coins.
• You need to trust that the mixer isn't a honeypot.
• Central points of failure can be shut down by authorities.

BTC <-> XMR
Pros:

• It's very effective if used properly.
• You don't lose custody.
• You don't trust any entity, nor can it be stopped by authorities (if trading peer-to-peer).

Cons:

• You need to hold XMR for undefined time, which is a different asset, and can therefore result in unexpected price fluctuations.
• You're charged highly if using a peer-to-peer decentralized exchange.
• Liquidity isn't the best, compared to the other two.

Note that the above assumes you're running and connecting to your own Bitcoin full node (and Monero full node for the last part), and that you're aware of coin control. It is very easy to screw it up with privacy.

[Flyingbeaver]

Note that the above assumes you're running and connecting to your own Bitcoin full node (and Monero full node for the last part), and that you're aware of coin control. It is very easy to screw it up with privacy.

Why do I have to have my own full node for it to be effective? How is it not effective otherwise?

[BlackHatCoiner]

Why do I have to have my own full node for it to be effective? How is it not effective otherwise?

If you don't run your own full node, you need to rely to someone else to serve you the balance of your wallet. But, to do that, you need to give it either some addresses or your master public key. Therefore, if the server is a honeypot, it can link your mixed outputs together. And that's true for both bitcoin and monero, even though it's significantly more private to use SPV in the latter due to the usage of ring signatures and stealth addresses.

[garlonicon]

Just use deniability. I saw that when I sent my own coins to myself in a proper way, many pages thought that coins are now owned by someone else. Also, using LN as a mixer is an option, but probably using deniability will be cheaper than making swaps.

Why do I have to have my own full node for it to be effective? How is it not effective otherwise?

Because of fingerprints like IP addresses or browser data, when you use a regular browser for posting transactions. Also, SPV nodes usually ask about many addresses, and it is possible for some SPV server operator to track users in that way.

[BlackHatCoiner]

What's the point, garlonicon? If you create Tx3, in which you spend all inputs of Tx2 and the change input of Tx1, then you make it clear that the owner of Tx2's and Tx1's inputs is the same. Before making Tx3, spectators can assume that you sent money to somebody else, but the moment you publish Tx3, they can be sure that this isn't the case.

[Edwardard]

If you don't run your own full node, you need to rely to someone else to serve you the balance of your wallet.

Either way, if he doesnt have any BTC, he has to rely on a third party to buy bitcoin first then he can mix them or convert to xmr. I suggest OP to send BTC to his own  wallet (if he have them on an exchange), then mix them twice and send back to other self-owned wallets. This will help reduce traceability.

[RocketSingh]

Which method is the most effective?

If MixingAmont < 1 BTC
  use some CoinJoin wallet

If 10 BTC > MixingAmont > 1 BTC
  use DASH/XMR on some non-KYC exchange

If 100 BTC > MixingAmont > 10 BTC
  use centralized mixing service

If MixingAmont > 100 BTC
  split it into multiple i/p below 100 BTC before mixing and use any of the methods above as per MixingAmont

[Flyingbeaver]

Because of fingerprints like IP addresses or browser data, when you use a regular browser for posting transactions. Also, SPV nodes usually ask about many addresses, and it is possible for some SPV server operator to track users in that way.

Does it matter if they're public ips or using vpn?

[NeuroticFish]

Does it matter if they're public ips or using vpn?

Let's say you bought Bitcoin with KYC and withdrew. And let's say you use Electrum with public node.
Let's say that you mix the coins and receive bitcoin to address2. You open Electrum again.
The second Electrum server operator (if he wants to check the data) will know that address1 and address2 are from same wallet. If he sells this info to a chain analysis company that works together with the KYC exchange, they will know that's still you and your money, so your mixing was pointless.
And this happens no matter you've used clear net, VPN or Tor.

The only proper way to handle this is not not use public SPV servers nor blockchain explorers, instead install your own on top of your own bitcoin core.

