What is your current multi-sig set up? Why is that insufficient and why are you planning to change?

The derivation path you need to use to recover an existing multi-sig set up is dependent on how it was created in the first place, not on which software you are using to recover it. As I said above, if you create an Electrum segwit multi-sig wallet using Electrum seed phrases, it will use m/1' If you create an Electrum segwit multi-sig wallet using BIP39 seed phrases, it will use either m/48'/0'/0'/1' or m/48'/0'/0'/2' for P2SH and P2WSH respectively. If you recover an existing segwit multi-sig wallet using Electrum, then you'll need to use whatever derivation path your original software used when first establishing the multi-sig wallet. If it tells you to use m/49' (or more likely m/49'/0'/0'), then use that.

The BIP39 seeds and any associated passphrases, yes. But be aware that by importing all of these in the same wallet, then you remove all the additional security that multi-sig brings by having all the keys necessary to spend your coins contained within the same wallet on the same device.

That's not quite right. Only the last word has exactly 128 possibilities, since for every final seven bits of entropy the last word provides, there will be exactly one word out of the 16 possibilities which has the correct checksum. When swapping out any other word, since the checksum is already fixed, there will be 128 possibilities on average (as opposed to exactly 128 words), since you cannot predict exactly how many possibilities will hash to the already fixed checksum.

Arguably, you only want error detection and not error correction. The checksum used in Bech32 addresses can provide error correction, but no piece of wallet software implements it. The reason behind this is explained in BIP173. In short, you don't want an error to accidentally be corrected to the wrong address, resulting in loss of funds.

My bad. I had in my head that version 0x101 was for multi-sig wallets, but you are right - it is specifically for 2FA wallets. Multi-sig wallets just use the usual 0x100 version of Segwit seed phrases.

By default, Electrum uses path m/0' for single sig segwit wallets but path m/1' for multi-sig segwit wallets, so the public keys would be different.

Yes, although if Electrum is no longer available then it could be tricky.

Even if Electrum is no longer maintained, chances are you will still be able to find a version of the software which is usable. If you can't find the software at all, then you might need to tinker with another piece of software in order to recover this wallet since Electrum seed phrases are not the same as BIP39 seed phrases. You should also note that Electrum Segwit multi-sig derives at m/1'.

Not with Electrum seed phrases. It has built in version which tells Electrum it is a multi-sig seed phrase, so you could only use it as a single sig seed phrase by doing something non-standard, which I would not recommend.
Correction below.

If you were to use BIP39 seed phrases, then you could use one of your multi-sig seed phrases for a single sig wallet.

I wouldn't say it is either. It's just how the checksum works.

That's because we are considering it backwards here. There are only 128 possible words if you are picking them manually. Since the last word of a 12 word seed phrase also contains 7 bits of entropy, then when generated properly there is exactly one word which provides the correct checksum for the provided entropy.

And yes, it is important. If you don't have a checksum and import an incorrect seed phrase, then you have no idea you have imported an incorrect seed phrase. You could spend weeks or months trying to brute force a passphrase which doesn't exist, or searching weird and wonderful derivation paths, or who knows what else, trying to hunt down your wallet. With a checksum, you know immediately one of your words is wrong and can immediately narrow down your search significantly. Not to mention that brute forcing an incorrect seed phrase is also quicker with a checksum since you do not have to derive addresses and check them for balance for all the invalid phrases.

Both keys.openpgp and keyserver.ubuntu are working normally for me. Also pgp.mit.edu, which is the other server I sometimes use. All three are processing Luke Dashjr's key normally without any errors.

For the expired error that OP is receiving - I would first check that your system date and time is accurate, and then I would update Kleopatra/Gpg4win to the latest version, and see if that helps.

To be beyond this upper limit by flipping a coin 256 times, your first 127 flips would have to be either all heads or all tails, depending on which face you assigned to "1". 127 consecutive identical flips with a fair coin is incredibly unlikely to happen.

But even so, generating private keys the most common way, i.e. by a piece of wallet software deriving them from a seed phrase, could still result in you generating a number which is above this upper limit. Deriving keys from a seed phrase simply uses the left 256 bits of a SHA512 output as the private key, which could equally as likely be above this limit. All good wallet software will have a procedure in place to deal with this.

