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OP constructs a phantasy smear campagn. ![Cry](https://bitcointalk.org/Smileys/default/cry.gif)
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If RSK is open source wouldn't it be possible to fork the code and remove this "tax" on mining?
Rsk is not open source, and because of this adoption will not be exciting. Opportunity to create a competitor. With better revenue model
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Hello guys,
I have been interested in currency trading since 2011 and I have pretty much learned the basics (even more probably) of the day trading, technical and fundamental analysis. I understand the concept of the Bitcoin and its trading in general.
Without minig you don't understand bitcoin. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lx9zgZCMqXE
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K99 interesting initiative. we see the Zipf distribution (power law) shaping out already as expected. maybe the non buyers can be infered by the thread views. Certainly this is not a randomized survey but a cue to consider.
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I'm curious as to why ETH should fetch a large value. Bitcoin has value because it is explicitly a store of value, as well as a payment system. Transfer fees are pretty much insignificant (cents). Ethereum's value only comes from it's ability to run decentralized Turing-complete code. Since you're paying per execution, most people will actually want the value of ETH to be low as possible, so they can execute their programs as cheaply as possible. This will lead to people rapidly dumping when they feel the price is too high, and sitting on the sidelines to wait until prices are reasonable and then buy in and quickly run their scripts at a cheaper price. Or, more likely, most people won't hold ETH at all, and only buy in a small amount at market price to cover the cost of whatever script they need to run. Large initial inflation combined with no software running on the network in the beginning will mean ETH effectively won't have any intrinsic value until the first programs are released. Any rises in value after the IPO and before the release of programs will be purely speculative.
See http://ethereum.org/ethereum.html#p5The coefficients will be revised as more hard data on the relative computational cost of each operation becomes available. The hardest part will be setting the value of x. There are currently two main solutions that we are considering:
Make x inversely proportional to the square root of the difficulty, so x = floor(10^21 / floor(difficulty ^ 0.5)). This automatically adjusts fees down as the value of ether goes up, and adjusts fees down as computers get more powerful due to Moore's Law. Use proof of stake voting to determine the fees. In theory, stakeholders do not benefit directly from fees going up or down, so their incentives would be to make the decision that would maximize the value of the network. A hybrid solution is also possible, using proof of stake voting, but with the inverse square root mechanism as an initial policy.
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Good stuff. The reference Bitcoin implementation obfuscates the core simplicity of transaction validation by oddly referring to scripts as "scriptPubKey" and "scriptSig" instead of "inputScript" and "outputScript". Realizing that "owning bitcoin" just means that you can provide a stack of instructions that evaluates to true when appended to another arbitrary instruction stack is what inspired me to hack on Bitcoin in the first place. Some feedback: - It's worth pointing out that "true" is really just "any non-zero value" rather than a boolean literal. In other words, a script is logically valid as long as the top stack value is not 0 and as long as the evaluation isn't short-circuited by an instruction like OP_RETURN.
- The significance of instructions like OP_RETURN and OP_VERIFY is that they short-circuit the evaluation. Otherwise, the script will evaluate in full and the final top stack value will determine the state of the stack. That's why you can append arbitrary data after OP_RETURN -- it's so that the data won't be evaluated.
Hey thanks, Ive inserted your comments as foodnotes in page 2 and 5. I would like to permalink to the comment as a citation but seems ont te be possible
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This paper suggests to leave out input scripts in the tx hashes, so that a tx can not be duplicated with a nonce. It seems a good idea, can we lobby for discuss this with the core developers? http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/837.pdf
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cool, you can always check bitcoining.it for updates.
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Thanks jbis1 tried to guesswork and compile obelisk wih -DENABLE_TESTNET. No chance. And this is all the documentation I have: cat /usr/local/share/doc/obelisk/* | grep testnet https://wiki.unsystem.net/index.php/ObeliskAt this point I consider moving to bitcoinj - after all I'm looking for the easiest way to work with transactions. thx, malefice
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@jbs1
truth is that it still operates on the main block chain, e.g. sx history
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i changed install-sx.sh to compile for testnet, but it seems not to work. ./configure --enable-testnet --enable-leveldb --prefix $INSTALL_PREFIX at github there is a reference to -DENABLE_TESTNET for CFLAGS https://github.com/spesmilo/sx/issues/9I dont know C, could you explain what I need to do to have sx enabled for testnet?
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i tried it with the following phrase now: Generally a command executed on the stack takes its parameters from the stack, and puts its result at the stack. So OP_VERIFY behaves normally if its FALSE, because it leaves the result on the stack, but it behaves abnormally when its TRUE. It removes the result TRUE from the stack to continue with the next parameters. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1D_gi_7Sf9sOyAHG25cMpOO4xtLq3iJUtjRwcZXFLv1E/edit#what do you think?
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One bit of feedback. It wasn't immediately obvious to me that OP_EQUALVERIFY would cause PubKeyHash and PubKeyHash2 to be removed from the stack. You stated: OP_EQUAL and OP_VERIFY are executed. OP_EQUAL puts TRUE on the stack if the two elements are the same. OP_VERIFY marks a transaction valid if the top stack element is true. And removes the top stack element if its TRUE, if its false it leaves it there.
So I thought this meant that OP_EQUAL would simply add TRUE to the stack when they are equal, and that OP_VERIFY would remove the top element ( TRUE ). But this would leave PubKeyHash and PubKeyHash2 still in place. So I reason that OP_EQUAL must also remove both input elements, and probably most operators do that when they evaluate to TRUE. But I'm not sure that you explicitly state that anywhere. So logically if we used OP_EQUAL and then OP_VERIFY we would have: TRUE PubKey Signature after OP_EQUAL and then PubKey Signature after OP_VERIFY. yes? Yes! generally the inputs of an operation are removed from the stack, this is very CPU like: they are loaded into the CPU and removed from the data store, the result is then put on the data store. this is like processor chips work at a low level. so its the exception that true will not be shown, how could I explain this best?
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I really like your introduction. It is essential that somebody produces some tutorials on general transaction writing.
Thank you!
Thank you for your encouragement, extro24! Learning transaction scripts together is very a fine intellectual pleasure.
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Ok, what's up with the flood of noobs posting links in here?
If you have something to say, say it here.
Because...? Arrogance wins over arguments? I will simply ask the moderator if my contribution is welcome or not.
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I write gentle introduction to transaction scripts, while learning them for myself. I think this is overdue for the average developer. Please give feedback (google docs comments) on mistakes and improvements you find useful.
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Only about 230 Vertices? Probably I'm just ignorant, but looks fragile.
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