>invented system for exploiting corporate IP
>don't want to go to jail
>write paper
>post paper online
>let anonymous developer make the ideas
>become early adopter

profit and win!!

it gets better...
>patent pending
>used to prevent non anonymous development or use
>prevent large companies from using the coin
>large companies have to choose: use the coin and get sued by me or get perpetually owned by my intellectual property exploit

Hilarious!!

On the Lumsden Economy, Nemesis Contract, and Timeline of Uploads
A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash and Intellectual Property System
Donal Lumsden
dlumsd1@lsu.edu

    A large feature of any economy is currency or a medium of exchange.  Currency is traditionally based on something of relative scarcity in order to maintain value.  Gold has been used as a basis for currency due to its intrinsic value and scarcity.  One criticism of gold backed currency is its inelasticity.  Government currency offers elasticity at the price of potential corruption.  Governments create artificial scarcity of their currency by limiting the supply in order to allow the currency to retain value.  As a result, users of government currency must have faith that the government will keep the supply of currency low.  Satoshi Nakamoto made an innovation for alternative, digital currencies by relating the introduction of new Bitcoins to the scarce resource of computational power through an intractable problem.  In this paper, another scarce resource is proposed for the basis of digital currency: innovation.  Rather than basing digital currency on proofs of work, the author proposes basing digital currency on proofs of innovation.

The author asserts the hypothesis that monetary compensation of an entity for generating intellectual property is governed on average by the following equation:


Where M represents monetary compensation
N is an integer representing the number of people involved in the organization
A is a constant > 0

The author asserts that this hypothesis is a logical conclusion of an entity’s ability to utilize an exploitive strategy in a competition to win a zero sum game, government granted monopolies.  The author proposes that if this equation is true, then this represents an unbalanced strategy in intellectual property.  By definition, an unbalanced strategy is exploitable.  A balanced strategy would be of the form:


    If the proposed hypothesis is valid, a certain intellectual property dilemma occurs as a result: the Lumsden Dilemma. The Lumsden Dilemma is summarized as such: compensation for innovation is important for economic advancement, but the end result of a government intellectual property system is to remove the necessity of compensation paid to innovators. The Lumsden Dilemma is dependent on the Lumsden Hypothesis; the more employees under contract in an organization, the more undeserved compensation that organization will receive through a government intellectual property system.  As a result, the most lucrative strategy for an organization is to be the largest organization.  
     A valid Lumsden Hypothesis results in an economy with a few massive organizations rather than a large number of smaller organizations.  Once the outcome of few large organizations has been achieved, these organizations can offer less and less compensation to their innovative employees, because financial compensation is largely dependent on the organization’s size rather than the innovations produced by the organization.  Once a certain threshold has been surpassed, the vast majority of profits attained through a government intellectual property system can be allocated to share holders and non innovative employees, rather than the innovators themselves.  


The object of the game is to have more value than your competitor at the end of the game;
2 entities (EA, EB) are in direct competition;
Each party has a file (FA, FB) with respective values (VA, VB);
EA has a number of employees NA;
EB has a number of employees NB;
Once a constituent has been exposed to a message there is no way of proving the removal of the message from the constituent;
Public disclosure of a file (F) results in the loss of the associated value (V) for the controlling entity (E);

Competing parties are allowed to pay a competitor's constituents to publicly disclose a message through the use of anonymous payment methods;
Constituents can publicly disclose a message without risk through the use of anonymous internet access;
If a message is disclosed, the chance a given constituent disclosed the message is 1/N where N is the number of constituents exposed to that message;
Constituents make decisions based on the options with the highest expected value governed by the equation:


Result of Proposed Strategy with Game: The smaller the ratio of 1/N, the more likely an entity will have a file publicly disclosed by an employee to collect the reward;

    The use of original disclosure of an innovation as the basis for currency has the potential to transform a capitalist economy.  Deemed the Lumsden Economy, the value of the currency in circulation will scale on a 1:1 ratio with the value of innovations disclosed by citizens of the economy.  This solves the problem of an inelastic money supply, by allowing the value of outstanding coins in the system to grow proportionately to the growth of the economy.  The use of original disclosure of innovation as the basis of currency gives Lumsden’s Currency intrinsic value in the form of useful information.  Implementations of a novel intellectual property and currency system are utilized to provide incentive for economic growth through innovation.  This new intellectual property system is designed with open source file sharing in mind, while retaining value for innovators through the network effect.  Such a system should align with the future of manufacturing: distributed production by micro factories such as 3D printers.
 
    A proposal of the Ethereum Project is the creation of a turing complete block chain, meaning any program could be coded and executed within a block chain.  As a result, many types of contracts could be developed, along with many iterations of an essentially similar contract.  The proposed Nemesis Contract produces a cryptographic currency specific to a file upload, and allocates a percentage of that currency X% to the uploader(s), and the rest (100-X)% to a network of seeders who provide access to the file and prevent file deletion, censorship.
 
