It consumes less electricity. Miners or delegates or validators or whatever will expend resources only to the extent justified by transaction processing profit margin, which delegates in DPoS will also do. In fact DPoS may well have high profit margins because the number of delegates is fixed, making it a closed market. So perhaps less electricity, but if so then more resources expended on something else (politics most likely). (This assumes that the coin distribution phase of Bitcoin is over or insignificant, which must be done to meaningfully compare with DPoS since DPoS is incapable of distributing coins at all.) Thus as I pointed out in 2013, a very high incentive exists to centralize mining, because transactions fees are a Tragedy of the Commons. We keep coming back to the research I did in 2013. I had already figured all this stuff out back then. I had even pointed out the block size issue back in 2013, which is now the raging problem today with BitcoinXT alias GavinCoin. Since I already argued that one can't mine with lower economies-of-scale without losing hash rate share over time I don't agree with your argument that your argument is conclusive. You need to show that economies of scale are net positive at the economically relevant scale, which depends greatly on many undetermined factors. I don't understand why you argue that economies-of-scale could be anything other than net positive at increasing scale? Afaics, the only way that wouldn't be true is if mining is not profitable any scale (which is what I hope to achieve in my design). Also how will you compete as a miner against a increasingly globalized government cooperation which will spend up to 17-18% of the global economy perpetually (the Laffer limit for taxation) to insure it can tax the crypto-currency economy? The government can subsidize miners who comply with demands to censor transactions which do not have KYC, so that they government is not rendered extinct by tax avoidance. Besides the government can leverage up that 17% homeostatic rate of healthy taxation by using regulation of ISPs. |
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I had gone into elaborate analysis as to why proof-of-stake and reputation based systems are inherently centralizing. Proof-of-work has the potential be an unbounded entropy (i.e. effectively random and not gameable) up to 25 - 51% (25 - 33% for selfish mining) concentrated control of the hash rate. That is where I agree with smooth's caveat, except if permission-less commerce is the goal even that caveat has another caveat which is you've still got to find sufficient hash rate to push your transaction through without KYC if 51% of the hash rate is regulated for KYC. It is time to squash Proof-of-Stake once and for all. It can NEVER remain decentralized. Satoshi's Proof-of-Work is the only known solution to the Byzantine General's Problem (was a known unsolved problem since at least the 1970s). Apologies I've been busy and hadn't had time to squash bytemaster's latest N.A.O.D. (nonsense algorithm of the day). First of all, he never was able to address the issues I raised about Transactions as Proof-of-Stake quoted as follows. This proposal appears to be flawed, unless I am missing something. I have only read the first 4 pages thus far. 1. You propose to decrease the coin rewards as coin-days-destroyed volume increases, so this makes it less costly for an attacker to obtain > 50% of the hash rate assuming the attacker includes all the transactions. You apparently are attempting to imply there is no useful attack to do if the attacker is including the most coin-days-destroyed? Please confirm or deny then I will dig into more analysis of this vector. 2. Also how do you choose between someone who generates a proof-of-work hash with lower coin-days-destroyed several times sooner than the network propagation delay versus another who generates it that much delayed with a higher coin-days-destroyed? If you choose the latter, then you've killed the proof-of-work incentive because it means it will always pay to be later and wait for more transactions to arrive. 3. You claim to defeat my Transactions Withholding Attack, by blacklisting those who send blocks with transactions that were not recently seen by all miners. I retorted against this recently. This centralizes the network (all for one and one for all outcome) by requiring every miner to be responsible for the incoming network connectivity of other miners. And it centralizes the network in other ways, such it can't tolerate a temporary partitioning of the network due to connectivity outages. P.S. By coin-days-destroyed, I assume you mean coin value x days, otherwise you would motivate proliferation of dust. The most significant flaw of any proof-of-stake system and any system that diminishes coin rewards, is it can't distribute currency from the hoarders to the users of the currency, thus it will end up with the hoarders (the banksters) accumulating all the coin and the currency usage dying.
This is because the wealthy spend a much lower % of their net worth than the masses do.
[snip]
Whereas those who actually mine are proactively using their time, ingenuity, initiative and capital to secure the network, thus it seems more capitalistic they should receive the redistribution from the hoarders. Besides it may beis the only viableplausible way to secure the public ledger.
The other attacks you describe all derive from the fundamental reason I declared all non-proof-of-work systems to be insecure back in April.
My logic was mathematically fundamental. The input entropy set is quite deterministic and well known and thus can be preimaged. For example, accumulating a lot of coin-days-destroyed and then targeting them in clever ways to subvert the security.
The randomness (entropy) of each proof-of-work is fundamental and mathematical and it can not be preimaged. It can only be surely defeated with > 50% of the network hash rate. Note I recently offered what I believe to a solution to the selfish-mining attack (the one at hackingdistributed.com that claims 25 - 35% attack).
I am skeptical that you can characterize all possible attack vectors of proof-of-stake in one coherent mathematical proof. Thus you will not know formally what the security is; instead a list of adhoc attacks and counter-measures.
[snip]
Edit: Perhaps coin-days-destroyed in some attack vectors motivates not transacting for long periods of time.
The bottom line is that no proof-of-stake system can ever remain decentralized. They all will require some sort of delegation of reputation to achieve consensus. I would have to go through a laundry list of examples to cover all the cases. For example, in Transactions as Proof-of-Stake it is required to delegate trust of propagation to the other nodes as I explained above. Thus there needs to be some reputation system to enforce this, e.g. blacklisting, whitelisting, etc.. All the other proof-of-stake systems have a requirement for some form of delegated reputation. I have many times explained to bytemaster and others the fundamental problem is that any system that attempts to replace proof-of-work will rely on some form of reputation, and reputation is centralization. And centralization is precisely what decentralized crypto-currency is not supposed to be because centralization will always end up control and manipulated (i.e. it is a fiat system). Trust is orthogonal to reputation and centralization. I can trust Proof-of-Work, which is decentralized trust without reputation. Reputation isn't needed in Proof-of-Work, because the input entropy is fresh (can't be preimaged) on every new TB.
You can 75% attack it if you like, but your nodes wont have any trust, so that block chain will just be ignored.
