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Author Topic: An "ethical" mixer / swap protocol - private but not helping crime  (Read 398 times)
d5000 (OP)
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November 03, 2026, 06:36:17 PM
 #21

Hasn't Wasabi wallet been bullied exactly for that? They pay a blockchain analysis company to analyze any UTXO which are trying to be coinjoined, which is a partnership and you offer the same idea.
There are two slight differences I think:

- In my protocol idea it's the user himself who can chose to initiate the check. If the check is not performed, then full KYC/AML may be performed in the case the risk score is too high.
- The idea is also that there is a clear separation of the check and the token you receive from the third party service, and the service provider itself. The idea is that the token only is given when the check is positive (i.e. low risk is found). If the risk is high, instead, you're not given a token. And thus, the mixer provider in this case will never see that your address/UTXO has a high risk core.

If I remember correct, Wasabi would have known if you had a high risk score, and it would have been up to them to pursue additional measures, and also the check was automatic.

If I'm incorrect and indeed there was such a separation (like @nc50lc's post suggest), then I think the criticism was exaggerated. I think some "privacy-oriented" users definitely are seeing the situation too much in a black or white way.

But the idea of "middle grounds" like my proposed protocol is not to cater to anybody's necessities. It is specifically directed at honest users who may fear to have got tainted coins in a P2P exchange for example. There is no perfect fungibility solution as long as we don't have a completely non-custodial privacy feature in Bitcoin (although of course, Lightning exists already, this is possibly even a better solution).

Also, I wonder, which jurisdiction will allow Bitcoin mixer to be run officially?
All jurisdictions where no-KYC crypto swap services are allowed, i.e. where there is no mandatory KYC check for any custodial (yes, mixers and also instant exchangers are custodial) crypto services. And in my previous post above I have also shown an example of a non-custodial type service that could even be allowed in jurisdictions where custodial mixing without KYC would be banned.

Quote from: OsaiEmma
All these headaches—for a legitimate user bothered about censorship—can be avoided by simply using a decentralized P2P service for off/on-ramping.
But P2P can deliver you tainted coins or illegal money. It's also much harder to use.

I honestly don't understand the rest of your post. There is no difference in linking an ID to an UTXO or an address, because each of both implies the other too.


OsaiEmma
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November 04, 2026, 06:30:18 AM
 #22

Quote from: OsaiEmma
All these headaches—for a legitimate user bothered about censorship—can be avoided by simply using a decentralized P2P service for off/on-ramping.
But P2P can deliver you tainted coins or illegal money. It's also much harder to use.

I honestly don't understand the rest of your post. There is no difference in linking an ID to an UTXO or an address, because each of both implies the other too.

If you're still going to off-ramp to fiat through a decentralized p2p after receiving the tainted coin, then there probably won't be an issue. Unless you intend sending to an address or service that filters tainted coins and reject them.

About the ID to address and UTXO part, what I mean is:

If I buy from a CEX and I transfer to a new address, what actually connects me to that address is the transferred UTXO (transaction history). That UTXO's input /output is like a compass used to navigate the path to the few addresses they can link to my identity.

Now, if they don't know the identity of who bought the UTXO and they see just different addresses associated with a UTXO's input/output, they can't link my identity to the UTXO or the address it's associated with; but they can still link the coin and the different addresses without associating it to an identity (unless I announced it or something).

My actual point is between having an identity-linked transaction entry/exit point and having no known identity-linked entry/exit point at all. I don't know if this is clear?

Mixers is like a pool, right? It will mask the address the UTXO is associated with, by obscuring the input/output relationship, right? But once your monitored CEX account(s) receives a particular UTXO for off-ramp, then the UTXO can be associated to an id—at the end of the day, there could be clues here and there. But using a decentralized P2P service, the UTXO input/output can just keep moving round and round—even when it's tainted.

That's why I said, if we all can avoid off/on-ramping with CEXs, then there will be minimal need for mixers.

So, without mixers:
on-ramp (CEX: known id; decentralized P2P: unknown id) --> coin --> addresses --> off-ramp (CEX: known id; decentralized P2P: unknown id)

With mixers:
on-ramp (CEX: known id; decentralized P2P: unknown id) --> coin --> address --> mixer --> obscured address --> off-ramp (CEX: known id --> potential retrace; decentralized P2P: unknown id)

Mixers can only mask your on-chain footprint, but your identity can still be revealed depending on how you off-ramp and on-ramp.

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