[Flyingbeaver]

Does it matter if they're public ips or using vpn?

Let's say you bought Bitcoin with KYC and withdrew. And let's say you use Electrum with public node.

So KYCed btc > to Electrum 1/address 1

Let's say that you mix the coins and receive bitcoin to address2. You open Electrum again.

By "again" do you mean the same Electrum wallet (Electrum 1)? Because I wouldn't use the same wallet. I'd use a new Electeum wallet and, of course, new address - Electrum 2/address 2.

The second Electrum server operator (if he wants to check the data) will know that address1 and address2 are from same wallet.

Wouldn't using a different wallet (even a diffrent provider) solve this issue? Seems like a much simpler solution than running your own full node. What am i missing?

[o_e_l_e_o]

theymos created this thread [Guide] Decent mixing methods which I think will give you an insight into anonymity comparison between monero and coinjoin or mixing coin.

This thread is outdated - it was created before Wasabi started cooperating with blockchain analysis and spying on all their users. Wasabi can no longer be recommended as a good option.

Just use deniability.

Yeah, this doesn't work at all. You can split up an UTXO as many time as you want, but as soon as you use multiple inputs together in one transaction, then all those inputs are linked together as most probably belonging to the same entity. If all those inputs can be traced back to the same entity in the last 5 or 10 parent transactions, then you've achieved absolutely nothing except wasting money on fees.

By "again" do you mean the same Electrum wallet (Electrum 1)? Because I wouldn't use the same wallet. I'd use a new Electeum wallet and, of course, new address - Electrum 2/address 2.

Doesn't really matter. If a server sees your device fingerprint and IP query all the addresses from wallet 1, and the minutes later sees the same device fingerprint and IP query all the addresses from wallet 2, it is trivial to deduce that wallet 1 and wallet 2 are owned by the same person.

Wouldn't using a different wallet (even a diffrent provider) solve this issue? Seems like a much simpler solution than running your own full node. What am i missing?

That blockchain analysis companies have admitted that they run multiple servers for such wallets with the sole purpose of collecting data. If you are serious about privacy, then you must run your own node. It is not a difficult thing to do.

[garlonicon]

If you create Tx3, in which you spend all inputs of Tx2 and the change input of Tx1, then you make it clear that the owner of Tx2's and Tx1's inputs is the same.

It is surprising, how often such transaction is marked as a CoinJoin transaction. There was even a case, when people thought that another bitcointalk user did it. Also, it is surprising, how often people think that the round amount is the payment, many services did it wrong, and thought that 14 was a payment, and 5.99 was a change, where in practice, there is a higher chance to see prices like 5.99 in many shops (because of that .99 ending that has a psychological impact on many customers).

Before making Tx3, spectators can assume that you sent money to somebody else, but the moment you publish Tx3, they can be sure that this isn't the case.

So far, I can't find a single page that tracked my UTXOs correctly. For example, blockchair always did it wrong. It was funny they assigned low or critical privacy score, and then gave a totally wrong results about what really happened.

Yeah, this doesn't work at all. You can split up an UTXO as many time as you want, but as soon as you use multiple inputs together in one transaction, then all those inputs are linked together as most probably belonging to the same entity. If all those inputs can be traced back to the same entity in the last 5 or 10 parent transactions, then you've achieved absolutely nothing except wasting money on fees.

By following that logic, someone can conclude that all LN channels on Taproot addresses are always owned by a single person. Because if you combine deniability and Taproot, then you don't know, how many parties there are. Also note that the same trick can be used on legacy addresses to some extent, because of homomorphic encryption: https://duo.com/labs/tech-notes/2p-ecdsa-explained

So, how do you know that Tx1 is not a channel opening transaction, Tx2 is not a channel closing transaction, and Tx3 is not owned by someone else, who received coins after swap? Also, for some LN wallets, this is the default, for example when you open a channel in the Phoenix wallet, then after going on-chain, your channel will stay opened, and you will receive completely different coins from a swap.

