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Alternate cryptocurrencies => Altcoin Discussion => Topic started by: rat4 on March 31, 2014, 07:07:20 PM



Title: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: rat4 on March 31, 2014, 07:07:20 PM
Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward

Low PoW reward doesn't attract miners. This leads to ridiculously low PoW difficulty.

A pair of examples:
Mintcoin scrypt diff 0.1 (vs Litecoin 5677)
SHACoin sha256 diff 1427 (vs Bitcoin 5006860589)

At such difficulty PoW blocks can be mined with speed of light.

Attack I

It is possible to build sequential chain of PoW blocks to confirm a transaction. Only 4 blocks for Mintcoin and 10 for SHACoin.

Is it hard to orphan the chain of PoW blocks?
One PoS block is enough. In both Mintcoin and SHACoin one PoS block may orphan a few millions of PoW blocks.
If at the same time the main chain will get a competing stake, attacker's chain can be enlarged with PoW.
This dramatically increases chance to success in comparison to pure PoW attack.

Ability to confirm a transaction and then orphan confirmations is ability to double spend.

Summary: double spend attack requires 1 PoS block and low hashing power.

Visualization: https://i.imgur.com/Pyrw75q.png

Attack II

Current implementation of stake miner gives up if median time of last blocks is in future.
This temporarily makes the whole network PoW-only and opens well known 51% PoW attack.

Attacker needs only 6 of 11 last blocks.

Successfully tested on Mintcoin: no PoS blocks from 203231 up to 203441, more than 1 hour of real time.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: sixteendigits on March 31, 2014, 07:30:47 PM
Where is Sunny King?  I will take this as nothing more than FUD until the godfather weighs in.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: futile-resistance on March 31, 2014, 07:44:18 PM
Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward

Low PoW reward doesn't attract miners. This leads to ridiculously low PoW difficulty.

A pair of examples:
Mintcoin scrypt diff 0.1 (vs Litecoin 5677)
SHACoin sha256 diff 1427 (vs Bitcoin 5006860589)

At such difficulty a sequential chain of PoW blocks can be mined in a flash.
Even long enough to confirm a transaction. Only 4 blocks for Mintcoin and 10 for SHACoin.

Is it hard to orphan the chain of PoW blocks?
One PoS block is enough. In both Mintcoin and SHACoin one PoS block may orphan a few millions of PoW blocks.
If at the same time the main chain will get a competing stake, attacker's chain can be enlarged with PoW.
This dramatically increases chance to success in comparison to pure PoW attack.

Ability to confirm a transaction and then orphan confirmations is ability to double spend.

Summary: double spend attack requires 1 PoS block and low hashing power.

Visualization: https://i.imgur.com/Pyrw75q.png

Can anyone test or confirm?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: emelac on March 31, 2014, 07:48:13 PM
I was wondering if there have been any successful PoS attacks yet. PoS is new to me.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Zzzack on March 31, 2014, 07:48:41 PM
Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward

Low PoW reward doesn't attract miners. This leads to ridiculously low PoW difficulty.

A pair of examples:
Mintcoin scrypt diff 0.1 (vs Litecoin 5677)
SHACoin sha256 diff 1427 (vs Bitcoin 5006860589)

At such difficulty a sequential chain of PoW blocks can be mined in a flash.
Even long enough to confirm a transaction. Only 4 blocks for Mintcoin and 10 for SHACoin.

Is it hard to orphan the chain of PoW blocks?
One PoS block is enough. In both Mintcoin and SHACoin one PoS block may orphan a few millions of PoW blocks.
If at the same time the main chain will get a competing stake, attacker's chain can be enlarged with PoW.
This dramatically increases chance to success in comparison to pure PoW attack.

Ability to confirm a transaction and then orphan confirmations is ability to double spend.

Summary: double spend attack requires 1 PoS block and low hashing power.

Visualization: https://i.imgur.com/Pyrw75q.png

Can anyone test or confirm?

Very true. POW is necessary for these coins to secure the network...and when minted coins are low (with little value), miners have an incentive to mine a different coin and sell it for their coin of choice. Few miners = low network hash = poorly protected public ledger. And, after all, we are investing in systems that maintain the public ledger in different ways.

I'm all in on cryptos, but the network strength of bitcoin is what gives it value right now over the cryptos.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: brokedummy on March 31, 2014, 07:55:47 PM
Not really a big deal, if it is an issue just fork it to not accept any more POW blocks.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Bit_Happy on March 31, 2014, 11:22:46 PM
PoW/PoS hybrids are supposed to be immune to attack. (at least CGB is/claims to be)
CryptogenicBullion has a good explanation on their site.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on March 31, 2014, 11:50:15 PM
attack one and see what happens


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: gonzoucab on March 31, 2014, 11:58:41 PM
POW has been proved

POW POS Hybrid have been proved, Sunny made a really nice software

POS only have never been proved,  have less programers dedicated to.

Thats the true.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 12:03:22 AM
This is a joke. Nice try to spread FUD about other coins, rat4, to try and promote your pure PoS blackcoin. How is it that Blackcoin prevents attack forks as a pure PoS coin, again?

You say "a sequential chain of PoW blocks can be mined in a flash."
Which is not true. Sure, you could mine all of the PoW blocks that occur sequentially, but there will be many, many more PoS blocks that interrupt those far and few apart PoW blocks. In a PoS/PoW hybrid there is no way to predict or control whether or not the next block will be PoS or PoW and therefore you cannot guarantee you will be in control of a long stream of blocks unless you have 51% of the PoW and PoS power.

Now, this brings up an issue with pure PoS coins such as your Blackcoin... That I have yet to be seen answered in any technical detail. How, when it is pure PoS and it IS known that every block in a row will be PoS, can you prevent an attack such as the one anonymousg64 brings up:

im still on the fence


can someone explain how this stops someone from generating lots of PoS blocks 20 days in the future from a bunch of TX's with small interval, whether through one or multiple wallets

Code:
ss << nStakeModifier;
ss << nTimeBlockFrom << nTxPrevOffset << txPrev.nTime << prevout.n << nTimeTx;
hashProofOfStake = Hash(ss.begin(), ss.end());
if(CBigNum(hashProofOfStake) > bnCoinDayWeight * bnTargetPerCoinDay)
    return false;


im not well enough versed with the code to know what these variable names imply

Without PoW blocks to interrupt such an attack, how is it prevented?

This thread of yours is in really bad taste, rat4, you should find better ways of promoting your coin.

I await your reply, and your explanation as to how PoS coins are safe from a TX/coinage attack.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: greentea on April 01, 2014, 12:08:13 AM
pretty obvious that a hybrid POW/POS is more secure than a pure POS ...

to make an attack you have to control hash and coin age in a POW/POS hyrbid, while a pure POS coin like blackcoin
only need to control coin age ... thus inferior

so what happen here with blackcoin:
http://www.blackcoin.co/wallet-2/official-statement-regarding-blockchain-problems-23rd-of-march/
https://i.imgur.com/o9PbvcH.png


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Bit_Happy on April 01, 2014, 12:12:03 AM
attack one and see what happens

I'll trust this for now
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=551861.msg6010168#msg6010168


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Soepkip on April 01, 2014, 12:17:00 AM
Yes, this is purely a discussion for us. The connection to BlackCoin is purely rat4 being the dev of it.

The earlier blockchain stuck we had for BlackCoin has nothing to do with this and is not adding to the discussion so far. We are talking hybrid PoW/PoS coins and their security.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 12:18:24 AM
Yes, this is purely a discussion for us. The connection to BlackCoin is purely rat4 being the dev of it.

The earlier blockchain stuck we had for BlackCoin has nothing to do with this and is not adding to the discussion so far. We are talking hybrid PoW/PoS coins and their security.

Well, now we are also talking pure PoS coins and their security- which is much less tested and founded. I still await a technical response as to how pure PoS prevents the type of transaction/coinage attacks that anonymousg64 has outlined before.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 12:23:02 AM
1. Mint is not a person.
2. SHACoin is not a person.
3. rat4 is not actively promoting PoS or blackcoin

This thread is about a potential security issue with PoW/PoS hybrids. Maybe it's true, maybe not. I don't know the technicals.

Same for PoS. I dont know how secure it is. I dont know the technicals.

I have asked many times on the blackcoin thread, and so have others, as to how pure PoS is safe. No reply, other than directing me to Sunny's answers, which actually only pertain to PoS/PoW hybrids if I am not mistaken.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: gonzoucab on April 01, 2014, 12:32:53 AM
The Blackcoin DEV dont wanna answer..

He throws the rock and hides the hand.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: morfans on April 01, 2014, 12:35:14 AM
The Blackcoin DEV dont wanna answer..

He throws the rock and hides the hand.

maybe hes AFK?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: gonzoucab on April 01, 2014, 12:41:50 AM
The Blackcoin DEV dont wanna answer..

He throws the rock and hides the hand.

maybe hes AFK?

He started the Thread minutes ago!!!!!!!


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Soepkip on April 01, 2014, 12:45:19 AM
Or he is sleeping.

This is not an attack on either Mint or Shacoin, this is purely an observation on hybrid pow/pos systems. If you want to discuss PoS security i do invite you to join IRC ##blackcoin on freenode and seek out rat4 there when he is awake.

Also, i'm not the dev of blackcoin


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Jabulon on April 01, 2014, 12:46:02 AM
Or he is sleeping.

This is not an attack on either Mint or Shacoin, this is purely an observation on hybrid pow/pos systems. If you want to discuss PoS security i do invite you to join IRC ##blackcoin on freenode and seek out rat4 there when he is awake.

Also, i'm not the dev of blackcoin

Yeah, as a professional he has more important business than engaging in this peeing contest. Make what you will of his analysis, do your own due diligence and try to come to rational conclusions based on what you learn rather than your emotional ties to this or that coin.

You guys are to be called out for the blatant and utter hypocrisy of Fudding the Blackcoin thread for days with inflammatory dirt, and then having hissy-fits when the Blackcoin dev weighs in with a technical statement, and you crying "fud, fud!"

Shame on you all for your childishness and abysmal conduct, which only hinders the progress of cryptocurrency. Examine your motivations more thoroughly.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: goblynn on April 01, 2014, 12:48:42 AM
The Blackcoin DEV dont wanna answer..

He throws the rock and hides the hand.

maybe hes AFK?

He started the Thread minutes ago!!!!!!!

check time stamp again..it was a 5 hours ago


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 12:48:53 AM
Or he is sleeping.

This is not an attack on either Mint or Shacoin, this is purely an observation on hybrid pow/pos systems. If you want to discuss PoS security i do invite you to join IRC ##blackcoin on freenode and seek out rat4 there when he is awake.

Also, i'm not the dev of blackcoin

Yeah, as a professional he has more important business than engaging in this peeing contest. Make what you will of his analysis, do your own due diligence and try to come to rational conclusions based on what you learn rather than your emotional ties to this or that coin.

You are to be called out for the blatant and utter hypocrisy of Fudding the Blackcoin thread for days with inflammatory dirt, and then having hissy-fits when the Blackcoin dev weighs in with a technical statement, and you crying "fud, fud!"

Shame on you all for your childishness and abysmal conduct, which only hinders the progress of cryptocurrency. Examine your motivations more thoroughly.

He has more important business to do? Yet he starts this thread? And then walks away? It was important enough for him to start the thread but not important enough for him to reply to responses? Still, nobody has addressed what I brought up and nobody has addressed the "time bomb" that greentea brought up. Now you are just trying to defame us on a personal level instead of addressing the content of what we said.

Examine the motivations of your dev more thoroughly.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 12:56:16 AM
Or he is sleeping.

This is not an attack on either Mint or Shacoin, this is purely an observation on hybrid pow/pos systems. If you want to discuss PoS security i do invite you to join IRC ##blackcoin on freenode and seek out rat4 there when he is awake.

Also, i'm not the dev of blackcoin

Yeah, as a professional he has more important business than engaging in this peeing contest. Make what you will of his analysis, do your own due diligence and try to come to rational conclusions based on what you learn rather than your emotional ties to this or that coin.

You are to be called out for the blatant and utter hypocrisy of Fudding the Blackcoin thread for days with inflammatory dirt, and then having hissy-fits when the Blackcoin dev weighs in with a technical statement, and you crying "fud, fud!"

Shame on you all for your childishness and abysmal conduct, which only hinders the progress of cryptocurrency. Examine your motivations more thoroughly.

He has more important business to do? Yet he starts this thread? And then walks away? It was important enough for him to start the thread but not important enough for him to reply to responses? Still, nobody has addressed what I brought up and nobody has addressed the "time bomb" that greentea brought up. Now you are just trying to defame us on a personal level instead of addressing the content of what we said.

Examine the motivations of your dev more thoroughly.

May I suggest we leave this discussion to technical users, and give them their time? No need to be impatient, the answers will be in this thread. Sorry for this spam comment.

