The supercoin's trustless approach is similar to that used by OpenBazaar (https://openbazaar.org/). This is a sound approach for trustless system and I'd consider it as "standard". BTW, I don't know if there exist any other system that is sound for making a trustless system.

Actually no, the "guarantor" is only involved in the act of sending coins, which is a "communication" in the context of the Two General's problem.

The "guarantor" is being trusted to do arbitration between the sender and the mixer. Therefore, given the nature of 2-of-3 multisig transactions, the guarantor and the mixer can sign the transaction, and then refuse to sign the cancellation transaction, leaving the sender out of luck and out of funds.

Even worse - the workflow is based on the txid and verifying the txid. Have we not learnt by now that the txid can change? How do you people not understand that this was the very thing that mtgox blamed for their destruction?

In fact, if there was ever a clearer indication that the idiot "developer" that designed this system should stick to something less complicated, Satoshi Nakamoto himself wrote a seminal post in December 2010 explaining why this is a bad idea, so it's not like this is a novel and unknown thing:


This is not a trustless system, this is a trivially broken, fundamentally flawed system. Praising it as anything but an idiotic idea merely reduces your own credibility.

Of course you can. Your consensus system can be designed around consensus, this is the very nature of Bitcoin - if 2 nodes cheat on the Bitcoin network, they get rejected as outliers.

You've literally described a system that requires you to trust that there's not collusion between 2 parties, that is not a trustless system, which is a twist of irony given that you called that other piece of junk out as not being trustless. There is no Byzantine fault tolerance with this system, which is the very problem Bitcoin solves. You're trying to solve this problem: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_Generals'_Problem - but the described system does not do so.

Well I'm not going to repeat what I said about increasing the barrier to entry and the knock-on effect of that. If it went over your head I completely understand.

But again, as mentioned more than once, this is about cheating the system. A guarantor could collude with mixers - even offering it as a service - to screw the senders over. This isn't rocket science, guys.

Cloak is in the middle of implementing a "block escrow" system that may share some similarities to a multi sig solution but is infact unique.

Once in place there will be nothing that a "bad/fake/evil" node can do to act malicious during a send from A to B. This is because of the order of the posa tx, combined with the blockchain, will not allow corruption.

PoSA will soon be entirely anon + trustless as we set out to achieve from day 1.

Having any kind of risk that a corrupt node could interfere with a transaction was a genuine concern (of the Cloak team and others) and as such it's been dealt with accordingly.

Per this comment from yesterday - "Among all the online coin clients, if some minimum requirements are met (e.g. with minimum amount of coins in the balance, and with minimum 2 addresses in the wallet, etc), the node will advertise itself as a service node." Creating two addresses is trivial, and even if you use address signing to verify a balance it's trivial to move funds out and into another address to advertise that node, and then bounce it back again. Sybil attacks aren't prevented by these minimum requirements, and higher the requirements just created a high barrier to entry for a "service node", and thus a reason for those running service nodes to knock others off the network.

Ok I am not a Developer to say in the begining.

But now you say it is not possible, but how can you say that without seeing the code and everything because it is not Open Source?
What if your knowledge (no offense please but critical thinking please! ) is not enough to understand what these guys (Developers) are doing.

As I said I am happy to discuss. But how can anyone not beeing the developer saying at the moment that the system don't work?

I just want people to see both sites, people who think its not working and people who think it is working.


When I understand you right you say we will never know what they doing with the middle nodes created to create the annon feature right?
Question here: Do we need to know? I mean if my money comes from a to b and no one can trace it isnt that enough?

Completely open to collusion. All you need is a significantly large number of nodes accepting requests to be guarantors, and since there's no barrier to entry this is trivial.

Ok so What defines a Bad Altcoin ?

i want you all to say what YOU think so the guys making the coins see what YOU say.
this is not a spring board for me to attack on some coins or something.
i intend on keeping out of it if i can lol

for me it just means a useless coin that does not fit a solid attempt at dethroning Bitcoin.
or at the very least a solid sincere attempt at being better than what is around..

for example i chose to support Jackpotcoin because when it was released a couple months ago
it was the best of the newer coins i figured and i seen it had some new features that were actually a step in the right direction for crypto.
the idea of using two separate Algo for POS and POW was a great idea !
and i wanted to pick the least worst coin to support pretty much.

anyway i thought it would be good for us to put it all on the table and talk about it !
like is a coin with scam code put in it any worse than a pure clone or a coin with just enough changes to say "it's different"
..I see it as same shit different pile.. ALL BAD !

but.. at least if guys TRY and make their coins seem legit that is step up sort of.. rather than not even trying (with clones etc)
lets think about what the outsiders think of all this too guys..

Happy to see you guys discussing here.  I am fine with discussing but I am not fine with seeing only one site here. Cloak has to prove that Escrow and POSA works in V2 which is expected this week. After this they want to review everything by trustful Auditors. Thats the most they can do isn't it? After that comes the Open Source, but which is at this moment dangerous because of copying, I am right there too? Correct me if I am not please happy to discuss.

Next thing I read here is not fast enough. Therefore please everyone check out my thread: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=714803.msg8296447#msg8296447
I tried to show the development of Cloak over the last 2 weeks. Only facts and community stuff. I didn't quote any rumor or fud.

Cheers!