More examples: https://www.truthcoin.info/blog/deniability/#c-example

[Flyingbeaver]

By "again" do you mean the same Electrum wallet (Electrum 1)? Because I wouldn't use the same wallet. I'd use a new Electeum wallet and, of course, new address - Electrum 2/address 2.

Doesn't really matter. If a server sees your device fingerprint and IP query all the addresses from wallet 1, and the minutes later sees the same device fingerprint and IP query all the addresses from wallet 2, it is trivial to deduce that wallet 1 and wallet 2 are owned by the same person.

Could you have a look at my method below and tell me if what you're saying applies? Also, the transactions would be done over different devices at different times.

1) Send KYCed BTC to a new address from Etherum Electrum wallet operating in Tails on public computer #1 at location A.

2) Create Kucoin account without KYC through the same Tails on the same USB stick as the above but from another public computer (computer #2) and a different location (location B) using different ip (ip #2).

3) Exchange BTC to XMR

4) Send XMR to a newly created cold wallet running on a Live Linux USB on public computer #3 at location C using ip #3.

5) Send %30 of the XMR to a new Hodlhodl account created throught the Live Linux USB on public computer #4 with ip #4 at location D

6) Send the remaining %70 of XMR to a new Bisq account created throught the Live Linux USB on public computer #5 using ip #5 at location E

7) Convert XMRs in both the exchanges into BTC.

8 ) Send the BTC from Hodlhodl to a new Etherum address from a new Etherum wallet on the same device as step 1.

9) Send the BTC from Bisq to a new Etherum Electrum address from the same wallet and device as step 9.

[BlackHatCoiner]

So far, I can't find a single page that tracked my UTXOs correctly.

Maybe they don't, because they believe it's too obvious to be true.

So, how do you know that Tx1 is not a channel opening transaction, Tx2 is not a channel closing transaction, and Tx3 is not owned by someone else, who received coins after swap?

I think this is missing the point. I can spend an entire UTXO A to create UTXO B, and by the same reasoning nobody can tell if I sent money to a merchant or to myself. Of course nobody can tell that for sure, but privacy isn't about being sure where the money is. It's to be as close to the truth as possible. In my example, you might not know where I've sent the money, but you know that I have either happened to pay someone with the exact amount of the output (which is very rare), or sent them back to myself. You can safely make this assertion, it'll be true. But the moment the money start moving later on, the analysis moves forward with the given input data. Whatever happen to that money later can bring us closer to the answer.

[n0nce]

So, how do you know that Tx1 is not a channel opening transaction, Tx2 is not a channel closing transaction, and Tx3 is not owned by someone else, who received coins after swap?

I think this is missing the point.

Also, not sure that garlonicon's concept takes 'time' into account. If I need to do this whole 3-transactions-deal, and do it quickly, it will be more obvious that it's fake.
Just as opening and closing a channel immediately, is very unlikely.

To OP: I believe all the 3 options have been summarized well already; but I do think that using Lightning is a pretty good fourth alternative to consider. Especially for smaller purchases, if you run a Lightning node, you can basically just spend some sats without worrying about labeling change, mixing it, consolidating it and all this annoying stuff.
You can also use Lightning as a mixer; by swapping on-chain funds into a Lightning wallet and from there, send the funds to a fresh address (or preferably, multiple addresses, in smaller chunks).

[o_e_l_e_o]

It is surprising, how often such transaction is marked as a CoinJoin transaction. There was even a case, when people thought that another bitcointalk user did it. Also, it is surprising, how often people think that the round amount is the payment, many services did it wrong

Maybe on a public block explorer, but you aren't fooling professional blockchain analysis firms by simply splitting UTXOs up and then recombining them later.

So, how do you know that Tx1 is not a channel opening transaction, Tx2 is not a channel closing transaction, and Tx3 is not owned by someone else, who received coins after swap?

