When using CPFP, you need to add the sizes of the two transactions and the fee of the two transactions together, to get the combined fee rate. Since your first transaction has 18 inputs, it is much larger than your second one, and so pulls the average fee down significantly.

Your first transaction is 1297.25 vbytes, and pays a fee of 3,900 sats, for a fee rate of 3 sats/vbyte.
Your second transaction is 110 vbytes, and pays a fee of 29,997 sats, for a fee rate of 272.7 sats/vbyte.

If you combine those two transactions, they have a combined size of 1407.25 vbytes, and a combined fee of 33,897 sats. This works out to a combined fee rate of 24.1 sats/vbyte.

If you look at the size of the mempool here (https://jochen-hoenicke.de/queue/#1,8h), 24.1 sats/vbyte puts your two combined transaction at around 6 MB from the tip of the mempool, so you will likely still be waiting several hours at least for these to confirm.

There appear to be a number of other users in the last few days who have bitcoin stuck in their Trading Wallet and are unable to withdraw it to their BTC Wallet. See this thread for example: blockchain.com - unable to send bought bitcoins via credit card.

In the short term, the only solution is to contact blockchain.com's support. Since the Trading Wallet is completely custodial and they control the private keys, there is nothing anyone here can do to help.

In the long term, the permanent solution is to stop using blockchain.com altogether. They are a terrible company with awful customer service, security flaws, no SegWit support, and a variety of other issues.

I wouldn't say I work there, but I do receive bitcoin payment from ChipMixer for wearing their ad in my signature. I am generally pretty passionate when it comes to all things privacy, and I am definitely one of the more hardcore members of the forum when it comes to general privacy practices. I have never used a centralized exchange, I have never completed KYC anywhere related to bitcoin or cryptocurrency, and I trade exclusively peer-to-peer. I have no apprehensions recommending ChipMixer if you are looking for a reliable mixer, as they have proved time and again they are trustworthy, mixing thousands of bitcoin worth millions of dollars simultaneously without scamming a single customer. If you prefer to avoid mixers, then using coinjoin transactions would be your best bet. Simply put, these are where multiple inputs from different people and outputs to different people are all combined in the same transaction, so it isn't clear which input is linked to which output. Wasabi wallet is probably the easiest way to achieve this currently.

But as you say, you will get a lot of conflicting information, and it is good practice not to trust the information from a single source (me included). Leave this thread open for a while and get some more answers. You can also use the search function to look for older threads which have discussed similar things. For example: Why not use Exchange instead of Mixer?

This is correct. Centralized exchanges give each customer one or more deposit addresses. Once coins have been deposited to those addresses, they are all swept and combined in to a single central hot wallet. Withdrawals are then processed from this central hot wallet. This means that even if you just deposit and then withdraw without doing any trading, you will get back different bitcoin from a different address.

Not at all. All centralized exchanges keep meticulous logs of all the transactions they receive and they send. Even without KYC, they keep plenty of details about you, such as your email addresses, IP addresses, browser fingerprint, computer software, and so on. Many monitor all deposits they receive to see where the coins are coming from, and they monitor the coins after they have been withdrawn. They all have the ability to shutdown your account, seize your coins, or spring KYC on you, if they don't like what you are doing. They will be quite willing to hand all your data over to any government or three letter agency which comes knocking, not to mention how often exchanges are hacked and could therefore leak all this data online. Most exchanges will pick up on the fact that you are using them as a surrogate mixer, and will shutdown your account for that.

Using a centralized exchange risks both your coins and your privacy.

Connecting to your VPN server first and then to Tor is "Tor over VPN", as opposed to the other way around for "VPN over Tor" as DroomieChikito is talking about it.

Connecting to a VPN first and then to Tor doesn't add much to your privacy, unless as you say you want to hide your Tor usage from your ISP. This can equally be achieved without a VPN at all by using Tor bridges and/or pluggable transports. It may be worthwhile doing if you trust your VPN provider more than Tor, and were worried that a malicious third party could control both your entry and exit nodes to the Tor network. In terms of the evil fee, this set up makes no difference as your IP address will still come from your Tor exit node.

Connecting to Tor first and then to your VPN negates the whole point of Tor, as I explained above. It could potentially help with the evil fee if your VPN server's IP address is considered less evil than the Tor exit node you are using. Just as you would have to try multiple Tor exit nodes and are unlikely to find a completely clean one, you would also have to try multiple VPN servers and again are unlikely to find a completely clean one.