You are right in saying you can infer nothing about the private key from knowledge of only the address. Generating an address from such an invalid private key would have one of two outcomes - either your software would return an error, or it would calculate a new private key modulo n and use that instead.

It is an inherent property of the curve bitcoin uses and the generator point of that curve. The curve order n is such that when multiplied by the generator point G, you get the point at infinity. It is the limit to how many distinct points there are on the curve.

Start with G. Add G to get 2G. Add G again to get 3G. Repeat. Once you've added G a total of n times, you hit the point at infinity. This means there are n-1 distinct points on the curve.

Pretty much this. Bankers have been stealing billions from the common person to enrich themselves and their politician buddies for years. The last few months are just the first time that this kind of scam has been exposed in crypto, and everyone is acting surprised. The scammed and stolen money ended up in the pockets of the right people, and while doing so SBF simultaneously made a great case for regulators to swoop in and seize control over the entire centralized exchange ecosystem, which is important to the government in order to be able to keep absolute control over monetary policy and their money printer. He's pretty much a hero in their eyes, hence why he is being rewarded with speaking gigs and TV deals.

If there is enough public outcry to actually force an arrest, he'll get off on a technicality or with some meaningless slap on the wrist fine, just like all the other banks and corporations who screw over the average Joe.

If you look at the data from some of the largest miners, then you see that instead of them varying their hashrate depending on the price of bitcoin, they instead vary how much of their mining rewards they immediately sell to cover their costs and how much they simply hold on to. But on the other hand, several such miners are also starting to dip in to the reserves they built up when hashrate was lower and price was higher, so this kind of buffering can't go on forever. If the price doesn't go back up in the medium to long term, then eventually miners who are dipping in to their reserves will run out of their reserves and simply shut down, and hashrate will come back down again. I don't necessarily think that's a bad thing though - it is impossible to sustain an exponential hashrate growth forever.

This site was spammed on this forum repeatedly by a newbie who would post about it and then a day or two later delete the post, repeating this pattern of behavior over and over. As I've pointed out before, the site itself is largely plagiarized from elsewhere, and contains plagiarized blog posts predating its registration date designed to make it appear older and more trustworthy than it actually is. There are zero confirmed reviews or feedback from people successfully using the site, and the user in question is negatively rated for this suspicious behavior.

So no, it is not safe.

As I said to you in your other thread, if you share as much as you can remember about your passphrase then we can help you to try to brute force it yourself using btcrecover.

As noted in BitMEX's tweet I linked to above, the biggest ones are Robinhood, Bittrex, Bitfinex, and KuCoin, although you can still see a full list on Greg's opening post on this thread or here: https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin-sv/markets/

The same reason they list and support any such shitcoin - as long as there are people willing to trade it, then centralized exchanges are willing to host that activity in order to cash in on the trading fees.

So, looks like BitMEX have given up trying to keep tabs on what the hell is going on with BSV.

After noting on November 14 that BSV was releasing a hardfork client to allow CSW to unilaterally start seizing coins which belong to other people, they attempted to monitor for such activities by running two version of the BSV software. They then on November 23 announced they were giving up trying to sync the ridiculously bloated blockchain and therefore cannot monitor for coins being seized or chain splits.

And looks like Bitfinex is starting to notice the effects of BSV being a complete mess: https://www.bitfinex.com/posts/868

I wonder how other exchanges are going to handle the fact that not only can coins start being seized, but apparently they can't even monitor for chain splits if this happens. Surely delisting has to happen soon?

They were very recently caught out by the bear market and had to lay off 20% of their workforce in order to cut costs. If a company which has been involved in bitcoin for years is not prepared for the price of bitcoin to be volatile, then I wonder what else they are not prepared for.

But the likes of FTX and BlockFi were not tier 3 no name exchanges. These were some of the biggest exchanges and biggest platforms in crypto, which is exactly the justification many are using for the fact that they still have coins on the likes of Coinbase or Binance. "Oh, *insert chosen exchange here* is different. It's well regulated/fully backed up/insured/too big to fail/some other meaningless platitude." Are your coins on any centralized exchange? Then start working on the assumption that you own nothing, because there is a very high chance that that will very soon be true unless you withdraw them.