You don't know (unless you are also collecting extra data such as IP addresses from light wallets or similar), but if there is a transaction which combines several UTXOs, all of which can be traced back to a single UTXO in the last couple of parent transactions, and indeed comprise the entirety of that UTXO, it is a very reasonable assumption to make.

Could you have a look at my method below and tell me if what you're saying applies? Also, the transactions would be done over different devices at different times.

It's not a bad solution, but I would avoid using KuCoin or any other centralized exchange at all since they all track your movements and report to blockchain analysis companies. Far better to use a proper DEX such as Bisq for this step, just as you do at the end. And you should be running your own node for both Bitcoin and Monero rather than using light wallets depending on someone else's node.

A simpler solution all round would be to return your KYCed bitcoin to whichever centralized exchange you bought them from with a KYCed account, sell them, withdraw your fiat, close your account, and then take that fiat over to Bisq and buy completely unrelated non-KYC bitcoin.

[Flyingbeaver]

Could you have a look at my method below and tell me if what you're saying applies? Also, the transactions would be done over different devices at different times.

I would avoid using KuCoin or any other centralized exchange at all since they all track your movements and report to blockchain analysis companies. Far better to use a proper DEX such as Bisq for this step, just as you do at the end.

Notice step 5 and 6 where %70 is sent to Hodlhodl and the remaining %30 to Bisq. Is that unnecessary, to divide the coins? Or just do all of it with one exchange (e.g. Bisq)? If it is a good idea, then is Hodlhodl good? And since you said to not use Kucoin, then which 3rd exchange do you recommend (besides Bisq and HodlHodl)?

And you should be running your own node for both Bitcoin and Monero rather than using light wallets depending on someone else's node.

What's the problem with that if using a public computer with a public ip? Downloading the entire blockchain will take 24 hours, which isnt feasible over a public computer.

A simpler solution all round would be to return your KYCed bitcoin to whichever centralized exchange you bought them from with a KYCed account, sell them, withdraw your fiat, close your account, and then take that fiat over to Bisq and buy completely unrelated non-KYC bitcoin.

No buyers

[Flyingbeaver]

2) Create Kucoin account without KYC through the same Tails on the same USB stick as the above but from another public computer (computer #2) and a different location (location B) using different ip (ip #2).

Tails? Be careful you might face problem due to changing IP. Few user report their withdraw disabled due to VPN usage,
https://reddit.com/r/kucoin/comments/t4wm7z/withdrawal_blocked_becasue_i_used_work_vpn/
https://reddit.com/r/kucoin/comments/z4xn4b/why_are_my_withdrawals_disabled/
https://reddit.com/r/kucoin/comments/zdoiri/i_am_seeing_more_kucoin_withdraw_disabled_for_non/

Thanks for this heads up. Good to know. Is the usage of VPN in their T&C? What about Bisq and Hodlhodl? And how do you resolve this issue if they dont give you back your coins even after verifying like what you linked? Who's law are they under?

[o_e_l_e_o]

Notice step 5 and 6 where %70 is sent to Hodlhodl and the remaining %30 to Bisq. Is that unnecessary, to divide the coins?

You certainly won't lose anything by doing it, but I'm not sure you would gain anything. As long as you make multiple trades and don't trade the exact amount all at once, then I don't see any real downside to just using Bisq.

And since you said to not use Kucoin, then which 3rd exchange do you recommend (besides Bisq and HodlHodl)?

I wouldn't recommend any centralized exchange at all. RoboSats is another option besides Bisq. More here: https://kycnot.me/

What's the problem with that if using a public computer with a public ip?

You need to consider the risks of doing all this in public. Are there people that can see what you are doing? Are there any cameras? Are you sure the computer you are using doesn't have some monitor device attached to it, such as a hardware keylogger, which would not be mitigated by your use of Tails?

No buyers

For your method of fiat? Can you swap it to USD or similar first?