(In any non-Proof-of-Work design, ) It is mathematically impossible for there to be external consensus trust of the honest chain if the dishonest chain is controlled by more than 51% of the peers. We've covered some of the scenarios upthread, and it always boils down to that the external viewers can not know who to trust except by trusting the majority of peers. The only mathematical way around this is to centralize the network, by placing more trust in some peers than others over time. Indeed long-term reputation is a mathematically viable alternative to Proof-of-Work. This is centralization. There are tradeoffs. So this is not "7 billion individually watching the network", but rather a fewer # of peers with reputation being trusted. This is just the political power vacuum all over again with its contingent problems of vested interests Olsen power scramble: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=226033 ( No Money Exists Without the Majority) Notwithstanding the above, any non-Proof-of-Work system can be attacked with much less than 51% of the peers, due to the fact that the input entropy is preimageable, as I explained upthread. Again the only way to work around this is to trust some established peers to guard against this. Financial transactions must be recorded in a public or private ledger trusted by both the spender and the recipient, otherwise funds could be unspent or double-spent to a plurality of recipients. To provide a ledger that can't be captured, Satoshi described a proof-of-work (PoW) scheme where transaction peers communicating over the network compete to be the first to solve a computational puzzle which is unique for each block of transactions added to a public ledger. The security of this ledger against double-spends has three (3) essential requirements.
1. The computational puzzle can't be preimaged, i.e. nothing can be known about solving the puzzle until the prior block's puzzle is solved.
2. Without at least 50% of the aggregate computational power of all transaction peers, it is not possible to create a modified chain of blocks starting from any present or past block, which would contain more blocks than the block chain controlled by the remaining cooperating peers. Thus the longer chain is trusted.
3. The block chain is cryptographically linked in forward order, such that the historical proof-of-work and transactions can be independently verified at any time in the future. Thus the transaction peers may leave and rejoin the network at will without need for a trusted centralized storage.
Note security point #1 eliminates from consideration PoW schemes in which the puzzle is some real-world computational work because the puzzles are known a priori and are thus pre-imageable. Non-PoW voting and membership schemes disqualify because the ordering of designation of authority (to decide which transactions are in each block) to transaction peers is pre-imageable, or requires peers trusted by reputation which is centralizing on a slippery slope towards Olsen capture.
You must also consider the negative impacts of design features when you state the positive impacts.
Reputation has many downsides:
a. It can be stolen, e.g. threaten first to extort private key, then kill, and keep key.
b. Censorship based on metadata which doesn't always correlate rationally.
c. Discriminate against early adopters out of jealously, i.e. retribution for #b.
d. Regulatory authorities can require the BitName same as they now do Social Security # and Id. They can now establish the BitName is real, because it has (duration) reputation.
The high cost to transfer or revoke a name also has many downsides, e.g. see #d.
I thinking the pool operator (server) does so little relative to work of the pool miners that it doesn't need to charge a very high fee. Thus there isn't much ability (incentive for pool miners) to undercut competitors based on fee.
So there just needs to be a slightest incentive to encourage pool miners to seek out another pool as a pool grows large. This will encourage a poliferation of pools.
How do pool miners know that a pool server isn't cheating them by paying some of the earnings to themselves pretending to be a pool miner?
Go down that line of thought and you will discover what I am thinking.
The only way you can prove a pool isn't cheating is by estimating the hash rate of the pool and comparing it to the number of blocks found. Unfortunately, you could probably still skim a couple of a percent this way. Modern protocols (GBT & Stratum) both have the full coinbase transaction visible to the miners, meaning you can verify that the block being built will be paid to a certain address or has a certain message encoded in the block that identifies the pool. This allows you to audit if the pool is trying to skim blocks if certain users start seeing work without a coinbase message that identifies the pool. In the case of BTC Guild, it's both, they always pay to the same address and always include "Mined by BTC Guild" in the coinbase message. It's not no-trust, but all it would take is a few % of users monitoring this to determine if a pool was trying to skim blocks by sending a certain % of work that doesn't include identifying marks. How could anything less than 100% of the pool miners know if some of the coinbase transactions were to addresses not owned by pool miners who contributed shares? Since you can never know if you are the 100% (because mining pool shares* are not recorded in the block chain), thus seems to me there is no way to verify if there is skimming or not, as bytemaster and I wrote. *For those who don't know the terminology, a pool share is a proof-of-work hash below some threshold that is easier than the current network difficulty. It might also be a block solution. Why don't you just use P2Pool? Is there any reason?
I was waiting for bytemaster to answer because I wanted to know his thoughts. Seems to me that you have no way to stop the Share Withholding Attack since it is decentralized. And every peer has to run more of a full client if I am not mistake. And there is a lot more overhead I believe. And perhaps also much less resistance against denial-of-service flooding. Frankly I didn't analyze for long enough to be very sure of my initial intuition which is to stay away from it. I know it is generally impossible to enforce reputation on a 100% decentralized system. So I am intuitively skeptical of P2Pool. P.S. I won't have time to go back here and debate. I am technically qualified and I am 100% sure I am correct. |
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Just some short little morsels of non-expertise I (as Anonymint) wrote some year(s) ago. Oh never mind me, I am just a grandstanding idiot whose only value in life is self-aggrandizing ego who craves attention and am otherwise a useless blob of flesh unlike the others here who are so productive. It is time to squash Proof-of-Stake once and for all. It can NEVER remain decentralized. Satoshi's Proof-of-Work is the only known solution to the Byzantine General's Problem (was a known unsolved problem since at least the 1970s). Apologies I've been busy and hadn't had time to squash bytemaster's latest N.A.O.D. (nonsense algorithm of the day). First of all, he never was able to address the issues I raised about Transactions as Proof-of-Stake quoted as follows. This proposal appears to be flawed, unless I am missing something. I have only read the first 4 pages thus far. 1. You propose to decrease the coin rewards as coin-days-destroyed volume increases, so this makes it less costly for an attacker to obtain > 50% of the hash rate assuming the attacker includes all the transactions. You apparently are attempting to imply there is no useful attack to do if the attacker is including the most coin-days-destroyed? Please confirm or deny then I will dig into more analysis of this vector. 2. Also how do you choose between someone who generates a proof-of-work hash with lower coin-days-destroyed several times sooner than the network propagation delay versus another who generates it that much delayed with a higher coin-days-destroyed? If you choose the latter, then you've killed the proof-of-work incentive because it means it will always pay to be later and wait for more transactions to arrive. 3. You claim to defeat my Transactions Withholding Attack, by blacklisting those who send blocks with transactions that were not recently seen by all miners. I retorted against this recently. This centralizes the network (all for one and one for all outcome) by requiring every miner to be responsible for the incoming network connectivity of other miners. And it centralizes the network in other ways, such it can't tolerate a temporary partitioning of the network due to connectivity outages. P.S. By coin-days-destroyed, I assume you mean coin value x days, otherwise you would motivate proliferation of dust. The most significant flaw of any proof-of-stake system and any system that diminishes coin rewards, is it can't distribute currency from the hoarders to the users of the currency, thus it will end up with the hoarders (the banksters) accumulating all the coin and the currency usage dying.