Agreed. I will wait patiently for a technical response to what I said about the relative security of PoS/PoW vs pure PoS, and to the "timebomb".


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 12:57:26 AM
Or he is sleeping.

This is not an attack on either Mint or Shacoin, this is purely an observation on hybrid pow/pos systems. If you want to discuss PoS security i do invite you to join IRC ##blackcoin on freenode and seek out rat4 there when he is awake.

Also, i'm not the dev of blackcoin

Yeah, as a professional he has more important business than engaging in this peeing contest. Make what you will of his analysis, do your own due diligence and try to come to rational conclusions based on what you learn rather than your emotional ties to this or that coin.

You are to be called out for the blatant and utter hypocrisy of Fudding the Blackcoin thread for days with inflammatory dirt, and then having hissy-fits when the Blackcoin dev weighs in with a technical statement, and you crying "fud, fud!"

Shame on you all for your childishness and abysmal conduct, which only hinders the progress of cryptocurrency. Examine your motivations more thoroughly.

He has more important business to do? Yet he starts this thread? And then walks away? It was important enough for him to start the thread but not important enough for him to reply to responses? Still, nobody has addressed what I brought up and nobody has addressed the "time bomb" that greentea brought up. Now you are just trying to defame us on a personal level instead of addressing the content of what we said.

Examine the motivations of your dev more thoroughly.

May I suggest we leave this discussion to technical users, and give them their time? No need to be impatient, the answers will be in this thread. Sorry for this spam comment. I'll delete my earlier posts. I had nothing to add anyways. I suggest we do the same so the thread is clean and can be constructive :)

I won't delete my initial post as it contains content which I want addressed, but I do regret having been so offensive in the manner of its presentation. Nonetheless, it is the content that matters.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Jabulon on April 01, 2014, 01:03:21 AM
Or he is sleeping.

This is not an attack on either Mint or Shacoin, this is purely an observation on hybrid pow/pos systems. If you want to discuss PoS security i do invite you to join IRC ##blackcoin on freenode and seek out rat4 there when he is awake.

Also, i'm not the dev of blackcoin

Yeah, as a professional he has more important business than engaging in this peeing contest. Make what you will of his analysis, do your own due diligence and try to come to rational conclusions based on what you learn rather than your emotional ties to this or that coin.

You are to be called out for the blatant and utter hypocrisy of Fudding the Blackcoin thread for days with inflammatory dirt, and then having hissy-fits when the Blackcoin dev weighs in with a technical statement, and you crying "fud, fud!"

Shame on you all for your childishness and abysmal conduct, which only hinders the progress of cryptocurrency. Examine your motivations more thoroughly.

He has more important business to do? Yet he starts this thread? And then walks away? It was important enough for him to start the thread but not important enough for him to reply to responses? Still, nobody has addressed what I brought up and nobody has addressed the "time bomb" that greentea brought up. Now you are just trying to defame us on a personal level instead of addressing the content of what we said.

Examine the motivations of your dev more thoroughly.

May I suggest we leave this discussion to technical users, and give them their time? No need to be impatient, the answers will be in this thread. Sorry for this spam comment. I'll delete my earlier posts. I had nothing to add anyways. I suggest we do the same so the thread is clean and can be constructive :)

I won't delete my initial post as it contains content which I want addressed, but I do regret having been so offensive in the manner of its presentation. Nonetheless, it is the content that matters.

All parties agreed then, myself included, if the discussion can be maintained as a discussion and not a repeat of yesterday.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: artiface on April 01, 2014, 01:26:44 AM
This is a joke. Nice try to spread FUD about other coins, rat4, to try and promote your pure PoS blackcoin. How is it that Blackcoin prevents attack forks as a pure PoS coin, again?

You say "a sequential chain of PoW blocks can be mined in a flash."
Which is not true. Sure, you could mine all of the PoW blocks that occur sequentially, but there will be many, many more PoS blocks that interrupt those far and few apart PoW blocks. In a PoS/PoW hybrid there is no way to predict or control whether or not the next block will be PoS or PoW and therefore you cannot guarantee you will be in control of a long stream of blocks unless you have 51% of the PoW and PoS power.

Now, this brings up an issue with pure PoS coins such as your Blackcoin... That I have yet to be seen answered in any technical detail. How, when it is pure PoS and it IS known that every block in a row will be PoS, can you prevent an attack such as the one anonymousg64 brings up:

im still on the fence


can someone explain how this stops someone from generating lots of PoS blocks 20 days in the future from a bunch of TX's with small interval, whether through one or multiple wallets

Code:
ss << nStakeModifier;
ss << nTimeBlockFrom << nTxPrevOffset << txPrev.nTime << prevout.n << nTimeTx;
hashProofOfStake = Hash(ss.begin(), ss.end());
if(CBigNum(hashProofOfStake) > bnCoinDayWeight * bnTargetPerCoinDay)
    return false;


im not well enough versed with the code to know what these variable names imply

Without PoW blocks to interrupt such an attack, how is it prevented?

This thread of yours is in really bad taste, rat4, you should find better ways of promoting your coin.

I await your reply, and your explanation as to how PoS coins are safe from a TX/coinage attack.

This was answered many times in the black coin thread and here you are asking it again.  

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=469640.msg5971244#msg5971244 (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=469640.msg5971244#msg5971244)

Oh look at YOUR REPLY
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=469640.msg5971375#msg5971375 (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=469640.msg5971375#msg5971375)


Thank you both, my fears have been quelled and I've learned some new stuff:)

So why are you here bringing it up again today in a new thread?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 01:38:54 AM
This is a joke. Nice try to spread FUD about other coins, rat4, to try and promote your pure PoS blackcoin. How is it that Blackcoin prevents attack forks as a pure PoS coin, again?

You say "a sequential chain of PoW blocks can be mined in a flash."
Which is not true. Sure, you could mine all of the PoW blocks that occur sequentially, but there will be many, many more PoS blocks that interrupt those far and few apart PoW blocks. In a PoS/PoW hybrid there is no way to predict or control whether or not the next block will be PoS or PoW and therefore you cannot guarantee you will be in control of a long stream of blocks unless you have 51% of the PoW and PoS power.

Now, this brings up an issue with pure PoS coins such as your Blackcoin... That I have yet to be seen answered in any technical detail. How, when it is pure PoS and it IS known that every block in a row will be PoS, can you prevent an attack such as the one anonymousg64 brings up:

im still on the fence


can someone explain how this stops someone from generating lots of PoS blocks 20 days in the future from a bunch of TX's with small interval, whether through one or multiple wallets

Code:
ss << nStakeModifier;
ss << nTimeBlockFrom << nTxPrevOffset << txPrev.nTime << prevout.n << nTimeTx;
hashProofOfStake = Hash(ss.begin(), ss.end());
if(CBigNum(hashProofOfStake) > bnCoinDayWeight * bnTargetPerCoinDay)
    return false;


im not well enough versed with the code to know what these variable names imply

Without PoW blocks to interrupt such an attack, how is it prevented?

This thread of yours is in really bad taste, rat4, you should find better ways of promoting your coin.

I await your reply, and your explanation as to how PoS coins are safe from a TX/coinage attack.

This was answered many times in the black coin thread and here you are asking it again.  

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=469640.msg5971244#msg5971244 (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=469640.msg5971244#msg5971244)

Oh look at YOUR REPLY
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=469640.msg5971375#msg5971375 (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=469640.msg5971375#msg5971375)


Thank you both, my fears have been quelled and I've learned some new stuff:)

So why are you here bringing it up again today in a new thread?

Because the answers that you speak of are just links to a comment from Sunny King, which actually only applies to PoS/PoW hybrids- as that is what he was working with. Am I mistaken? I still await a technical response that pertains to pure PoS specifically.

If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.

I will patiently await a technical response which pertains specifically to pure PoS and a technical response to my initial comment which also outlines why I think PoS/PoW hybrid systems are not vulnerable in the manner that rat4 proposes.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: artiface on April 01, 2014, 01:59:56 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 02:04:26 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right? Was it designed for pure PoS? Wasn't it designed by Sunny King for a PoS/PoW hybrid (peercoin)?

The second point you reiterated seems legit to me.

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.




Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: artiface on April 01, 2014, 02:12:33 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period. 

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 02:19:09 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: artiface on April 01, 2014, 02:43:15 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 03:01:27 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.

I don't know the specific vulnerabilities, I'm not saying that there necessarily are any. My argument is purely from a logic standpoint. If the security of PoS was in any way dependent upon PoW in the PoS/PoW hybrid system, then just because the PoS security flaws were fixed in that context doesn't mean they will be fixed when PoS is standing alone, or that new security flaws wouldn't be introduced when PoS stands alone. So the question is, did Sunny build/fix PoS to be completely secure standing alone or was it in anyway dependent on PoW? I guess this is ultimately what I am trying to figure out.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: artiface on April 01, 2014, 03:17:19 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.

I don't know the specific vulnerabilities, I'm not saying that there necessarily are any. My argument is purely from a logic standpoint. If the security of PoS was in any way dependent upon PoW in the PoS/PoW hybrid system, then just because the PoS security flaws were fixed in that context doesn't mean they will be fixed when PoS is standing alone, or that new security flaws wouldn't be introduced when PoS stands alone. So the question is, did Sunny build/fix PoS to be completely secure standing alone or was it in anyway dependent on PoW? I guess this is ultimately what I am trying to figure out.

POS and POW are completely separate and different systems.  They do not depend on each other at all.  They work separately and can compliment each other as 2 different methods to secure a block chain or they can each stand alone. 


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Zzzack on April 01, 2014, 03:22:55 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.

I don't know the specific vulnerabilities, I'm not saying that there necessarily are any. My argument is purely from a logic standpoint. If the security of PoS was in any way dependent upon PoW in the PoS/PoW hybrid system, then just because the PoS security flaws were fixed in that context doesn't mean they will be fixed when PoS is standing alone, or that new security flaws wouldn't be introduced when PoS stands alone. So the question is, did Sunny build/fix PoS to be completely secure standing alone or was it in anyway dependent on PoW? I guess this is ultimately what I am trying to figure out.

Sunny built them to be dependent on each other. POW is a proven system. POW/POS is a proven system. POS is not and may be vulnerable to attack.

OP's point is that a POW/POS system with very small rewards creates a weak POW system that someone could exploit and it would essentially be the same as a standalone POS system which may be vulnerable.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: artiface on April 01, 2014, 03:57:16 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.

I don't know the specific vulnerabilities, I'm not saying that there necessarily are any. My argument is purely from a logic standpoint. If the security of PoS was in any way dependent upon PoW in the PoS/PoW hybrid system, then just because the PoS security flaws were fixed in that context doesn't mean they will be fixed when PoS is standing alone, or that new security flaws wouldn't be introduced when PoS stands alone. So the question is, did Sunny build/fix PoS to be completely secure standing alone or was it in anyway dependent on PoW? I guess this is ultimately what I am trying to figure out.

Sunny built them to be dependent on each other. POW is a proven system. POW/POS is a proven system. POS is not and may be vulnerable to attack.

OP's point is that a POW/POS system with very small rewards creates a weak POW system that someone could exploit and it would essentially be the same as a standalone POS system which may be vulnerable.

You clearly did not understand the OP. That is not the OP's point at all.  The OP's point is that POW/POS hybrid is vulnerable to a double spend attack by a POS block negating/orphaing a POW chain with enough blocks to have confirmed transactions.

I expect you have never looked at the source code of a POW/POW hybrid, because it it very clear POS and POW are not dependent on each other in any way.  They are completely separate methods.  It is true that POS only has never been tried before, but the POS system is secure in itself and has no known vulnerabilities.   POW is a proven system with a known vulnerability called 51% attack which is why POS was added.  POS/POW may be vulnerable by the method explained in the OP.   POS alone, again has no known vulnerabilities besides a 51% attack which would require owning 51% of the coins which would mean you already basically control the money supply and would devalue your own coins.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: presstab on April 01, 2014, 04:06:16 AM
Isn't it true that most PoW/PoS hybrids have the same target block generation speed for both systems?  So why would there be many PoW blocks in a row unless it happens by random chance?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: TrollboxChamp on April 01, 2014, 04:06:45 AM
Some of yall are crazy.

He just had to hard fork his coin. Do you think he did this to blow smoke out his ass? hahaha


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: artiface on April 01, 2014, 04:25:05 AM
Isn't it true that most PoW/PoS hybrids have the same target block generation speed for both systems?  So why would there be many PoW blocks in a row unless it happens by random chance?

If the difficulty is very low due to low network hash rate then applying a substantially higher hashrate can cause many POW blocks to be generated quickly, much quicker than the target rate.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: gonzoucab on April 01, 2014, 04:37:25 AM
Today theres nothing more secure and proven that POS/POW Hybrid

To attack you need 1/2 os POS and 1/2 POW

Add cost to the attact.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 05:30:19 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.

