Dare I say it, but the often derided central banking news pieces claiming an interest to create "national cryptocurrency" might be the genuine solution, depending on which central bank actually does this (and under what conditions). I'm not sure if it's more likely that Bitcoin simply gains more share of commercial transactions first instead, although that might be the catalyst that inspires a central bank to make the breakthrough.
They don't even need to launch their own cryptocurrency - all they need to do is to create a coloured coin on omni ledger (like USDT is). They'd then have all the power to issue/confiscate coins and trace transactions that they require while piggybacking on bitcoin. |
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It is slow. Why do people think that cryptocurrencies could compete against Amazon AWS? Cryptocurrencies has many use cases that are better than anything else, but not this one.
Not cryptocurrencies exactly, but there is something worth exploring in p2p consensus in games. Having the worlds first true, real p2p game would be amazing. |
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No, it's too slow. You need something much quicker than that. PoW probably isn't best suited.
Maybe something like swilrds hashgrid would work.
But the game does not have to wait for confirmations, it also does not have to send 10tx per second but only one per turn and in for example chess turn can take few seconds and finaly it does not have to be as secure as money transaction it just needs to be propagated among nodes mempool. Turn based it might be suitable. I'm considering full scale games tho, or at least slow moving ones, like RTS. |
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No, it's too slow. You need something much quicker than that. PoW probably isn't best suited.
Maybe something like swilrds hashgrid would work.
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Full decentralisation is difficult without atomic swaps to perform the actual trade. And that limits any platform to trading pairs for which atomic swaps can be programmed. As much as I like the concept, having to rely on arbitrators to fall back on is in some ways less desirable that the centralised model. Perhaps this is a good thing though; in a future dominated by p2p trading platforms, if a development team wants their cryptocurrency to be taken seriously, atomic swaps with the major coins they compete against must be easy to implement or else the market may be too thin
In a first on BCT, I agree with you. Moreover, what's required is an 'official standard' for implementing atomic swaps which would be functional not just across nakamoto style blockchains, but across all crypto-currencies which implement the standard. |
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Thank you for the answer. But I am still unclear on your answer to question 2. You said any node can lie and it's true. But gossip protocol is based on psychological implication that at least some peers on the network WILL relay message (if everybody kept messages to themselves, gossip protocol wouldn't work, but it works). So, let's presume a message X needs to be asymmetrically signed by sender and I can verify that signature. Then if I will ask my peers did they received X, and:
a) they said (or most of them) they didn't - I couldn't deduct with 99.999% confidence that there was no X on network, because if there was X, at least some of peers would respond me in the positive (because of gossip psychology).
b) they said they did - I could deduct with 99.999% confidence that there was X on network, because I can check the signature of X.
In this scenario peers cannot lie about positive answer (because they would need to forge signature), but they can lie about negative (they received X, but said no, we didn't). But, if networks would act like that, gossip protocol would not work in bitcoin too - for example block propagation would be impossible if almost all peers would keep info about new blocks for themselves without relaying. So, in practice, I could deduct that if many nodes said they didn't received X, then almost certainly there was no X on network?
Many thanks.
Peers cannot lie about the positive answer but they could lie about the negative if there was any incentive for them to do so. In bitcoin, there is no incentive to lie about receipt of transactions, so likelihood of them lying is small. |
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Hello,
Basically I know how message propagation works in peer-to-peer bitcoin network. But I need a clarification on three points below:
QUESTION 1: In bitcoin network every node relays every message it received to it's peers. If node A received message X and relayed it to his peers, and those peers relayed it to theirs, can we take for granted that finally this message X will return to node A like a boomerang? Because if every node relays every message, it should finally.
Basically, yes. It's the gossip protocol. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gossip_protocolQUESTION 2: I know there is no feature in bitcoin client for this, but let's suppose there was one. If node A would like to know if message X was ever relayed on the network, and there would be a feature that allowed to ask it's peers if they had ever received X, and once enough number of peers answered that they do indeed relayed such X, would it imply that all connected (at the time when X was relayed on network) nodes received X? Because if some originator node originates X, than one of his peers relays this X, and their peers also relay X (or at least most of them, which acts honestly), then eventually X should reach all connected nodes, right?
And reversing this, if node A would ask enough number of his peers if they received/relayed X and enough number of them answered that no, they haven't, could node A deduct that X was never relayed on the network, for the same reason as stated above?
No. Nodes can lie about the receipt of any message. QUESTION 4: If theoretically at a given time all nodes participating in the network were connected to network, then a message X send at that time should reach (after some time) all nodes, right?
Please somebody answer this.
Basically, yes - again its the gossip protocol. |
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The $64,000 question.. you need some way of distributing the coins.
Not coins. Specifically mining tokens - because if you start with ~0 you've got the problem I outlined. If you decide to start the chain with, say a large number like 33% mining tokens allocated, then this is basically exactly the same as plain PoS. |
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Mate - I'm sorry - but you're still not quite getting it..
Perhaps if you'd have described this with more than one paragraph it might have been easier to analyse? I have 33% of the mining tokens.
You have 33% of the tokens.
Anony has 33% of the tokens.
And what do you do at the currency's inception when no one has any mining tokens? |
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Proof is not subjective, but determined by a collection of results, and the one with the smallest error wins.
You are right, IPFS does open a pandora box of attack scenarios. maybe models should only be trained on datasets that meet a certain characteristics like: recency, age, size, transaction fee?