This is because the wealthy spend a much lower % of their net worth than the masses do.
[snip]
Whereas those who actually mine are proactively using their time, ingenuity, initiative and capital to secure the network, thus it seems more capitalistic they should receive the redistribution from the hoarders. Besides it may beis the only viableplausible way to secure the public ledger.
The other attacks you describe all derive from the fundamental reason I declared all non-proof-of-work systems to be insecure back in April.
My logic was mathematically fundamental. The input entropy set is quite deterministic and well known and thus can be preimaged. For example, accumulating a lot of coin-days-destroyed and then targeting them in clever ways to subvert the security.
The randomness (entropy) of each proof-of-work is fundamental and mathematical and it can not be preimaged. It can only be surely defeated with > 50% of the network hash rate. Note I recently offered what I believe to a solution to the selfish-mining attack (the one at hackingdistributed.com that claims 25 - 35% attack).
I am skeptical that you can characterize all possible attack vectors of proof-of-stake in one coherent mathematical proof. Thus you will not know formally what the security is; instead a list of adhoc attacks and counter-measures.
[snip]
Edit: Perhaps coin-days-destroyed in some attack vectors motivates not transacting for long periods of time.
The bottom line is that no proof-of-stake system can ever remain decentralized. They all will require some sort of delegation of reputation to achieve consensus. I would have to go through a laundry list of examples to cover all the cases. For example, in Transactions as Proof-of-Stake it is required to delegate trust of propagation to the other nodes as I explained above. Thus there needs to be some reputation system to enforce this, e.g. blacklisting, whitelisting, etc.. All the other proof-of-stake systems have a requirement for some form of delegated reputation. I have many times explained to bytemaster and others the fundamental problem is that any system that attempts to replace proof-of-work will rely on some form of reputation, and reputation is centralization. And centralization is precisely what decentralized crypto-currency is not supposed to be because centralization will always end up control and manipulated (i.e. it is a fiat system). Trust is orthogonal to reputation and centralization. I can trust Proof-of-Work, which is decentralized trust without reputation. Reputation isn't needed in Proof-of-Work, because the input entropy is fresh (can't be preimaged) on every new TB.
You can 75% attack it if you like, but your nodes wont have any trust, so that block chain will just be ignored.
(In any non-Proof-of-Work design, ) It is mathematically impossible for there to be external consensus trust of the honest chain if the dishonest chain is controlled by more than 51% of the peers. We've covered some of the scenarios upthread, and it always boils down to that the external viewers can not know who to trust except by trusting the majority of peers. The only mathematical way around this is to centralize the network, by placing more trust in some peers than others over time. Indeed long-term reputation is a mathematically viable alternative to Proof-of-Work. This is centralization. There are tradeoffs. So this is not "7 billion individually watching the network", but rather a fewer # of peers with reputation being trusted. This is just the political power vacuum all over again with its contingent problems of vested interests Olsen power scramble: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=226033 ( No Money Exists Without the Majority) Notwithstanding the above, any non-Proof-of-Work system can be attacked with much less than 51% of the peers, due to the fact that the input entropy is preimageable, as I explained upthread. Again the only way to work around this is to trust some established peers to guard against this. Financial transactions must be recorded in a public or private ledger trusted by both the spender and the recipient, otherwise funds could be unspent or double-spent to a plurality of recipients. To provide a ledger that can't be captured, Satoshi described a proof-of-work (PoW) scheme where transaction peers communicating over the network compete to be the first to solve a computational puzzle which is unique for each block of transactions added to a public ledger. The security of this ledger against double-spends has three (3) essential requirements.
1. The computational puzzle can't be preimaged, i.e. nothing can be known about solving the puzzle until the prior block's puzzle is solved.
2. Without at least 50% of the aggregate computational power of all transaction peers, it is not possible to create a modified chain of blocks starting from any present or past block, which would contain more blocks than the block chain controlled by the remaining cooperating peers. Thus the longer chain is trusted.
3. The block chain is cryptographically linked in forward order, such that the historical proof-of-work and transactions can be independently verified at any time in the future. Thus the transaction peers may leave and rejoin the network at will without need for a trusted centralized storage.
Note security point #1 eliminates from consideration PoW schemes in which the puzzle is some real-world computational work because the puzzles are known a priori and are thus pre-imageable. Non-PoW voting and membership schemes disqualify because the ordering of designation of authority (to decide which transactions are in each block) to transaction peers is pre-imageable, or requires peers trusted by reputation which is centralizing on a slippery slope towards Olsen capture.
You must also consider the negative impacts of design features when you state the positive impacts.
Reputation has many downsides:
a. It can be stolen, e.g. threaten first to extort private key, then kill, and keep key.
b. Censorship based on metadata which doesn't always correlate rationally.
c. Discriminate against early adopters out of jealously, i.e. retribution for #b.
d. Regulatory authorities can require the BitName same as they now do Social Security # and Id. They can now establish the BitName is real, because it has (duration) reputation.
The high cost to transfer or revoke a name also has many downsides, e.g. see #d.
I thinking the pool operator (server) does so little relative to work of the pool miners that it doesn't need to charge a very high fee. Thus there isn't much ability (incentive for pool miners) to undercut competitors based on fee.
So there just needs to be a slightest incentive to encourage pool miners to seek out another pool as a pool grows large. This will encourage a poliferation of pools.
How do pool miners know that a pool server isn't cheating them by paying some of the earnings to themselves pretending to be a pool miner?
Go down that line of thought and you will discover what I am thinking.
The only way you can prove a pool isn't cheating is by estimating the hash rate of the pool and comparing it to the number of blocks found. Unfortunately, you could probably still skim a couple of a percent this way. Modern protocols (GBT & Stratum) both have the full coinbase transaction visible to the miners, meaning you can verify that the block being built will be paid to a certain address or has a certain message encoded in the block that identifies the pool. This allows you to audit if the pool is trying to skim blocks if certain users start seeing work without a coinbase message that identifies the pool. In the case of BTC Guild, it's both, they always pay to the same address and always include "Mined by BTC Guild" in the coinbase message. It's not no-trust, but all it would take is a few % of users monitoring this to determine if a pool was trying to skim blocks by sending a certain % of work that doesn't include identifying marks. How could anything less than 100% of the pool miners know if some of the coinbase transactions were to addresses not owned by pool miners who contributed shares? Since you can never know if you are the 100% (because mining pool shares* are not recorded in the block chain), thus seems to me there is no way to verify if there is skimming or not, as bytemaster and I wrote. *For those who don't know the terminology, a pool share is a proof-of-work hash below some threshold that is easier than the current network difficulty. It might also be a block solution. Why don't you just use P2Pool? Is there any reason?