I don't know the specific vulnerabilities, I'm not saying that there necessarily are any. My argument is purely from a logic standpoint. If the security of PoS was in any way dependent upon PoW in the PoS/PoW hybrid system, then just because the PoS security flaws were fixed in that context doesn't mean they will be fixed when PoS is standing alone, or that new security flaws wouldn't be introduced when PoS stands alone. So the question is, did Sunny build/fix PoS to be completely secure standing alone or was it in anyway dependent on PoW? I guess this is ultimately what I am trying to figure out.

Sunny built them to be dependent on each other. POW is a proven system. POW/POS is a proven system. POS is not and may be vulnerable to attack.

OP's point is that a POW/POS system with very small rewards creates a weak POW system that someone could exploit and it would essentially be the same as a standalone POS system which may be vulnerable.

You clearly did not understand the OP. That is not the OP's point at all.  The OP's point is that POW/POS hybrid is vulnerable to a double spend attack by a POS block negating/orphaing a POW chain with enough blocks to have confirmed transactions.

I expect you have never looked at the source code of a POW/POW hybrid, because it it very clear POS and POW are not dependent on each other in any way.  They are completely separate methods.  It is true that POS only has never been tried before, but the POS system is secure in itself and has no known vulnerabilities.   POW is a proven system with a known vulnerability called 51% attack which is why POS was added.  POS/POW may be vulnerable by the method explained in the OP.   POS alone, again has no known vulnerabilities besides a 51% attack which would require owning 51% of the coins which would mean you already basically control the money supply and would devalue your own coins.
looking at your posts and the OP
"double spend attack requires 1 PoS block and low hashing power."

So wouldn't this method of attack require that you control/know precisely when you are going to receive a PoS block, so that you can orphan your transactions that you confirmed on the PoW chain you control (otherwise somebody else will have a greater chance of getting the next PoS block, unless you control 51%)?
You made it sound earlier like it is not possible to control when a PoS block will be generated:
"The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less"
So, are there ways to control/know the timing of PoS block generation even though coinage is not the sole determining factor?
If so, wouldn't that mean pure PoS is vulnerable too?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: markm on April 01, 2014, 05:40:13 AM
POW has been proved

POW POS Hybrid have been proved, Sunny made a really nice software

POS only have never been proved,  have less programers dedicated to.

Thats the true.

I have still not seen any good proofs around Sunny's PoS methods.

Someone pointed out a gaping hole once upon a time, he claimed to fix it but refused to explain, and since then everyone seems to have run along in blissful ignorance blindly spawning clones of the mysterious unexplained but according to its author fixed system.

Which might even by why no one has bothered to actually implement either of the methods of PoS that discussions in the development and technical section had eventually managed to come up with that seemed as if they might actually be able to work.

(Sunny was proud not to have even read any of the research, claiming he simply came up with an idea out of the blue himself and flew with it. Then on having it pointed out that it was utterly broken/flawed/vulnerable, claimed to have come up with a fix out of the blue himself, that he refused to explain.)

-MarkM-


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: wasamata on April 01, 2014, 05:46:03 AM
I would say this to OP
People who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 01, 2014, 05:49:21 AM
There's only one way to find out and that is to pick a target, attack, and see what happens.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: rat4 on April 01, 2014, 05:51:22 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.

I don't know the specific vulnerabilities, I'm not saying that there necessarily are any. My argument is purely from a logic standpoint. If the security of PoS was in any way dependent upon PoW in the PoS/PoW hybrid system, then just because the PoS security flaws were fixed in that context doesn't mean they will be fixed when PoS is standing alone, or that new security flaws wouldn't be introduced when PoS stands alone. So the question is, did Sunny build/fix PoS to be completely secure standing alone or was it in anyway dependent on PoW? I guess this is ultimately what I am trying to figure out.

Sunny built them to be dependent on each other. POW is a proven system. POW/POS is a proven system. POS is not and may be vulnerable to attack.

OP's point is that a POW/POS system with very small rewards creates a weak POW system that someone could exploit and it would essentially be the same as a standalone POS system which may be vulnerable.

You clearly did not understand the OP. That is not the OP's point at all.  The OP's point is that POW/POS hybrid is vulnerable to a double spend attack by a POS block negating/orphaing a POW chain with enough blocks to have confirmed transactions.

I expect you have never looked at the source code of a POW/POW hybrid, because it it very clear POS and POW are not dependent on each other in any way.  They are completely separate methods.  It is true that POS only has never been tried before, but the POS system is secure in itself and has no known vulnerabilities.   POW is a proven system with a known vulnerability called 51% attack which is why POS was added.  POS/POW may be vulnerable by the method explained in the OP.   POS alone, again has no known vulnerabilities besides a 51% attack which would require owning 51% of the coins which would mean you already basically control the money supply and would devalue your own coins.
looking at your posts and the OP
"double spend attack requires 1 PoS block and low hashing power."

So wouldn't this method of attack require that you control/know precisely when you are going to receive a PoS block, so that you can orphan your transactions that you confirmed on the PoW chain you control (otherwise somebody else will have a greater chance of getting the next PoS block, unless you control 51%)?
You made it sound earlier like it is not possible to control when a PoS block will be generated:
"The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less"
So, are there ways to control/know the timing of PoS block generation even though coinage is not the sole determining factor?
If so, wouldn't that mean pure PoS is vulnerable too?

Attacker should wait for 1 PoS block and delay announcing this block.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 01, 2014, 05:54:52 AM
Maybe dev should build test coin and use 51% premine for attack to see what happens that way no damage to existing coins


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: markm on April 01, 2014, 06:00:25 AM
OP's point is that a POW/POS system with very small rewards creates a weak POW system that someone could exploit and it would essentially be the same as a standalone POS system which may be vulnerable.

It would not be the same as a standalone PoS system; rather, what it is is a PoS system plus a pathetically weak work PoW system which completely sidesteps aka does an end run around the PoS, so that the PoW attacker can attack without the PoS system getting in the way of the attack. Basically the PoS part is almost irrelevant given that the PoW attacker can do their attack and run with the loot before PoS even notices or acts?

Possibly the PoS might even lock into place the success of the attack, by building on a chain that already has the attack in place as having happened, over and done with, fait accompli ?

-MarkM-


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 01, 2014, 06:03:58 AM
thats pure speculation


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: markm on April 01, 2014, 06:05:48 AM
POS and POW are completely separate and different systems.  They do not depend on each other at all.  They work separately and can compliment each other as 2 different methods to secure a block chain or they can each stand alone.  

Also though by the sound of it they can separately and independently conduct their attacks?

If so then maybe for example a PoW attack can be accomplished and over and done with then a PoS block or series of blocks come along taking the success of the attack as valid accomplished fact and building upon it?

And maybe vice-versa also?

So that although they are two independent separate means of securing a chain they are also two separate and independent vulnerabilities whereby attacks can be performed?

-MarkM-


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 06:11:34 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.

I don't know the specific vulnerabilities, I'm not saying that there necessarily are any. My argument is purely from a logic standpoint. If the security of PoS was in any way dependent upon PoW in the PoS/PoW hybrid system, then just because the PoS security flaws were fixed in that context doesn't mean they will be fixed when PoS is standing alone, or that new security flaws wouldn't be introduced when PoS stands alone. So the question is, did Sunny build/fix PoS to be completely secure standing alone or was it in anyway dependent on PoW? I guess this is ultimately what I am trying to figure out.

Sunny built them to be dependent on each other. POW is a proven system. POW/POS is a proven system. POS is not and may be vulnerable to attack.

OP's point is that a POW/POS system with very small rewards creates a weak POW system that someone could exploit and it would essentially be the same as a standalone POS system which may be vulnerable.

You clearly did not understand the OP. That is not the OP's point at all.  The OP's point is that POW/POS hybrid is vulnerable to a double spend attack by a POS block negating/orphaing a POW chain with enough blocks to have confirmed transactions.

I expect you have never looked at the source code of a POW/POW hybrid, because it it very clear POS and POW are not dependent on each other in any way.  They are completely separate methods.  It is true that POS only has never been tried before, but the POS system is secure in itself and has no known vulnerabilities.   POW is a proven system with a known vulnerability called 51% attack which is why POS was added.  POS/POW may be vulnerable by the method explained in the OP.   POS alone, again has no known vulnerabilities besides a 51% attack which would require owning 51% of the coins which would mean you already basically control the money supply and would devalue your own coins.
looking at your posts and the OP
"double spend attack requires 1 PoS block and low hashing power."

So wouldn't this method of attack require that you control/know precisely when you are going to receive a PoS block, so that you can orphan your transactions that you confirmed on the PoW chain you control (otherwise somebody else will have a greater chance of getting the next PoS block, unless you control 51%)?
You made it sound earlier like it is not possible to control when a PoS block will be generated:
"The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less"
So, are there ways to control/know the timing of PoS block generation even though coinage is not the sole determining factor?
If so, wouldn't that mean pure PoS is vulnerable too?

Attacker should wait for 1 PoS block and delay announcing this block.

So, in that case, what is preventing an attacker from waiting for multiple PoS blocks and delaying announcing the multiple PoS blocks to form a string of PoS blocks similar to a TX attack chain like the one anonymousg64 was talking about? If it is not possible to wait/delay more than one block per wallet, then one could easy use multiple wallets. If the timing of generating/announcing a single PoS block can be controlled, what is preventing reiteration of the process to control a series of single blocks?
Also, what would prevent another block from being announced at that same time or right before you? Say you control when you can announce your PoS block, but does that mean you can control when other people generate/announce theirs?

im still on the fence


can someone explain how this stops someone from generating lots of PoS blocks 20 days in the future from a bunch of TX's with small interval, whether through one or multiple wallets

Code:
ss << nStakeModifier;
ss << nTimeBlockFrom << nTxPrevOffset << txPrev.nTime << prevout.n << nTimeTx;
hashProofOfStake = Hash(ss.begin(), ss.end());
if(CBigNum(hashProofOfStake) > bnCoinDayWeight * bnTargetPerCoinDay)
    return false;


im not well enough versed with the code to know what these variable names imply


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 01, 2014, 06:17:47 AM
Well unless there is some kind of actual effort to collect objective facts about the matter it's not worth paying any attention to a lot of talk.

Until there is that's pure FUD


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: sidhujag on April 01, 2014, 06:31:21 AM
Ya markm knows what hes talking about.. But rather then talk gibberish its better to simply try a demo coin like last poster said.. run fast hash on non mined pow with low rewards and see if you cam break it before pos catches on... Would be cool to know once and for all.. maybe a curious dev can do this to put an end to all the shitcoins with pos claiming its the greatest thing when sunny king hasnt even explained himself yet regarding his fix...


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: rat4 on April 01, 2014, 06:35:16 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.

I don't know the specific vulnerabilities, I'm not saying that there necessarily are any. My argument is purely from a logic standpoint. If the security of PoS was in any way dependent upon PoW in the PoS/PoW hybrid system, then just because the PoS security flaws were fixed in that context doesn't mean they will be fixed when PoS is standing alone, or that new security flaws wouldn't be introduced when PoS stands alone. So the question is, did Sunny build/fix PoS to be completely secure standing alone or was it in anyway dependent on PoW? I guess this is ultimately what I am trying to figure out.

Sunny built them to be dependent on each other. POW is a proven system. POW/POS is a proven system. POS is not and may be vulnerable to attack.

OP's point is that a POW/POS system with very small rewards creates a weak POW system that someone could exploit and it would essentially be the same as a standalone POS system which may be vulnerable.

You clearly did not understand the OP. That is not the OP's point at all.  The OP's point is that POW/POS hybrid is vulnerable to a double spend attack by a POS block negating/orphaing a POW chain with enough blocks to have confirmed transactions.

I expect you have never looked at the source code of a POW/POW hybrid, because it it very clear POS and POW are not dependent on each other in any way.  They are completely separate methods.  It is true that POS only has never been tried before, but the POS system is secure in itself and has no known vulnerabilities.   POW is a proven system with a known vulnerability called 51% attack which is why POS was added.  POS/POW may be vulnerable by the method explained in the OP.   POS alone, again has no known vulnerabilities besides a 51% attack which would require owning 51% of the coins which would mean you already basically control the money supply and would devalue your own coins.
looking at your posts and the OP
"double spend attack requires 1 PoS block and low hashing power."

So wouldn't this method of attack require that you control/know precisely when you are going to receive a PoS block, so that you can orphan your transactions that you confirmed on the PoW chain you control (otherwise somebody else will have a greater chance of getting the next PoS block, unless you control 51%)?
You made it sound earlier like it is not possible to control when a PoS block will be generated:
"The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less"
So, are there ways to control/know the timing of PoS block generation even though coinage is not the sole determining factor?
If so, wouldn't that mean pure PoS is vulnerable too?

