https://blockchain.info/address/13STWgarJY21fZAHhNMsA3bia5L52zx5qv

https://blockexplorer.com/address/13STWgarJY21fZAHhNMsA3bia5L52zx5qv


Clearly the blockchain.info explorer is missing the latest transaction:

https://blockexplorer.com/tx/43a8712cbdb0f6fe304858e40920be8d35d90fc2d6b0f9ae3c834ae037197305

but it is still visible and blockchain.info explorer:

https://blockchain.info/tx/43a8712cbdb0f6fe304858e40920be8d35d90fc2d6b0f9ae3c834ae037197305


So why is blockchain.info explorer not showing the right amount of unspent inputs for the said address?

It is the following transaction.

https://blockchain.info/tx/98023274befba1e6726e7a6a1b73f122c83bf56692eb84f94d5754005df57953

I sent it from Blockchain.info wallet after reading that unconfirmed tx will be dropped if unconfirmed after 72 hours.
I would not mind getting the tx rejected by the network and trying with a higher fee but that is not happening.

I can not send it again from Blockchain.info wallet because it says that balance is zero on that address.

What are my options?

It was clear that massive shift over the last weekend was BTC being exchanged for BCH (in addition to spaming the BTC network).
I doubt any new fiat money came amidst this mess.

Now couple of days later it seems like a very expensive way to show that you have the biggest d***

Those were real BTC exchanged for BCH that now can not do a round trip without losing 50% of its "fiat" value.

Can someone illuminate me why a rational party would do such a thing?

[WHAT SHOULD I DO WITH MICROSD CARD AND USB STICK?]

I am not familiar with Linux. That is the reason I am asking the question.

I used the following process to derive my private keys and use them for bitcoin cold storage.

1. Ordered Raspberry Pi, MicroSD card and USB disk exclusively for this purpose.
2. Copied NOOBS from raspberrypi.org onto microSD card on a windows machine.
3. Checked hash of NOOBS with MD5 and Checksum utility.
4. Saved bitaddress.org, keybase.io/warp wallet and iancoleman BIP 39 pages on the USB disk.
5. Started RaspberryPi.
6. Installed Raspbian from NOOBS microSD card. Raspberry Pi was never online or connected to any other device except Sony TV via HDMI cable.
7. Opened Chromium in incognito mode and opened the pages under 4)
8. Created first private key on bitaddress.org
9. Plugged that private key into warp wallet and created another private key
10. Plugged that private key into BIP39 as the seed for 24-word mnemonic.
11. Typed in password as the 25th seed.
12. Wrote that down.
13. Checked public addresses via QR code generator and mobile phone on google to verify that they are unknown entities in online space.
14. Plugged wiped Trezor into windows machine and used secure seed recovery.
15. Transfered bitcoins to that address.

Questions that I have are:
WHAT SHOULD I DO WITH MICROSD CARD AND USB STICK?

Please state reasons for choosing one of the options.

Options:

1. Burn 'em. It is not worth risking your BTC for 20 bucks of disposables.

2. Wipe both. If so how?

3. You can use both because the process that you described does in no way, shape or form leave a trace that a malicious party could use to restore your master private key or seed?

I would like to LEARN what happens with such drives under Linux distribution and also recycle them in order to repeat the same process for another altcoin or a smaller BTC amount that I can use as semi-cold storage.

Thanks

?

Bitfinex, Yobit do not although they trade it.

Thanks.

...and why are they valued at 5000$ and 134$ respectively at the present moment?

I want to check for myself.

I am sorry if I do not trust a single wallet that handles the private keys as if it was 0800 - toll free number.

Usability, safety and ergonomics of most cryptocurrency products is brutally substandard compared to any other software.

The course of open source is obvious.
If you do not leave your code open source you gain no trust.
If you do you risk being forked with an one-liner, so what is the point?

That is why billion plus projects like Neo, Ether do not have a decent wallet.
That is why Neo which is supposed to be the next best thing to sliced bread displays your private key and saves it unencrypted in a file.
That is why Mycelium can not implement Segwit addresses for months under HD wallets which probably requires two lines of code.
This is why there is no decent Android bitcoin wallet and the list goes on.....