I was waiting for bytemaster to answer because I wanted to know his thoughts. Seems to me that you have no way to stop the Share Withholding Attack since it is decentralized. And every peer has to run more of a full client if I am not mistake. And there is a lot more overhead I believe. And perhaps also much less resistance against denial-of-service flooding. Frankly I didn't analyze for long enough to be very sure of my initial intuition which is to stay away from it. I know it is generally impossible to enforce reputation on a 100% decentralized system. So I am intuitively skeptical of P2Pool. P.S. I won't have time to go back here and debate. I am technically qualified and I am 100% sure I am correct. |
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TooDumbForBitcoin
Well at least you got that part right. Lol. Losers. Any more "me toos" from the monkey cheerleading section of the auditorium? Does anyone have to wonder why the West is about to collapse economically? Rewarding failure. Disrespect for expertise. Ego instead of rolling up the sleeves together. Appeal to authority. Obstructing productive people out of spite and jealously. Lack of even the basic human decency and empathy towards serious disabilities. Etc.. You probably throw you own mother under the bus to get your daily fix. |
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As the baboons pile on, I want to help reinforce their Neanderthal chest thumbing claim that I demonstrated no expertise and have no expert reputation. Something random I just stumbled across while refreshing my memory on Bitshares' DPoS (for a debate smooth, r0ach, and I are having else where). It is time to squash Proof-of-Stake once and for all. It can NEVER remain decentralized. Satoshi's Proof-of-Work is the only known solution to the Byzantine General's Problem (was a known unsolved problem since at least the 1970s). Apologies I've been busy and hadn't had time to squash bytemaster's latest N.A.O.D. (nonsense algorithm of the day). First of all, he never was able to address the issues I raised about Transactions as Proof-of-Stake quoted as follows. This proposal appears to be flawed, unless I am missing something. I have only read the first 4 pages thus far. 1. You propose to decrease the coin rewards as coin-days-destroyed volume increases, so this makes it less costly for an attacker to obtain > 50% of the hash rate assuming the attacker includes all the transactions. You apparently are attempting to imply there is no useful attack to do if the attacker is including the most coin-days-destroyed? Please confirm or deny then I will dig into more analysis of this vector. 2. Also how do you choose between someone who generates a proof-of-work hash with lower coin-days-destroyed several times sooner than the network propagation delay versus another who generates it that much delayed with a higher coin-days-destroyed? If you choose the latter, then you've killed the proof-of-work incentive because it means it will always pay to be later and wait for more transactions to arrive. 3. You claim to defeat my Transactions Withholding Attack, by blacklisting those who send blocks with transactions that were not recently seen by all miners. I retorted against this recently. This centralizes the network (all for one and one for all outcome) by requiring every miner to be responsible for the incoming network connectivity of other miners. And it centralizes the network in other ways, such it can't tolerate a temporary partitioning of the network due to connectivity outages. P.S. By coin-days-destroyed, I assume you mean coin value x days, otherwise you would motivate proliferation of dust. The most significant flaw of any proof-of-stake system and any system that diminishes coin rewards, is it can't distribute currency from the hoarders to the users of the currency, thus it will end up with the hoarders (the banksters) accumulating all the coin and the currency usage dying.
This is because the wealthy spend a much lower % of their net worth than the masses do.
[snip]
Whereas those who actually mine are proactively using their time, ingenuity, initiative and capital to secure the network, thus it seems more capitalistic they should receive the redistribution from the hoarders. Besides it may beis the only viableplausible way to secure the public ledger.
The other attacks you describe all derive from the fundamental reason I declared all non-proof-of-work systems to be insecure back in April.
My logic was mathematically fundamental. The input entropy set is quite deterministic and well known and thus can be preimaged. For example, accumulating a lot of coin-days-destroyed and then targeting them in clever ways to subvert the security.
The randomness (entropy) of each proof-of-work is fundamental and mathematical and it can not be preimaged. It can only be surely defeated with > 50% of the network hash rate. Note I recently offered what I believe to a solution to the selfish-mining attack (the one at hackingdistributed.com that claims 25 - 35% attack).
I am skeptical that you can characterize all possible attack vectors of proof-of-stake in one coherent mathematical proof. Thus you will not know formally what the security is; instead a list of adhoc attacks and counter-measures.
[snip]
Edit: Perhaps coin-days-destroyed in some attack vectors motivates not transacting for long periods of time.
The bottom line is that no proof-of-stake system can ever remain decentralized. They all will require some sort of delegation of reputation to achieve consensus. I would have to go through a laundry list of examples to cover all the cases. For example, in Transactions as Proof-of-Stake it is required to delegate trust of propagation to the other nodes as I explained above. Thus there needs to be some reputation system to enforce this, e.g. blacklisting, whitelisting, etc.. All the other proof-of-stake systems have a requirement for some form of delegated reputation. I have many times explained to bytemaster and others the fundamental problem is that any system that attempts to replace proof-of-work will rely on some form of reputation, and reputation is centralization. And centralization is precisely what decentralized crypto-currency is not supposed to be because centralization will always end up control and manipulated (i.e. it is a fiat system). Trust is orthogonal to reputation and centralization. I can trust Proof-of-Work, which is decentralized trust without reputation. Reputation isn't needed in Proof-of-Work, because the input entropy is fresh (can't be preimaged) on every new TB.
You can 75% attack it if you like, but your nodes wont have any trust, so that block chain will just be ignored.
(In any non-Proof-of-Work design, ) It is mathematically impossible for there to be external consensus trust of the honest chain if the dishonest chain is controlled by more than 51% of the peers. We've covered some of the scenarios upthread, and it always boils down to that the external viewers can not know who to trust except by trusting the majority of peers. The only mathematical way around this is to centralize the network, by placing more trust in some peers than others over time. Indeed long-term reputation is a mathematically viable alternative to Proof-of-Work. This is centralization. There are tradeoffs. So this is not "7 billion individually watching the network", but rather a fewer # of peers with reputation being trusted. This is just the political power vacuum all over again with its contingent problems of vested interests Olsen power scramble: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=226033 ( No Money Exists Without the Majority) Notwithstanding the above, any non-Proof-of-Work system can be attacked with much less than 51% of the peers, due to the fact that the input entropy is preimageable, as I explained upthread. Again the only way to work around this is to trust some established peers to guard against this. Financial transactions must be recorded in a public or private ledger trusted by both the spender and the recipient, otherwise funds could be unspent or double-spent to a plurality of recipients. To provide a ledger that can't be captured, Satoshi described a proof-of-work (PoW) scheme where transaction peers communicating over the network compete to be the first to solve a computational puzzle which is unique for each block of transactions added to a public ledger. The security of this ledger against double-spends has three (3) essential requirements.