Attacker should wait for 1 PoS block and delay announcing this block.

So, in that case, what is preventing an attacker from waiting for multiple PoS blocks and delaying announcing the multiple PoS blocks to form a string of PoS blocks similar to a TX attack chain like the one anonymousg64 was talking about? If it is not possible to wait/delay more than one block per wallet, then one could easy use multiple wallets.

Nothing prevents. Chance to find even 2 blocks in a row is low.
Long chain of PoS blocks is realistically only for exchanges with old coins in cold wallet.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 01, 2014, 06:36:25 AM
Ya markm knows what hes talking about.. But rather then talk gibberish its better to simply try a demo coin like last poster said.. run fast hash on non mined pow with low rewards and see if you cam break it before pos catches on... Would be cool to know once and for all.. maybe a curious dev can do this to put an end to all the shitcoins with pos claiming its the greatest thing when sunny king hasnt even explained himself yet regarding his fix...

I'm sure he does. But he has stated his thinking and now it is time to test it. If not, well...

At this point we all need concrete facts.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mercSuey on April 01, 2014, 06:40:14 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.

I don't know the specific vulnerabilities, I'm not saying that there necessarily are any. My argument is purely from a logic standpoint. If the security of PoS was in any way dependent upon PoW in the PoS/PoW hybrid system, then just because the PoS security flaws were fixed in that context doesn't mean they will be fixed when PoS is standing alone, or that new security flaws wouldn't be introduced when PoS stands alone. So the question is, did Sunny build/fix PoS to be completely secure standing alone or was it in anyway dependent on PoW? I guess this is ultimately what I am trying to figure out.

Sunny built them to be dependent on each other. POW is a proven system. POW/POS is a proven system. POS is not and may be vulnerable to attack.

OP's point is that a POW/POS system with very small rewards creates a weak POW system that someone could exploit and it would essentially be the same as a standalone POS system which may be vulnerable.

You clearly did not understand the OP. That is not the OP's point at all.  The OP's point is that POW/POS hybrid is vulnerable to a double spend attack by a POS block negating/orphaing a POW chain with enough blocks to have confirmed transactions.

I expect you have never looked at the source code of a POW/POW hybrid, because it it very clear POS and POW are not dependent on each other in any way.  They are completely separate methods.  It is true that POS only has never been tried before, but the POS system is secure in itself and has no known vulnerabilities.   POW is a proven system with a known vulnerability called 51% attack which is why POS was added.  POS/POW may be vulnerable by the method explained in the OP.   POS alone, again has no known vulnerabilities besides a 51% attack which would require owning 51% of the coins which would mean you already basically control the money supply and would devalue your own coins.
looking at your posts and the OP
"double spend attack requires 1 PoS block and low hashing power."

So wouldn't this method of attack require that you control/know precisely when you are going to receive a PoS block, so that you can orphan your transactions that you confirmed on the PoW chain you control (otherwise somebody else will have a greater chance of getting the next PoS block, unless you control 51%)?
You made it sound earlier like it is not possible to control when a PoS block will be generated:
"The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less"
So, are there ways to control/know the timing of PoS block generation even though coinage is not the sole determining factor?
If so, wouldn't that mean pure PoS is vulnerable too?

Attacker should wait for 1 PoS block and delay announcing this block.

PoS block is a stochastic process.  You say this like it's a given that it can be done...it's not.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 06:41:28 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.

I don't know the specific vulnerabilities, I'm not saying that there necessarily are any. My argument is purely from a logic standpoint. If the security of PoS was in any way dependent upon PoW in the PoS/PoW hybrid system, then just because the PoS security flaws were fixed in that context doesn't mean they will be fixed when PoS is standing alone, or that new security flaws wouldn't be introduced when PoS stands alone. So the question is, did Sunny build/fix PoS to be completely secure standing alone or was it in anyway dependent on PoW? I guess this is ultimately what I am trying to figure out.

Sunny built them to be dependent on each other. POW is a proven system. POW/POS is a proven system. POS is not and may be vulnerable to attack.

OP's point is that a POW/POS system with very small rewards creates a weak POW system that someone could exploit and it would essentially be the same as a standalone POS system which may be vulnerable.

You clearly did not understand the OP. That is not the OP's point at all.  The OP's point is that POW/POS hybrid is vulnerable to a double spend attack by a POS block negating/orphaing a POW chain with enough blocks to have confirmed transactions.

I expect you have never looked at the source code of a POW/POW hybrid, because it it very clear POS and POW are not dependent on each other in any way.  They are completely separate methods.  It is true that POS only has never been tried before, but the POS system is secure in itself and has no known vulnerabilities.   POW is a proven system with a known vulnerability called 51% attack which is why POS was added.  POS/POW may be vulnerable by the method explained in the OP.   POS alone, again has no known vulnerabilities besides a 51% attack which would require owning 51% of the coins which would mean you already basically control the money supply and would devalue your own coins.
looking at your posts and the OP
"double spend attack requires 1 PoS block and low hashing power."

So wouldn't this method of attack require that you control/know precisely when you are going to receive a PoS block, so that you can orphan your transactions that you confirmed on the PoW chain you control (otherwise somebody else will have a greater chance of getting the next PoS block, unless you control 51%)?
You made it sound earlier like it is not possible to control when a PoS block will be generated:
"The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less"
So, are there ways to control/know the timing of PoS block generation even though coinage is not the sole determining factor?
If so, wouldn't that mean pure PoS is vulnerable too?

Attacker should wait for 1 PoS block and delay announcing this block.

So, in that case, what is preventing an attacker from waiting for multiple PoS blocks and delaying announcing the multiple PoS blocks to form a string of PoS blocks similar to a TX attack chain like the one anonymousg64 was talking about? If it is not possible to wait/delay more than one block per wallet, then one could easy use multiple wallets.

Nothing prevents. Chance to find even 2 blocks in a row is low.
Long chain of PoS blocks is realistically only for exchanges with old coins in cold wallet.

But like you said "Attacker should wait for 1 PoS block and delay announcing this block." Why couldn't this process be simply reiterated to form a string? You wouldn't need to "find" >2 blocks in a row, you would just need to announce them in a row. Or am I missing something?

My edit of what I said above, must have been editing while you responded:
"So, in that case, what is preventing an attacker from waiting for multiple PoS blocks and delaying announcing the multiple PoS blocks to form a string of PoS blocks similar to a TX attack chain like the one anonymousg64 was talking about? If it is not possible to wait/delay more than one block per wallet, then one could easy use multiple wallets. If the timing of generating/announcing a single PoS block can be controlled, what is preventing reiteration of the process to control a series of single blocks?
Also, what would prevent another block from being announced at that same time or right before you? Say you control when you can announce your PoS block, but does that mean you can control when other people generate/announce theirs?"

Similar to mercSuey's point that PoS is a stochastic process,

What would prevent another block from being announced at that same time or right before you? Assuming you can control when you can announce your PoS block, does that mean you can control when other people generate/announce theirs?






Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Crestington on April 01, 2014, 06:44:26 AM
Colossuscoin is 100% Proof of Stake through Pow/Pos. It it the oldest Proof of stake only coin and I started working with it about 4 months ago, right after it finished Pow and became POS only.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: rat4 on April 01, 2014, 07:06:05 AM
But like you said "Attacker should wait for 1 PoS block and delay announcing this block." Why couldn't this process be simply reiterated to form a string? You wouldn't need to "find" >2 blocks in a row, you would just need to announce them in a row. Or am I missing something?

My edit of what I said above, must have been editing while you responded:
"So, in that case, what is preventing an attacker from waiting for multiple PoS blocks and delaying announcing the multiple PoS blocks to form a string of PoS blocks similar to a TX attack chain like the one anonymousg64 was talking about? If it is not possible to wait/delay more than one block per wallet, then one could easy use multiple wallets. If the timing of generating/announcing a single PoS block can be controlled, what is preventing reiteration of the process to control a series of single blocks?

Attacker should build a chain longer than main. The more he waits the less chance to success.

Also, what would prevent another block from being announced at that same time or right before you? Say you control when you can announce your PoS block, but does that mean you can control when other people generate/announce theirs?"

Similar to mercSuey's point that PoS is a stochastic process,

What would prevent another block from being announced at that same time or right before you? Assuming you can control when you can announce your PoS block, does that mean you can control when other people generate/announce theirs?

Yes, this attack has not 100% chance to success. The point is that average block time is known.
One honest PoS block will not stop attack. Two will.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 07:33:26 AM
But like you said "Attacker should wait for 1 PoS block and delay announcing this block." Why couldn't this process be simply reiterated to form a string? You wouldn't need to "find" >2 blocks in a row, you would just need to announce them in a row. Or am I missing something?

My edit of what I said above, must have been editing while you responded:
"So, in that case, what is preventing an attacker from waiting for multiple PoS blocks and delaying announcing the multiple PoS blocks to form a string of PoS blocks similar to a TX attack chain like the one anonymousg64 was talking about? If it is not possible to wait/delay more than one block per wallet, then one could easy use multiple wallets. If the timing of generating/announcing a single PoS block can be controlled, what is preventing reiteration of the process to control a series of single blocks?

Attacker should build a chain longer than main. The more he waits the less chance to success.

Also, what would prevent another block from being announced at that same time or right before you? Say you control when you can announce your PoS block, but does that mean you can control when other people generate/announce theirs?"

Similar to mercSuey's point that PoS is a stochastic process,

What would prevent another block from being announced at that same time or right before you? Assuming you can control when you can announce your PoS block, does that mean you can control when other people generate/announce theirs?

Yes, this attack has not 100% chance to success. The point is that average block time is known.
One honest PoS block will not stop attack. Two will.

Going back to the OP,
"At such difficulty a sequential chain of PoW blocks can be mined in a flash."

And what artiface said,
"If the difficulty is very low due to low network hash rate then applying a substantially higher hashrate can cause many POW blocks to be generated quickly, much quicker than the target rate."

How exactly is this possible, particularly with difficulty re-targeting every block? Also, it is my understanding that not only would the difficulty of finding a PoW block go up, but the difficulty of finding a PoS would go down in response as well.


Additionally, no matter how fast you can manage to generate a string of PoW blocks there is no way to know with certainty that a PoS block wont be randomly generated within that time and interrupt the string? The best you could do is estimate based on the average block time, right? But this would be further complicated since the chance of finding a PoS block is increased by PoW blocks being found.

https://i.imgur.com/vxPyapF.png
As you can see here, the PoW blocks have a different and independent difficulty algorithm than PoS blocks. If you start getting a lot of PoS blocks in a row, the chance of PoW block generation increases in order to achieve the PoW target; so after each PoS block is generated the likely-hood of generating a PoW block as the next block goes up, and after every PoW block, the chance of generating a PoS block goes up. They are both integrated with block targets and difficulties that are independent of one another; so one cannot perpetually overpower the other. This is why PoS/PoW hybrid is more secure vs just PoS only. And, it is also worth noting that over time, the Mintcoin networks actually will get more secure with age, whereas a PoW only coin has the potential to get less secure due to centralized mining processes. Mintcoin is protected from PoW overpowering, as well as PoS overpowering. You cannot know for certain the future of the Mintcion blockchain (at least very far). With Pure PoS, you know the future will always be a PoS block next, and with PoW you know that the future will always be PoW blocks next, but you cannot know the future with hybrid PoW/PoS like Mintcoin.




Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: dille71 on April 01, 2014, 07:59:33 AM
That is YOUR reply I quoted.

You must have read the answer at one point, because YOU commented that your question was answered, but I will summarize it again here just to be perfectly clear.

  • Blackcoin use POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time
  • The "attack" suggested is impossible because coins do not stake on age alone, therefore making deposits at small intervals in no way guarantees you will generate POS blocks at those intervals.  In fact splitting coins to generate these intervals will make the chance of staking at each interval even less

Right, it uses "POS 0.3.0 protocol which has no known vulnerabilities at this time" in the context of a PoS/PoW hybrid, right? It has never been tested in the context of pure PoS, right?

I will restate: If i said said anything further about it on the blackcoin thread, I would have been ran out of there and labeled as a FUDer.
Similar to how what I am saying now, not on the blackcoin thread, is drawing so much heat.

I'm not giving you heat, i'm only answering your question.. again.

Saying Sunny King's fix only applies to POS/POW hybrids is incorrect, it fixed the POS protocol. Period.  

The timebomb attack is not feasible because coins do not stake on age alone, there are other factors.   Even if you could guarantee that all your coins ages were spaced at a minimum interval there is no guarantee they will all stake at their intervals. Also POS blocks have a target time interval, so coins that were eligible to stake too soon would not generate blocks any faster than the target interval, there is no way that one person could force their coins to be the ones to generate stake for many consecutive intervals.  This attack is pure nonsense.  