[ABCbits]

2) Create Kucoin account without KYC through the same Tails on the same USB stick as the above but from another public computer (computer #2) and a different location (location B) using different ip (ip #2).

Tails? Be careful you might face problem due to changing IP. Few user report their withdraw disabled due to VPN usage,
https://reddit.com/r/kucoin/comments/t4wm7z/withdrawal_blocked_becasue_i_used_work_vpn/
https://reddit.com/r/kucoin/comments/z4xn4b/why_are_my_withdrawals_disabled/
https://reddit.com/r/kucoin/comments/zdoiri/i_am_seeing_more_kucoin_withdraw_disabled_for_non/

Thanks for this heads up. Good to know. Is the usage of VPN in their T&C?

Their ToS doesn't mention word "vpn", "proxy", "tor" or "hide". Although their privacy policy mention about prevent fraud/monitor anomaly using third-party.

For Example, (a) We may use AppsFlyer to measure the advertising performance, detect and prevent fraudulent activity on your account in real time. Information shared with AppsFlyer is treated by AppsFlyer in accordance with its Privacy Policy, available at https://www.appsflyer.com/legal/services-privacy-policy/ .  (b)We may use Sentry to monitor the anomalies of the Platform. Information shared with Sentry is treated by Sentry in accordance with its Privacy Policy, available at https://sentry.io/privacy/ .

What about Bisq and Hodlhodl?

I don't know about HodlHodl, but Bisq use Tor by default.

And how do you resolve this issue if they dont give you back your coins even after verifying like what you linked? Who's law are they under?

Honestly i don't know.

[Flyingbeaver]

What's the problem with that if using a public computer with a public ip?

You need to consider the risks of doing all this in public. Are there people that can see what you are doing? Are there any cameras? Are you sure the computer you are using doesn't have some monitor device attached to it, such as a hardware keylogger, which would not be mitigated by your use of Tails?

Considered all of that and its a green light. Now, considering that, is there any benefit to running my own full node?

No buyers

For your method of fiat? Can you swap it to USD or similar first?

I'm assuming you mean P2P? Not really.

[PrivacyG]

Do not forget something very important.  Make sure you time things properly.  It is very important to make it least possible to correlate devices, time stamps et cetera.

For example.  If you have to launch your Bitcoin Full Node and then the Monero Full Node, do not do it simultaneously.  Do not close them simultaneously either.  The more time there is in between two actions, the less likely it is to link the two actions together.

I never open my computer, immediately start posting and shut it down afterwards.  If some body was interested in revealing my identity, they would know PrivacyG logs on when X's computer made a successful Internet connection and logs off shortly before X's computer disconnects from the Internet.  If you have 10 separate Bitcoin addresses, it is just as bad to move all funds the same day every time.  By doing so, some body will know there is likely a link between them.  If you are going to launch Chip Mixer, do not search on a separate device how to use it or stuff about them.  This can be a privacy breaker.

When spending Bitcoin or Monero, make sure you do not spend about the same amount every time.  If you send 0.01 BTC to an Instant Exchange for them to turn it into say 0.05 XMR and next time you spend 0.05 XMR minus change to receive the equivalent in Bitcoin minus change, they can put a question mark in between the receivers and senders.  Because even if both Exchanges go from and to other addresses every time, they will have this log

0.01 BTC from address A turned into 0.05 XMR sent to address B
0.0499504 XMR from some body turned into 0.00993432 BTC sent to address C

While they are not completely sure the addresses are linked, it now becomes a possibility that address A is in fact address C.

Thought it would be important for you to keep this in mind.

-
Regards,
PrivacyG

[o_e_l_e_o]

Now, considering that, is there any benefit to running my own full node?