1. The computational puzzle can't be preimaged, i.e. nothing can be known about solving the puzzle until the prior block's puzzle is solved.
2. Without at least 50% of the aggregate computational power of all transaction peers, it is not possible to create a modified chain of blocks starting from any present or past block, which would contain more blocks than the block chain controlled by the remaining cooperating peers. Thus the longer chain is trusted.
3. The block chain is cryptographically linked in forward order, such that the historical proof-of-work and transactions can be independently verified at any time in the future. Thus the transaction peers may leave and rejoin the network at will without need for a trusted centralized storage.
Note security point #1 eliminates from consideration PoW schemes in which the puzzle is some real-world computational work because the puzzles are known a priori and are thus pre-imageable. Non-PoW voting and membership schemes disqualify because the ordering of designation of authority (to decide which transactions are in each block) to transaction peers is pre-imageable, or requires peers trusted by reputation which is centralizing on a slippery slope towards Olsen capture.
You must also consider the negative impacts of design features when you state the positive impacts.
Reputation has many downsides:
a. It can be stolen, e.g. threaten first to extort private key, then kill, and keep key.
b. Censorship based on metadata which doesn't always correlate rationally.
c. Discriminate against early adopters out of jealously, i.e. retribution for #b.
d. Regulatory authorities can require the BitName same as they now do Social Security # and Id. They can now establish the BitName is real, because it has (duration) reputation.
The high cost to transfer or revoke a name also has many downsides, e.g. see #d.
I thinking the pool operator (server) does so little relative to work of the pool miners that it doesn't need to charge a very high fee. Thus there isn't much ability (incentive for pool miners) to undercut competitors based on fee.
So there just needs to be a slightest incentive to encourage pool miners to seek out another pool as a pool grows large. This will encourage a poliferation of pools.
How do pool miners know that a pool server isn't cheating them by paying some of the earnings to themselves pretending to be a pool miner?
Go down that line of thought and you will discover what I am thinking.
The only way you can prove a pool isn't cheating is by estimating the hash rate of the pool and comparing it to the number of blocks found. Unfortunately, you could probably still skim a couple of a percent this way. Modern protocols (GBT & Stratum) both have the full coinbase transaction visible to the miners, meaning you can verify that the block being built will be paid to a certain address or has a certain message encoded in the block that identifies the pool. This allows you to audit if the pool is trying to skim blocks if certain users start seeing work without a coinbase message that identifies the pool. In the case of BTC Guild, it's both, they always pay to the same address and always include "Mined by BTC Guild" in the coinbase message. It's not no-trust, but all it would take is a few % of users monitoring this to determine if a pool was trying to skim blocks by sending a certain % of work that doesn't include identifying marks. How could anything less than 100% of the pool miners know if some of the coinbase transactions were to addresses not owned by pool miners who contributed shares? Since you can never know if you are the 100% (because mining pool shares* are not recorded in the block chain), thus seems to me there is no way to verify if there is skimming or not, as bytemaster and I wrote. *For those who don't know the terminology, a pool share is a proof-of-work hash below some threshold that is easier than the current network difficulty. It might also be a block solution. Why don't you just use P2Pool? Is there any reason?
I was waiting for bytemaster to answer because I wanted to know his thoughts. Seems to me that you have no way to stop the Share Withholding Attack since it is decentralized. And every peer has to run more of a full client if I am not mistake. And there is a lot more overhead I believe. And perhaps also much less resistance against denial-of-service flooding. Frankly I didn't analyze for long enough to be very sure of my initial intuition which is to stay away from it. I know it is generally impossible to enforce reputation on a 100% decentralized system. So I am intuitively skeptical of P2Pool. P.S. I won't have time to go back here and debate. I am technically qualified and I am 100% sure I am correct. |
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I only wish all of you had to go through even 1 month of the past 3 year hell I been going through with M.S.. You have no way to understand the debilitation of the effects until you've experienced it. But I don't want any fucking sympathy. Instead I want to kick your asses.  |
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So the plutocrats WANT governmental default and deflation? Interesting. Never thought of that as a wealth grab. But I suppose it would work. They just need to get rid of any debt they have and loan as much money as possible to people (with the people's houses, land, and future earnings as collateral.) Holy shit. I'm going to pay all my debts ASAP and stack cash. That sound pretty scary. But I still think a default would end up weakening the currency.
Yes. Sorry I was going to get around to responding, but I got bogged down by some crap in the Altcoin discussion thread. 2015.75 is well underway as Brazil was downgraded to junk bond rating: http://www.armstrongeconomics.com/archives/37119 |
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You are going to let me go back to work now?
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haha the baboon betamales are so offended. Who can thump their chest the loudest? Who can cut down Anonymint the most for the tribe?
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Smooth, you've constructed an elaborate strawman. I claim the entire purpose of crypto-currency is a) permission-less commerce and b) decentralized control to prevent gaming the control over the issuance of money (so it can scale globally among other benefits). Since I already argued that one can't mine with lower economies-of-scale without losing hash rate share over time, then the ability to mine or not mine in any specific pool is irrelevant to homeostasis of the case #b. So that leaves us only with #a remaining as it pertains to pools. QED. For his original argument to hold he has to show both that the distribution-of-power outcome is different between delegates in DPoS and pools in "delegatable PoW" and that the DPoS outcome is (in some specified way) preferable.
It consumes less electricity. Fact is that mining will become ever more centralized in Satoshi's design because of the economies-of-scale of ASICs and electrical power. I believe there was maybe even a research paper that proved something along these lines?
The fundamental problem is the mining is done for profit. For as long as that is the case, ASIC farms (or Larry Summers' 21 Inc. economies-of-scale) and subsidized, industrial/government/utility scale electricity will rule.
Also due to bandwidth issues and that every full mining node has to validate every transaction, scaling transaction volume will force centralization.
Also your argument about sacrificing cost is nonsense, because the low cost leader will take hash rate from the others over time by reinvesting higher rates of return.
Edit: Smooth has a valid point if no entity (or collusion of entities) has 51% of the hash rate because then someone could sacrifice mining losses in return for censorship resistant way to post transactions to the block chain. So in that sense, my word "nonsense" is incorrect and I apologize. But the huge glaring flaw is that once the State can regulate 51% of the mining power (which is destined to be centralized), then Smooth's caveat no longer applies. And this is my overriding concern, so that is why I often downplay this caveat that smooth points out.
