If I didn't offer the bonds, it is likely that I would have instead invested funds in BTCST. He is "making money off me" due to the fact that I chose to take a long position, but he is not making any more money due to the fact that I obtain this position by offering bonds rather than investing. In fact he will be making less money because he has to pay a fee on top of the face value. All of this is of course under the assumption that he does in fact have malicious intents.

Positive bonds such as PPT.X, on the other hand, do allow more cash to flow into Pirate, but I still believe the effect is small.

It's a bit long. I'll see if I can find the time to do it later today, the half of it that is about Bitcoin anyway.

That's stupid. I suppose nobody told them about Bit-Pay?

It's not the first time we've had articles about Bitcoin, but this seems to be a step up in terms of length and quality. The overall tone seems to be positive but only mildly so - an unenthusiastic acknowledgement that the thing has potential in spite of the rough start.

Interestingly, the article fails to mention anything about Bitcoin in Israel.

Here is an excerpt:

Yeah, I know. Also says the inventor is Satoshi Nakamura (though he does seem to be the master of time and space). This article also has a Hebrew version (http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/2011-year-ender/2012/1.1603318#), I tried to control the damage in the talkbacks but you know how these things go.

Edit: It also seems there was an article on TheMarker about Bitcoin earlier this month, http://www.themarker.com/wallstreet/1.1677670, though that is little more than a translation of Naomi O'leary's Reuters article (which wasn't very good to begin with).

The most important factor is (1-f)*(1-c) which is the average payout rate. But that's a non-issue since AFAIK most or all currently existing DGM pools are free so they will have (1-f)(1-c)=1.

If the above is fixed, you'll want c to be as high as possible. o depends on your preferences and on the value of c. For fixed c, lower o means payments arrive faster but are more variable.

High ping can increase your invalid shares rate.

For reference, I have contacted them about this multiple times, as early as 9 months ago (and I had at the time reason to believe they had already known about it, which is why I didn't give a detailed explanation). Here is the discussion.

For me a forum address is first and foremost a cultural thing. If you are a part of the Bitcoin community, you should have a Bitcoin address associated with you.

And, it was also supposed to encourage the culture of embracing Bitcoin's power of low-friction transactions to express gratitude in the form of microdonations. It's not a huge success.

My forum address is not empty.

It doesn't matter if people tip you or not, they should have the option.

The forum address is meant to be used to earn BTC for useful things that cannot be otherwise monetized. But I haven't heard of a forum address standing in the way of anyone doing useful things that can be monetized.

They could. As well as the account of the other party.

You would be hard-pressed to find such an exchange, for the reason stated above.

https://www.spendbitcoins.com/convert/paypal/ seem to offer converting Bitcoin to PayPal.

If you can use Amazon Payments instead of PayPal, you can try CoinCard which is highly recommended.

If you do the trade with a reputable member of this forum or bitcoin-otc there is close to 0 chance of being scammed, and it's also not very likely PayPal would find out.

This makes sense, I'll think about this.

Creating assets on GLBSE requires planning. I wrote the OP when I was ready to write the OP, not when I was ready to create the asset. If all goes well it should be a matter of days.

Rest assured that MPOE-PR's objections are not holding me back.

I think you'll find that most of your posts in this thread contain personal attacks, including the first and the latest.

A number of people have suggested that your behavior is unacceptable. There are two possibilities, either we're all wrong and you should stop wasting your time on us, or you're wrong and you should stop wasting our time.

You are no longer welcome in this thread.

The currently intended scale of the offering will be such that the additional incentive, compared to Pirate's existing holdings, is negligible. If Pirate isn't planning to default now, it is highly unlikely that buying this bond will convince him to do so.

But that's not even the main point, there's something much more basic that you're missing. Suppose I want to take a long position of X BTC on Pirate. I can do this by either depositing in his program or by offering X BTC worth of bonds. Assume the worst case that Pirate buys them all. Then this increases his incentive to default by X BTC, and if I deposited in his program I would also have increased his incentive by X BTC. So choosing to offer these bonds has no effect on the incentive to default, and that's assuming the worst case - if people other than Pirate buy bonds, his incentive to default decreases (when compared to the case that I obtained my position by depositing).

What you're really saying is that depositing in Pirate's program is a very bad idea as it encourages default. Which may be true, but has nothing to do with this. This bond allows people to deposit negative amounts which discourages default, unless pirate deposits a negative amount in his own program which makes this neutral.

Ok, that was weird.

The customer who recently purchased bonds directly from me has had second thoughts. He requested to sell (most of) them back to me, at a lower price of course. I agreed to this as well.

