"It might make sense just to get some [coins] in case it catches on." Satoshi Nakamoto, before he released Bitcoin's client "I wonder when it's safe to spend these" .. a few years later
|
|
|
Let's put in some constants and swap the last variable to 1 since block time won't vary that much on this coin...
Block 120 (2 hours): Miners: 50*e^(-0.0000011*120)+3 = 52.99 Dev: e^(-0.00000059 * 120) + 0.1 = 1.09
Block 525600 (1 year): Miners: 50*e^(-0.0000011*525600)+3 = 31.04 Dev: e^(-0.00000059 * 525600) + 0.1 = 0.83
Block 2628000 (5 year): Miners: 50*e^(-0.0000011*2628000)+3 = 5.776 Dev: e^(-0.00000059 * 2628000) + 0.1 = 0.312
So you start taking roughly 2%, rising to 2.7% after a year, and 5.4% after 5 years.
Unsure what to say, that's a horrible unfair greedy amount to try and take, and to try and mask using relatively complex equations.
|
|
|
can we track the outputs and have the network reject them?
|
|
|
so after one hour: 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 60 * 0.1) + 3 = 52.99 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 60 * 0.5) + 3 = 52.99 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 60 * 0.99) + 3 = 52.99
and after 5 years: 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 2628000 * 0.1) + 3 = 40.44 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 2628000 * 0.5) + 3 = 14.78 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 2628000 * 0.99) + 3 = 6.707
okay.
How does the transition from PoW to PoS work, and over what time/block period?
Block Times: [1 Minute POW, 10 Minute POS] transitioning to [10 Minute POW, 1 Minute POS]
This is how it will transition from POW to POS, to where POS will be doing more of the block work after the 10 year initial distribution. Okay, I can graph the PoW blocks now over multiple years. Over what block numbers will the transition from PoW to PoS take place? 1m PoW at block 1, 10m PoW by block x? (what is x)
|
|
|
Define a hard range for the value. <1, 1-100, 1-10000 etc.
M >=0 and M <= 1. [/quote] so after one hour: 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 60 * 0.1) + 3 = 52.99 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 60 * 0.5) + 3 = 52.99 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 60 * 0.99) + 3 = 52.99 and after 5 years: 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 2628000 * 0.1) + 3 = 40.44 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 2628000 * 0.5) + 3 = 14.78 50 * e^(-0.0000011 * 2628000 * 0.99) + 3 = 6.707 okay. How does the transition from PoW to PoS work, and over what time/block period?
|
|
|
so far it looks like you're going to be making a coin that 50% minted within two weeks!
|
|
|
If there is no merkle tree in the blockheader, does that not leave it open to transactions being removed / replaced / double spent?
|
|
|
define "chain time modular", that has a huge bearing on how this rewards..
Chain Time Modular is a Percent of Chain Time, so it would be ActualChainTime/TargetChainTime This will keep the coin distribution curve on a time based model, rather than block based. Think of it as such: as the block time gets faster than target time, the reward will be reduced to allow the same distribution curve over more blocks. Define a hard range for the value. <1, 1-100, 1-10000 etc.
|
|
|
define "chain time modular", that has a huge bearing on how this rewards..
|
|
|
scary: nothing sure or fair about this
|
|
|
lol well done, although now I assume you have a brain wallet cracking rig ready to accept new dictionaries whenever.