Edit#2: however if hashrate is very large then smooth's caveat is really pointless because who has enough hash rate to push their transaction onto to the block chain without a pool. And again Satoshi's design doesn't enforce that pools must allow getblocktemplate. If your hashrate is not too small, you can just mine on any pool that offers getblocktemplate and wait a long time until you win a block solution to insert your transaction, or just mine a long time solo. Many could potentially join together to pool their resources to mine at a loss to have ready access to censorship resistance, but unless you are using P2Pool (which can be attacked with share withholding attacks) then the State might target your pool server (but again I think it is easier for them to just target 51% of the hash rate for regulation requiring all transactions to carry KYC, since you might place your server behind an anonymity network although this will be very difficult to do in Satoshi's design because of the bandwidth requirements).
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You've demonstrated jack shit as far as trustless, zero-confirmation txs are concerned, which is about as much as Fuseleer, johnconner, and jl777 have demonstrated as well.
haha. Good betamale. Good boy. You are fitting the profile in spades. It is so damn predictable. |
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Is it unreasonable to label someone as "Warning: Trade with extreme caution!" if they're making ridiculous claims when they've demonstrated nothing.
I have demonstrated 2.5 years of astute analysis on wide ranging topics. I have been working for a long time on these technologies, going back to discussions in 2013 between myself as Anonymint and the author of Decrits, which was one of the early Emunie-like attempts. If by your criteria I am untrustworthy, then you should also mark Fuseleer the author of Emunie with the same warning label, because he is making similar claims. Ditto John Conner. Ditto the author of InstantDEX, etc, etc. If you are really diligent maybe you can drive away every superstar developer from the community and languish with shitcoins forever. P.S. one reason there is less code now, is I was suffering from Multiple Sclerosis and this causes severe Chronic Fatigue that makes it difficult to work. But unfortunately for you, my M.S. is now in remission. Any way, I was eating and reflecting a bit on this charade. It is quite clear what is going on here. It is a well known fact that males organize themselves in a baboon hierarchy[1]. Males will attack any male who claims an alphamale position in order to challenge that claim. It is the natural state of men to cut down every other man to the same level or lower. Alphamales have to literally dominate the other males in order to get them to fall in line. Betamales will only tolerate other men who bow their head. We can see this when walking in the mall, men literally won't move as they walk forward challenging the other men to move first from their direction. I wasn't making my thread to challenge the egos of the betamales. I was trying to gain some community-wide synergies by getting some feedback on the name choice and also to perhaps maybe interest some other developers to help me code it. Clearly what has happened is I have set off the normal baboon mode of betamales. How naive of me. I have to accept this is the way males organize and it will never change. The only way to deal with this of course is via action. On that note, I need to add another TODO to my long list of projects I'd like to implement, which will include implementing decentralized forums and discussion sites to replace forums like this one and Reddit. So that we can end this corrupt betamale baboob barbaric corruption that is going on. Power corrupts. I shouldn't even give myself any centralized power. Because surely I too would be corrupted, just as Smoothie has been corrupted by the centralized power he was entrusted. [1] http://esr.ibiblio.org/?p=1404Ego is for little people Posted on 2009-11-09 by Eric Raymond When I got really famous and started to hang out with people at the top of the game in computer science and other fields, one of the first things I noticed is that the real A-list types almost never have a major territorial/ego thing going on in their behavior. The B-list people, the bright second-raters, may be all sharp elbows and ego assertion, but there’s a calm space at the top that the absolutely most capable ones get to and tend to stay in. I’m going to be specific about what I mean by “ego” now, because otherwise much of this essay may seem vague or wrongheaded. I specifically mean psychologial egotism, not (for example) ethical egoism as a philosophical position. The main indicators of egotism as I intend it here are are loud self-display, insecurity, constant approval-seeking, overinflating one’s accomplishments, touchiness about slights, and territorial twitchiness about one’s expertise. My claim is that egotism is a disease of the incapable, and vanishes or nearly vanishes among the super-capable. It’s not only scientific fields where this is true. For various reasons (none of which, fortunately, have been legal troubles of my own) I’ve had to work with a lot of lawyers. I’m legally literate, so a pattern I quickly noticed is this: the B-list lawyers are the ones who get all huffy about a non-attorney expressing opinions and judgments about the law. The one time I worked with a stratospherically supercompetent A-list firm (I won’t name them, but I will note they have their own skyscraper in New York City) they were so relaxed about recognizing capability in a non-lawyer that some language I wrote went straight into their court filings in a lawsuit with multibillion-dollar stakes. This sort of thing has been noted before by other people and is almost a commonplace. I’m bringing it up to note why that’s true, speaking from my own experience. It’s not that people at the top of their fields are more virtuous. Well…actually I think people at the top of their fields do tend to be more virtuous, for the same reason they tend to be be more intelligent, less neurotic, longer-lived, better-looking, and physically healthier than the B-listers and below. Human capability does not come in nearly divisible chunks; almost every individual way that humans can excel is tangled up with other ways at a purely physiological level, with immune-system capability lurking behind a surprisingly large chunk of the surface measures. But I don’t think the mean difference in “virtue”, however you think that can actually be defined, explains what I’m pointing at. No. It’s more that ego games have a diminishing return. The farther you are up the ability and achievement bell curve, the less psychological gain you get from asserting or demonstrating your superiority over the merely average, and the more prone you are to welcome discovering new peers because there are so damn few of them that it gets lonely. There comes a point past which winning more ego contests becomes so pointless that even the most ambitious, suspicious, external-validation-fixated strivers tend to notice that it’s no fun any more and stop. I’m not speaking abstractly here. I’ve always been more interested in doing the right thing than doing what would make me popular, to the point where I generally figure that if I’m not routinely pissing off a sizable minority of people I should be pushing harder. In the language of psychology, my need for external validation is low; the standards I try hardest to live up to are those I’ve set for myself. But one of the differences I can see between myself at 25 and myself at 52 is that my limited need for external validation has decreased. And it’s not age or maturity or virtue that shrunk it; it’s having nothing left to prove. I’m going to use myself as an example now, mainly because I don’t know anyone else’s story well enough to make the point I want to with it. I’m the crippled kid who became a black-belt martial artist and teacher of martial artists. I’ve made the New York Times bestseller list as a writer. You can hardly use a browser, a cellphone, or a game console without relying on my code. I’ve been a session musician on two records. I’ve blown up