As I was just saying in another thread, it's a triumph of centralized exchanges' marketing departments that they have convinced people that they are too stupid to write down 12 words on a piece of paper.

But, but, but, it says "decentralized" right there in the name! These scammers wouldn't lie, surely!?

Here it is: All centralized exchanges.

I doesn't really make a difference if the exchange is offering unsustainable interest rates to their customers, or if they are just pocketing 100% of the profit for themselves. The fact is that every centralized platforms is/was taking part in this shady and often illegal practice of just handing out customers' deposits to random third parties.

I'm shocked! Shocked, I tell you!

The writing has been on the wall for a long time. I've been warning people about BlockFi on these forums for years. Their business model (and indeed their Terms of Use) was almost identical to that of Celsius. When Celsius collapsed, if you didn't pull everything you owned out of every centralized platform then you weren't paying attention. If you still have coins on any centralized platform today then you are an idiot. Nowhere is safe. Nobody is too big to fail.

Don't forget of course that BlockFi can also be added to the growing list of "Platforms which made statements/tweets assuring everyone that everything was fine days before they collapsed".

Who knows!? Genesis? Tether? Crypto.com? Binance? All possibilities!

Stop trusting third parties and you won't lose your coins. It's literally the first two sentences of the whitepaper.

Not until the difficulty adjusts, and if that isn't going to happen for a year then it makes no difference. If the difficulty is based on a hashrate of 200 EH/s, and you have 100 TH/s, then it will take you the exact same amount of time (on average) to find a block whether the other 199.9999 EH/s actually exists or not.

Some altcoins have attempted this, and it has often resulted in miners gaming the system to maximize their profits, generating lots of blocks in quick succession and then very few for a sustained period. Having a fixed difficulty adjustment also protect against some kinds of Sybil attack in which an attacker could trick you in to accepting a malicious chain.

What does this key look like? Is it a series of words? How many words? Or is it a series of letters and numbers? Does it start with 5, K, or L? Or does it start with the characters xprv, zprv, or similar?
Where did this key come from? Did you generate it yourself? Using what software?
When you import this key, are you shown a single address, or multiple addresses? What do those addresses start with (1, 3, or bc1)?
What about the balance you looked up? Is it on one address or several? What do those addresses start with (1, 3, or bc1)?
Are you certain the addresses you looked up are linked to this key? How do you know?

In addition to the answers above, in a completely extreme solution in which bitcoin becomes complete unusable, such as a loss of something like 99% of the hashrate semi-permanently, block times going to 16 hours and the next difficulty retarget being over a year away, then there is nothing stopping us from forking bitcoin in order to manually adjust the difficulty back down to a more reasonable level. We would then just let it self adjust again from that new level, and it would slowly creep back up over the coming months and years as humanity slowly recovers from whatever massive disaster has befallen us.

Which is absolutely your right. If you don't like it, then don't enable it. But similarly, you don't get to tell everyone else not to enable it. And I'd point out again that the default setting here is false i.e. disabled.

It is tagged on GitHub as the latest release, and it is available on bitcoincore.org. There are already 230 nodes running it according to blockchair. And even if you succeeded in getting 24.0 pulled (which would not happen), then anyone who wants this option can still download the necessary code from GitHub.

Still, if you want to argue against it, then here is the latest pull request to remove the option: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26525. I would strongly suggest you read all the comments in this request plus the 4 other pull requests I linked to previously, because you are simply rehashing arguments which have already been had.

Sure, but simply deleting an already hot wallet and turning it in to a watch only wallet on the same machine isn't that safe, which was the point I was making. In fact, you might even expose yourself to more risk if you are going to have to import your seed phrase in plain text back on to that online computer every time you want to make a transaction, as opposed to having it stored encrypted on the same computer in your wallet file. If you want the real security that a watch only wallet brings you, then the seed phrase/private keys need to have been generated securely in the first place.

Yeah, this. No amount of tinkering around the edges of a hot wallet will make it safe.