Ledger CTO warns of a potential mass attack taking place

[rdluffy]

Source: https://x.com/P3b7_/status/1965094840959410230

This post is already circulating on several profiles on X, and it seems serious
Be careful when making any transactions, as the warning is quite vague and does not say exactly what is being affected

[Z-tight]

A few hours after posting that, he goes on to post this:

If you use a Ledger or hardware wallet with clear signing, you are not at risk. My tweet above is warning people who do not use a hardware wallet with clear signing of the risk. Always review every transaction before you sign.

I don't know if it is what i am thinking, but sounds like a marketing campaign, trying to promote and sell ledger devices.

I suspect it to be marketing because he is is unclear what the exploit is. And he also said this: 'it is unclear whether the attacker is also stealing seeds from software wallets directly at this stage', how is this possible, seeds stored where and from what software wallets? The warning does not make too much sense right now.

[BattleDog]

Seems like your usual NPM supply-chain pop -- a maintainer account gets hijacked, a popular package ships a poisoned minor version, front-ends pull it and the JS swaps addresses / injects malicious approvals. We've seen variants before (event-stream, Ledger ConnectKit, etc.). Whether Ledger's tweet has marketing spin or not, the class of risk is real.

Hardware wallets help if you actually read the screen. For Bitcoin, confirm every output/address and amount on the device; For EVM, confirm to, value, chainId and especially approvals (unlimited approve() is how most drains start).

If you use a browser/extension wallet, assume the page can lie. Avoid copy/paste; use an address book or a QR / known contact. Do small test sends. Never type a seed anywhere except your hardware device during setup. If a web page asks for it then close the tab.
Check and revoke suspicious token approvals (e.g., revoke.cash) after using unfamiliar dapps.

For devs, freeze builds now: lockfile + exact versions, no auto-updates. Roll back any package released in the suspicious window until there's a clean advisory.
Verify checksums / provenance (npm --integrity, npm ci, Sigstore if you have it). Don't ship from latest.

A HW wallet won't save you from approving a malicious contract if you click through. "Clear signing" only helps if you read it. It can't stop drains from an already-granted allowance; that's on you to revoke.

Treat this like any other NPM blast radius -- freeze, verify, and verify on the device before you sign, somewhat decent opsec.

[fillippone]

This is a serious attack.
Apparently, there is a vector attack where the address in the Wallet UI is the user's one, and the one on the HW wallet is the attacker's one. So use extreme caution.

	Doing shitcoin things, win shitcoin prizes.	I don't trust them.

I don't trust them: of course, the Hardware Wallet signs the transaction the HW receives:

ALWAYS CHECK THE ADDRESS IN THE HW DISPLAY.
DON'T BE COMPLACENT WITH SECURITY.

[Dictator69]

If you use a browser/extension wallet, assume the page can lie. Avoid copy/paste; use an address book or a QR / known contact. Do small test sends. Never type a seed anywhere except your hardware device during setup. If a web page asks for it then close the tab.
Check and revoke suspicious token approvals (e.g., revoke.cash) after using unfamiliar dapps.

I don't have a hardware wallet yet but this seems serious as it is all over the crypto communities, I also found it because someone else has shared this thread some other place of this forum. I don't understand most of the technical terms you mentioned here but for someone like me, I think it is best to see if our address is correct if that is then we are good to make the transaction right!

About browser extensions wallets, I read it somewhere here that when we connect our wallet to some website if it is unlocked don't type the password, first unlock it without giving command to the site to open the wallet, unlock it and then connect. I have pinned the site for revoking thanks for sharing.

This is a serious attack.
Apparently, there is a vector attack where the address in the Wallet UI is the user's one, and the one on the HW wallet is the attacker's one. So use extreme caution.

This is really serious, on the back it is other address and on the screen it is yours, then how can we be sure if we are sending to the right one, I think we have to test it for the first few times before sending a bigger amount, this changes my concepts about hackers, they are really smart people but bad too.

[Lucius]

It's one thing to warn people about the danger, but when I read how they boast that only their devices have secure screens that show the correct information, then it's clear to me where this story is going. Their devices are the only ones that allow users to share their seed with third parties, and the only ones that we suspect have access to all generated seeds at all times.

For me personally, it is a greater danger to use that hardware wallet at all than this danger that they warn about.

[Charles-Tim]

For me personally, it is a greater danger to use that hardware wallet at all than this danger that they warn about.

Many people on X will fall for it already, not knowing how bad Ledger hardware wallet is with close source secure element. We do not even know if the company can be able to know people's seed phrase is another thing. Also we do not know when next they will let people know the home addresses of people that bought the hardware wallet directly from them. It is a hardware wallet that I can not also recommend. They just use this as an opportunity to do their marketing.

[NotATether]

I suspect it to be marketing because he is is unclear what the exploit is. And he also said this: 'it is unclear whether the attacker is also stealing seeds from software wallets directly at this stage', how is this possible, seeds stored where and from what software wallets? The warning does not make too much sense right now.