the software industry once, reinvented the hacker culture twice, and am without doubt one of the dozen most famous geeks alive. Investment bankers pay me $300 an hour to yak at them because I have a track record as a shrewd business analyst. I don’t even have a BS, yet there’s been an entire academic cottage industry devoted to writing exegeses of my work. I could do nothing but speaking tours for the rest of my life and still be overbooked. Earnest people have struggled their whole lives to change the world less than I routinely do when I’m not even really trying. Here’s the point: In what way would it make sense for me to be in ego or status competition with anybody? And yet, there are people out there who are going to read the previous paragraph and think “Oh, that’s Eric’s ego again. The blowhard.” I’ve had a lot of time to get used to such reactions over the last decade, but it’s still hard for me not to collapse in helpless laughter at the implied degree of Not Getting It. Now (limiting myself to a small random sample of the A-listers I’ve actually met and taken the measure of) Alan Kay or Terry Pratchett or David Friedman or Freeman Dyson…they would understand why I was laughing. Because real A-listers are sui generis, and usually polymaths; they tend to have constellations of talent so extreme and idiosyncratic that they couldn’t even really be in ego competition with each other, let alone with those much less capable. That’s supposing they wanted to be. And generally they don’t want to be. If you’re the kind of person who can make it to the top even in a single field (law or CS or whatever) you may not have started out with better things to do than compete for attention and glory, but by the time you make the A-list you’ve almost certainly discovered subtler games to play that are much more fun. You’ll maintain a reputation because a reputation is a useful tool, but it’s not the point any more. If it ever was. In my experience this is even more true of polymaths, possibly because their self-images as competent people.have broader and more stable bases. I think there are a couple of different reasons people tend to falsely attribute pathological, oversensitive egos to A-listers. Each reason is in its own way worth taking a look at. The first and most obvious reason is projection. “Wow, if I were as talented as Terry Pratchett, I know I’d have a huge ego about it, so I guess he must.” Heh. Trust me on this; he doesn’t. This kind of thinking reveals a a lot about somebody’s ego and insecurity, alright, but not Terry’s. There’s a flip side to projection that I think of as the “Asimov game”. I met Isaac Asimov just a few months before he died. Isaac had long been notorious for broadly egotistical behavior and a kind of cheerful bombast that got up a lot of peoples’ noses. But if you ever met him, and you were at all perceptive, you might see that it was all a sort of joke. Isaac was laughing inside at everyone who took his “egotism” seriously – and, at the same time, watching hungrily for people who could see through the self-parody, because they might – might – actually be among the vanishingly tiny minority that constituted his actual peers. The Asimov game is a constant temptation to extroverted A-listers; I’ve been known to fall into it myself. It’s not really anybody’s fault that a lot of people are fooled by it. Another confusing fact is that though A-listers may not be about ego or status competition, they will often play such games ruthlessly and effectively when that gets them something they actually want. The something might be more money from a gig, or a night in the hay with an attractive wench, or whatever; the point is, if you catch an A-lister in that mode, you might well mistake for egotism some kinds of display behavior that actually serve much more immediate and instrumental purposes. Your typical A-lister in that situation (and this includes me, now) is blithely unconcerned that a bystander might think he’s egotistical; the money or the wench or the whatever is the goal, not the approval or disapproval of bystanders. Finally, a lot of people confuse arrogance with ego. A-listers (and I am including myself, again, this time) are, as a rule, colossally arrogant. That is, they have utter confidence in their ability to meet challenges that would humble or break most people. Do not be fooled by the self-deprecating manner that many A-listers cultivate; it is a mask adopted for social purposes, mostly to avoid freaking out the normal monkeys. But this arrogance is not the same as egotism; in fact, in many ways it is the opposite. It is possible to be arrogant about one’s abilities compared to the statistically average human being and the range of challenges one is likely to encounter, but deeply and genuinely humble when dealing with peers or contemplating the vastness of one’s own ignorance and incapability relative to what one could imagine being. In fact, this combination of attitudes is completely typical of the A-listers I have known. The behaviors most people think of as “egotism” tend to be driven out by arrogance rather than motivated by it. If you really believe bone-deep that you are superior, you don’t act insecure and twitchy and approval-seeking, because you just aren’t! Arrogance doesn’t even have to be justified to drive out egotism – it just has to be there. It’s all the more powerful an egotism-banisher when the arrogance is actually well-justified by the A-lister’s track record. Thus, egotists are usually people who have not yet established their capability to themselves, or who had that confidence in the past but are beginning to doubt it. Finally, I think a lot of people need to believe that A-listers invariably have flaws in proportion to their capabilities in order not to feel dwarfed by them. Thus the widely cherished belief that geniuses are commonly mentally unstable; it’s not true (admissions to mental hospitals per thousand drop with increasing IQ and in professions that select for intelligence, with the lowest numbers among mathematicians and theoretical physicists) but if you don’t happen to be a genius yourself it’s very comforting. Similarly, a dullard who believes A-listers are all flaky temperamental egotists can console himself that, though he may not be smarter than them, he is better. And so it goes. Ego is for little people. I wish I could finish by saying something anodyne about how we’re all little when you come down to it, but I’d be fibbing. Yeah, we’re all little compared to a supernova, but that’s beside the point. And yeah, the most capable people in the world are routinely humbled by what they don’t know and can’t do, but that is beside the point too. If you look at how humans relate to other humans – and in particular, how they manage self-image and “ego” and evaluate their status with respect to others…it really is different near the top end of the human capability range. Better. Calmer. Sorry, but it’ s true. |
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Attack-free and instant zero confirmation txs? Sounds like bs to me. And it's not labeling you as a scammer, it's labeling you as untrustworthy. If you promise the moon and demonstrate nothing, then you're probably untrustworthy. If you promise the moon and hold an ICO before releasing any code, then you're probably a scammer.
How is stating that I am working on those features make me untrustworthy? I even said I would publish some code soon. What justification would one have for putting a message on someone's profile " Warning: Trade with extreme caution!" if that person is not even trading. Rather just stating that he is coding something and asking for feedback on the name and possible interest from other developers who might want to help code it. kemosabe, please enlighten me on your barbaric Bitcoin culture? (why so slow to reply kemosabe? Cat lose his tongue?) |
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I can call people funny mexican food-based insults.
I don't find it humorous. I feel you are picking a fight with me. I do not feel you are trying to be cordial or even civil. If you make outlandish claims without backing them up (with code), why is it unreasonable for senior members of the forum to mark you as untrustworthy?