But the datasets containing the verification and the proof are external to the chain - the integrity of this external data is not guaranteed, therefore this entire process is subjective; you have to trust it is valid, which is the antitheses of cryptocurrency. hmmm, in that case, how about putting a portion (10K samples) of the validation dataset on chain, rendering them immutable, at the start of each contest epoch. A simple way to validate data integrity is to check the data signature hash. You need both validation and proof data sets on chain for this to work objectively. And worse yet, they need to be generated by the blockchain itself, not some external party, otherwise you have more attack angles to worry about. |
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You'd need 51% of the mining tokens to pull that off
Why? If I have a mining token to build a block, I can exclude all other purchases (as discussed), but my own, so I buy another token in the block I produce using the block reward, which I then use to repeat the process forever. In fact, it is in everybody's best interests to do this, since it maximises their rewards - they can all build private infinite length chains and fork the coin into infinity for maximum rewards. |
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No no.. I think you're making it too complicated.
You don't spend mining tokens. They are the same as your stake in POS.
More tokens more chance you find a block. That's it.
Fair enough... But presumably, you buy them with a transaction? So this will devolve into plain POS - what will happen is that the person who buys a token can produce a block in which no one else bought any tokens, so he is the only one who can produce a block, rinse and repeat into infinity. |
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Proof is not subjective, but determined by a collection of results, and the one with the smallest error wins.
You are right, IPFS does open a pandora box of attack scenarios. maybe models should only be trained on datasets that meet a certain characteristics like: recency, age, size, transaction fee?
But the datasets containing the verification and the proof are external to the chain - the integrity of this external data is not guaranteed, therefore this entire process is subjective; you have to trust it is valid, which is the antitheses of cryptocurrency. |
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No - no real POW component.
Virtual POW. POW generated by the mining tokens you own. More Tokens - more VPOW. Zero energy - like POS.
It still has some intrinsic issues that POS has - I agree.
But some POS issues, large issues IMHO, are dealt with in this incarnation.
I don't think they are. How do you buy a mining token? Presumably via some kind of on chain transaction? How is that transaction finalised? By 'spending' that token and then mining a block? So, what can happen is that an attacker will just undo the spend of his purchased mining token in a private chain - he can do this forever if he has sufficient tokens, forking the chain into infinity. |
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Not easily achievable IMO. For PoW, you need two characteristics:
1) The solution must apply to data available 'within' the chain
2) Any proposed solution must be easily verifiable using only the solution itself
What you're proposing fails both of these two requirements.
Agreed. Not easy to achieve. So far only prime coin does something useful, to the best of my knowledge. 1) Suppose we put 1000 different datasets on IPFS, and a public chain like GDOC randomly picks a dataset to start the deep neural net training, training can take anywhere between few seconds to few days, but the idea is to let whoever achieves the smallest error in the shortest period of time, win the bounty, we have to define the bounty as, perhaps: achieve accuracy verifiable and 10% better than 50% of all results out there, then he walks away with the bounty 2) Verification is relatively slow (compared to SHA, perhaps 100-1000 times slower) for a DNN, but can still be done in a matter of seconds. DNN is slow to train, but validating a trained model on data is very fast (seconds for thousands of samples). But verification requires a dataset, again from IPFS. So making the dataset easily readily accessible is important. It can't be called a 'proof of work' if said proof is subjective. Using IPFS presents all kinds of attack scenarios on the validation and task data sets. |
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You've got the same chicken and egg problem here that PoB has; how can you come to a consensus on the valid set of transactions by sending more transactions?
Sorry - not quite sure I get you. Consensus is reached by the chain with the most VM (Virtual Mining). Are you referring to the Boot-Strap Period, when you are starting the chain ? Some one needs to own _some_ mining tokens to start the chain ? It isn't clear from your OP that your proposal actually has a PoW component? I assumed not. In which case you'd have the illustrated problem. |
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You've got the same chicken and egg problem here that PoB has; how can you come to a consensus on the valid set of transactions by sending more transactions?
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You could do what IOTA does. Have a 'Coordinator'.
Basically it's a centralised server that Timestamps the CORRECT chain. You run it on your servers (users check with you), and you refuse to re-org past 1 hour, no matter the weight of the other chain. Totally not cool in the long run, but in the Bootstrap period of a coin, I don't see any issues.
This is only temporary ( or so they say on IOTA, but I have my doubts ), and once your hash rate is high enough you can get rid of it.
I don't want to derail this thread too much, but I thought I would comment on this - IOTA can never remove the coordinators, for two reasons: 1) Their security model is utter snake oil* 2) DAGs require some kind of centralisation otherwise lite nodes cannot function at all. *) https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1799665.msg20108439#msg20108439 |
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We at GDOC (Global Data Ownership Chain) are contemplating this approach, but would like to solicit inputs from the powers that may be.
Thank you for sharing your ideas and feedback.
Not easily achievable IMO. For PoW, you need two characteristics: 1) The solution must apply to data available 'within' the chain 2) Any proposed solution must be easily verifiable using only the solution itself What you're proposing fails both of these two requirements. |
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Hello Paul, Isn't it also just an opportunity cost in PoW as well? If a miner devotes half of his equipment to an alternate fork, he may lose additional earnings but his mining equipment remains intact.
This is a common misconception. Although the miners equipment stays intact, they always lose cost of mining to electricity, and, on average this loss is equal to the block reward. Yes, you are right - I didn't think of the electricity cost. In PoA nothing at stake defense is structured as 1. No rewards for a predefined period - opportunity cost 2. Lock up of principal for a predefined period. I believe this is more than just the opportunity cost although I can't really put a cost number to it. If the stake were to be locked up forever - that would be equivalent to the loss of the principal. But since the lockup is for a short period - not exactly sure how to calculate it's effect. Regards, Shunsai Hi Shunsai, It's hard to see how it can be anything more than opportunity cost, because no coins are ever lost. The only loss is future earnings, from either the block reward, or other possible investments that could have been undertaken with said coins. I'm no economist, but personally, I don't see removing liquidity as being a realised cost. Cheers, Paul. |
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