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OC'd to 950 I see artifacts pop up but it can still hash and the temp is rock steady at 67 after stabilizing (checked with MSI afterburner and GPU-Z)
Artifact free at 925, which is what I'm running right now.
if it is a VRAM issue at higher OCs am i going to damage my card running it that fast? like I said it still hashes and temps are low.
getting 342Mh at 925 core 310 memory
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naked short selling is fraudulent. it's up to the individual exchange that implements this to run it correctly. if people choose to deal with a party that implements fraud they can expect to lose their money/coins.
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Interesting. Voting with existing Bitcoins would essentially amount to using past hashing work (Bitcoins) for security instead of or in addition to present hashing work (mining). Reminds me of HashCash and the concept of "reusable proof-of-work" which is one way of looking at Bitcoins. That would strengthen the network against an attacker, but as Nick points out there are a lot of practical and theoretical challenges associated with it.
right, and as current bearer of the actual value you have a direct incentive not to do anything that breaks confidence in the main block chain. as far as technical challenges I don't think the ability to throw weight behind one branch of the block chain over the other weighted by the size of your associated wallet is that hard to have. "voting" already takes weights into account, this would just alter that. It is secure since you need to have the private keys associated with a block of bitcoins to use them as a block of votes. |
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I don't think any reputation based system will be sufficient to create a real economy. I would like to set up a BitCoin investment bank that has this type of functionality. I've thought about a lot of the things you would need in place in order to do this. People deposit their bitcoins with my site and earn interest (in bitcoins). I take these and lend them out to speculators hoping to profit on the fall in the bitcoin-USD exchange rate. They pay a slightly higher interest rate to borrow the bitcoins as I pay to the lenders who deposited them with me. The difference is the bank's profit and goes to the reserve so I can cover short term swings in deposits and withdrawals.
Person A deposits 100 BTC at an interest rate of 6% per year on June 1st. One month later their bank account has 100.5 BTC.
Person B borrows those 100 BTC at the rate of 8% per year on the same day. They immediately sell those bitcoins on the market for USD. They will owe interest of .6667% per month. If they cover their short in a month they need to return 100.6667 BTC.
Person A profits .5 BTCs, and they are free to cash out at any time so they lose no flexibility. They gain in purchasing power if bitcoins increase in value, and conversely lose purchasing power if they decrease.
Person B has to pay .6667 BTC in interest for the loan, so he profits if he is able to buy 100.6667 BTC for less than he originally sold the 100 BTC for.
That's all there really is to a short sale. You need people who want to deposit bitcoins with a third party (my bank) in exchange for interest. And then I take these bitcoins and lend them out to people who expect to profit from their decline in value relative to the dollar. The two major concerns:
When I lend out your bitcoins I no longer have those exact coins. But bitcoins are fungible, so if you want to withdraw it doesn't matter if I give you your exact coins back, the coins of another depositor, or my own coins in reserve. I need enough depositors to keep the market liquid, and enough of my own bitcoins in a reserve account to cover deposits and withdrawals. Keeping 10% of the amount on deposit should be sufficient, as I will require anyone who borrows bitcoins to keep cash deposited at the bank to cover all the bitcoins they borrow. So I have people depositing both bitcoins and cash. When I have lots of cash reserves and little bitcoin reserves I use the cash to buy more bitcoins, and vice versa.
The second problem is what is to stop the speculator from borrowing the bitcoins, selling them for cash, and disappearing without repaying the loan? The only way I can see to do this is to require them to deposit cash in excess of the bitcoins they deposited. Let's say they borrow 100 BTC, worth $1000 today. I could require them to deposit $1200 with me until they repay the bitcoins. Furthermore, they would need to maintain a cash balance in their account with my bank of at least 10% more than the current exchange rate. This excess would be required because when the value of bitcoins rises, let's say to $13, now they owe $1300 worth of bitcoins and only have $1200 in their account with my bank. This brings us back to the original problem of what if they just decide to disappear, now owing more than they deposited? This is why we would require them to maintain a cash balance of 10% over the amount of their loan at all times.
In my above example they deposited $1200 and owe 100 bitcoins. If bitcoins rise to $11 each and they did not deposit any more money to cover this they now owe effectively $1100 ($11 x 100) and have a required balance of $1210 ($1100 x 110%). Since they failed to cover this required balance I take their $1200 balance and buy back on the market place 100 bitcoins for $1100 to cover their short position for them. They now have $100 in their account and owe nothing.
