Не понимаю этой радости по поводу интеграции lightning в Twitter... По сути, они даже ничего не интегрировали, они используют API централизованной платформы Strike для проведения платежей между пользователями. Все это по сути, одна большая централизованная помойка, к которой доступ могут получить только "свои". Сами подумайте,
1) Strike работает только в паре-тройке стран и то все они на американском континенте
2) Они требуют полной верификации, никаких вам анонимных платежей
3) В отличие от lightning network, strike lightning - это система, где вам нужно просить разрешения присоединиться
4) Естественно все транзакции идут через ноду Strike и они в одностороннем порядке контролируют все комиссии
5) Банально, пользователям было бы проще совершать транзакции напрямую без участия посредника, но Twitter не могут этого допустить
По сути, это что-то вроде PayPal с их "интеграцией криптовалют", признаки те же самые и в обоих случаях вы вынуждены доверять третьей стороне, что противоречит принципам Биткоина.
Вердикт, в топку такие интеграции.
Полностью согласен с комментарием. Замечание только по 3-му пункту. Не вижу больших отличий. Нельзя так просто взять и присоединиться к LN.  Как минимум, партнер, с кем вы бы хотели создать канал, должен дать вам свое согласие, то есть разрешение. |
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Все приведенные цифры - это изменение за МЕСЯЦ, а не за день. И никакого отношения к твиттеру не имеют. Наоборот, рост количества активных нод поднимался до 10% за месяц, но в последнее время снижается и на текущий момент где-то на уровне 6% за месяц. |
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A block size increase “based on demand”, and leaving it to the miners to decide how large the blocks should be “based on demand” is a very dangerous proposition, topcoin360. It will open an attack vector, that would possibly disrupt the network.
As far as I understand, you do not want to allow miners to increase the block, because they will have the opportunity to hack the system. Very strange reasoning. After all, miners ALREADY have a 100% chance to hack the system. If, of course, they have such a collective desire. For example, they can start mining empty blocks. Or make a 51% attack. That's all, the system is broken. It looks like this: a person has a full warehouse of weapons. And you : we can't give him a loaded gun. He will have the opportunity to kill someone. The security of the bitcoin system is 99.99% dependent on the miners. And if you give them the opportunity to change the block size, nothing will change. Similarly, the security will be 99.99% dependent on the miners. Hack the system? No, that’s not the reason. I’m talking about incentives. If you give the miners the power to decide how large the blocks should be “based on demand”, then you’re giving them an incentive to fake that demand for them to earn more in fees. Especially when most of the coins are mined out. "an attack vector, that would possibly disrupt the network"- isn't that "hacking the system"? The miner can increase its income due to the fact that users will pay a large commission for the transaction. This can be achieved by reducing the block. Or by setting a high commission for the right to be included in the block. And the miners ALREADY have such an opportunity. Miners can set any commission they want. To do this, they do not need to "fake demand". A couple of years ago, a delusional idea was popular that miners fill blocks with their transactions (fake demand) in order to artificially increase the mempool and thus earn more commissions. Miners ALREADY have such an opportunity - "to fake demand". Delusional ideas die very hard. |
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You want to say that if all miners establish the highest possible exchange rate among themselves, this makes the system more centralized. Judging by the number of orphan blocks, the miners have achieved this goal. That is, at the moment, the miners are as centralized as possible in terms of the exchange between them. It is simply impossible to make it more centralized already. Hmm. I recall certain pools don't have direct connections to each other and were resorting to running zombies on each other in the past. I find the current stale rates fairly reasonable and mining pools don't necessarily have to resort to those tactics to improve their propagation. If we were to reach the state whereby blocks takes 50 seconds to propagate, then is it possible for the major mining pools to strategically exclude others from their exclusive "subnet"? Miners can do this right now. The main mining pools can strategically exclude others from their exclusive "subnet" by simply broadcasting a new block only among themselves, and transmitting it to the general network with some delay. If it was profitable. Judging by the fact that this is not being done, the miners do not have any benefit from this. Or they do not want to do this for the sake of a minimal and risky increase in income. Any activity of this kind is a loss of Bitcoin's reputation, which will eventually lead to much greater losses. |
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1. It is worth noting that the speed of distribution of blocks in general on the network does not play a special role for mining. The main thing is what is the speed of distribution of blocks within the subnet that covers miners. If the speed inside the subnet was at the level of 1 second, we would have ~1.6% of orphan blocks. But there are much fewer orphan blocks at the moment. Somewhere on the forum, a figure of 0.0024% was given (I can't vouch for the accuracy). This means that the speed is now much less than 1 sec.
