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I will wait for offers for about 24 hours and then close the auction.
The current highest bid is 1.23 BTC.
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No, he IS a scammer... what don't you get about this?
Why are you even dealing with people on Telegram?
It has been proven over and over that you are setting yourself up to get robbed of your btc.
Maybe he will have you peel the private key and send him the funds to pay for the coin?
WATCH OUT.....
Yes, he definitely was a scammer -- he deleted the chat and account after my request for ID and photos. I'm quite open to people, but I will not let myself scam out of >1 BTC  |
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Well, thanks for clarifications!
Telegram guy seems like scammer so the 1.25 BTC offer is off until he is sending me his ID and a picture of him holding a sign "I offer 1.25 BTC".
So I currently have 2 apparently adequate offers of 1.23 BTC.
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I highly suggest you read this post before you get scammed out of your coin... https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5277761.0and posting what offers you have had in dm are irrelevant. Impossible to verify and makes people who are actually interested in buying your coin think twice about giving you an offer. Thanks for advice! I'll wait for MJ comment and try to figure out if the offers in DM are real or scam attempts. |
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Looks like mj is winning the public auction at 1 BTC so far, when does this end? I'm more of a lurking sniper lol
MJ also made a private offer of 1.05 BTC I'll wait for few more days with the offers. I did? Someone with your name contacted me in Telegram. https://t.me/MlNERJONES: " Hello , i am just updating you about your WTS/Auction thread at forum. My offer stands at 1.05BTC ,if you dont get any other bids. Also if you do ,i am glad to escrow it for you Sincerely,MJ " So, that wasn't you? |
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Looks like mj is winning the public auction at 1 BTC so far, when does this end? I'm more of a lurking sniper lol
MJ also made a private offer of 1.05 BTC I'll wait for few more days with the offers. |
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Another offer of 1.25 BTC recived!
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So today morning I received two offers of 1.23 BTC in DM.
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I just made a deal for a 2013 Cas around that price in a sale. I don’t think the 1.2ish is out of line. Good luck with sale.
Thanks! |
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Smells like BS.
Why? Is the offer of 1.22 BTC too high? Anyway, I'll wait for few more days to see if there will be more offers. |
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Got an offer of 1.22 BTC in DM  Any better offers? |
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Can MJ Escrow?
Also, when does the auction end? This seems more like a "WTS".
Escrow is reasonable. Changed the type/title from "[AUCTION]" to "[WTS]". |
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You listed as auction without a starting price, what are you expecting?
Ups, good point! So starting price 1 BTC it is! |
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Doesn't seem to be much interest in keeping the historic coin loaded  I guess I will just peel the key  |
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Reply from SatoshiLabs:
Hacking other companies' HW wallets is not our company's focus. We are also not able to provide you with any contacts for any subjects that deal with this because we simply don't have them.
Completely understandable.