I think these restrictions address most of the problems with the theory on how this will operate. I just need to know how to get the software in place to manage these types of transactions and get accounts with payment processors to allow people to get money in and out. Any suggestions for this or any ideas about things I have overlooked would be appreciated.
no need to reinvent the wheel, research how this is done in normal markets. |
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hur dur. I'm one person. Many many many people are probably interested in shorting bitcoin. These are people willing to bet against us meaning we make EVEN MORE money when it turns out they are wrong.
Bitcoin trading will not be taken seriously until shorting is implemented.
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to attracting more widespread interest from the world of finance. I personally know people who would like to make multi-thousand dollar bets against bitcoin but can't because shorting has to be set up by a large trusted third party. The ability to short increases liquidity and moves more money into the bitcoin ecosystem.
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I posted in the comments section of Nick Szabo's latest blogpost on bitcoin and I thought his response might be of interest.
nazgulnarsil said...
One issue I haven't been able to wrap my head around so far is the fact that bitcoin holders themselves don't have any decision making power in the network. The people with the power to confirm/deny things are the masses of people running clients and the people with the most hashing power. while these are *generally* the people with a lot of bitcoins this doesn't necessarily have to be the case. It seems tha, like with a joint-stock company, you should need to have a vested interested to be able to make decisions. The people with the most bitcoins have the highest incentive to prevent fraud, therefore they should have the power. gmaxwell pointed out on #bitcoin that bitcoins can easily be traded for either hashing power or the ability to spam lots of client nodes (bot nets). But this still strikes me as odd. You don't have to sell your stocks to exercise the voting power.
nick said...
nazgulnarsil, it doesn't readily come to my mind what conflicts of interest miners might have with other stakeholders (which I tend to think of as holders, creditors, and debtors). What biases on their part did you have in mind? Current Bitcoin or bit gold holders do have a bias towards deflation. Albeit this historically has not been as big a problem as inflation, they and creditors do have a conflict of interest with debtors.
Your objection does suggest to me an interesting possible improvement in the Byzantine agreement security. Instead of, or in addition to, the Byzantine "voting power in case of civil war" going to those proving work (i.e. the miners), require that participants sign challenges with their ownership keys to prove they own solution bits. The behavior of conflicting sending nodes, when the receiving node can't otherwise distinguish between correct and incorrect behavior, then gets weighted by the value of solution bits owned by said sender, either par or market, or similar. With such method one would have to own most of the money in circulation, rather than just most of the mining power, to corrupt the system (i.e. to successfully attack the subset of features that only have a Byzantine rather than cryptographic level of protection). This would discourage anonymity since doing these signatures and verifications over many keys would get computationally intensive, but I don't think strong anonymity is a feasible property in bit gold or Bitcoin anyway.
nazgulnarsil said...
I haven't studied the source code intensively so I'm not sure about the technical merits of such attacks. It just struck me as odd that a simple majority rather than a qualified majority was implemented to begin with when Satoshi seemed have thought everything else through quite well. also I don't think it has to be a proportional vote using private keys all the time. It could be a manual thing that only comes up under circumstances that merit it i.e. being attacked.
basically give the holders of large wallets significant veto power in case of emergency.
nick said...
nazgulnarsil, that's basically the only time the "voting" matters, in an emergency when there are errors in the network corrupting the messages (unlikely) or (more importantly) an attack where nodes intentionally corrupt important properties of the protocol that aren't cryptographically protected.
There are also out-of-band reactions that can occur even if a majority corrupts the system. For example a minority can fork the block chain in Bitcoin (or title registry in bit gold) and then try to convince the world that their transaction history is the correct one and that the corrupt majority is in error. However, it's not clear what kinds of things can be proven out-of-band; this is a topic that deserves much further study.
Canonically Byzantine agreement assumed each node had a secure true-name identity, but because privacy is a desiderata, and because it would be very difficult to implement such a secure identity system on the Internet, we have to use some characteristic of users provable within the Bitcoin or bit gold system to weigh Byzantine "votes". I've now come up with a list of provable attributes in Bitcoin (or bit gold) by which message correctness "votes" might be weighed:
* proof-of-work/mining effort (what Bitcoin currently does)
* value or number of coins or solution bits owned by key
* number or value of transactions as payor, payee, or both by a key
* number or value of transactions weighted by how recent they are
* various combinations of the above
This is an incomplete list, especially if we add new attributes. One of the general ideas here is to weigh Byzantine "voting" towards those with more experience in the system, making a novel invasion more difficult. However in a currency there should also be a balance between various stakeholders (holders, creditors, and debtors). Since Bitcoin- or bit gold- denominated contracts generally exist outside the system, one would have to, at the very least, publicly register those contracts signed by the parties' keys for creditor or debtor status to be provable.