But Sunny King fixed PoS in the context of PoS/PoW hybrid, not pure PoS. Right?

Since there have not been any other pure POS coins yes the fix was originally applied to a POS/POW hybrid.  Nevertheless the fix is for the POS protocol and did nothing to POW. The fix ensured that POS was a secure way to generate blocks to secure a blockchain.  If you know of any vulnerabilities in POS please make them known so they can be addressed.

I don't know the specific vulnerabilities, I'm not saying that there necessarily are any. My argument is purely from a logic standpoint. If the security of PoS was in any way dependent upon PoW in the PoS/PoW hybrid system, then just because the PoS security flaws were fixed in that context doesn't mean they will be fixed when PoS is standing alone, or that new security flaws wouldn't be introduced when PoS stands alone. So the question is, did Sunny build/fix PoS to be completely secure standing alone or was it in anyway dependent on PoW? I guess this is ultimately what I am trying to figure out.

Sunny built them to be dependent on each other. POW is a proven system. POW/POS is a proven system. POS is not and may be vulnerable to attack.

OP's point is that a POW/POS system with very small rewards creates a weak POW system that someone could exploit and it would essentially be the same as a standalone POS system which may be vulnerable.

You clearly did not understand the OP. That is not the OP's point at all.  The OP's point is that POW/POS hybrid is vulnerable to a double spend attack by a POS block negating/orphaing a POW chain with enough blocks to have confirmed transactions.

I expect you have never looked at the source code of a POW/POW hybrid, because it it very clear POS and POW are not dependent on each other in any way.  They are completely separate methods.  It is true that POS only has never been tried before, but the POS system is secure in itself and has no known vulnerabilities.   POW is a proven system with a known vulnerability called 51% attack which is why POS was added.  POS/POW may be vulnerable by the method explained in the OP.   POS alone, again has no known vulnerabilities besides a 51% attack which would require owning 51% of the coins which would mean you already basically control the money supply and would devalue your own coins.
You dont need 51% of the coins, you need 51% of the coin age
So, with a pure pos coin that has no upper limit for coin age it might be enough to own 10% of the coins and let them age long enough......


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: rat4 on April 01, 2014, 08:09:35 AM
Quote
How exactly is this possible, particularly with difficulty re-targeting every block?

Blocks may have timestamp different from real time. This allows keeping low difficulty. Time window is limited but enough for this attack.

Quote
Also, it is my understanding that not only would the difficulty of finding a PoW block go up, but the difficulty of finding a PoS would go down in response as well.

No.

Quote
Additionally, no matter how fast you can manage to generate a string of PoW blocks there is no way to know with certainty that a PoS block wont be randomly generated within that time and interrupt the string?

Again, one PoS block will not stop attack. Two will.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Crestington on April 01, 2014, 09:13:27 AM
What do you want to know about a POW/POS coin after its fully Proof of Stake?  How wallets interact? Pitfalls? Colossuscoin is the longest running POS only coin from POW 4 months ago. I'm looking to create a Proof of Stake only,  fee sharing system, Do any of you understand how multi-signiture transactions could work on the blockchain?

Also, could it be possible to have fees from transactions go to a particular address built into the blockchain where fees get distributed 75% to a central fund,  and 25% to an address that gets mined with your POS coins. POS mining is 7-15 days Max weight and POS interest is 15-30 days Max weight. I was also thinking that you could reduce blockchain size by having a large float but lower minimum such as 500,000,000,000.01  How would that affect size at a faster block time?

What would you recommend in terms of POS only for security, could TX fees be added to POS generation? If you used POW, could it be an added function for security and pays out based on POS? If you had fees being split and some that go into a central fund, it would mean that one address would have a full record of the blockchain, could that be loaded on a central server?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: oinquer on April 01, 2014, 09:20:16 AM
POW has been proved

POW POS Hybrid have been proved, Sunny made a really nice software

POS only have never been proved,  have less programers dedicated to.

Thats the true.

But the fact is that all POW/POW+POS/POS coins have the possiblities to get attacked.
Blackcoin has its problem just a week ago.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 03:42:11 PM
POW has been proved

POW POS Hybrid have been proved, Sunny made a really nice software

POS only have never been proved,  have less programers dedicated to.

Thats the true.

But the fact is that all POW/POW+POS/POS coins have the possiblities to get attacked.
Blackcoin has its problem just a week ago.

Yeah and does anybody else find it interesting how timing of the "timebomb attack" described here:
http://www.blackcoin.co/wallet-2/official-statement-regarding-blockchain-problems-23rd-of-march/

"To solve the issue, by making a check for such cases and making sure the right value is always returned we had to hard fork the BlackCoin blockchain at block 38424."

Corresponds to the problems that occurred at cryptorush:

Getting scary out there...  The roundness of those orders suggests it's just a few people holding up the price....

https://i.imgur.com/xuMJJ9U.png

Yep, its being manipulated to dump - they get you to pump it up by panic buying more only to dump on you - probably the coins that were stolen.

Are the 22 million coins that went out of the CR wallet simply on the bad fork? or can they be used by the new client?

Total loss reported about 1.5 million coins, 22 million number is their total processed coins as far as I understand. The coins were withdrawn by normal CR users seeing larger balance than they should have, not a single entity/hacker. The coins were distributed across many people, no single large dumper was born. The coins are useable.

How did they end up with a total negative balance in their wallet? I mean, the daemon will not send coins it doesn't have. They must have HAD that many coins -- but they're claiming they didn't. They say they only had 68k coins or something, and ended up with a massive negative balance. The client doesn't -- or obviously shouldn't -- allow that to happen. The only way it might happen that I can see would be if the coins were on a bad fork. Right? Forget about logs, all the coins coming out of that wallet should be traceable and invalidated if they were in fact sent due to a bug in the client.

???


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 01, 2014, 03:49:23 PM
I had suspected as much as well. But apparently the BC devteam was on the ball and it was really just a blip. I have been observing BC as well as other coins along the course of those events across several different threads such "operation shitcoin" the BTCX attack progress thread, the BC thread +more and pretty much got to watch the whole thing transpire from that vantage point.

Very interesting and dramatic forum experience btw lol. I've been participating in internet forums for over 10 years and Bitcointalk is among the best, that's for sure.

I guess it's the money that's at stake that makes it so piquant  :D



Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 04:01:57 PM
Quote
How exactly is this possible, particularly with difficulty re-targeting every block?

Blocks may have timestamp different from real time. This allows keeping low difficulty. Time window is limited but enough for this attack.

Quote
Also, it is my understanding that not only would the difficulty of finding a PoW block go up, but the difficulty of finding a PoS would go down in response as well.

No.

Quote
Additionally, no matter how fast you can manage to generate a string of PoW blocks there is no way to know with certainty that a PoS block wont be randomly generated within that time and interrupt the string?

Again, one PoS block will not stop attack. Two will.

Quote

Quote
Additionally, no matter how fast you can manage to generate a string of PoW blocks there is no way to know with certainty that a PoS block wont be randomly generated within that time and interrupt the string?

Again, one PoS block will not stop attack. Two will.

This I don't understand because of my own ignorance, like most of the things I don't understand, how is it possible that you only need to control one PoS block to orphan your PoW chain and carry out this attack but there would need to be two legitimate PoS blocks to stop the attack from occurring?

Quote
Blocks may have timestamp different from real time.

So this is attack is dependent upon an unknown? Is there a way to confirm one way or another?

Quote
Quote
Also, it is my understanding that not only would the difficulty of finding a PoW block go up, but the difficulty of finding a PoS would go down in response as well.

No.

Can you be a little more detailed? I have been told in the past that the two difficulties adjust to one another.




Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Soepkip on April 01, 2014, 04:11:42 PM
POW has been proved

POW POS Hybrid have been proved, Sunny made a really nice software

POS only have never been proved,  have less programers dedicated to.

Thats the true.

But the fact is that all POW/POW+POS/POS coins have the possiblities to get attacked.
Blackcoin has its problem just a week ago.

Yeah and does anybody else find it interesting how timing of the "timebomb attack" described here:
http://www.blackcoin.co/wallet-2/official-statement-regarding-blockchain-problems-23rd-of-march/

"To solve the issue, by making a check for such cases and making sure the right value is always returned we had to hard fork the BlackCoin blockchain at block 38424."

Corresponds to the problems that occurred at cryptorush:


???

CryptoRush's problems with BlackCoin were due to their usage of the getbalance accounts function, which no other exchange out there uses for good reason:
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Accounts_explained#Account_Weaknesses

In fact, the fork itself has nothing to do with the losses that CryptoRush had due to the usage of the accounts feature. If CryptoRush had checked the new version of BlackCoin before implementing it in their live exchange there would've been no losses since they would have found the issue with the accounts feature immediatly and asked us to fix it.  

But again we are discussing BlackCoin vs Mintcoin while we are talking security vunerabilities of PoW/PoS hybrid based systems.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 04:20:17 PM
POW has been proved

POW POS Hybrid have been proved, Sunny made a really nice software

POS only have never been proved,  have less programers dedicated to.

Thats the true.

But the fact is that all POW/POW+POS/POS coins have the possiblities to get attacked.
Blackcoin has its problem just a week ago.

Yeah and does anybody else find it interesting how timing of the "timebomb attack" described here:
http://www.blackcoin.co/wallet-2/official-statement-regarding-blockchain-problems-23rd-of-march/

"To solve the issue, by making a check for such cases and making sure the right value is always returned we had to hard fork the BlackCoin blockchain at block 38424."

Corresponds to the problems that occurred at cryptorush:


???

CryptoRush's problems with BlackCoin were due to their usage of the getbalance accounts function, which no other exchange out there uses for good reason:
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Accounts_explained#Account_Weaknesses

In fact, the fork itself has nothing to do with the losses that CryptoRush had due to the usage of the accounts feature. If CryptoRush had checked the new version of BlackCoin before implementing it in their live exchange there would've been no losses since they would have found the issue with the accounts feature immediatly and asked us to fix it.  

But again we are discussing BlackCoin vs Mintcoin while we are talking security vunerabilities of PoW/PoS hybrid based systems.

Thanks for clarifying. I made no mention of Mintcoin vs Blackcoin. Just talking security, of both PoW/PoS hybrid systems and pure PoS.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: valley365 on April 01, 2014, 05:36:13 PM
This seems weird to me. The blackcoin gets hacked and killed cryptorush and now it blames the algorithm. Is MINT hacked? If it is so easy as one PoS block why not try to hack MINT and prove your "theory"? You'll quickly find your "theory" is flawed.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 01, 2014, 05:41:28 PM
Time for real facts, not speculation.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: neilh on April 01, 2014, 06:27:19 PM
This seems weird to me. The blackcoin gets hacked and killed cryptorush and now it blames the algorithm. Is MINT hacked? If it is so easy as one PoS block why try to hack MINT and prove your "theory"? You'll quickly find your "theory" is flawed.

Try reading this...

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=529779.0 (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=529779.0)

Maybe then you will realise cryptorush committed suicide.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: draco71 on April 01, 2014, 07:14:34 PM
From what I read and understand, I suspect that forks are coming soon on POS/POW and POS only coins. But, this is perfectly fine.

We are talking about software, it can not be flawless. My personal experience, working for more than 15 years on a sw giant that controls more than 50% of the global market in a mainstream technology, proves it. There are hundreds of people here, working only on sw fault fixing, by patching the code all the time and deliver these patches to the customers around the globe.

So, please take it easy and relax. The possible faults will be discovered and fixed.

And have something else in mind: The real developers respect and support each other and they do not do "dogfights" as the coins investors/zealots/holders (you name it) do. And from what I saw so far, at least BC and MINT both have real developers.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 01, 2014, 07:17:14 PM
Quote
My personal experience, working for more than 15 years on a sw giant that controls more than 50% of the global market in a mainstream technology

SAP?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 01, 2014, 09:24:41 PM
From what I read and understand, I suspect that forks are coming soon on POS/POW and POS only coins. But, this is perfectly fine.

We are talking about software, it can not be flawless. My personal experience, working for more than 15 years on a sw giant that controls more than 50% of the global market in a mainstream technology, proves it. There are hundreds of people here, working only on sw fault fixing, by patching the code all the time and deliver these patches to the customers around the globe.

So, please take it easy and relax. The possible faults will be discovered and fixed.

And have something else in mind: The real developers respect and support each other and they do not do "dogfights" as the coins investors/zealots/holders (you name it) do. And from what I saw so far, at least BC and MINT both have real developers.