Here is the 2nd part of the whitepaper, which gives a high level in-depth view of the trustless algorithm we use. Please refer to the part 1 if you need to understand some terms. Part 1 is here:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=618552.msg8272890#msg8272890

==
The following diagram shows a high level description of the trustless system algorithm. It shows the “normal” case where everything goes as expected.




The next diagram shows the case where, after step 6, the Sender is not satisfied with the Mixer’s txid. This could happen if the Sender cannot verify Mixer’s transaction, or Mixer did not send enough funds to the destination. In which case Sender asks Guarantor to do the arbitration. The new scenario are marked in brown lines and explained in the diagram.



There are other possible scenarios, that we will describe in the next parts, where we will show details of the algorithm and steps. But from the above two cases you see why multisig is tightly linked with trustless system and how it creates a bonding among all parties where they have to follow the anonymous transfer rules.

Read through the supercoin update and I have a few questions for you. What prevents the middle nodes from being bad actors?
The sender randomly selects service nodes based on a list of 30 nodes he can control in his configuration file. What prevents the sender from controlling 2 of the 3 nodes?

As far as I understand(I am not a developer, but this is an attempt to paraphrase the devs when they give us updates in IRC) In cloak, the entire blockchain is the escrow service to prevent bad actors. If coins dont make it to the reciever, the transaction doesnt occur.

While I am writing the whitepaper, I think instead of publishing it all at once when I finish, I will post it in parts, every 2-3 days, so community will get more details about the algorithm we use and logistics behind it. It is also an education process so people will understand what is a trustless system and why we need it. So expect 3 parts to be posted in this thread. I will prepare a pdf file with all parts together (the formal whitepaper).

All questions are welcomed, though I may not have time to answer all the questions. Because I still need to do testing on the code and fix bugs, and add bells and whistles etc.

Below is the first part on the SuperSend Trustless system. I will try to publish the next part in 2-3 days, maybe Monday/Tuesday time frame. Next parts will describe the overview and details of the algorithm.

==

SuperSend Trustless is an advanced p2p completely decentralized anonymous system. It belongs to Coinjoin category of the anonymous wallet. In this system all nodes (clients) are equal; there are no centralized or special nodes that hold more info than others. The coin transfer happens with the help of middle nodes that are randomly chosen. Mini-escrow is used with multisig address and transactions to ensure all the parties behave according to the transfer rules. This is a complete trustless system. The system is designed in a forceful way for all parties to behave correctly. If any party tries to cheat, he will lose more than his gain in the cheat.

Among all the online coin clients, if some minimum requirements are met (e.g. with minimum amount of coins in the balance, and with minimum 2 addresses in the wallet, etc), the node will advertise itself as a service node. Other nodes receiving the advertisement will add it to their service node list. There’s a limit in the service node list for each client (currently limited at 30). Any client can turn off the advertisement, if it does not want to be a service node. To turn off the service node advertisement, user just need to put a line in the config file. A service node will receive certain fee for each service it performs. Node not want to be service node can still receive other node’s advertisement and use the anonymous service, as long as it pays the service fee.

SuperSend Trustless makes heavy use of multisig technology. The sender of the coin will choose randomly 2 middle service nodes from his service node list to help the anonymous transfer. Among the two nodes chosen, one provides mix service, and another provides guarantee service. Why need 2 nodes? Because if there are any disputes between sender and mixer, it is up to guarantor to make a final judgment and then distribute the fund in the escrow accordingly.

Mixer is the node to mix the coins with his own, and send to destination. It is possible to have multiple mixer nodes, so to further obfuscate the transfer. At the current implementation, we use a single mixer node.

Guarantor is the one who will make the final judgment if any dispute between sender and mixer. If everything goes on well, Guarantor’s job is just to create multisig address and multisig transactions. It will not be involved in the signing processes of the multisig transactions in normal cases. But if there are disputes, the Guarantor will decide, based on the facts of the existing transactions, the outcome of escrow distribution. Of course, Guarantor cannot decide alone, he has to coordinate with another party (see below for the signing of multisig transactions).

We use a 2-of-3 multisig address for escrow. What is a 2-of-3 multisig address? It is an address that is created based on 3 public keys, each from Sender, Mixer and Guarantor, respectively. Remember, Sender, Mixer and Guarantor each hold the corresponding private key of the public key. Anyone is free to deposit coins to the 2-of-3 address. But in order to spend any fund from the address (i.e. send to another address), the transaction needs to be signed using at least 2 out of 3 private keys. Since the private keys are in different nodes, different nodes must willing to sign the same transaction before it becomes valid. In another words, the coins in that address cannot be spent by anyone alone, at least two of them should agree before the money can be spent.

==

Way too many promises, and too little being done

They will get it right eventually. Have faith.

None of you know for certain what cloakcoin is capable of.

The devs have made promises of anonymity, not specifying the exact method in their whitepaper. I see nothing wrong with this. Maybe they are testing various methods and have not made a concrete decision. Who cares?

What's the point of this thread other than to spread your own fear, uncertainty, and doubt? Everyone in the game should know the risks of this game. But if cloak is able to deliver, then these risks are worth it. If not, the world keeps spinning. If you dont believe in cloak and youre not invested in it, you have nothing to lose so why bother making this thread?  Are you afraid of this coin destroying the coins you're invested in?

This is what makes me think the alt world is truly mad as a hatter. We have a proven WORKING anon that is untraceable and people still keep acting like we are still searching for the holy grail elsewhere.