Depends. Let's say you are using Electrum on a public computer. Whatever server(s) your copy of Electrum connects to will be able to link all your addresses to that IP address. Let's presume you connect over Tor so your IP address doesn't give away your rough geolocation or anything like that. What else do you do from that session which could then link you to your addresses via that IP address? Do you log in to an exchange account? Do you communicate with a trading partner via some third party platform or software? Do you open another wallet, linking those addresses to the first set of addresses? It all depends on your exact activities.

Keep in mind you can always set up your own node and Electrum server on your home computer and then connect to it over Tor from all the public computers you are using - you don't have to run the node on the public computers themselves.

[dkbit98]

Which method is the most effective?

Why wouldn't you use all of them, and I would also add Joinmarket in that bunch.
There are also other options like using Lightning Network, or using Layer 2 Bitcoin wallets like Mercury that uses statechains.
I like to have more options when I want to have more privacy, and combination of more tools is certainly giving better results.

[barto123]

coinjoin/mixing/monero will all improve your privacy, but you need some basics first.

first thing you need to learn is coin control of your UTXO's (unspent transaction outputs). think of UTXO's as individual coins & notes in your physical wallet (just in digital form)
- I like to use free & open source wallets like sparrow wallet, which makes UTXO management very easy. samourai wallet for mobile. if you spend across multiple UTXO's, you can destroy your privacy in an instant. most wallets will do this by default.

second, run a node & connect all your wallets to it - when all your transactions go through your own server they can't be censored & you won't dox your IP if you're running over TOR. i like mynode or raspiblitz - they're like a swiss army knife for bitcoin.

if you screw up these 2 steps, all the privacy you gained through coinjoin/mixing can be undone.

privacy tools - they all improve your privacy in some form, however they all have their pros & cons - used in conjunction with one another, much more powerful.

the thing about bitcoin privacy - you need forward looking & reward looking privacy.

you can coinjoin into oblivion, but if the last spend is done incorrectly/to a KYC destination, it will undo all your privacy. I think coinjoin + lightning is good - transactions aren't public & you can hide your spend UTXO (however there's considerations).

when spending on lightning you want to choose a relatively well connected node (but NOT a honey pot or where you're actually sending the funds). You want to route your transaction through another node (perhaps multiple) to hide your UTXO. Lightning will do this automatically if you send to a destination you're not actually connected to. i wouldn't receive on lightning at this stage, unless you can cover your tracks after receiving it.

there's no reason why you can't throw an XMR transaction into the mix too - using fixedfloat, sideshift.ai, coinswap.click. You could also perform these swaps in a TOR browser. there's plenty of sites to swap without KYC. check out kycnot.me. there are atomic swaps BTC - XMR without a trusted third party, however I don't feel comfortable using it yet - looks like it's for advance users. if you need to go back to fiat, you can exit using XMR throught bisq or localmonero. both are great IMO. need to stop using KYC exchanges & go P2P only.

personally i don't like mixing services - they could be honey pots to catch the people who want privacy. I like whirlpool & join market, or a combination. i prefer join market as there's no central co-ordinator, coinjoins are much cheaper & use can coinjoin any amount. however, whirlpool has a massive liquidity pool, so that's a huge benefit too. anon set is probably way higher than join market. different strokes for different folks. depends on your threat model.

lately i've been playing with liquid & statechains on mercury wallet. just more options to throw into the mix.

obviously, if you can buy BTC/XMR without KYC, you can avoid a lot of the headache above, however i'd still use it all, privacy is a must in these times.

the more the merrier - they're pushing more & more surveillance & control on the us, we need the tools to push back. none of it is ethical, privacy is basic human right.

[o_e_l_e_o]

there's no reason why you can't throw an XMR transaction into the mix too - using fixedfloat, sideshift.ai, coinswap.click.

Whenever I want to swap BTC/XMR or vice versa, I always do it via Bisq/LocalCryptos/LocalMonero or someone I trust on this forum, or more recently via RoboSats. How good are these services in comparison? What fees do they charge?

however, whirlpool has a massive liquidity pool, so that's a huge benefit too. anon set is probably way higher than join market.