Agreed. These things need to be discussed. A lot of good can come out of it. Although, perhaps this would be better discussed not on a public thread such as this, where if any true and effective attack mechanism were described it would then be readily available for people to recognize and exploit. I think that, if somebody actually had good intentions for pointing out what they theorize as and believe is a possible security hole then they should have contacted the devs of the vulnerable coins directly and not stated the possible exploit on a public thread (IMHO; I also expressed this opinion to anonymousg64 when he started talking about the theoretical TX bug). FYI I have contacted both the mintcoin dev and the eccoin dev and neither of them are concerned about this "security issue"... whether that means it is not an issue at or, or that it is one that can be easily solved I am not entirely sure (they both made it sound like it was likely the former, though).


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: rat4 on April 02, 2014, 05:25:34 AM
First post has been updated with second attack, actually tested on Mintcoin.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Crestington on April 02, 2014, 05:48:01 AM
From what I read and understand, I suspect that forks are coming soon on POS/POW and POS only coins. But, this is perfectly fine.

We are talking about software, it can not be flawless. My personal experience, working for more than 15 years on a sw giant that controls more than 50% of the global market in a mainstream technology, proves it. There are hundreds of people here, working only on sw fault fixing, by patching the code all the time and deliver these patches to the customers around the globe.

So, please take it easy and relax. The possible faults will be discovered and fixed.

And have something else in mind: The real developers respect and support each other and they do not do "dogfights" as the coins investors/zealots/holders (you name it) do. And from what I saw so far, at least BC and MINT both have real developers.


Agreed. These things need to be discussed. A lot of good can come out of it. Although, perhaps this would be better discussed not on a public thread such as this, where if any true and effective attack mechanism were described it would then be readily available for people to recognize and exploit. I think that, if somebody actually had good intentions for pointing out what they theorize as and believe is a possible security hole then they should have contacted the devs of the vulnerable coins directly and not stated the possible exploit on a public thread (IMHO; I also expressed this opinion to anonymousg64 when he started talking about the theoretical TX bug). FYI I have contacted both the mintcoin dev and the eccoin dev and neither of them are concerned about this "security issue"... whether that means it is not an issue at or, or that it is one that can be easily solved I am not entirely sure (they both made it sound like it was likely the former, though).

I wouldn't be afraid of operation shitcoin too much, they are more concerned community members than destructive hackers. I much prefer their "I don't give a fuck" attitude than people too afraid what others think but I guess I just like the renegade style.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: XbladeX on April 02, 2014, 07:07:33 AM
First post has been updated with second attack, actually tested on Mintcoin.
rat4 i am impressed.

To be honest i am not programmer but i see that you know what you are are doing.
I have checked those blocks and i can confirm that your test attack is successful.

just use:
mintcoin-explorer.info
"no PoS blocks from 203231 up to 203441, more than 1 hour of real time"
and check those POW only blocks.
And it looks like that is no longer true, for now:

https://i.imgur.com/vxPyapF.png
As you can see here, the PoW blocks have a different and independent difficulty algorithm than PoS blocks. If you start getting a lot of PoS blocks in a row, the chance of PoW block generation increases in order to achieve the PoW target; so after each PoS block is generated the likely-hood of generating a PoW block as the next block goes up, and after every PoW block, the chance of generating a PoS block goes up. They are both integrated with block targets and difficulties that are independent of one another; ]so one cannot perpetually overpower the other.This is why PoS/PoW hybrid is more secure vs just PoS only. And, it is also worth noting that over time, the Mintcoin networks actually will get more secure with age, whereas a PoW only coin has the potential to get less secure due to centralized mining processes. Mintcoin is protected from PoW overpowering, as well as PoS overpowering. You cannot know for certain the future of the Mintcion blockchain (at least very far). With Pure PoS, you know the future will always be a PoS block next, and with PoW you know that the future will always be PoW blocks next, but you cannot know the future with hybrid PoW/PoS like Mintcoin.

And Mintcoin is open for double spend attack according to Wiki...
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Double-spending


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: XbladeX on April 02, 2014, 11:28:29 AM
This is a joke. Nice try to spread FUD about other coins, rat4, to try and promote your pure PoS blackcoin. How is it that Blackcoin prevents attack forks as a pure PoS coin, again?

You say "a sequential chain of PoW blocks can be mined in a flash."
Which is not true. Sure, you could mine all of the PoW blocks that occur sequentially, but there will be many, many more PoS blocks that interrupt those far and few apart PoW blocks.
....

I think you should apologize now rat4, thank him and pay him BIG bounty for helping Mintcoin and others for founding bugs...
And even bigger bounty for solving issue...

PS:He just mined 1h in POW Mintcoin you want more evidence... ? Do you want double spend ?



Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: MuffinMaster on April 02, 2014, 11:54:02 AM
This is a joke. Nice try to spread FUD about other coins, rat4, to try and promote your pure PoS blackcoin. How is it that Blackcoin prevents attack forks as a pure PoS coin, again?

You say "a sequential chain of PoW blocks can be mined in a flash."
Which is not true. Sure, you could mine all of the PoW blocks that occur sequentially, but there will be many, many more PoS blocks that interrupt those far and few apart PoW blocks.
....

I think you should apologize now rat4, thank him and pay him BIG bounty for helping Mintcoin and others for founding bugs...
And even bigger bounty for solving issue...

PS:He just mined 1h in POW Mintcoin you want more evidence... ? Do you want double spend ?



serious props to rat4. better to find out now then have it escalate.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mellomike on April 02, 2014, 12:46:13 PM
Wow great job rat4 on finding this... while others tried to turn a blind eye to the subject to protect the image of their dear coin, you pointed out the flaws so that they could hopefully fix them.

Great dev!!


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Jabulon on April 02, 2014, 12:53:07 PM
Wow great job rat4 on finding this... while others tried to turn a blind eye to the subject to protect the image of their dear coin, you pointed out the flaws so that they could hopefully fix them.

Great dev!!

Hear hear! This is a true act of community-service, a contribution of enormous value to the evolution of safe and legitimate cryptocurrency. It speaks for itself, from far above the maddening crowd, and partisan mudslinging based on ignorance and greed.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: PhilippeStevens on April 02, 2014, 12:54:49 PM
I expect some apologies from people in here calling fud when he was trying to help other coins..


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: tacotime on April 02, 2014, 12:58:33 PM
Told OP it was a bad idea, was ignored by OP in the Blackcoin thread. If you don't understand the code you're modifying, don't muck with it.

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=509928.msg5651789#msg5651789
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=469640.msg5651892#msg5651892

There is another issue with using stake modifiers derived only from PoS blocks as well.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 12:59:58 PM
I expect some apologies from people in here calling fud when he was trying to help other coins..

looks like the fud is still happening, I wouldn't hold your breath



Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: brokedummy on April 02, 2014, 01:04:26 PM
Wow great job rat4 on finding this... while others tried to turn a blind eye to the subject to protect the image of their dear coin, you pointed out the flaws so that they could hopefully fix them.

Great dev!!

Hear hear! This is a true act of community-service, a contribution of enormous value to the evolution of safe and legitimate cryptocurrency. It speaks for itself, from far above the maddening crowd, and partisan mudslinging based on ignorance and greed.

This should NOT have been publicly exposed. If rat4 was truly a good guy he would have communicated this privately with the mintcointeam so that they could work on a fix before all was revealed. Not cool.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: rat4 on April 02, 2014, 01:06:39 PM
Told OP it was a bad idea, was ignored by OP in the Blackcoin thread. If you don't understand the code you're modifying, don't muck with it.

These attacks are not applicable to BlackCoin. Guess why.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: maarx on April 02, 2014, 01:09:21 PM
Wow great job rat4 on finding this... while others tried to turn a blind eye to the subject to protect the image of their dear coin, you pointed out the flaws so that they could hopefully fix them.

Great dev!!

Hear hear! This is a true act of community-service, a contribution of enormous value to the evolution of safe and legitimate cryptocurrency. It speaks for itself, from far above the maddening crowd, and partisan mudslinging based on ignorance and greed.

This should NOT have been publicly exposed. If rat4 was truly a good guy he would have communicated this privately with the mintcointeam so that they could work on a fix before all was revealed. Not cool.

That was done. This was posted 18 hours after notifying the mintcoin dev's.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 01:10:00 PM
Wow great job rat4 on finding this... while others tried to turn a blind eye to the subject to protect the image of their dear coin, you pointed out the flaws so that they could hopefully fix them.

Great dev!!

Hear hear! This is a true act of community-service, a contribution of enormous value to the evolution of safe and legitimate cryptocurrency. It speaks for itself, from far above the maddening crowd, and partisan mudslinging based on ignorance and greed.

This should NOT have been publicly exposed. If rat4 was truly a good guy he would have communicated this privately with the mintcointeam so that they could work on a fix before all was revealed. Not cool.

That is what someone who is honest would have done, but he went and got a bunch of people from the BC thread to come to this thread and the mintcoin thread to spread FUD

We don't know even if there was actually a successful attack or not yet, that hasn't been confirmed. I certainly didn't notice any attack.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: tacotime on April 02, 2014, 01:10:43 PM
Told OP it was a bad idea, was ignored by OP in the Blackcoin thread. If you don't understand the code you're modifying, don't muck with it.

These attacks are not applicable to BlackCoin. Guess why.

My guess is that you modified the trust weighting for PoS blocks (to lessen weighting for any individual block based on coinage) or that you manipulated timestamping variability (https://github.com/rat4/blackcoin/commit/06e30838eae9a33d9d40d4e2bc6076141a719c47), neither of which are great solutions in the distributed system you're playing with.

It looks like you tried to fix the stake modifier with a hardfork and then broke it in the process, too:
https://github.com/rat4/blackcoin/commit/47d2eec662b738b39cdb45f3ef6f72a13b929268#diff-25d902c24283ab8cfbac54dfa101ad31
https://github.com/rat4/blackcoin/commit/9dea231970c5c73dd6b7e3d0d20210233574a179#diff-25d902c24283ab8cfbac54dfa101ad31

Others vulnerabilities exist and you still refuse to address them (the "nothing at stake" fork, stake modifier manipulation).


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 01:12:05 PM
Perhaps now is the time for additional helpful security testing of blackcoin?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Soepkip on April 02, 2014, 01:16:25 PM
Perhaps now is the time for additional security testing of blackcoin?

We welcome you to, really.

We are talking about systems that keeps track of people's money. People invest in coins with their hard earned money or do it via mining with their expensive equipment. If the coin's system is at risk this is a risk for everyone involved.

If you are successfull, have the same decency as us and report it to the devs. We did for MintCoin and you do not want to read their response. That is the sole reason it has been posted here. We too have money invested in other crypto's and would like them to be as secure as possible, that's why we checkout other coins security and report security risks immediatly.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 01:18:53 PM
Perhaps now is the time for additional security testing of blackcoin?

We welcome you to, really.

We are talking about systems that keeps track of people's money. People invest in coins with their hard earned money or do it via mining with their expensive equipment. If the coin's system is at risk this is a risk for everyone involved.

If you are successfull, have the same decency as us and report it to the devs. We did for MintCoin and you do not want to read their response. That is the sole reason it has been posted here. We too have money invested in other crypto's and would like them to be as secure as possible, that's why we checkout other coins security and report security risks immediatly.

You mean same decency and also helpfully inform all mintholders to go to BC thread and spread FUD?

No, I won't be doing that.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: XbladeX on April 02, 2014, 01:27:30 PM
Perhaps now is the time for additional security testing of blackcoin?

We welcome you to, really.

We are talking about systems that keeps track of people's money. People invest in coins with their hard earned money or do it via mining with their expensive equipment. If the coin's system is at risk this is a risk for everyone involved.

If you are successfull, have the same decency as us and report it to the devs. We did for MintCoin and you do not want to read their response. That is the sole reason it has been posted here. We too have money invested in other crypto's and would like them to be as secure as possible, that's why we checkout other coins security and report security risks immediatly.

You mean same decency and also helpfully inform all mintholders to go to BC thread and spread FUD?

No, I won't be doing that.
Sry mgburks77 but Soepkip just answered because some people accuse BC developers Soepkip is one of them...
He is not just random hater, flamer or FUDer...I just believe him he proved his trustworthy and transparency so far.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: rat4 on April 02, 2014, 01:28:37 PM
Told OP it was a bad idea, was ignored by OP in the Blackcoin thread. If you don't understand the code you're modifying, don't muck with it.

These attacks are not applicable to BlackCoin. Guess why.

My guess is that you modified the trust weighting for PoS blocks so that PoW block or that you manipulated timestamping variability (https://github.com/rat4/blackcoin/commit/06e30838eae9a33d9d40d4e2bc6076141a719c47), neither of which are great solutions in the distributed system you're playing with.

It looks like you tried to fix the stake modifier with a hardfork and then broke it in the process, too:
https://github.com/rat4/blackcoin/commit/47d2eec662b738b39cdb45f3ef6f72a13b929268#diff-25d902c24283ab8cfbac54dfa101ad31
https://github.com/rat4/blackcoin/commit/9dea231970c5c73dd6b7e3d0d20210233574a179#diff-25d902c24283ab8cfbac54dfa101ad31

Others vulnerabilities exist and you still refuse to address them (the "nothing at stake" fork, stake modifier manipulation).