Stating that I am working on something justifies labeling me as a scammer? That is an attack. Did I launch a coin? Did I sell coins to the public? Did I do anything which could justify attacking me? You see you don't have a basic level of civility. And you wonder why the mainstream looks at Bitcoin as a wild west of baboons and they are afraid to use it! And here we are professing that we want to stop corruption by centralization and then you appeal to authority. Aren't we supposed to despise arguments that appeal to authority? You guys are so fucking confused, you probably can't even tie your shoe laces much less find your way out of a wet paper bag. And that is why Crypto is stuck in the slow lane. You need a leader because you are clueless. Any more imbeciles that want to test their debate skills against me? |
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Smoothie, I am going to put it to you a different way and I hope you can understand. My father (same name as myself) is a very powerful attorney. He was the former West Coast Division head attorney running the entire Alaska operation for Exxon. He rose up higher than that being a general counsel for THUMS the consortium of the oil companies.
Remove the slander or you may find yourself in a lawsuit that could be very damaging to your financial well being.
...
Lol what a fucking douchetaco. Watch out Smoothie, he's gonna call his dad on you. Don't sue me bro  Don't fuck with people's reputation like it is toy. Just like you wouldn't do that in the middle of the road to someone walking down the street. Douchetacos hide behind the internet, because in real life they'd get their ass kicked for doing what they do on the internet. Have some respect for humans please. I know you younger generation think life is just swiping. You've lost all touch with reality. And you are another fool who can't read. Try again to read about how I said I might go about incentivizing an attorney. I mention my father meaning I have some comprehension about the law having grown up reading legal briefs laying around the house and I suppose some of my father's intellect has been inherited. Also you might imagine that I can also get access to a quick legal opinion. And yes I have been advised that he probably doesn't have enough networth to make it worthwhile and the best is to try to move on. But on principle, there is a case that could be made. The difficulties are proving damages and then collecting them. For example, some states have provisions that protect some assets, e.g. in Texas and Florida at least you can't lien on someone's home in certain circumstances. Also you don't know how people may have structured assets in trusts and other means. Also when bringing any case, they other party can counter-sue for their legal defense costs. Etc. There are many issues involved. Bottom line is that other than small claims court, there needs to be a lot of value involved to even consider it actionable. |
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Can anyone confirm that Smoothie has removed the negative trust report? I am not seeing it any more.
If yes, I will thank him and close this issue by removing my reports as well.
He will be welcome to report me in the future if there is any strong evidence of me being involved in any scam.
UPDATE: I did just signed in as ion.cash and I still see his negative trust report. I guess his negative rating disappeared when I am signed in as TPTB_need_war because I added ~smoothie to my trust list. So now I understand that the reason smoothie's rating shows up for all users by default is that smoothie is in the list of default trust for this forum. Web of Trust concept I presume. This forum has some serious issues. For one, Google has stopped listing this forum by default in searches. I have to add site:bitcointalk.org to the query to pull up listings from this forum.
I have been thinking the easy way to replace Reddit and this forum, will be to implement decentralized versions. I don't think any one really likes that one group of people has the control. That is the entire point of our interest in Bitcoin is to remove the corruption. What Smoothie has done is yet another example of how centralized control is inherently corrupt.
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I added the following removals from my trust: ~smoothie
~gmaxwell
~majamalu
~Carlton Banks
~evoorhees I just noticed that Trust doesn't display in most of the forums. Apparently only in the altcoin forums? |
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I am so proud of this forum where the baboons are allowed to dominate.
Is it a joke, like the old 'their food is terrible, and the portions are so small' saw? So murder doesn't need to be prosecuted because we have a Bitcoin culture. You are a great spokesman for Crypto to the masses.
Edit: I just noticed that Trust doesn't display in most of the forums. Apparently only in the altcoin forums?
Thus the implication is that altcoins have been relegated to a cesspool. |
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BitUsher, afaik the security vulnerabilities all exist in Java libraries and not in the JVM (virtual machine). Please stop FUDing by implying that the broken web app sand box applies to JVM in all use cases. C++ sucks because it introduces so many complexities and inconsistencies of invariants. Besides subclassing is an anti-pattern. Do not do it. That is not a subjective judgement. This is a well known fact amongst serious programming language designers. Agreed the best is to write low level crypto routines in C or assembly language (but not C++!). For higher level logic in your software, writing it in a lower level language will just introduce more bugs by making your semantics more obscured. I already wrote all this and am forced to repeat myself again. The principle of functional programming is "do not repeat yourself". Edit: also the web applet sandbox issues (which I stated above are irrelevant to other use cases of the JVM) are not even the most numerous security holes: http://www.infoworld.com/article/2610267/security/patching-has-failed--so-it-s-time-for-java-to-go.htmlInterestingly, Oracle or Java's previous owners shouldn't get all the blame. Heck, most of the successful exploitations are exploitations of already patched vulnerabilities. Oracle released a patch and begged you to deploy it, and still you didn't. That hesitation, more than any other factor, is responsible for the bad rap Java is earning. It's not like Java is the program with the most exploitable bugs in a given year. That distinction belongs to Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Apple iTunes. |
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Hopefully this is the last post I will ever make in this thread. I hope to just let this die. The most amicable path would be for Smoothie to man up and remove the nonsense from my profile as ion.cash.
Just imagine the following scenario Smoothie. Let's for a moment assume I succeeded to launch a very successful coin that ended up with a large market cap. That is a long shot, but for sake of argument, let's assume I succeeded.
I had documented this erroneous abuse that had been on ion.cash's forum profile for the months during the development phase.
And with the global economy collapsing 2015.75 to 2020.05, how many attorneys are going to be looking for a simple civil case where they are given let's say 80% of the proceeds of the case.
And how large will the damages be, given the large market cap and the potential for the market cap to have been higher if the reputation of the developer had not been so libeled. I assume more than Smoothie's net worth.
Just to teach a punk a lesson I might consider doing that. Or I might not. We'll see...
Edit: and for the record, I was not aware of this Trust system when I joined these forums. It is only in recent months as I've noticed the reputations on others' profiles that I became aware that was something that applied to every users' profile. It was too late by the time I realized that feature existed for me to opt out of the investment I had made in my reputation on this forum. And it wasn't until Smoothie did this, that I realized the Trust feature could be abused this way. So that is why I am advising Theymos to also consult his attorney as well. Again I don't really want to make trouble for anyone. So I suggest Smoothie also stop stirring up trouble.
Edit#2: remember how the Winklevoss twins attained their wealth. Well after the fact, they sued once the Facebook market cap was large enough. However, it may also be the case that Smoothie's net worth isn't large enough to entice any attorney to take the case. Oh well.
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