I think it's just following the (old) standard paper wallet print format which labels the private key as "Spend".
Notice that in most paper wallet generators or some printable wallet private key exports, the private key is printed with the word 'Spend'.

Are you perhaps using a "centralized wallet" or exchange?
Because withdrawals from those are usually sent in batches; and it's not initiated by you, but by their system.

The reason they do that is because it's cheaper to send transactions with multiple outputs than multiple transaction with single output and change.
Normal transaction outputs are commonly just the recipient and change.

Maybe the same author but there's a similar question in Bitcoin Stackexchange
and there's an interesting answer that identifies the "S" as "Spend", he didn't included a source though.

Link: bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/117486/mini-private-key-format

...and to satisfy that curiosity, it'll still work if they decided to use it even if the words aren't included in BIP39 wordlist nor for having 1626 words.

Electrum's seed doesn't actually need a fixed wordlist, you can even edit the english.txt with your own set of words
and it will produce a valid seed (given that there's enough to produce a valid one).
e.g. (SegWit - Can be imported to Electrum):

According to you other thread, your Ledger Nano X is new.
So, have you updated its firmware yet? Because the device that you've received might have an outdated firmware.

The reply above is correct.
And to answer this question, 3JvL6Ymt8MVWiCNHC7oWU6nLeHNJKLZGLN is derived from the compressed public key of the private key 0x01
While 33q2i3GDkpHFAXnD3UdBsKhxzg7pvwAqtN is derived from the uncompressed public key.

It's published in BIP143 as the default policy: github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0143

Yes, it can create partially signed raw transaction (without any signature) but cannot sign since it only contains master public key.
So it can't spend your bitcoin.

'Close all' should've have worked if there's no issue with your node.
You can try post it as a new issue in GitHub and see if the developers can help: https://github.com/rootzoll/raspiblitz/issues

BTW, I checked your node in 1ML site and your channels seem to be active still (excluding onion): 1ml.com/node/03443d4d2248e25ed0bc726aaba3a9a858561f452f62e3c3baa36abe5d99e74d65

Alternatively, try to find if there's a "Force Close" option or after getting the developers' opinions.
Take note that force closing channels will lock the funds for a few days before you can spend them.

You can't send funds from your channel to bitcoin addresses.
The funds has to be on-chain first to be able to send to paper wallets.

For that, you'll have to close the channel and proceed to create an on-chain transaction with multiple outputs (if Raspiblitz doesn't support 'pay-to-many', use a wallet that can do so).
Since you only have 1 channel open, "close all" will do: https://github.com/rootzoll/raspiblitz#close-all-closing-all-open-channels

I've tested it, the wallet in Bitcoin Core isn't spendable since it shows "private_keys_enabled": false," in getwalletinfo command.
You can also check the Send tab in the GUI if it has "Create Unsigned" in place of the "Send" button.

My reply isn't about the overall security but the difference between the randomly generated seed phrase and the one with edited word
as a response to his follow-up question.

It's less safer in terms of RNG.
Because you basically reduced it from 256-bit.
One word is approximately 11-bit so if you've replaced one word, you've reduced the number of randomized portion of the seed by that amount.

But changing only one word out of 24, IMO isn't much of a safety issue, I'm not recommending it though.

Your hardware wallet's seed is generated randomly in the device itself, not by the manufacturer.
The only trust issue is if the hardware's RNG is bad or rigged which is never the case in genuine famous hardware wallets.

If your hardware wallet came with a pre-generated wallet or seed phrase, avoid using that device entirely.

hexvir isn't the OP  
From what I see, his reply is to give OP an alternative mempool explorer or blockexplorer site.

I don't know which site that shows "waiting to appear" so I have no idea, usually there'll be a result or none.
On a side note, there's no official mempool ('cause of the phrase "mempool site itself"), every node has its own and has their own set of rules. (usually the default)
So if the majority of the nodes don't have your transaction, chances that it's non-standard is high.

For broadcasting transactions, every site with push service has a Bitcoin node on its backend so it's all basically the same as sendrawtransaction command.

It's your mempool, it's still subjected to other node's mempool if your transaction will propagate.
Try to search its txid in blockexplorers; if it's not there, chances that it's only in your node is high. (or a few nodes)

No, it's used to add inputs to an existing transaction.
Mainly used for funding no input transactions created via createrawtransaction command.

Electrum is non-custodial and the 2FA service provider (TrustedCoin) don't have access to your 2FA wallet's other two master keys.
Also, your wallet files aren't saved online, it's in your PC or device's storage
so the only way that it's created as 2fa is if you or someone who have access to your PC have setup a 2fa wallet.
Or other reasons like you're using a fake Electrum wallet which can easily be detected by verifying its signature: https://bitcoinelectrum.com/how-to-verify-your-electrum-download/
Signature files for old versions can be downloaded here: https://download.electrum.org/ (find the correct '.asc' file for your wallet's version)

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The only way to spend from it is to have access to either two of the three master keys:
TrustedCoin has one, your wallet file has one and your seed phrase has two.

So you either need the "seed phrase" which you should've saved
or the wallet (and its password) plus the master key in TrustedCoin's server.

Regarding the latter, you can try to contact them to see if there's a chance to provide a new authenticator, use the email that you've used to setup the 2FA wallet.
but AFAIK, they do not usually entertain such requests
Link to FAQ: https://trustedcoin.com/#/faq#lost_authenticator
Link to Contact (read the note): https://trustedcoin.com/#/contact-us

Try signrawtransactionwithkey and fill the optional "prevtx" arg with the required script depending on the input(s).
More info about the command: https://bitcoincore.org/en/doc/24.0.0/rpc/rawtransactions/signrawtransactionwithkey/

It just happened that the result of Hash160 is always 160-bit so any data that you've hashed can be converted into an address.

Now, if it's pure coincidence, then you've discovered a collision (but only until you find the owner of that address to confirm that your and his inputs are different).
But the most possible scenario here is someone did the exact same thing.

You can't, and I highly doubt that there's an owner of that address. (someone who owns its private key)
If there's someone who claims it for some reason, ask him to provide a signed message.

Try to run "salvage" on a copy of that wallet using Bitcoin Core's bitcoin-wallet tool.
The result will depend on the deleted parts, if the (encrypted) master key is intact, it should be able to restore it to a usable state.

Follow this post to use the command:

If you don't know how to "cd" (change directory), simply type cd "path_to_the_directory" in your Command Prompt window, in this case bitcoin core's bin folder.
e.g. (Windows default): cd C:\Program Files\Bitcoin\bin