Zero difficulty PoW is open door and cannot be trusted. One of possible fixes is to disable PoW.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 01:32:30 PM
Quote
I just believe him he proved his trustworthy and transparency so far.
he's one of the one's so helpfully spreading FUD

so no, that is not the type of attention he is attracting

Quote
Zero difficulty PoW is open door and cannot be trusted. One of possible fixes is to disable PoW.

Thank you. I wondered if that was a possibility or not.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: tacotime on April 02, 2014, 01:32:58 PM
Zero difficulty PoW is open door and cannot be trusted. One of possible fixes is to disable PoW.

Or you can have PoW with a reasonable subsidy and use it to secure the network, but then you just have PeerCoin.  Unsurprisingly, Peercoin works because of this and not in spite of this.  Now you've simply opened yourself to all the catastrophic bugs in PeerCoin's PoS system that you refuse to acknowledge.

There are easy applied fixes for hybrid PoW/PoS with low subsidy that involve adjusting the trust of the timestamping of PoW blocks and content of PoW blocks in general -- but again, there are the same PoS bugs which already exist in PeerCoin, which are non-trivial.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: tacotime on April 02, 2014, 01:45:53 PM
tacotime can you please link some info about peercoin pos weaknesses?

ok
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Problems (See 5. Create an incentive-compatible proof-of-stake currency) and also here: http://blog.ethereum.org/2014/01/15/slasher-a-punitive-proof-of-stake-algorithm/

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=131940.0 (addressed by the creation of kernel.h and kernel.cpp which compute the stake modifier, which has its own problems)


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 02:05:46 PM
So basically the claim is that because of this vulnerability it is possible to complete a 51% attack.

Is that or is that not also a possibility with pure PoS coins?

I'm not seeing how the security status of blackcoin is any different than the security status of mintcoin, as both are supposedly vulnerable to this attack. Which from what i gather is quite expensive to launch successfully and therefore highly unlikely in the first place.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: tacotime on April 02, 2014, 02:07:42 PM
So basically the claim is that because of this vulnerability it is possible to complete a 51% attack.

Is that or is that not also a possibility with pure PoS coins?

I'm not seeing how the security status of blackcoin is any different than the security status of mintcoin, as both are supposedly vulnerable to this attack. Which from what i gather is quite expensive to launch successfully and therefore highly unlikely in the first place.

Quote
In the event of a fork, whether the fork is accidental or a malicious attempt to rewrite history and reverse a transaction, the optimal strategy for any miner is to mine on every chain, so that the miner gets their reward no matter which fork wins. Thus, assuming a large number of economically interested miners, an attacker may be able to send a transaction in exchange for some digital good (usually another cryptocurrency), receive the good, then start a fork of the blockchain from one block behind the transaction and send the money to themselves instead, and even with 1% of the total stake the attacker's fork would win because everyone else is mining on both.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: noerc on April 02, 2014, 02:08:51 PM
tacotime can you please link some info about peercoin pos weaknesses?

ok
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Problems (See 5. Create an incentive-compatible proof-of-stake currency) and also here: http://blog.ethereum.org/2014/01/15/slasher-a-punitive-proof-of-stake-algorithm/

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=131940.0 (addressed by the creation of kernel.h and kernel.cpp which compute the stake modifier, which has its own problems)

Thanks a lot, this is very interesting. To problem #1: What exactly is meant with consensus failure and how does it affect network security? So if I have a faked time stamp that is t seconds in the future, how much less coins do I need to perform a 51% attack?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Soepkip on April 02, 2014, 02:13:03 PM
So basically the claim is that because of this vulnerability it is possible to complete a 51% attack.

Is that or is that not also a possibility with pure PoS coins?

I'm not seeing how the security status of blackcoin is any different than the security status of mintcoin, as both are supposedly vulnerable to this attack. Which from what i gather is quite expensive to launch successfully and therefore highly unlikely in the first place.

Okay, for your understanding:

1) All coins ever created are suspectable to 51% attacks.
2) Mintcoin is PoW/PoS hybrid
3) We have succesfully tested a hypothesis that prevents PoS blocks from being accepted. - This means that MintCoin was PoW-only for one full hour.
4) Due to the low rewards on the Mintcoin PoW chain the hashrate is low. This means that during that time that MintCoin is PoW-only it is very easy to perform a 51% attack.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 02:14:50 PM
So basically the claim is that because of this vulnerability it is possible to complete a 51% attack.

Is that or is that not also a possibility with pure PoS coins?

I'm not seeing how the security status of blackcoin is any different than the security status of mintcoin, as both are supposedly vulnerable to this attack. Which from what i gather is quite expensive to launch successfully and therefore highly unlikely in the first place.

Quote
In the event of a fork, whether the fork is accidental or a malicious attempt to rewrite history and reverse a transaction, the optimal strategy for any miner is to mine on every chain, so that the miner gets their reward no matter which fork wins. Thus, assuming a large number of economically interested miners, an attacker may be able to send a transaction in exchange for some digital good (usually another cryptocurrency), receive the good, then start a fork of the blockchain from one block behind the transaction and send the money to themselves instead, and even with 1% of the total stake the attacker's fork would win because everyone else is mining on both.

What if everyone else IS NOT mining both?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: tacotime on April 02, 2014, 02:24:45 PM
tacotime can you please link some info about peercoin pos weaknesses?

ok
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Problems (See 5. Create an incentive-compatible proof-of-stake currency) and also here: http://blog.ethereum.org/2014/01/15/slasher-a-punitive-proof-of-stake-algorithm/

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=131940.0 (addressed by the creation of kernel.h and kernel.cpp which compute the stake modifier, which has its own problems)

Thanks a lot, this is very interesting. To problem #1: What exactly is meant with consensus failure and how does it affect network security? So if I have a faked time stamp that is t seconds in the future, how much less coins do I need to perform a 51% attack?

This is the means to generating hashes for PoS for PPC (paraphrased a little):
Code:
int64 nTimeWeight = min((int64)nTimeTx - txPrev.nTime, (int64)STAKE_MAX_AGE) - nStakeMinAge);
CBigNum bnCoinDayWeight = CBigNum(nValueIn) * nTimeWeight / COIN / (24 * 60 * 60);
if (!GetKernelStakeModifier(blockFrom.GetHash(), nStakeModifier, nStakeModifierHeight, nStakeModifierTime, fPrintProofOfStake))
    return false;
ss << nStakeModifier;
ss << nTimeBlockFrom << nTxPrevOffset << txPrev.nTime << prevout.n << nTimeTx;
hashProofOfStake = Hash(ss.begin(), ss.end());
if (CBigNum(hashProofOfStake) > bnCoinDayWeight * bnTargetPerCoinDay){
    return hashProofOfStake; } // Golden "nonce" found, we have a block!
else {return false;}

You can game this in a bunch of ways.  If you're building your own chain of blocks, you can manipulate the timestamp; BlackCoin uses 10 minute intervals, so there's another 600 chances right there (+ 10 min).  If you want to build lots of blocks, you need coinstake distributed in lots of places (nTimeBlockFrom << nTxPrevOffset << txPrev.nTime << prevout.n).

Now you can bruteforce a chain of length whatever privately so long as you have a bunch of coinstake at different addresses, and then doublespend using that.  Unless everyone is trying to do this, you don't need 51% stake to do this -- just the hoarding of a bunch of stake and some bruteforcing at an exacting time and you can doublespend.  This is why PoS in PPC and friends defaults to PoW; you're just manipulating a bunch of different factors in search of golden "nonces" (manipulations of non-nonce parameters) in a chain of blocks instead of simply increasing the nonce.

Using PoW blocks to make stake modifiers can also help prevent you from being able to game this a bit from the "if (!GetKernelStakeModifier(blockFrom.GetHash(), nStakeModifier, nStakeModifierHeight, nStakeModifierTime, fPrintProofOfStake)) return false;" portion, but I don't think it completely eliminates the risk.

Sunny King at some point mentioned changing confirmation rules from number of blocks that have passed to the amount of coinage that has been included in blocks since a transaction has taken place ("trust score").  But this still doesn't solve the "nothing at stake" forking problem, and you can still likely doublespend in that case with <51% stake.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: tacotime on April 02, 2014, 02:29:10 PM
What if everyone else IS NOT mining both?

As soon as someone doublespends successfully on the network using the current PoS protocol, any node that is even modestly intelligent is going to switch to a more belligerent protocol that better defends the value of their coins.  Then you run into this problem.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: willowfoot on April 02, 2014, 02:33:55 PM
so Tacotime,

for a newbie which coin Mintcoin/Blackcoin is more vulnerable to attack, with Blackcoin being Pure POS and Mintcoin being a POW/POS hybrid?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 02:35:57 PM
What if everyone else IS NOT mining both?

As soon as someone doublespends successfully on the network using the current PoS protocol, any node that is even modestly intelligent is going to switch to a more belligerent protocol that better defends the value of their coins.  Then you run into this problem.

OK, but can they doublespend if some miners are already only doing PoW only mining for a hybrid PoS coin?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: tacotime on April 02, 2014, 02:38:04 PM
What if everyone else IS NOT mining both?

As soon as someone doublespends successfully on the network using the current PoS protocol, any node that is even modestly intelligent is going to switch to a more belligerent protocol that better defends the value of their coins.  Then you run into this problem.

OK, but can they doublespend if some miners are already only doing PoW mining for a hybrid PoS coin?

No, so long as the PoW difficulty is high enough to actually secure the network.  This requires subsidy (block reward) to be high enough to justify lots of people mining the chain.  Hence why PeerCoin works.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: tacotime on April 02, 2014, 02:38:17 PM
so Tacotime,

for a newbie which coin Mintcoin/Blackcoin is more vulnerable to attack, with Blackcoin being Pure POS and Mintcoin being a POW/POS hybrid?

They both are vulnerable.  PeerCoin is what is (sort of) functional.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: markm on April 02, 2014, 02:39:10 PM
The big problem is simply that none of the scamcoin devs care, because if one scam fails it is so easy to simply launch another.

So bullshitting and bluffing and yelling "FUD!" and so on ensues until someone actually does trash the value of the scam's coins enough to make pasting another announce of another launch seem more worthwhile than posting claims of FUD.

Sunny is simply the first of many such scam "devs", notice he never did even bother to try to justify in what way his fix was a fix, he just went like oh yeah ok its true my idea was utterly broken butv thats okay I fixed it now. With nothing explaining how exactly the supposedly fix actualyl fixed anything.

Also tore a leaf from the solidcoin book, putting in a centralised privileged node.

It is more centralised that solidcoin as it uses just one privileged node it seems at least realsolid had a token decentralisation in the form of having more than one privileged node. But nonetheless solidcoin was laughed out of town so to speak, but nowadays the pronzi-players want a constant stream of new scams to get in on the bottom of and promote, so don't care anymore that all the coins coming out are scams because they are themselves scammers looking for scams to promote to scam money out of people so all these scams are just fine for their purposes.

Except for all the facts, which they decry as "FUD", because they think that if the people they are promoting the scams to knew for a fact they were scams less suckers might fall for them. Knowing it is a scam causes people to fear being a victim of the scam, be uncertain whether they can profit from the scam fast enough instead of being one of the victims, and doubt whether they can suck in enough new victims to ensure their own profit. Hence, "FUD".

-MarkM-


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 02:41:32 PM
Well, I guess there needs to be an actual attack to prove it.

Until then it's FUD


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: Soepkip on April 02, 2014, 02:49:27 PM
Well, I guess there needs to be an actual attack to prove it.

Until then it's FUD

There was an actual attack, the proof if it is in the blockchain. Watch from 203198 and up. Look at the timestamps. Look at the type of blocks.
We have no reason to break mintcoin's chain. We have merely proofed it takes about 5 minutes to turn mintcoin into PoW only for 1 hour+.



Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: markm on April 02, 2014, 02:49:42 PM
See, they don't even care if it is attacked, in fact they urge an attack, insist jupon an attack as the only way they will even admit that they are running a scam.

They don't care if it gets attacked because they can clone hundreds more identical scams with different names and images and other similar minor details changed and claim oh this one is different, until someone actually pulls off an attack this one is not a scam...

Oops missed prior post.

I guess they also don't care if there is an attack because they will just claim that the attack does not matter, so what we are a scam uh I mean were demonstrably successfully attacked, we are making money, suckers are falling for the scam, so fooey on you you FUDster, suckers are gonna get suckered no matter what you do, so hahaha I win.

-MarkM-


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: sargecap on April 02, 2014, 02:51:37 PM
so Tacotime,

for a newbie which coin Mintcoin/Blackcoin is more vulnerable to attack, with Blackcoin being Pure POS and Mintcoin being a POW/POS hybrid?