|
|
|
This bit concerns me greatly: When the Nth stakeholder sees that the block derives her, she creates a wrapped block that extends the empty block header by including as many transactions as she wishes to include You mean the potential for underground websites like stakesignfavors.com popping up, where signers can try to make a little extra money on the side? No the unwritten bit which allows not including as many transactions as desired, together with the unreferencing of the tree of transactions from the block header. Merkle root must be in there. edit: because the transactions merkle root isn't in the header they can be added and removed at will.. it breaks the strength and the point of the blockchain. From the many proposals I've seen, it seems apparent that Proof of Decentralization is required, as centralization is always the root of the problems. To do this blocks need to be floated around the network randomly in some way until agreed, then the next block can be started. I can see multiple viable approaches as alternatives, which expand on PoW. For example: nBlocks: a traditional PoW block is created and sent to the network, it is then recomputed with another hash, and repeat until n-hashes have been found, the block identifier becomes the sha256d of the concatenation of (nhash, n+1hash, ...). block-reward/n is claimed by each miner. transactional block verification: traditional PoW block is created and sent to the network, each client which sent a transaction included in the block signs the hash with the private key they control associated with aforementioned transaction, once xx% of signatures has been received the block is accepted by the network. combination of both of the above. supernodes/unl, trusted nodes which much meet majority consensus that a block is good before it is accepted - perhaps with a latent design which acts a soft checkpoint for currentblock - n. zero interest PoS and feeless transactions, discourage hoarding and just take it as a given that this computational processing is the fee for using the network. and so on. a side point: one cpu one vote was long gone, with the introduction of pools, which centralized the network. The pool problem is primarily a problem because it's been black boxed and miners are now "dumb" with no attachment to the network or awareness of the blockchain. If there was a way to force them to be aware of the network protocol and the chain again, it may open alternative avenues to solve the problems. aside for tromp: you seem to have some overlap with CPoS and graph based data.. it would be interesting if the block chain was a graph instead, which was mined with cuckoo.
|
|
|
X509 certificate server - provides Texai X509 certificates when installing full nodes X509 authentication - each agent and each hardware node is assigned an X509 certificate for pseudonymous authentication SSL/TLS network - communications between authenticated full nodes are encrypted with X509 certificates on both endpoints
Do not mix authentication with authorization. Let each node be named with a URI (URI-A) Nodes issue their own certificates with URI-A in the subjectAltName part of the x509 As authentication dereference URI-A to find RDF-data, check for the public key from the x509. If public key is found, assert that the node "owns" URI-A and thus can use it as an identifier. This covers authentication and allows each node to revoke and change certificates as it chooses, it also allows nodes to provide more information at the dereferenceable URI and acts as an extension point. Layer on authorization using ACL, which can also be implemented using RDF. See webid (formerly foaf-ssl) for more information, see web access control for more on authn. Consider defining a simple protocol that allows multiple forms of passing keys and establishing identifiers for agents, x509 may need to be replaced, legacy and different networks may need different auth protocols, your suggested approach binds to HTTP+TLS only, when multiple transport level protocol may be required for this. Webserver - full node statistics and network operations are presented to the operator via HTML pages
I suggest an RDF data API, it will be far more beneficial if the information is machine readable data (possibly with a default HTML view.. RDFa?), then multiple different UIX can be built on top allowing independent innovation and it'll be readily extensible by using new classes and properties in the rdf.
|
|
|
I was wondering when someone would mention PoA. This bit concerns me greatly: When the Nth stakeholder sees that the block derives her, she creates a wrapped block that extends the empty block header by including as many transactions as she wishes to include
|
|
|
However, botnets are less likely to target a coin whose PoW has ASICs since ASICs will only be developed when they significantly outperform CPUs&GPUs, which limits profitability compared to ASIC-less PoWs/coins.
That was my understanding. Perhaps "prevent" is a powerful word, and disincentivize more accurate. Thanks.
|
|
|
title says it all - I presume roughly that if you have ASICs then Botnets cannot muster enough power to compete. Is this correct?
|
|
|
There's checkpoint consensus, but then consensus allows for islands to form.
A simple technical (rather than social) solution to the 51% problem must exist, for PoW.
|
|
|
Sure that could work. But it doesn't cover third party development, which will be the main driving force in cryptocurrency penetration in this year and the following .. and not just one centralized development team.
Interested to hear what you class as third party development? Software, Hardware, Services, additional core development? How can you keep them from becoming entirely closed source?
Open from the start, multiple contributors, patches from healthy up to date forks - the usual methods. Take a look at BBR right now, over 50% of the coin is mined by Christian and Christian alone. Not all the hard-coded centralized developer fees in the world can stop that, and he's currently in a position where he would require infinite money to open source or even distribute his software.
What then?
The fee model is only to provide a fair approach to remuneration. All aspects of the project would have to be open, right from the start, including the initial requirements and proposal, even before specification happens. As we are doing here
|
|
|
|