Of course she would. Just pay an insane amount of electricity once to ruin the currency that "destroys the environment".  

This explains well why state-level agents wouldn't attack the network with the intention to steal bitcoin, for example by purchasing billions worth of bitcoin and then shorting them right before they reverse the transactions. Doing so would require a lot of time, which is translated in a lot of blocks, and therefore a great cost in reorging those blocks.

But, in my opinion, it makes no sense for the state to attack like that. Instead, it's more likely that one of the following will happen:

• It already has an effective way to steal bitcoin. It's called tax department, and of course it can impose tight(er) regulations.
• Otherwise, a simple 51% attack will do some work to destroy the reputation.

It will depend on whether the state wants to destroy Bitcoin or to acknowledge it and welcome it as part of the system.

Strawman. I never claimed that by looking at the coinjoin you can tell that the whale inputs are controlled by the same user. But, information from past transactions does reveal it, and Wasabi software preserves no privacy in that case. Only wasted block space.

Create lower value outputs that have less link probability. For example, instead of a 171.79 output, you could have 171 1.0 BTC outputs.

Wouldn't it be more appropriate if it split the entire amount in a single round and then leave it for future remixes? Also, when you say "leftover change", to which thing are you referring specifically?

Theoretically, lightning can work without Bitcoin, but practically, it has little to no purpose. I presume that's what pooya meant. You'd use lightning mostly to avoid paying an outrageous amount of money for a low-value Bitcoin transaction, but beyond that it isn't useful. Litecoin's mempool is mostly empty, micro-transactions can take place there cheaply and get confirmed soon enough. Needless to mention that most lightning software is written to work on Bitcoin and isn't tested anywhere else.

They preserve nothing. It is trivial for everyone with a slight knowledge on blockchain heuristics to figure out that the 200/200/200/249 inputs are owned by the same entity, and therefore so are the 171.79. You pointed it out yourself.

I don't do blockchain analysis, and that's why I didn't figure it out at the beginning. It drew my attention when you confidently said they are provably owned by one entity, a little after you proudly claimed that the whale went anonymous.  

• I never said the client should create a 687 BTC output instead of four 171.79.
• The top four inputs are definitely owned by the same user regardless if the output was a 687 BTC or four 171.79.

What's "diminishing marginal returns"? First time hearing this. And why didn't it work in the 200/200/200/249 coinjoin?

Here's a list of what I predict will happen (with no particular order):

• Billions of tax payer's dollars would be wasted. The Bitcoin network would continue operating, as the state cannot endlessly retain this attack, because it doesn't have the money.
• People would likely consider Bitcoin transactions prone to reversal for quite a lot of time.
• If this happens in the far future, then perhaps the government that attempted to do it will be sanctioned by other governments that save / invest in Bitcoin.
• Some people will take advantage of their transactions being unconfirmed and double-spend them.

Here's a list of the reasons I think this is unlikely to ever happen:

• It'd require an astonishingly efficient coordination between the government people. And usually, they don't work efficiently, because... they're bureaucrats.
• It'd require vast amounts of money such that they'd be more incentivized to issue and earn the number #1 asset in the world, than destroy it.
• They would have to purchase an unusually large number of ASICs, and setup a noticeably long infrastructure. I don't believe there even exist so many ASICs, so they'd probably have to manufacture their own.

Did I mention that bureaucrats do not work efficiently?

Even that way, shouldn't the client prevent wasting that block space? Why would the client allow you to join coins that will not get better in terms of privacy?

Why don't they get divided in small amounts in the first place? If you follow the remixes, you can notice that the amounts are still big. It would be more appropriate if instead of four 171.79 outputs, there were more lower in value outputs, which could be probable suspects for the other inputs as well.

What I don't like about Wasabi coinjoins is that the outputs don't have the same link probability. A 5000 sat output doesn't have the same link probability with a 10 BTC, because the former can be produced with any combination of the inputs, as opposed to the latter. (i.e., any input and combination of inputs can create a 5000 sat output, but not a 10 BTC, because for example, a 1 mBTC cannot create a 10 BTC output alone).

Right, sorry. About 5% of their coins were anonymized. My bad. 

And the question remains. Shouldn't the coordinator check and prevent the waste of 4 inputs and 4 outputs in the WabiSabi coinjoin? If it displays an anonymity score of 1, then it means it's already analyzed that the 200/200/200/249 inputs make the 171.79 outputs, otherwise it'd return slightly more than that (25% chance for each). Why should it spend an input to create another output with no added anonymity score?

That guy might sound reasonable until you understand Bitcoin. It's that brilliant moment when you realize... You can't overlook what you have realized. It's too damn significant to ignore.

This contradicts your other post, in which you claim that the whale went anonymous.

Shouldn't Wasabi software automatically check and prevent what just happened? It is the user's fault to consolidate the change of the 200/200/200/249 outputs, but it's Wasabi's fault when it wastes block space and gives them the impression that their coinjoined coins are now private.

It'd be more block space efficient if it'd done that, yes, but in both cases the whale gains no anonymity. The probability of these 171.79 outputs being owned by the whale is 100%. The sum of the inputs after the 200/200/200/249 inputs is about 40 BTC, meaning that no other participant could have created an output of 171.79 BTC.

Someone in September 2013: "Wouldn't it be fun if ChartBuddy displayed $69k for the April fools?" 

Two questions of mine.

• How do you know there is a whale of 850 BTC? I see four separate inputs of 200, 200, 200 and 249 BTC. Couldn't there be four people with the respective inputs separately instead of one?
• Isn't it apparent that the 171.79869184 BTC outputs are likely related to these four inputs?

50 and 51 - Thanks!

You've earned at least 500. The -216028 is the penalty. 

The price of Bitcoin is $69,420 in April Fools. What else could one ask for?

You're cycling backwards.

Good. Good. Here, take a few merits. Spend them wisely.

Merit overflow incident.  

Heh. Replacement of gold can happen within the next 4 to 8 years. Replacement of the real estate is going to take a little longer though...

Even if Trezor required no updates, the airgapped wallet would still be safer. Hardware wallets that require connection to an Internet connected computer are not airgapped.

They do, but if they're installed in an airgapped computer as they say, then almost all the risks of not updating are mitigated, because the risk of not updating almost always has to do with an attacker compromising your device via some communication channel. If it's airgapped, you can't compromise it, unless physically.