Worth pointing out that if you use Whirlpool you must use it via your own node or else your xpub is shared with the central coordinator.

I notice you say you use Sparrow wallet - have you used Whirlpool via Sparrow? How does it compare to Whirlpool via Samourai?

[PrivacyG]

Whenever I want to swap BTC/XMR or vice versa, I always do it via Bisq/LocalCryptos/LocalMonero or someone I trust on this forum, or more recently via RoboSats. How good are these services in comparison? What fees do they charge?

I think it is about convenience.  Swaps are done instantly with enough Confirmations and there is no need for BTC security deposits.  I used all three of them.  Fixed Float was one of my top choices for a while, but they recently started selectively scamming freezing deposits if they think or are told you are bad.  See this topic for reference, it is a fun read indeed https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5424907.0

Last time I used them, Fixed Float and Side Shift have fees around 0.5%

How does RoboSats work?  I notice you primarily like Peer to Peer and Decentralized services.  Is RoboSats a Centralized service?

-
Regards,
PrivacyG

[o_e_l_e_o]

Fixed Float was one of my top choices for a while, but they recently started selectively scamming freezing deposits if they think or are told you are bad.

Well, that's then immediately discounted then. I have no interest in using a service which uses blockchain analysis to examine my deposits and attacks bitcoin by buying in to the nonsense of "taint".

How does RoboSats work?  I notice you primarily like Peer to Peer and Decentralized services.  Is RoboSats a Centralized service?

It's as centralized as every other DEX (other than Bisq) in that it runs via a website (trading only possible over Tor), but is focused on Lightning trades. Their escrow/bonds work via Lightning hold invoices, which probably requires as little trust as possible when compared to other DEXs (again, other than Bisq). n0nce posted a nice review several months ago: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5405549.0

[BlackHatCoiner]

when spending on lightning you want to choose a relatively well connected node (but NOT a honey pot or where you're actually sending the funds).

Actually, I don't see how that's a problem. Honeypots, if there are, would come with good connectivity-- like tens of nodes with sufficient liquidity. But, when you make a payment the intermediaries don't know about the sender, nor the receiver. Even the receiver doesn't know the sender (unless he's chosen to reveal the public key on purpose).

i wouldn't receive on lightning at this stage, unless you can cover your tracks after receiving it.

There's indeed this problem, but BOLT12 aims to solve it.

(trading only possible over Tor)

It's possible to access it through clearnet, I just find no reason to.

[bct_ail]

BTC -> a non KYC exchange use a free / disposable email -> convert to XMR -> withdraw -> send to another non KYC exchange with a different free / disposable email -> convert to BTC -> withdraw.

To ensure more anonymity would it not make more sense to interpose the route with two XMR-wallet addresses?

BTC -> a non KYC exchange use a free / disposable email -> convert to XMR -> withdraw to XMR-wallet 1-> send from XMR-wallet 1 to XMR-wallet 2 -> send to another non KYC exchange with a different free / disposable email -> convert to BTC -> withdraw.

[o_e_l_e_o]

To ensure more anonymity would it not make more sense to interpose the route with two XMR-wallet addresses?

Given the way in which Monero works, and assuming you are doing all this via your own node and not relying on someone else's node, then adding in an additional address in the way you have proposed adds very little to the process. The first exchange will not be able to see where the coins sent to the first address go, regardless of if they go to another address you own or directly to a different exchange. Similarly, the second exchange will not be able to see where the coins from the second address came from, regardless of if they came from another address you own or directly from a different exchange.

What is far more likely to compromise your privacy here is that you have withdrawn x amount of Monero from exchange 1, and then deposited x minus fees amount of Monero in to exchange 2. If the exchanges talk to each other, or share data with third parties (which is likely), then it becomes possible to link your withdrawal on one exchange to your deposit on a different exchange. So instead of simply moving all the coins from one address to another, you would be better served moving all the coins from one address and splitting them across two or more different addresses in non-equal amounts, before changing some of them back in to bitcoin now, some of them back in to bitcoin later, some of them back in to bitcoin later still, and so on. Even better if you use multiple different exchanges or trading partners to do this.