Ironically, a Ledger will not save you from clipboard malware (which is directly what the exploit embedded into the malicious npm package versions is doing). Neither will any other hardware wallet.

	Doing shitcoin things, win shitcoin prizes.	I don't trust them.

These does not protect you from the malware.

It is specifically targeting developers who use npm install without pinning package versions. Not the general public, which is why....

ALWAYS CHECK THE ADDRESS IN THE HW DISPLAY.
DON'T BE COMPLACENT WITH SECURITY.

[m2017]

Their devices are the only ones that allow users to share their seed with third parties, and the only ones that we suspect have access to all generated seeds at all times.

I'm not going to defend this company that screwed up again, but I would like to clarify, if ledger has the ability to access all generated seeds, then what prevents them from stealing the contents of all their customer's wallets? Are they waiting for the best moment? Waiting for more users to become their "victims"? Until there is evidence (facts) of their abuse of their position, it is impossible to say for sure (about access to all generated seeds) and all our suspicions remain just suspicions.

For me personally, it is a greater danger to use that hardware wallet at all than this danger that they warn about.

Until the Ledger is caught red-handed (if that ever happens), the only way to "protect yourself" is to buy a hardware wallet from another manufacturer. At least, I personally would not want to risk it and wait for the moment when all suspicions are realized.

By the way, +1 for another fackup on the part of Ledger for compromising the developer's NPM account. This company is becoming a champion with all sorts of troubles. Trick question: if the bank where your money is kept is constantly robbed (for example), would you want to keep your money there? Ledger is constantly getting embroiled in various negative stories.

[Forsyth Jones]

I saw this tweet on X recently, so let me share it with you (I don't know the author): https://x.com/P3b7_/status/1965336272550899932



In short, the warning advises users of software wallet not to proceed with on-chain transactions at this time, while those using hardware wallets are safe as long as they read the output addresses on the display.

Would users who use Bitcoin Core, Electrum, and Sparrow also vulnerable?

[Ambatman]

For me personally, it is a greater danger to use that hardware wallet at all than this danger that they warn about.

It is surprising how people are still using it. Though I doubt many are really aware of it's dangers.

I'm not going to defend this company that screwed up again, but I would like to clarify, if ledger has the ability to access all generated seeds, then what prevents them from stealing the contents of all their customer's wallets? Are they waiting for the best moment? Waiting for more users to become their "victims"? Until there is evidence (facts) of their abuse of their position, it is impossible to say for sure (about access to all generated seeds) and all our suspicions remain just suspicions.

You check out this thread Ledger Recovery - Send your (encrypted) recovery phrase to 3rd parties entities
Where there was some backing to this claim that they could access users seedPhrase.
Not go mention not really an Open sourced wallet.

Until the Ledger is caught red-handed

One doesn't have to be shot to know that a bullet in the head can kill.

[dkbit98]

Ledger is again deceiving everyone claiming that only ledger devices have secure screens 
First of all, everyone can see what piece of shit ledger nono S is, and it can't even show complete address on the screen.
I remember when this device was creating problems when used in multisig setup, and this crap is not produced anymore.

[suzanne5223]

A few hours after posting that, he goes on to post this:

If you use a Ledger or hardware wallet with clear signing, you are not at risk. My tweet above is warning people who do not use a hardware wallet with clear signing of the risk. Always review every transaction before you sign.

I don't know if it is what i am thinking, but sounds like a marketing campaign, trying to promote and sell ledger devices.

I suspect it to be marketing because he is is unclear what the exploit is. And he also said this: 'it is unclear whether the attacker is also stealing seeds from software wallets directly at this stage', how is this possible, seeds stored where and from what software wallets? The warning does not make too much sense right now.

It's indeed a marketing campaign strategy because attackers replace recipant wallet address is not something new in the crypto space which is why people are advise to always double check wallet address before doing an onchain transaction.
Meanwhile, they seem to already have some influencers who are already pushing the narrative. Besides, his last statement about the attack is

Hardware wallets are built to withstand these threats. Features like Clear Signing let you confirm exactly what’s happening, and Transaction Checks flag suspicious activity before it’s too late.

[Lucius]

I'm not going to defend this company that screwed up again, but I would like to clarify, if ledger has the ability to access all generated seeds, then what prevents them from stealing the contents of all their customer's wallets? Are they waiting for the best moment? Waiting for more users to become their "victims"? Until there is evidence (facts) of their abuse of their position, it is impossible to say for sure (about access to all generated seeds) and all our suspicions remain just suspicions.

You have to look at the bigger picture because it's not just about what someone from the Ledger team could do, but what those who would be able to use Ledger as a bridge to attack their users could do. They always claimed that the seed can never leave their devices, only to have that become a lie overnight when they announced their new option (Recovery) that extracts the seed from the device and then divides it into three parts, two of which go to two external companies, and one remains with Ledger.

It's true that there's no concrete evidence that seed could have been pulled out even before they admitted it was possible, but who wants to take the risk and believe it?