Is there a way out of this curse?

I watched some videos, decided I should get familiar with under the hood mechanics of Bitcoin through Python and and the usual way to install Python bitcoin library was ...

pip install bitcoin

That worked only as far as import bitcoin being recognized by shell and Jupyter notebook but no commands that I expected (for example random_key(), privtopub() etc.) were available.
Tried afterwards:

pip install pybitcointools

Same story.

Did some reading and found out there are conflicting libraries so went to the github repository of
https://github.com/vbuterin/pybitcointools

Installed directly from downloaded .zip file after more reading with

pip install .

after going to the unzipped folder

Still the stuff does not work as expected.

Help a bro out of this mess!
Questions:
1. What python bitcoin library is the most recent/relevant, feature rich?
2. If I installed another one before the 'best' one can they conflict?
3. How do I uninstall an undesired one?
4. Where is a good guide on this pip install nightmare?

Thanks

Is there such a tool?

Meaning if I enter my master public key to derive the addresses and show me balances?
Monitoring of cold storage would be the intended use.

Is there an online tool or an Android wallet that can convert a Segwit address private key (generated via mnemonic seed on https://iancoleman.github.io/bip39/ under BIP49 derivation path) to a correct public address?
Both Mycelium android app or bitaddress.org come up with the same public address that is incorrect and does not start with 3.

I am doing this within the scope of Trezor testing. Trezor wallet generated with the same same seed offers Segwit addresses but I feel uncomfortable sending BTC to an address whose keys I am not able to restore with multiple tools.

Has anyone tried it? How do they do it, i.e. what service are they using?

This subject ties into my different ideas of designing a cold storage.

Part of the idea was to store the 24 word seed in randomized order in a bank safe (this should prevent malignant government or bank related parties from stealing my BTC).
In addition to that I would encrypt the order and the instructions to my "heirs" and store it in a dead-man's switch email service.

I do not feel comfortable leaving unencrypted information online in any way shape or form.

So I would like to encrypt the instructions and the order of the seed.

First I looked to PGP but disadvantages are:
1. complicated
2. no user-friendly software
3. error-prone with multiple lines of encryption
4. servers etc.

I thought PGP was an overkill for the problem I have anyway so I thought why not try symmetrical cypher.
To that end I did some searching online and read that AES-256 should be sufficiently strong tool for the job.

To get acquainted with the technology I usually start with an online tool. So I tried encrypting simple messages like "Cheers" with a password "onetwo" under the following pages:

https://aesencryption.net/
https://www.browserling.com/tools/aes-encrypt
https://encode-decode.com/aes256-encrypt-online/

Literally none of the pages came out with the same result.

And the champion is

http://www.bierkandt.org/encryption/symmetric_encryption.php

Which not only does not come up with the same results, but spits out different results every time you click on Encrypt (although the text and the key remain the same).

So could someone with the knowledge of subject please explain what is going on:
1. I am too dumb to use the pages properly
2. I am using wrong settings
3. The pages in question are spitting random junk out
4. something else

Thanks

Many of the withdrawals from Poloniex were almost instantaneous.

That leaves me wondering how do they initiate something that comes from users input ("hot side") to send out coins from the "cold" side so quickly?

For exaple

m/44'/0'/0'/0/1

Could someone provide an explanation?

I compared results of the two sites

bitaddress.org
bitcoinpaperwallet.com

I generated a private key using bitaddress.org

The key is:

KyuXav8xGTtUwgZP4V4FAHxdp7ktkzEEudUWXj19v4kpvbGcdHvA

I then used both sites to encrypt the private key with bip38 passphrase: "numberone"

bitaddress.org is ready to print the following encrypted key:
6PYKHgxkMHgogDj168W3LULC56QmrhBtMk3HojmBVcbP3cZr4SttZbb7qw


and bitcoinpaperwallet.com is ready to print the following encrypted key:
6PRHytQcwdJBZhcYSsRBCv5USV21NA1LQjKMTqE3TSofmTxsF8UpYKBjLT

Both sites give the same public key:
15Nmh1S7nB3paLbTTLqu5gXyt2dj7cdCeH

NOW PLEASE POINT TO ME TO AN ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM THAT I AM MISSING OR IS THERE A HUGE PROBLEM?