Correct. Keep in mind that doing so would make the current mining scene more centralized, whereby miners that are not interconnected with the majority of the miners are more likely to experience more orphans, due to the lack of a direct connection. You want to say that if all miners establish the highest possible exchange rate among themselves, this makes the system "more centralized". Judging by the number of orphan blocks, the miners have achieved this goal. That is, at the moment, the miners are as "centralized" as possible in terms of the exchange between them. It is simply impossible to make it "more centralized" already. (p/s/ reasoning in terms of "increasing / decreasing centralization/decentralization" is meaningless until you determine what these indicators are:" level of decentralization / level of centralization". And how these levels are measured.) Some miner will not want to, cannot speed up the exchange with other miners as much as possible and will lose his income because of this. And another miner can. So these are the problems of the miner. We do not solve the problems of miners in terms of the price of electricity, equipment, taxes. Why should we solve the problems of the miner in terms of its exchange rate over the network? I would prefer miners to validate the blocks first. SPV mining is not a behavior that I think we should encourage, we've had a mishap with SPV mining in the past so probably not such a good idea given that current validation speeds are sufficiently fast.
As far as I know, there has been one failure with spv mining over the past 5 years. And besides the loss of a part of the miners ' income, there were no other losses. Yes, spv mining has risks for the miner. And the miner himself decides whether to use it or not. And if you claim that it is impossible to increase the block in order not to encourage miners to use spv mining, then this is one of the most ridiculous arguments against increasing the block. I don't think those sizes are particularly unrealistic to achieve in the future. If you don't need the majority of the network to be able to run their own nodes and that mining to be centralized with a few entities, then it should probably be fine.
IIt is interesting that now, when it is almost free to save a full node, less than 1% of users save it. Why we set such a goal: so that most users can have a full node. If most people don't need it. To achieve this goal, we almost stopped the development and expansion of the bitcoin system 4 years ago. As for me, this is too expensive and pointless a sacrifice. Maybe it makes sense to look at reality and change our goals. For example, so that the number of nodes is not less than a certain number, which is enough to ensure the security of the system. |
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Could you tell us how would you determine what the block size limit should be in the future?
Estimate the time it takes for blocks to be propagated through the majority of the network. Determine the block size that still takes a reasonable amount of time to propagate through the network and use that as the max block size. Currently, the 4vMB blocks have a median propagation time of 6.5s (or less since the study was done a long time ago). If we can keep the expected stale rates to be <5%, then I consider it an acceptable compromise. Expected stale rate is a function of the time it takes for the block to propagate and the block intervals. 1. It is worth noting that the speed of distribution of blocks in general on the network does not play a special role for mining. The main thing is what is the speed of distribution of blocks within the subnet that covers miners. If the speed inside the subnet was at the level of 1 second, we would have ~1.6% of orphan blocks. But there are much fewer orphan blocks at the moment. Somewhere on the forum, a figure of 0.0024% was given (I can't vouch for the accuracy). This means that the speed is now much less than 1 sec. 2. When using a technology such as spv mining, the block size ceases to affect the number of orphan blocks. Miners start mining the next block almost immediately after the block appears. However, this increases the number of empty blocks. But I think this is quite a reasonable compromise: reducing the number of orphan blocks at the expense of some increase in empty blocks. Moreover, an empty block, which sometimes appears a few seconds after a non-empty block, does not cause any inconvenience to users. From all this, we can conclude that, for example, 10-20 MB. blocks do not pose any threat to the security of the network in terms of orphan blocks. A block size increase “based on demand”, and leaving it to the miners to decide how large the blocks should be “based on demand” is a very dangerous proposition, topcoin360. It will open an attack vector, that would possibly disrupt the network.