This already happens, with centralized exchanges choosing to seize coins and freeze accounts if you deposit or withdraw directly to a casino, sportsbook, darknet market, coinjoin, and so on.

It's an untenable position for a couple of reasons. First of all, the majority of bitcoin in circulation have, at some point, passed through one of these "undesirable" services. Centralized exchanges cannot ban them all since they would rapidly go out of business. So how far back do they look? 5 transactions? 10? 20? So if you bounce your bitcoin around for n+1 transactions then suddenly they become "clean" again? It makes no sense. This is only going to get worse as time goes on, with more people using bitcoin and fewer bitcoin entering circulation means pretty much every bitcoin which isn't in a long term hold will become "tainted" in one way or another.

Secondly, people are getting fed up of this kind of behavior. The number of DEXs and the volume they are handling is steadily growing. Mixer use is increasing. Coinjoin is becoming mainstream. It is becoming more and more difficult to track "tainted" bitcoin if you are intent on obfuscating them. Again, centralized mixers cannot ban every coin which has ever been through one of these services.

The community should do its part and stop supporting centralized services which dictate what you are and are not allowed to do with your own money.

Even if I turn off "Advanced preview", after I hit "Pay" I get the simple fee slider, and then after I hit "Send" on the simple fee slider, I still get shown the "Transaction" box with all the inputs and outputs listed, the TXID at the top, the size, fee, LockTime, etc.

Is this different in 2FA wallets?

Edit: Maybe this is different because I am using a watch only wallet and therefore the transaction cannot be sent automatically, and so Electrum must display the transaction box so I can export the transaction to be signed on my airgapped device? If that's so, then that's a flaw in Electrum I think. The full transaction with all inputs and outputs should be displayed by default to all users prior to them broadcasting a transaction.

That's better, but it's still not great. Once you've moved from A, B, and C, to D, E, and F, if you then start to consolidate D, E, and F together, although a third party couldn't definitively link A, B, and C as all belonging to you, they could get a pretty good idea which they may be able to combine with other information.

If it were me, I would either pass D, E, and F, individually through ChipMixer or a coinjoin before consolidating them at a later date, or keep them separate altogether and just use them for various payments as you suggest.

Ahh yes, the good old "account with no merit giving out tips on how to earn merit in a thinly veiled attempt to gain merit" thread. Haven't had one of these in almost a week! Check back tomorrow for the brand new account giving out tips on how to make good posts with their very first post.

Why threads like this always get a bunch of replies correcting the OP I'll never understand. Nothing you say here is going to make any difference to the OP, who is obviously only here to try to rank up and monetize their account. Just ignore them and move on.

The "Trading Wallet" is a custodial wallet where blockchain.com control the keys, so restoring from the passphrase will not help in this case. OP is trying to send the coins from this custodial wallet to the wallet which is backed up by his seed phrase.

Because you are transferring between wallets, this will generate a transaction which has to be broadcast to the network. Such a transaction cannot have zero fees. You'll need to change that to pay an appropriate fee. Be aware that the mempool is pretty backlogged at the moment so if you really need to make the transaction soon then you will have to pay a significant fee, in the region of 80-100 sats/vbyte.

Even so, Electrum will still display the entire transaction before you broadcast it, which will include the output for TrustedCoin's fee. If people are unhappy with the fee, then they can simply choose not to broadcast it and instead recover their wallet using their back ups and bypass paying the fee altogether. OP saying the fee was not disclosed is categorically not true - genuine versions of Electrum will not sign a transaction without you approving it first.

If people do not read the text they are signing up to, and they also don't pay attention to the transaction they are signing, then there is really little else which can be done.

It was only created a month ago. Even for Yobit, it usually takes a few months for the trade volume to disappear completely. Still, the fact that there is 1,247 BTC worth of DICE sell orders at a single satoshi with zero volume for weeks should tell you all you need to know about this scam.

No worries for Yobit though. They don't care about all their users losing money. All they have to do is come up with a new name and repeat literally the exact same process again next month. Maybe CLONE or PONZI would be a good name for their next scam "coin".

I've never used a single centralized exchange, and I don't plan on ever using one. Using a centralized exchange is not a requirement for being interested in or using bitcoin.

