You can update safely


Yes, that's part of the paper backup purpose.

Corrupted DB, delete it and try again.

At which rate? And what color is Armory's icon? Your block num seems closer to testnet than mainnet (~260k vs ~320k). At any rate, you are way behind. Let Armory sync fully then you'll be able to see your balance.

Green figure in the bottom right corner

I see what you mean, I'll get add it but you'll have to wait for the next release to enjoy it.

Is Armory online? What top block is it displaying?

In this case there is a TxIn that redeems your 1BTC UTXO. A 0.9 UTXO is created on the change address. The net effect on your balance is -0.1 BTC, but the change address is oblivious to the spent amount, it only knows its new 0.9 UTXO.

Look at the funding transaction you say is different in amount. Double click on it and look at the change address and its funding, then compare that to your wallet address ledger.

You dont see change amounts. You only see how much was taken out of your balance, not how much was returned.

Busy with new wallets and backend overhaul. Can't integrate Trezor until the new wallets are ready, because Trezor requires BIP32. Once that's done, we'll support Trezor, which is frankly trivial from what I've seen of their code base.

Armory chains addresses through a multiplier based on the wallet's chaincode and the previous public key. If an attacker reveals a public key + chaincode, all public keys beyond that point can be calculated. If an attacker reveals a private key + chaincode, he can compute private and public keys past that point. This calculation cannot be reversed however so keys before the revealed entry are still safe.

The chaincode is considered a non critical part of the wallet, as WOs need it to extend their public chain. Before you ask, there is no option to encrypt public chains in current Armory wallets, and there are plans to allow users to encrypt public portion of wallets. Still discussing the implementation of this feature inhouse so I can't tell you more yet.

I haven't personally worked with BIP32 yet (ima have to soon, but im busy with other stuff atm). If I recall right however, BIP32 derives its chain from its master private/public key and the address entry's chain index. Thus revealing one BIP32 private/public address will not allow the attacker to compute any other element on the chain. Obviously, revealing the master component is a no no regardless of the wallet implementation.

Yeah ima need the full log.

You shouldn't try to build the Python packages, you should be looking for the prebuilt binaries for your distro.

Lavender:

First of all your wallet is has private keys and no encryption. I suggest you create a proper WO wallet before you move any funds there.

Next, create a ticket and post your armorycpplog.txt:

https://bitcoinarmory.com/support

delete the content of ~/.armory/databases.

Then start Armory with this flag:

--dbdir=/home/*myusername*/.armory/databases

I was under the impression he was talking about the addresses he found empty. There is also sort of a denial of service attack associated with spending dust.

Let me stress that you should listen to my advice and move your coins to a proper WO wallet. You should create that new wallet on an offline machine as well. Can't you put some old parts together to get something to boot a live Linux?

ForgottenPassword put you in the right direction for the download. Once you have downloaded 0.92.1, let it do its thing, and you should soon be able to witness your actual balance.

As for the satoshis you received, this is called dust. The main purpose is to link your addresses together and reveal your wallet's structure. The attack is undiscriminated so you shouldn't feel directly targeted. It is easily mitigated: don't consume the dust UTXOs and avoid address reuse.

So I wake up this morning to find bissell's ticket on the support channel, with his log file. Let's say there is a lot of pebkac going on here, but so far it seems under control.

I can't tell you a thing without seeing a log file.

In Armory's datadir folder, you'll find armorylog.txt and armorycpplog.txt. Post both of these.

The default datadir can be found here:

Windows -> C:\Users\*myusername*\AppData\Roaming\Armory
Linux -> ~/.armory
OSX -> ask Doug, I got no idea

That's a possibility, but unlikely. Unless he stopped using his original online machine and started using a second machine to extend the chain past the first 100 pre-computed addresses, he would not have an off sync WO chain on the first machine.

Still, looking at single address balance on Blockchain.info is not conclusive. BC.i is completely oblivious to the wallet's structure.

I'm still waiting for a log file to pronounce anything, but since he mentioned Armory crashed while syncing, it is very likely he isn't seeing his wallet's valid balance, nor which addresses have UTXOs, thus possibly researching addresses on BC.i that he depleted a while ago.

Signing a raw tx created from bitcoind with Armory will be tricky. There is no UI functionality that allows that currently. Armory will require the header and eof marker to read the transaction, as well as the supporting UTXO to verify the balance spent and avoid change disaster.

On the other hand, you can recover the signed raw Tx through Armory's UI to broadcast it from bitcoind.