As far as I understand, you do not want to allow miners to increase the block, because they will have the opportunity to hack the system. Very strange reasoning. After all, miners ALREADY have a 100% chance to hack the system. If, of course, they have such a collective desire. For example, they can start mining empty blocks. Or make a 51% attack. That's all, the system is broken. It looks like this: a person has a full warehouse of weapons. And you : we can't give him a loaded gun. He will have the opportunity to kill someone. The security of the bitcoin system is 99.99% dependent on the miners. And if you give them the opportunity to change the block size, nothing will change. Similarly, the security will be 99.99% dependent on the miners. |
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Also applies to the routing amounts. Nobody can tell you which amounts are forwarded and which aren't, unless node operators make it public. Spoiler: Most node operators don't do that.
That is, your confidence that LN is confidential is based only on the assumption that node operators will not transmit transaction data to anyone. Does anyone believe that messengers are confidential, just because they will not share their information with anyone? What I'm saying is, that node operators only know about the routings of their own node. They don't know the origin and they don't know the destination of a transaction unless they started it themselve. Most of the node operators are completely unknown btw. So if somebody shares the info about the tx he was routing and how much fee he earned, you still don't know anything about the other nodes and you might never find out. Everybody is free to tell you how much Bitcoin he has, still many people won't tell you. Your initial statement was :"Nobody can tell you which amounts are forwarded and which aren't, unless node operators make it public.". And this is a true statement. From this statement another true statement follows: If node operators make their data public, then everything will be bad with privacy in LN. No one can guarantee that node operators will not do this. You can only believe in it. But, as the English proverb says, "When three know it, all know it". You didn't understand this part: They don't know the origin and they don't know the destination of a transaction unless they started it themselve. Means, if a node operator makes his data public, he will only lose his own privacy. Just like everyone who makes his finances available to public, because he doesn't know where the money is coming from and where it went to. The english proverb you provided doesn't apply to lightning, because when three know it, only these three now it and the rest of the 12000 nodes doesn't know shit. Everything is clear with this statement. It works if only one node operator discloses the data. ( and then not always). If we return to your statement again ( and to mine), then "node operators"were used there. Why did you decide that only ONE node operator will give its data. Where there is one, there are 2, and 3, ... And here everything depends on the number. Let's take the end users who will not keep the routed nodes. If one end user makes a transaction to another end user, then most likely 2 nodes (the sender node and the recipient node) are enough for the whole world to know about this transaction. And if we take into account that in the future, with a significant development of LN, there will be 98-99% of such end users,then the privacy of LN looks less convincing. |
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1) If node B does not receive confirmation during the timeout period, the transaction is considered incomplete. That is the only option, because in other cases some nodes will receive payments and others do not. And that's not how it works: you have a route from A to B and this route as a whole is either completed or not. If it is completed, then fine, every node updates its closing transaction. But if there is any problem at any point of this transaction chain, then everything is rolled back to the state as if that payment from A to B was never started. If some node will try to use any state of "half-baked coins", then some penalty transaction will be broadcasted by some other node. Node A sends a confirmation. This confirmation passes through M1, M2, etc. The Mk node fails. And then the confirmation does not go further. Nodes A, M1, M2, ... Mk-1 will assume that the transaction is completed. After the timeout, the other nodes will assume that the transaction was interrupted. |
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Also applies to the routing amounts. Nobody can tell you which amounts are forwarded and which aren't, unless node operators make it public. Spoiler: Most node operators don't do that.