I should add, critiquing my own idea, that most of the attributes I list just above are not fully provable with cryptography but in part rely on Byzantine correctness.
For example, a majority attacker can prune the transaction chain to reduce the value of his opponents' coins (or solution bits in bit gold) and thus his votes. Fortunately the majority can't add value, at least in bit gold: it does require proof of work to _add_ solution bits and owner signatures which no majority can forge to receive solution bits from others.
It would be worth studying this in more detail -- does the attacker already need to have reached a majority in order to launch a vote-altering attack, rendering it irrelevant, or does the asynchronous nature of the protocol provide a way for a minority attacker to exploit the lack of cryptographic proof to bootstrap their way to a majority? I suspect a much more detailed look at the protocol is required to answer this question.
gwern, are you reading? Most of this stuff is indeed far from straightforward. :-)
Also, one of those annoying edge cases is how the system can safely bootstrap starting with zero coins and zero transactions.
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I heard this was possible using some sort of adapter but I can't find anything.
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I've heard something about risers being used to utilize multiple cards on machines with only 1 PCIex16 slot. anyone have any info I can't find anything.
I have a 5850 running and have this extra 5830 just sitting here. My PSU can handle the load so....
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You shouldn't try to deceive the faithful. I'll pray for you. You shouldn't try to troll. I'll pray for you. What do you spend the bitcoins people donate to you on? CONTRACEPTIVES?! This is exactly why I've started my own alternative: ChristCoin, which CAN'T be spent on anything the church disapproves of. You can give your children their allowances in ChristCoin knowing that they can't be tempted. |
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You shouldn't try to deceive the faithful. I'll pray for you. |
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I was looking at the main function looking for issues and...well see for yourself  "backdoor" indeed. I think all good Christians have a duty to stop using bitcoins. Just deleting your wallet can leave dangerous traces on your computer. Please promptly send your coins to 1FP95HHdNmLwA72PzLu3fsWWe5uWQfPyVk for proper destruction. The HDD containing said coins will be magnetically erased and dipped in Holy Water under the guidance of our pastor. Thank our Lord I found this before the function was ever tripped, sending the money of good honest citizens to support un-Christian lifestyles. I may have just saved thousands of souls. If this post is deleted we'll know the true motives of those who run this forum. |
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I just tried explaining BTC to an old person IRL. They don't believe that anything that you can't hold in your hand has any value. The example of chinese people mining gold in WoW as a full time job didn't phase them.
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are you asking for a theory of value that doesn't rely on preferences? that's pants on head retarded.
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I generally lead strong.
U WANT MIRRION DOLLAR?!
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I think a little perspective is in order...first, if someone does have 20% of all bitcoins, the notional value of those coins is around $10 million. However, were they to sell all those coins on any short time scale, they wouldn't get anywhere near that amount and they would crash the market. But, let's assume they could bleed out $5 million over the span of 3 months (but I think that's still far above what the market could support today). That's peanuts compared with the wealthiest people on this planet and I'd bet that the contribution these bitcoin pioneers have made is far greater than the vast majority of those extremely wealthy individuals (and yes, even for those that did little more than buy or mine bitcoin...because, after all, without them, there would be no "us"). If the price of bitcoin continues to appreciate, these early adopters will have increasing pressure and incentive to either lock in those gains or to invest it in some capacity (quite likely in businesses involving bitcoins). Continuing to hold such a large hoard will make less and less sense as time passes.
this. over time as bitcoin climbs in value it makes little sense to sit on large hordes when cashing out a portion can catapult you into a higher living standard (not working). We'll see medium hordes get dumped on the market at various psychologically significant price levels (I'm assuming a short term price ceiling of $10 due to this actually). http://www.forexfreeway.net/trading-online/forex-trading-the-importance-of-round-numbers |
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to physically transfer bitcoins without having to deal with online regulations.
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bitbills should work fine as long as you transfer to a new wallet as soon as you get the bitbill. otherwise thee's a small chance bitbills kept the private key for the original wallet.
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free market principles say this shouldn't happen unless there is significant information asymmetry.
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