Can a fake Private Key Protect Bitcoin holders from harm Under Duress?

[aoluain]

Buy the cheapest hardware wallet you can get or use a hot wallet on your phone.

Showing off your hardware wallet or simply walking around the beach with it is a great way to become an easy target. The ledger has a hole for you to attach a lanyard to it, like a keychain or neck lanyard.

Definitely avoid this! I recommend leaving your hardware wallet at home, especially if you live in a country where access to weapons is restricted by the government and is a violent country.

People who aren't familiar with BTC will likely assume that someone carrying a hardware wallet has a lot of bitcoins, which isn't always true.

That makes sense - but I didnt advocate for any of that. I think you misunderstand
my quoted text.

[suzanne5223]

Many have discussed duress PINs and BIP-39 passphrase decoy wallets. I am actually asking about a different model here: a registered fake private key that a custodial/back-end system recognises and intercepts thereby simulating success to an attacker while preventing actual on-chain movement. Is this technically feasible?

For example, a BTC holder is abducted and instructed at gunpoint to release his private key or perform a BTC transfer to any BTC wallet, he gives out the fake key or enters it to do the transfer but the system recognises the security threat and seemingly allows the transfer to occur but in reality it is only a fake transfer due to the fake code, so when transactions are signed with a registered fake key, the backend intercepts/flags them and simulates success for the attacker while preventing actual irreversible movement.the system is notified that this is not a real transaction and play along. I wonder if this can be implemented or not.

The major setback I will admit here is that this can create rooms for holders with devious mindsets to perform such transactions for fraudulent purposes.
So the question would be about what technical measures that can be in place to avert such abusive attempts. I am thinking of a possible solution that fits this puzzle but I am inviting everyone to give their thoughts.

Could this be possible? please I am open minded.

What you're saying here will cause more problems than the solution you believe it will create.
Years ago, if we once saw a situation where testnet coin was used to scam merchants and newbies, there's nothing preventing scammers from using the strategy you propose to scam a lot of people.
If any Bitcoiner wants to safeguard themselves from duress that could jeopardize their BTC, it is better to prioritize privacy and avoid human error.
 
If you're thinking about a solution to an issue, always think about the consequences that come with it.

[mcdouglasx]

compared to the number of existing bitcoin users, the kidnapping problem is minimal collateral damage, I think there is nothing viable to do through software, the best thing that can be done to combat this type of crime is to educate people so that they do not walk around with a sign on their forehead that says "I have bitcoins" , because if nobody knows that you have bitcoin or how much bitcoin you have, most likely nobody will try to take it from you, and in the event that it is inevitable that people find out, the only thing I can recommend is to have several wallets, one as a decoy and another with the rest, the decoy should have enough funds to make it look real and not suspect that there are more, but not all your capital.

[Forsyth Jones]

That makes sense - but I didnt advocate for any of that. I think you misunderstand
my quoted text.

Sorry, I know you didn't advocate any of this, just to clarify, it was just an addendum I thought was important. Don't worry 

compared to the number of existing bitcoin users, the kidnapping problem is minimal collateral damage, I think there is nothing viable to do through software, the best thing that can be done to combat this type of crime is to educate people so that they do not walk around with a sign on their forehead that says "I have bitcoins" , because if nobody knows that you have bitcoin or how much bitcoin you have, most likely nobody will try to take it from you, and in the event that it is inevitable that people find out, the only thing I can recommend is to have several wallets, one as a decoy and another with the rest, the decoy should have enough funds to make it look real and not suspect that there are more, but not all your capital.

Exactly, the Bitcoin protocol through BIP38, 39, BIP85, etc. already enables several functionalities, as well as other external open source encryption tools.

[philipma1957]

Many have discussed duress PINs and BIP-39 passphrase decoy wallets. I am actually asking about a different model here: a registered fake private key that a custodial/back-end system recognises and intercepts thereby simulating success to an attacker while preventing actual on-chain movement. Is this technically feasible?

For example, a BTC holder is abducted and instructed at gunpoint to release his private key or perform a BTC transfer to any BTC wallet, he gives out the fake key or enters it to do the transfer but the system recognises the security threat and seemingly allows the transfer to occur but in reality it is only a fake transfer due to the fake code, so when transactions are signed with a registered fake key, the backend intercepts/flags them and simulates success for the attacker while preventing actual irreversible movement.the system is notified that this is not a real transaction and play along. I wonder if this can be implemented or not.

The major setback I will admit here is that this can create rooms for holders with devious mindsets to perform such transactions for fraudulent purposes.
So the question would be about what technical measures that can be in place to avert such abusive attempts. I am thinking of a possible solution that fits this puzzle but I am inviting everyone to give their thoughts.

Could this be possible? please I am open minded.

you could have the 10 coin key real  used with big wallet


and a 1 coin key real but just a fraction of your coins used with small wallet

the robbers would figure 120K nice score.

you would still have the 10 coins in the other wallet.

[Mia Chloe]

Actually yeah your registered fake private key system may be technically feasible but only within a centralized custodial environment like an exchange or a centralized back end service. It simply wouldn't work with a self custody wallet broadcasting directly to the decentralized bitcoin network as there's no intermediary to perform any form of interception and simulation.
As little as the double spend feature it's already being abused plus all these things don't  really align with the authenticity of coins based on the bitcoin protocol.

[Ferib]

On hardware wallets like Ledger you can set a "double pin", which means you can have the device unlock on 2 pins with each one linking to another wallet. The idea is that the same seed phrase is used, but depending on the pin used to unlock the device, there is an extra type of salt or "password" ontop of it.

I assume the same can be done with software wallets, where your 24 word seed phrase is holding a "password" to obscure the real funds.

You would hold assets in the 'naked' 24 seed phrase but keep the real big funds on a "password" protect one. You may even use a "system" that monitors the blockchain for the naked seed phrase and perform an automated sweep of the password protected when a certain amount of naked assets has moved.

Alternative, you may lock up coins in HTLC or similar type of tx. You commit to locking up X coins and unlock them at any time by using the spend tx. Attackers may not be skilled enough, or lack the resources to scan every blockchain for HTLC type of transactions.