Well, I've tried. Sorry that the idea was not as good as I hoped... Maybe you could concentrate on finding flaws in that secure chip instead of telling that you're targeting exactly a Ledger device; if you tell about Ledger some may not help you because it can cause them bad publicity (bad actors vs the competition). But yeah, make your own decisions, my ideas are not always great.  Yes, concentrating on the chip is a good idea. Actually the idea of Trezor as fan of open source hacking a closed source chip looked quite engaging 
If it weren't for the secure element present in the Ledger, I would tell you to get in touch with hardware hacker Joe Grand. He has some experience in that field, but it was with a Trezor with outdated firmware. His website that deals with hacking hardware and software wallets is https://www.offspec.io/. The way I see it is that you have nothing to lose that isn't already lost (meaning the crypto on the device whose PIN you don't know and you don't have the seed either). Yes. I contacted them and got some hope Their answer was: Currently, there is no attack for the Ledger but we’re working on it. |
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In one of the many options we reviewed, we saw a potential candidate for a Secure Element to be used in our product and we went deeper into our research. As this was a Common Criteria certified chip, we did not expect what we found. Over a few weeks, we uncovered several different critical flaws requiring no special hardware leading to the extraction of the secrets from the chip. We quickly realized these were the attacks nobody tested against. I don't know whether it's the same chip as Nano S is using, but maybe you get to use some of Trezor's knowledge on the matter. Unlike Ledger, who are bound to not divulge anything about the secure chip they use, Trezor may be able to help. I don't know, maybe I'm wrong, still, it can be an idea... Wow, that's an interesting finding! I will contact them and see if they can help Reply from SatoshiLabs: Hacking other companies' HW wallets is not our company's focus. We are also not able to provide you with any contacts for any subjects that deal with this because we simply don't have them.Completely understandable. |
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In one of the many options we reviewed, we saw a potential candidate for a Secure Element to be used in our product and we went deeper into our research. As this was a Common Criteria certified chip, we did not expect what we found. Over a few weeks, we uncovered several different critical flaws requiring no special hardware leading to the extraction of the secrets from the chip. We quickly realized these were the attacks nobody tested against. I don't know whether it's the same chip as Nano S is using, but maybe you get to use some of Trezor's knowledge on the matter. Unlike Ledger, who are bound to not divulge anything about the secure chip they use, Trezor may be able to help. I don't know, maybe I'm wrong, still, it can be an idea... Wow, that's an interesting finding! I will contact them and see if they can help |
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Unfortunately, I'm not aware of firmware bugs that are easily exploitable on old Ledgers, like on Trezor Model One.
Yes, the Trezor from that time where much easier to hack: one could simply brute force the PIN ( https://blog.ledger.com/Breaking-Trezor-One-with-SCA) and there is no secure element in use -- so it would be possible to extract the keys straight from the chip ( https://medium.com/the-capital/trezor-hardware-wallet-hacked-in-15-min-and-75-e3c23ced166). Have you tried contacting reputable people with knowledge / experience in this field yet? That's probably a workable sum of money.
Do you have some people in mind that you think I should try to contact?
Does it have something to do with the exchange which owner suddenly died but later it was rumored that he did not? A lawsuit was filed against him for scamming and then disappearing. I can not remember the story correctly but there was Canadian (maybe) exchange few years ago that was gone by telling this story.
No, that's another story. The owner actually really died in Spain by suicide and the documents are in German court.
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No no, the idea is to flash custom firmware on the Ledger's main MCU, leaving the secure element (and the seed stored therein) alone. You can do that before or after usage, should not matter. This custom firmware can then just ask the secure element to sign a transaction sending all funds to a certain address and it should indeed return the signed transaction. You do need to bypass firmware verification (performed by secure element), though, as described here. https://youtu.be/Y1OBIGslgGM?t=1551It is true, that I could put a custom software to Ledger's main MCU and leaving the secure element with the keys as it is. However, the secure element takes PIN code as an argument when doing actions (like signing transaction for example) with the keys. So with custom firmware I could do all kind of interesting tricks with the Ledger, but without the PIN code I still have no access to the secure element and it's functions nor keys. And when supplying 3 incorrect PIN-s to the secure element then it will just erase the keys.
Is there any way to get access to the funds on Ledger Nano S (from year 2018) without the PIN code?
I also don't have the seed words.
How do you suppose to do that? No idea so far. That's what I'm trying to find out here The situation is complex. In short: the owner was running a badly structured business and died. The business partners are trying to recover their funds from the wallet. There is nothing criminal. I understand this, but if he died he probably left some will and documents containing seed words and PIN, maybe even passphrase(s). The documents (and maybe the seed words) are stuck in court. The crypto business the owner was running was formalized loosely on a blockchain and the court does not understand nor accept that. The business partners have spent years without success in that front. You can't hack hardware wallets so easy, or governments wouldn't pay millions to do it somehow.
I could pay 6-7 figures for this work. [moderator's note: consecutive posts merged] |
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