An attack has been demonstrated against Mintcoin that disabled pos mining and only allowed pow mining, leaving it wide open to a 51% attack. The first stage of this was demonstrated. The second stage only wasn't executed out of manners (51% attacking a coin with 0.1 difficulty is easy).

No such attack has been demonstrated against Blackcoin. In fact the above attack by definition isn't possible since there isn't any pow mining.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 02:52:16 PM
See, they don't even care if it is attacked, in fact they urge an attack, insist jupon an attack as the only way they will even admit that they are running a scam.

They don't care if it gets attacked because they can clone hundreds more identical scams with different names and images and other similar minor details changed and claim oh this one is different, until someone actually pulls off an attack this one is not a scam...

-MarkM-


What the hell are you talking about?

You have to prove you can double spend or it's FUD and that's all there is to that.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 02:54:40 PM
Why should anyone take the claims of sock puppet accounts seriously?

You guys seem pretty knowledgeable about this stuff for a bunch of newbies lol


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: thisisit on April 02, 2014, 03:00:34 PM
i agree. well done.

+1


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: sargecap on April 02, 2014, 03:02:20 PM
Why should anyone take the claims of sock puppet accounts seriously?

You guys seem pretty knowledgeable about this stuff for a bunch of newbies lol

um the original post by the blackcoin developer lists the blocks which were successfully attacked. Those blocks were forced to proof of work only and proof of work only blocks have close to 0 difficulty. Only thing which protects from a 51% attack is high difficulty.

I would be shitting my pants if I held mintcoin right now hence why the price is crashing


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 03:04:47 PM

Quote
I would be shitting my pants if I held mintcoin right now hence why the price is crashing

ha ha the price is exactly the same as it was when this thread was posted

I have some mintcoin and I say do the double spend attack, if you can. I want to see if I am going to put more money into this or not.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 02, 2014, 03:23:56 PM
This is a joke. Nice try to spread FUD about other coins, rat4, to try and promote your pure PoS blackcoin. How is it that Blackcoin prevents attack forks as a pure PoS coin, again?

You say "a sequential chain of PoW blocks can be mined in a flash."
Which is not true. Sure, you could mine all of the PoW blocks that occur sequentially, but there will be many, many more PoS blocks that interrupt those far and few apart PoW blocks.
....

I think you should apologize now rat4, thank him and pay him BIG bounty for helping Mintcoin and others for founding bugs...
And even bigger bounty for solving issue...

PS:He just mined 1h in POW Mintcoin you want more evidence... ? Do you want double spend ?



I already said I regretted how I originally addressed rat4, it was rude, why not include that? Not to mention this is an entirely different problem, so everything I said up until now was concerning "attack 1". Thank you for finding the bug, rat4. But, as far as I can see he has not provided a fix for the issue. He has publicly displayed a security flaw thereby allowing anybody to now take advantage of it, and allowing the entire BC community to use this to defame Mint thread and others. So I still doubt his motives were in the right place, I won't be thanking him for that.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: maarx on April 02, 2014, 03:33:43 PM
This is a joke. Nice try to spread FUD about other coins, rat4, to try and promote your pure PoS blackcoin. How is it that Blackcoin prevents attack forks as a pure PoS coin, again?

You say "a sequential chain of PoW blocks can be mined in a flash."
Which is not true. Sure, you could mine all of the PoW blocks that occur sequentially, but there will be many, many more PoS blocks that interrupt those far and few apart PoW blocks.
....

I think you should apologize now rat4, thank him and pay him BIG bounty for helping Mintcoin and others for founding bugs...
And even bigger bounty for solving issue...

PS:He just mined 1h in POW Mintcoin you want more evidence... ? Do you want double spend ?



I already said I regretted how I originally addressed rat4, it was rude, why not include that? Not to mention this is an entirely different problem, so everything I said up until now was concerning "attack 1". Thank you for finding the bug, rat4. But, as far as I can see he has not provided a fix for the issue. He has publicly displayed a security flaw thereby allowing anybody to now take advantage of it, and allowing the entire BC community to use this to defame Mint thread and others. So I still doubt his motives were in the right place, I won't be thanking him for that.

Maybe ask the MINT devs to fix this? :)


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 03:40:08 PM
What if everyone else IS NOT mining both?

As soon as someone doublespends successfully on the network using the current PoS protocol, any node that is even modestly intelligent is going to switch to a more belligerent protocol that better defends the value of their coins.  Then you run into this problem.

OK, but can they doublespend if some miners are already only doing PoW mining for a hybrid PoS coin?

No, so long as the PoW difficulty is high enough to actually secure the network.  This requires subsidy (block reward) to be high enough to justify lots of people mining the chain.  Hence why PeerCoin works.

Hi Tacotime, thanks for the information! I notice you have an ad in your signature that describes a PoS/PoW hybrid.

Have you been able to resolve the issue with that coin?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: tacotime on April 02, 2014, 03:42:41 PM
Hi Tacotime, thanks for the information! I notice you have an ad in your signature that describes a PoS/PoW hybrid.

Have you been able to resolve the issue with that coin?

It's a very different system; basically PoS miners vote on every PoW block to verify the contents, and PoW blocks are validated one block at a time.  PoS miners are given complete control over the contents of PoW blocks and whether or not the PoW miner gets rewards.

This is a *really* experimental incentives system and it might do crazy things yet.  The Bitcoin core devs I've talked to are wary of it doing things I haven't predicted.  Additionally, it relies heavily on PoW (which I think is a good and reasonably fair distribution system).  But it does not have the "nothing at stake" forking issue.

It's more comparable to a blockchain with "two factor authentication" for every PoW block, to ensure that miners aren't putting weird transactions into the network or are simply not including transactions.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: omahapoker on April 02, 2014, 03:56:21 PM
I've been a MINT investor from the start. go most on my MINT at 8

today i told them I sold half my stake and keeping it BTC. first thing i thought was just stick it in blackcoin.

but from what ive seen fromthe exchanges market has become the last 2 months i'm just sticking with BTC.


i wished they was a bigger response from MINT people.



people know i never bash MINT, but we have to address issues like this.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 03:58:55 PM
Hi Tacotime, thanks for the information! I notice you have an ad in your signature that describes a PoS/PoW hybrid.

Have you been able to resolve the issue with that coin?

It's a very different system; basically PoS miners vote on every PoW block to verify the contents, and PoW blocks are validated one block at a time.  PoS miners are given complete control over the contents of PoW blocks and whether or not the PoW miner gets rewards.

This is a *really* experimental incentives system and it might do crazy things yet.  The Bitcoin core devs I've talked to are wary of it doing things I haven't predicted.  Additionally, it relies heavily on PoW (which I think is a good and reasonably fair distribution system).  But it does not have the "nothing at stake" forking issue.

It's more comparable to a blockchain with "two factor authentication" for every PoW block, to ensure that miners aren't putting weird transactions into the network or are simply not including transactions.
Is there a projected release date or is it totally experimental? 


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: tacotime on April 02, 2014, 04:01:39 PM
Is there a projected release date or is it totally experimental? 

Hopefully testnet within 2-5 months or so, then mainchain launch after the testnet seems stable.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 02, 2014, 04:10:02 PM
Is there a projected release date or is it totally experimental? 

Hopefully testnet within 2-5 months or so, then mainchain launch after the testnet seems stable.

Interesting. Thanks for the info!!! 8)


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: virtualfaqs on April 02, 2014, 07:53:33 PM
Sheesh. Wish I saw this thread when it was first posted. For someone running around MINT & BC thread, I'm still missing info.  :-\


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 02, 2014, 09:20:23 PM
Thank you for your help Blackcoin community, you know which people you are (rat4, Soepkip, etc). Perhaps now we can put our differences aside and work together or at the very least coexists as pure PoS coins.

Update on the potential security issues mentioned earlier.

As a cautionary measure and since MINT does not really need PoW, we have decided to get rid of the PoW. We don't want to take any security risk.
And since our ego is less important than your hard earned money, we won't have any problem to be thankful to another coin dev if it appears he has helped to increase MintCoin's security.

For now, a new wallet is available and this is a mandatory update!
https://mega.co.nz/#!YI4DETrC!0Cy_PFqWkLF52Ic_Hoo-5v_oyUGWa2R4dcIvlX1S2H0 (https://mega.co.nz/#!YI4DETrC!0Cy_PFqWkLF52Ic_Hoo-5v_oyUGWa2R4dcIvlX1S2H0)


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: brokedummy on April 02, 2014, 09:51:01 PM
Not really a big deal, if it is an issue just fork it to not accept any more POW blocks.

Looks like I called it on the first page. Thanks rat4 for exposing the flaw and not leaving anybody with a bag of unconfirmed mints. Good guy dev makes competing coin more secure.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: stormia on April 02, 2014, 10:19:35 PM
Not really a big deal, if it is an issue just fork it to not accept any more POW blocks.

Looks like I called it on the first page. Thanks rat4 for exposing the flaw and not leaving anybody with a bag of unconfirmed mints. Good guy dev makes competing coin more secure.

+1. And sorry for being rude and assumptious with my initial post of this thread, it was uncalled for.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: damiano on April 03, 2014, 04:54:57 AM
Hmm I know what I'm trying out tomorrow morning

 ::)


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mchrist152 on April 03, 2014, 03:16:18 PM
Were not there other ways to fix this issue?

For example, if the problem is PoW difficulty gets too low, why not set a minimum difficulty for PoW mining?

Or, do not allow two PoW blocks in a row.  Enforce that a least one PoS block is between each PoW block?

I think those fixes might be better than to just eliminating PoW altogether.  Just trying to understand this better.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: noerc on April 03, 2014, 04:40:16 PM
Were not there other ways to fix this issue?

For example, if the problem is PoW difficulty gets too low, why not set a minimum difficulty for PoW mining?

Or, do not allow two PoW blocks in a row.  Enforce that a least one PoS block is between each PoW block?

I think those fixes might be better than to just eliminating PoW altogether.  Just trying to understand this better.

If you set a lower bound to the difficulty that is much larger than the actual difficulty level then it is absolutely not profitable for any miner to generate PoW blocks anymore which basically leads to the same problem.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 03, 2014, 04:47:44 PM
Quote
Or, do not allow two PoW blocks in a row.

What about this idea? Can it be implemented? And is it worth doing?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: sidhujag on April 03, 2014, 04:52:58 PM
Were not there other ways to fix this issue?

For example, if the problem is PoW difficulty gets too low, why not set a minimum difficulty for PoW mining?

Or, do not allow two PoW blocks in a row.  Enforce that a least one PoS block is between each PoW block?

I think those fixes might be better than to just eliminating PoW altogether.  Just trying to understand this better.

If you set a lower bound to the difficulty that is much larger than the actual difficulty level then it is absolutely not profitable for any miner to generate PoW blocks anymore which basically leads to the same problem.
Most of the premined pos coins are not profitable to mine pow anyway.. 1 coin per block at 20 sats.

I figure the devs were either lazy or dont understand the code enough to fully remove pow thus they just set the reward to the minimum so its quick and dirty. In reality if the pow is not helping with block authentication it
should be removed... surely devs knew if a hybrid approach was beneficial or not to the security against attacks that are common sense with both pow and pos?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: noerc on April 03, 2014, 05:32:33 PM
Quote
Or, do not allow two PoW blocks in a row.

What about this idea? Can it be implemented? And is it worth doing?

Wouldn't this be the same as raising the PoW difficulty to the level that only one PoW would be generated in the time one PoS block gets generated? I don't really see the difference.


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: mgburks77 on April 03, 2014, 05:36:08 PM
Quote
Or, do not allow two PoW blocks in a row.

What about this idea? Can it be implemented? And is it worth doing?

Wouldn't this be the same as raising the PoW difficulty to the level that only one PoW would be generated in the time one PoS block gets generated? I don't really see the difference.

it wouldn't require that minors participate for a low block reward, yet you receive the same result


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: omahapoker on April 03, 2014, 08:04:11 PM
I'm a MINT investor and want to thank you guys for exposing the issue. and no destroying the coin


 i never bash people and dont know why MINT people did.


thanks again.






Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: danbi on May 24, 2014, 08:23:55 AM
I am trying to qualify the claim made by the OP, that MintCoin had no PoS block in a hour.

What is the proof that this was because of the "attack", or there was just nothing to stake during that hour?

Also, how would an PoS block in a hybrid coin "invalidate many PoW blocks"? The PoW and PoS chains are pretty much independent, no?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: TotalPanda on March 04, 2015, 04:32:59 PM
Hi

Is a classic standart non-POS sCrypt (end of POW) easily attackable ?


Title: Re: Security analysis of PoW/PoS hybrids with low PoW reward
Post by: coinedabit on April 15, 2015, 12:05:22 AM
Just read through this thread. Lots of good info. Any updates to these security flaws?