That is, your confidence that LN is confidential is based only on the assumption that node operators will not transmit transaction data to anyone. Does anyone believe that messengers are confidential, just because they will not share their information with anyone? What I'm saying is, that node operators only know about the routings of their own node. They don't know the origin and they don't know the destination of a transaction unless they started it themselve. Most of the node operators are completely unknown btw. So if somebody shares the info about the tx he was routing and how much fee he earned, you still don't know anything about the other nodes and you might never find out. Everybody is free to tell you how much Bitcoin he has, still many people won't tell you. Your initial statement was :"Nobody can tell you which amounts are forwarded and which aren't, unless node operators make it public.". And this is a true statement. From this statement another true statement follows: If node operators make their data public, then everything will be bad with privacy in LN. No one can guarantee that node operators will not do this. You can only believe in it. But, as the English proverb says, "When three know it, all know it". |
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Let A be the last node that has a closing channel transaction updated. How does node B know that everything ended well and all nodes were updated. It is solved by timeouts. You start from some huge timeout of "N*unit" and decrease it by "unit" for each node. In this way, timeouts are reached from the last node to the first. That means the first node cannot simply run away with its coins, because the timeout for the last node occurs first. Also, there are penalty transactions, so each node doing stupid things is putting the whole channel balance at risk. As far as I understand, there are two options: 1) If node B does not receive confirmation during the timeout period, the transaction is considered incomplete. 2) If node B does not receive a denial during the timeout period, the transaction is considered completed. |
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Nodes A, M1, ..., Mk-1 will assume that the transaction is completed. And the nodes Mk+1,...Mn,B will remain in uncertainty. They don't, because nodes don't blindly trust that LN internal transactions (with HTLC and millisatoshis) are final. They are final only when closing channel transactions are updated for each node. Closing channel transactions are not updated simultaneously, but sequentially, node by node. Let A be the last node that has a closing channel transaction updated. How does node B know that everything ended well and all nodes were updated. |
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During the transaction through LN, the information is transmitted sequentially. Any participant of the transaction can transfer information only to the previous one or to the next one. This means that all participants cannot simultaneously come to a single decision regarding the transaction status.
For example, let's take the status of a transaction - that it is completed and cannot be canceled. and we have a chain of nodes
A<->M1 <-> M2 <-> ... Mk ... <-> Mn <-> B.
Let node A decide that the transaction is final and passes information about it to node M1. M1 passes M2, etc. the information reaches node B. What happens if the Mk node fails at the time of transmitting this information. Nodes A, M1, ..., Mk-1 will assume that the transaction is completed. And the nodes Mk+1,...Mn,B will remain in uncertainty.
These are theoretical reflections. I don't see a solution to this problem. Therefore, it is interesting to know how this problem is solved in LN.
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Also applies to the routing amounts. Nobody can tell you which amounts are forwarded and which aren't, unless node operators make it public. Spoiler: Most node operators don't do that.
That is, your confidence that LN is confidential is based only on the assumption that node operators will not transmit transaction data to anyone. Does anyone believe that messengers are confidential, just because they will not share their information with anyone? |
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Энтони Скарамуччи: «биткоин – сверххищник на криптовалютном рынке»
Основатель SkyBridge Capital Энтони Скарамуччи считает, что популярность альткоинов не мешает биткоину сохранять превосходство на рынке криптовалют. При этом индекс доминирования биткоина продолжает удерживаться около 40%.
Серьезно? "Продолжает удерживаться"? Ничего, что на 1 февраля этого года этот самый индекс был 62%. Биткоин-максималисты находят все новые ресурсы для подтверждения своей идеи о "безуcловной монополии Биткоина в криптовалютном мире". У этой идеи есть очень плохие последствия. Ведь если ты уверен, что эта идея абсолютно верна, тогда можно ничего не делать с Биткоином. Можно развивать, а можно не развивать. Можно масштабировать, а можно и заморозить количество транзакций 350 тыс. в сутки. Зачем что-то делать, зачем спешить, если "Биткоин единственная истинная криптовалюта."? Когда-то они ссылались на то, что у Биткоина доминирующее положение на рынке. Когда было больше 90%. Сейчас аргумент уже не звучит. Когда-то у Биткоин было больше всего транзакций в сутки. Чего нет, того нет. Когда в Эфире транзакций 4 раза больше. Когда-то ссылались на то, что весь оборот на криптовалютном рынке идет через Биткоин. Сейчас, когда у Тезер обороты в 2.5 раза больше, чем у Биткоина, этот аргумент испарился. Теперь напирают на то, что Биткоин в несколько раз превышает ближайшего преследователя. Подождите-ка, в несколько раз. А ведь уже всего в 2 раза. А ведь еще 1 февраля этот показатель был 4. И чего мы ждем? Что когда-то какая-то криптовалюта обгонит по капитализации Биткоин? Что в какой-то криптовалюте пользователи будут делать десятки миллионов транзакций в сутки? Что будет тем самым аргументом, который заставит задуматься нынешнее Биткоин-сообщество, что что-то не так с развитием их любимого детища. |
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Падает цена, то и себестоимость падает, если она становится меньше цены.