How can I ever be confident that encrypted keys can be reversed back when I get such disparaging results?

I am paranoid by design and by professional deformation.

Suppose you have the following tools available:

1. two Trezor hardware wallets
2. offline bootable PC with Ubuntu
3. bitaddress.org site burned to a CD
4. BIP39 passphrase and mnenomic code generator burned to CD
5. passguardian.org Shamirs secret sharing page burned to CD
6. offline printer to print and laminate paper wallets
7. metalstamps to stamp seeds/keys to metal plates if need be
8. two rented safe deposit boxes in two banks in two different European jurisdictions

How would you go about designing a "perfect" cold storage that should fulfill the following criteria:

1. be resistant to my death hence inheritable
2. be reistant to my amnesia
3. be resistant to being denied physical access to both safe deposit boxes
4. be resistant to malevolent staff opening the contents of the safe deposit boxes
5. be resistant to goverment confiscation/access denial to your safe deposit boxes

So basically I want no other entity (spouse, underage children, bank staff, evil government officials) to be able to spend my bitcoins as long as I am alive and with a functioning brain.
I also want to be able to comitt to memory a seed or an encryption method that would grant me access to bitcoins if I am not able to access the cold storage in safe deposit boxes.
Ultimately I would need to leave clear instructions in case of my death so that the family would be able to reconstruct access to those bitcoins.

I have some ideas but would like to hear flaws in my design.

1. PAPER WALLET ROUTE

One way to go about it would be to create paper wallets, print them offline, encrypt them with a strong passphrase (for example Diceware generated) using BIP38 and store them in two separate safe deposit boxes.
The secret passphrase would be easy to memorise for me and could be split using sharding into 3 pieces (2 safe deposit boxes and my home for example) so that you would need access to all of those in order to decrypt the paper wallets.

It prevents goverment or the bank staff from spending your bitcoins but if you find yourself unable to access the physical location of your paper wallets you are doomed.

2. TREZOR MNEMONIC SEED

You load your Trezor hardware wallet and stamp the seed on metal plates in a randomly generated order that you put in one safe. In another safe you put an encrypted message that is simply the order in which you have to put the mnemonic seed to be able to access bitcoins. You distribute the passphrase to unlock the order in the same way as in design No. 1.

You carry your Trezor with you (your home) hoping that even if it gets stolen nobody will be able to break the PIN.

This method has the advantage that with some memory technique you should be able to remember the seed yourself and reuse it should you be locked out of access to your safe deposit boxes.



Is all of this an overkill? Are there simpler ways?

Assume the following:

1. you created your private keys on an offline computer
2. you encrypted your private keys using BIP38 also offline
3. you used dices and Diceware word list at your table at home to create a strong passphrase
4. you printed your private keys on a printer that was offline

Should you under this scenario still avoid saving your encrypted private keys online?

If BIP38 is power intensive and bruteforce resistant with even a reasonable password (let alone one Diceware-generated) why should you be worried about scanning your private keys and uploading them to a cloud for example (that way you would have access to them whereever you might find yourself?)

I watched the following video on Youtube and it is scary how weak any passphrase is as a seed for brainwallet:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foil0hzl4Pg

That makes me wonder if by the creation of paperwallets and encryption of privatekeys with a "weak" passphrase (I have no idea what would constitute a strong passphrase) we run the risk of accidentally found paper wallets with encrypted private keys being brute forced by the knowledgable finder of such a paper wallet?

Hi!

I have 2 Blockchain wallets. One dating back from 2013, one made in 2017.
I am able to access both and was able to send funds from both as well as receive funds on the newer wallet.
UI on both looks indistigishable.

It is my understanding that they did not have hierarchical deterministic (HD) wallets back in 2013.

The question relating to this topic are:

1. How do I know if any of my wallets is LEGACY vs. NEW?

2. If my old wallet is a LEGACY wallet how do I retrieve private keys?

3. If my old wallet is a LEGACY wallet is the 12 word backup seed the same seed that can be used in Mycelium or Electrum or is it some proprietary seed that they used internally?

Thanks  a lot for help!