Yes and no. Splitting your seed phrase and hiding it in multiple places obviously increases the risk that someone discovers one of your back ups, but if they do discover one then they only have half (or less) of your seed phrase, which is significantly better than them having it all.

You should make sure to have at least two back ups of every piece though. Having a single back up, and then only discovering it has been stolen or damaged when you need to restore from it could result in the complete loss of your coins.

I would be careful about assuming this. If one of my friends left me a couple of words that I did not know the significance of, I'm not going to go around all their friends and family after they died and ask if anyone knows the significance of them. More likely I'll assume they were a password to something that is no longer needed now they are dead. Different if it's someone familiar with bitcoin, but with someone who has no idea what seed phrase are, your coins may end up irretrievable.

Yobit is categorically a scam.

I do not hide my disdain of the vast majority of altcoins, and I completely agree with the posters above saying that most altcoins, such as XRP, are centralized scams. Yobit, however, takes the scamming to a whole new level.

Have a read of this post I made back in January regarding the "X10" coin which was shilled and spammed on this forum before rightly being banned: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5217581.msg53650350#msg53650350

Next, go to Yobit and look up the trade history and order books for the two "coins" that OP has referred to - YODA and DICE. It is the exact same story as it was with X10. Both created out of nothing and sold to their users for BTC and ETH, both without a blockchain or smart contract and unable to be withdrawn, both artificially pumped through Yobit's "InvestBox", and both with hundreds of BTC in sell orders stacked up with no buyers.

With Yobit successfully haven stolen BTC from these users with their false promises, fake advertising, and lies, they now leave them holding bags of a token which does not even exist and will repeat the whole process by launching some new made up nonsense next month.

The removable battery is not proprietary or even similar to a phone's battery, though. It simply uses 2x standard AAA batteries. If anything, that should make it cheaper than using a more expensive rechargeable battery.

Until your child decides to dunk it in their juice, take it in the bath, or leave it outside in the rain.

Yeah, and I stand by that. As someone who likes to carry a hardware wallet around in their pocket, a device which is 8 times larger in volume than the Nano S or the Trezor One does not fit my use case. But hey, YMMV.

Completely disagree.

You are essentially making the "nothing to hide" argument - if you aren't doing anything shady or immoral, then you have nothing to hide, and therefore you have nothing to fear from the government/feds/big brother sticking their noses in to your business and monitoring all you transactions. Only criminals/scammers/terrorists/etc. who are doing illegal things have something to fear.

Privacy is a fundamental human right. Without it, "normal citizens" as you put it suffer greatly. They simply become subjects of their government, willing to roll over and do whatever they are told to. Privacy must be protected.

I have suggested for a long time now that people should make more use of multiple different passphrases, and this seems to be another good reason to do so. If each of the different coins you store on your Ledger device were stored behind a different passphrase, then it would be impossible for this vulnerability to affect you.

However, I appreciate this wouldn't be easy for ERC20 tokens, since they are stored on standard Ethereum addresses and you need some Ethereum on said address to be able to spend/transfer them, so you would be forced to hold a few dollars worth of Ethereum in multiple different addresses, one for each token. In this case, there really is no substitute for paying close attention to what your hardware wallet is displaying on the screen and double and triple checking it matches the transaction you wish to make.

We can never say never, as there could be a vulnerability we don't know about, but there is currently no known way for a fake MEW to compromise a Ledger device.

At most, a fake or malicious software wallet can push a malicious transaction to the hardware wallet. That transaction will only be signed and broadcast if the user presses the physical buttons on the Ledger device required to accept it. If the user rejects the transaction, then it cannot be signed and cannot be broadcast.

In terms of the recently discovered Ledger exploit - if there was a similar exploit for Ethereum and ERC20 tokens, then theoretically someone trying to transfer Ethereum or a token to an address could be tricked in to also transferring some other token to that address. There is, however, currently no known exploit which could achieve this.

The hardware wallet will indeed protect your coins.

All the fake version of Electrum does is attempt to generate, sign, and broadcast a transaction which sends the entire contents of your wallet to the attacker's address. If you are using Electrum as an interface for a hardware wallet, then that transaction cannot be signed with you manually approving it on the hardware wallet. Provided you don't just blindly accept everything the hardware device displays and actually pay attention to what it is doing, then you can reject the transaction which will prevent it from being signed and broadcast.

The bitcoin community does not need liars and con artists peddling their snake oil.

If by "hundreds of years" you mean "to the ripe old age of 29".