Это кажется логичным, но почему-то так не работает. Цена растет - сложность растет потому что майнить выгодно, цена падает - сложность растет потому что выпускают новые асики. Блин, где-то я что-то подобное слышал? А, точно, цена бензина в РФ ))) У меня в утверждении: отношение цены и себестоимости. В вашем утверждении вы сравниваете цену и сложность. Как бы разные вещи. |
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Знакомые, которые майнингом занимаются на промышленной основе, всегда меняют свое оборудование, но в минус не работают.
Практика показывает, что собственный опыт и опыт знакомых - почти всегда не репрезентативен. Я конечно могу ошибаться, просто сейчас лень лазить уточнять, но вроде бы график цены биткоина вообще нигде никогда и никак не коррелирует с графиком его сложности? С другой стороны, вы видели в интернете хоть одно заявление: "Я майнер, и я майню в минус". Ведь это же признаться всему миру, что ты дебил. Миф о том, что существуют майнеры, которые майнят в минус, довольно популярен в биткоин-сообществе. Я не понимаю причин этого явления. Вы что, серьезно верите в то, что существуют майнеры-дебилы? График сложности зависит от цены и от развития производительности асиков. Поэтому даже если цена падает, то за счет роста производительности асиков сложность может расти. Себестоимость добычи биткоина почти что напрямую зависит от его цены. Растет цена, растет себестоимость. С каким-то лагом, но растет. Падает цена, то и себестоимость падает, если она становится меньше цены. |
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My suggestion was to introduce a minimum fee in the Bitcoin system. And it is better to introduce such changes at the protocol level. You claim that the disadvantage is that "Need to change Bitcoin protocol to explicitly disallow transaction low fees". Although this is not entirely true. The minimum fee can be entered at the level of miners, without changing the protocol. If, for example, 95% of miners vote for this and activate this mode, then blocks with transactions with a fee less than the established one will be considered invalid by the rest of the miners. But I emphasize that it is better to introduce such changes at the protocol level. Bitcoin network isn't only about miner, but also node. If Bitcoin community don't agree to the change, it'll fail and we'll see 2 chain. I think that in this topic we only consider those changes that will be added with the consent of the entire community. 1. Miners can still fill blocks with their own transactions (spam from miners). But so far, there is no evidence that this happened in reality.
I think transaction with 0-fee could serve as evidence, even though the goal isn't to attack Bitcoin, but to prevent fees on transaction they actually want to create. Spam from miners is a lot, a lot of transactions. Therefore, single transactions with 0-fee are unlikely to be evidence. In fact, most miners can already set any transaction fee they want. If they want to. And you can't prevent it. The introduction of a minimum fee does not give them this opportunity. They already have this opportunity. 3. The community has the ability to react to such an event. Most miners should block the "malicious" miner.
If the majority of miners cannot overcome this phenomenon, then the bitcoin community can replace the miners.
Not realistic, i doubt miners would block malicious miners as long as the block itself follow Bitcoin protocol. The second sentence already has an answer to this situation. Consider the situations: 1. Most miners set a high transaction fee. And they stop taking transactions with a lower fee. Technically, they don't violate protocol. But at the same time they cause inconvenience to users. 2. The system has implemented a minimum fee with adjustment from the block size. Miners start filling blocks to the maximum with useless transactions in order to raise the fee level. Technically, they don't violate protocol. But at the same time they cause inconvenience to users. Increasing the size of the blockchain unnecessarily. Artificially increase the transaction fee. What is the difference between these situations? Why don't miners do the same as in situation 1? And why would they do as described in situation 2? What is the Bitcoin community's response to the first situation, and what is the response to the second situation? My answer is this. Miners have the ability to do malicious actions.The Bitcoin community can adequately respond to such actions of miners. Therefore, miners do not do malicious actions. And they won't. Therefore, I once again suggest not to discuss the situation with "bad miners". |
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Back in 2012, when I first got cryptocurrencies in my wallet, the transaction fee for Bitcoin was around $0.01. Now it is almost 500 times that amount. And if the trend continues, within the next 3-4 years we will be paying $100 or $200 for a single transaction. Lightning is not the solution for this. The only real solution is to increase the block size. Miners are going to oppose, but for the greater good this should be done.