~snip~
By the way, +1 for another fackup on the part of Ledger for compromising the developer's NPM account. This company is becoming a champion with all sorts of troubles. Trick question: if the bank where your money is kept is constantly robbed (for example), would you want to keep your money there? Ledger is constantly getting embroiled in various negative stories.

I would say it in a slightly different way - they are actually a negative story that keeps repeating itself. Despite everything, people still use and buy their devices.

[satscraper]

Would users who use Bitcoin Core, Electrum, and Sparrow also vulnerable?

Regarding this specific attack they are not vulnerable because none of the mentioned wallets use JavaScript packages in their codebase, and all of them perform independently of WEB3 services subjected to NPM attack. However, all of them are still vulnerable to destination address substitution if the relevant machine is compromised. In this respect hardware wallets with their own secure displays are more reliable unless the users don't verify what they're signing.

[EL MOHA]

Ledger is again deceiving everyone claiming that only ledger devices have secure screens 
First of all, everyone can see what piece of shit ledger nono S is, and it can't even show complete address on the screen.

Sadly it is not everyone that actually knows how shitty the ledger wallet is I usually see their posts on X and to be honest I saw certain users recommend them. In fact I have actually had to talk someone out of buying where he says he usually sees them been recommended on X I think they have actually done well in hiring promoters than they have did in developing a good wallet. That’s why I always like the constant threads advising users to stay off them on this forum.

Regarding this specific attack they are not vulnerable because none of the mentioned wallets use JavaScript packages in their codebase. However, all of them are still vulnerable to destination address substitution if the relevant machine is compromised. In this respect hardware wallets with their own secure displays are more reliable unless the users don't verify what they're signing.

Yes the wallets like electrum and others might not directly be affected but the reason why hot wallets are advised to be cautious right now is because of vulnerability of the device that the wallets are on, since the number of applications that potentially will be affected are unknown there is no clarity on which applications on the device that will be compromised which will infect the whole device. If this wallets are on airgapped devices I think they are completely save too like the hardware wallets

[satscraper]

the reason why hot wallets are advised to be cautious right now is because of vulnerability of the device that the wallets are on, since the number of applications that potentially will be affected are unknown there is no clarity on which applications on the device that will be compromised which will infect the whole device.

This is not entirely accurate regarding the attack under discussion. The attack involves HW pairing with WEB3 service via WalletConnect interface of some app using intermediate device (e.g., computer, smartphone). The intermediate device itself may remain untouched, all apps on it remain untouched,  but if the WEB3 service is compromised by malicious JavaScript package the code in the latter could alter the destination address in a transaction. This could result in the loss of transferred funds if users do not carefully verify the address before signing the transaction.

[LoyceV]

Apparently, there is a vector attack where the address in the Wallet UI is the user's one, and the one on the HW wallet is the attacker's one. So use extreme caution.

Wait.... are you saying there are people who use a hardware wallet but don't confirm the address on the screen? That's one of the main reasons to use a hardware wallet: to verify you actually sign a transaction to the correct address!

I'd be much more concerned if an address changes before I see it on my screen. Let's say you deposit to an exchange, but the deposit address on your screen is changed already before you copy it. That would mean the address on the hardware wallet matches the address on your monitor, but it's not the exchange's address. I have no idea how (un)likely this scenario is, but it's always on the back of my mind when making a transaction. And it's impossible to verify.

[Lucius]

~snip~
I'd be much more concerned if an address changes before I see it on my screen. Let's say you deposit to an exchange, but the deposit address on your screen is changed already before you copy it. That would mean the address on the hardware wallet matches the address on your monitor, but it's not the exchange's address. I have no idea how (un)likely this scenario is, but it's always on the back of my mind when making a transaction. And it's impossible to verify.

And I always wonder if something like that is possible, because in that case the verification on the hardware wallet would be completely pointless. However, for something like that to happen, hackers would have to have some kind of super access to that user to be able to do something like that. Maybe if they managed to install a remote access trojan on the user's computer, they would gain full access and be able to completely manipulate such things.

I think the only way we can protect ourselves from such a scenario is to use air-gapped wallets and separate computers for cryptocurrencies. If hackers don't have access to our devices, then they can't do anything to us.

[LoyceV]

And I always wonder if something like that is possible

A couple of years ago, I read about Man In The Middle Attacks by Tor exit nodes. I think they had to remove or replace https-encryption, after which they could replace Bitcoin addresses for their own.

Maybe if they managed to install a remote access trojan on the user's computer, they would gain full access and be able to completely manipulate such things.

Or just a malicious browser that replaces crypto addresses.

I think the only way we can protect ourselves from such a scenario is to use air-gapped wallets and separate computers for cryptocurrencies. If hackers don't have access to our devices, then they can't do anything to us.

If you're depositing to an online service, you still need to get their address. A Letter of Guarantee could work, as long as you have their signing address from a previous visit. But I don't think any CEX (or casino) offers that. For some reason depositing is completely trust-based: if they'd say the address you found on their website isn't yours, you can't prove anything.