Since I now possess more unsold bonds than I intended, and I made some net profit out of these two trades, I am offering >5000 bonds for sale at the lower price of 0.37 BTC each.

That's not a likely use case. Every Anti-Pirate bond negates an equivalent pirate investment. People who invest in both will make no returns and will just have to provide collateral and a fee for the privilege of getting nothing.

It's a stretch, but maybe it can be used to move up a Pirate tier, or enable other special Pirate offerings. For example someone who wants to risk only 1500 BTC with Pirate, can deposit 2000 BTC and buy 500 BTC face value worth of anti-pirate bonds. The increased interest rate just might be able to compensate for the costs.

The intended use case is for people who really want to be short on Pirate.

Not a fan, but will consider this.

What do people think about renaming from Anti-Pirate to Antimatter? Less descriptive, but way cooler.

The people buying these bonds will want Pirate to have additional incentive to default.

I don't think there is any planned activity to be done here. When there is enough trade volume in the bonds, market makers will emerge naturally to make profits. They can also do arbitrage by buying one bond and shorting another, thus equalizing the prices (taking into account, of course, any differences between the bonds).

What I would like to see eventually, as I alluded in the PureMining OP, is a dedicated hashrate exchange which revolves around margin trading and accurately distributing rewards. It will be operated by a registered company (for the sake of accountability and signaling commitment for indefinite operation) which does not issue bonds itself, but rather merely allow investors to trade among themselves (the total hashrate in the exchange is 0; in the beginning the only way to buy is if someone else sells on margin).

Such an exchange should be able to operate on a much larger scale, improving liquidity.

Come on, with all this respect, at the very least you could use my name...

Is the failure mode Pirate offering such bonds, or buying them?

Assuming he plans to default, by buying bonds he is essentially encouraging me to effectively invest funds into his program. There's some profit to be made here but this doesn't seem catastrophical to me. I doubt anything can be done to prevent this.

If he's issuing bonds, I don't think he has any advantage over anyone else issuing bonds without intending to fulfill his obligations. Obviously whoever is issuing the bonds should be trustworthy.

My words exactly. (imagines self as Pirate) Wow.

Ask anyone who has met me in NYC or Prague (or in Israel for that matter) if I look anything like a pirate.

Basically yes, but that's not accurate. You need to consider this with respect to a complete model of the default time probability distribution.

If I believe that Pirate has a probability of p to default, and that the time of the event in this case is exponentially distributed with mean m, then the expected amount I will have to pay per 1 BTC face value worth of bonds is

\[ 2p \int_0^{\infty} (1/m)\exp(-t/m)(1-r)^t dt = 2p / (1 - m\ln(1-r)) \]

Mircea's offering is basically just like PPT, but with some tweaked terms, some more precise description of terms, and where they are issued without being backed by actually depositing funds in BTCST (which is relevant only for the issuer, not for investors).

The main difference with Anti-Pirate is that they are exact opposites. PPT are positive, Anti-Pirate is negative. Buying Anti-Pirate can be compared to selling PPT, and vice versa. MPOE-PR has made a big deal in this thread out of the fact that these can be sold, borrowing as necessary.

The issuer of an asset always takes the opposite position of a buyer of an asset; if his desired position is neutral, he will have to seek an alternative means to take the same position as buying the bond. For mining bonds this is generally buying hardware; for PPT this is depositing funds in BTCST; etc.

The 2nd difference is that Anti-Pirate is perpetual while PPT has a set time. As the one who first mentioned the term "perpetuity" in the PureMining thread you can surely appreciate that, but anyway think what would it be like if instead of offering PureMining I would offer PureMining.March, PureMining.April, PureMining.May...

Finally, Anti-Pirate is an original (individually at least, globally until shown otherwise) methodology to provide perpetual negative bonds. Not that the idea is groundbreaking, just a correct application of some concepts to the issue at hand.

EDIT: I'm not sure you can deduce my personal motivation for (considering) offering the bond, since its place in my entire investment portfolio needs to be considered.

I will not comment on whether I did or will invest funds into Pirate. I will say however that availability of funds is not really much of a problem as far as such investment is concerned, only default risk (and possibly, lack of storage demand).

Yes, offering this bond lengthens my Pirate position. But that doesn't mean I can't seek ways to hedge this risk.

Ok, now I know you're just trolling.

Yes. See also my edit to my previous answer.

The point is that the decay rate does not need to correspond to pirate's interest rate. In principle, the effective interest rate is (ry)/(1-y), where r is the decay rate and y is the ratio between the face value and the maturity value. In the no-sell variant, the "face value" does not need to be predefined and is de facto determined by the traded price. In this case the price can change to match whatever pirate's interest rate is.