I don't know where you got this information about miners. Miners have always been in favor of increasing blocks. Who is against the increase-so this is the team of bitcoin developers. |
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Disadvantages:
1. Need to change Bitcoin protocol to explicitly disallow transaction low fees. Currently minimum fees is only set with parameter minrelayfee, but miner could include transaction with 0 fees on mined block.
My suggestion was to introduce a minimum fee in the Bitcoin system. And it is better to introduce such changes at the protocol level. You claim that the disadvantage is that "Need to change Bitcoin protocol to explicitly disallow transaction low fees". Although this is not entirely true. The minimum fee can be entered at the level of miners, without changing the protocol. If, for example, 95% of miners vote for this and activate this mode, then blocks with transactions with a fee less than the established one will be considered invalid by the rest of the miners. But I emphasize that it is better to introduce such changes at the protocol level. 2. Miners could manipulate minimum fee simply by including their own transaction when all transaction on mempool isn't enough to fill the block.
1. Miners can still fill blocks with their own transactions (spam from miners). But so far, there is no evidence that this happened in reality. 2. Such "spam from miners" is very easy to detect. And the entire Bitcoin community very quickly learns that some miner is engaged in malicious activity. 3. The community has the ability to react to such an event. Most miners should block the "malicious" miner. If the majority of miners cannot overcome this phenomenon, then the bitcoin community can replace the miners. 4.The mining system is a billion-dollar business, and there is no reason for miners to engage in any malicious activity, because it will cause much more damage than the likely profit. 5.The probability of any malicious activity from miners is very low, practically zero. Therefore, I suggest that we stop discussing any arguments that start with the words "bad, malicious miners". It's just a waste of time. The same as spending time discussing of the "Perpetuum mobile". |
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As far as I understand your principle, you propose to regulate the transaction fee through changing the block size.
I suggest another option: adjust the block size by changing the transaction fee.
Let's say we have a sample computer of the lower segment, and we focus on it when setting constraints.
We can count the parameter:
1. The maximum block size that our sample computer can process in the time we need.
Additionally, we can evaluate one more parameter:
2. We estimate the maximum level of growth of bitcoin, based on the level of technology development that we can afford.
Based on it, we calculate the parameter: average block size.
I don't know why, but everyone decided that the 2nd parameter must be adjusted through the 1st.
Suppose we have a parameter 1: 10 MB.
And parameter 2 : 100gb per year. - >the average block size should be ~2mb.
These parameters can be very different.
Algorithm diagram:
1. When switching to a new scheme, the values of parameters 1-2 are set, and the minimum transaction fee is assigned.
2. After 2016 blocks (this value may be different), the recalculation takes place.
If the average size of the resulting blocks is higher than the parameter 2, the minimum fee increases.
If the average size of the resulting blocks is lower than the parameter 2, the minimum fee is reduced.
The calculation of the average block can be done for the last period, you can calculate for the last few periods.
3. The fee can be changed with a certain step, for example, 10-20%. That is, if the average block has not changed much, then it is better not to change the fee .
4 You can always calculate the maximum fee amount for the next period. Towards the end of the period, it becomes more accurate.
And if you make a transaction at the very end of the period, you can make a fee =maximum (the current fee , the maximum possible for the next period). This should save you from possible problems at the junction of periods.
Advantages:
1. Excellent system response to peak loads. Since there is a margin due to the large size of the maximum block.
2. The percentage of non-occurrence of transactions in the nearest block is sharply reduced and is close to zero.
3. There is no need for dynamic fee calculation. It is enough to get the set amount of fee from the system.
4. the overall growth of the blockchain should not be very different from what we wanted.
5. You will not have spam.
Disadvantages:
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