[Emitdama]

Some amazing information in this thread, bookmarking it for later when I need to mix my coins.

So far I have been using chipmixer (not promoting them, use at your own risk) for mixing my coins and I thought there was no other way to mix the coins. Before chipmixer I would simply deposit to Binance and Poloniex (before Binance) and withdraw them after a few meaningless trades.

I have heard Monero is untraceable but not sure how it works, I will be learning a lot from this thread though, thanks OP  .

[BlackHatCoiner]

Before chipmixer I would simply deposit to Binance and Poloniex (before Binance) and withdraw them after a few meaningless trades.

That sounds terrible. To register at Binance, you forfeit every single square of privacy you're left with, due to mandatory KYC. Secondly, Binance is known to cooperate with chain analysis companies. Even if KYC wasn't a thing, I'd expect zero obfuscation from a service like Binance, because they'd surely hand your activity to their partners (e.g., what you deposit, what you buy, what you withdraw, where you withdraw etc).

[bct_ail]

then adding in an additional address in the way you have proposed adds very little to the process. The first exchange will not be able to see where the coins sent to the first address go, regardless of if they go to another address you own or directly to a different exchange. Similarly, the second exchange will not be able to see where the coins from the second address came from, regardless of if they came from another address you own or directly from a different exchange.

Okay. I remember being recommended the 2 adress solution in my early days with Monero. Maybe something has changed since then and it made more sense then?

What is far more likely to compromise your privacy here is that you have withdrawn x amount of Monero from exchange 1, and then deposited x minus fees amount of Monero in to exchange 2. If the exchanges talk to each other, or share data with third parties (which is likely), then it becomes possible to link your withdrawal on one exchange to your deposit on a different exchange. So instead of simply moving all the coins from one address to another, you would be better served moving all the coins from one address and splitting them across two or more different addresses in non-equal amounts, before changing some of them back in to bitcoin now, some of them back in to bitcoin later, some of them back in to bitcoin later still, and so on. Even better if you use multiple different exchanges or trading partners to do this.

Your example that both exchanges know each other was exactly in my mind.

The blockchain analysis due to the amount minus fee situation is not only a problem with Monero.

Another possibility to the method of splitting is to send a small additional amount from another XMR-adress to the withdraw wallet. Then the sum that arrives at the exchange #2 is greater than that from the exchange #1.

[o_e_l_e_o]

Okay. I remember being recommended the 2 adress solution in my early days with Monero. Maybe something has changed since then and it made more sense then?

I certainly wouldn't be sending directly from one exchange to another, but sending the full UTXO from one address to another achieves very little on any coin. If an adversary can't see your transactions (Monero) then adding extra hops does nothing, and if an adversary can see your transactions (Bitcoin) then extra hops which move an entire UTXO are most likely going to be a self transfer and so are easily traced. Hence my recommendation to split the UTXO up across multiple addresses and multiple transactions.

The blockchain analysis due to the amount minus fee situation is not only a problem with Monero.

Absolutely. You should assume that every centralized exchange you use (KYC or not) is sharing your data and your activities with each other and with blockchain analysis companies, because almost all of them are. Amount matching is an easy way to link accounts as belonging to the same person, especially if the withdrawal from one exchange and deposit to another exchange are within a relatively short space of time.

Another possibility to the method of splitting is to send a small additional amount from another XMR-adress to the withdraw wallet. Then the sum that arrives at the exchange #2 is greater than that from the exchange #1.

True, but you should be careful not to combine coins which have previously been linked to your real identity with these coins you are trying to obfuscate. Although important for any coin, it would result in a complete failure of the process if you did it with bitcoin.