    Inventors or uploaders submit files to a cryptographic ledger, forming a timeline of files.  Upon the upload of each file, an upload specific currency is generated.  The number of upload specific coins generated per upload is fixed.  X% of these upload specific coins will be transacted to the uploader(s) over time while (100-X)% will be transacted to seeding miners over time.  The author is proposing a crypto currency backed by the intrinsic value of files submitted by a network of uploaders, a new type of P2P currency miner.
 
    To provide incentive for users to both seed and upload files in exchange for an upload specific currency, that currency must have some scarcity.  One way to drive scarcity is through advertising revenue.  By hosting advertising slots in a region specific to an upload, and selling advertising rights through auctions of the upload specific currency, there will be demand for that upload specific currency as long as there is demand for upload specific advertising.
>I don’t believe this is necessary. In my opinion, the information has intrinsic value without forcing advertising to be sold in upload specific coins
 
    The threshold for file uploading is dependent on the value paid to the uploader and the cost of uploading the file.  If the information of the file is worthless then uploading the file to the system will be a waste of the uploader’s time and payment for uploading, limiting reclaimed and frivolous claim submissions.  A small fee could be charged to the uploader to prevent the upload of small value files and spam uploads.  In general, it is good practice to keep this fee as low as possible to prevent giving an advantage to rich uploaders, whose information may not be any more valuable to the economy than a poor uploader.  Paying the uploader a fixed fee would create a fundamental inefficiency in the system as an upload’s value would drop due to an incentive to submit poor claims for the reward, hence the use of upload-specific currencies.  
 
    The block chain for such a system becomes a randomly generated, randomly changing sequence of uploaded information.  New uploads add information to the end of the timeline of uploads.  Elimination of the seeding network for an upload results in the redaction of the complete file from the “Timeline of Uploads” leaving behind only a hashed version of the uploaded file.

    One potential contract would pay upload specific coins between the seeding network and the uploader in a 1:1 manner. Rather than giving 50% of all potential coins outstanding immediately, the uploader’s coins are vested over the life of the seeding process.
 
    Seeders are paid with inflation of upload specific currencies for the uploaded files that they seed.  Seeders provide a decentralized network of storage and hosting.  The value of such a network is related to its ability to survive an attack and its ability to provide the content to other users.
>Proof of storage miners may be used with the main goal of preventing censorship and deletion of the upload, then users who want to view content can separately negotiate a price for downloading the file based on the price of bandwidth usage, supply and demand.  
 
    The aforementioned system of currencies intends to directly monetize the creative process.  The system of currencies intends to bring equality to intellectual property markets by providing incentive for transparency and compensation for open sourcing information.  The system of currencies intends to provide incentive for uploaders to publish files.  The peer-to-peer intellectual property system intends to maximize the efficiency of the economy by allowing free markets to competitively value novel claims in the form of uploaded files, by giving the ability to claim inventions to a larger population such as people who can’t afford filing fees/enforcement of a patent, by allowing claimers to be rewarded for pseudonymously publishing claims such as trade secrets of an employer, by providing incentive to publish ideas of ingenuity immediately rather than after years of government deliberation and patent filings, by removing government bureaucracy from intellectual property, and by removing the need for lawyers in order to receive compensation for ideas.

References
Satoshi Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer to Peer Electronic Cash System.” https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
John F. Nash Jr., “Ideal Money and the Motivation of Savings and Thrift.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Je22xKQekCk
Vitalik Buterin, “Ethereum: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform.” http://www.ethereum.org/ethereum.html

You are espousing ideas that I invented.  They are good ideas, but I haven't seen much indication from oocook5u that this is what is actually going to happen. 

Furthermore,  where can I find a graph of Datacoin's inflation rate?

It would be nice to hear this from the developer himself.  I would love if this were actually going to happen. 

The idea that all data will be stored on a single chain and mined by lots of people, not knowing what could be on the chain, defies logic.  Most people do not want to risk getting arrested just to receive some credits inside a computer. 

Also, I would like to hear the developer comment on changing storage payments from a payment made to the miners to a proof of burn.  Without this, the claim that "data coins have intrinsic value" is completely misleading. 

thanks

I would enjoy a debate.  Argue away.  

I'm not quite sure what you mean by this, but I think I have a clue.  I believe you do not foresee how incentive for innovation will promote the growth of ideas and technologies that feed many people.  

I am not a socialist or a nazi.  I am a capitalist.  I have proposed a way to split up the wealth dependent on a scarce resource that is not money or even "physical world" resources.  

This is a good question. 

I see a need for a constant inflation rate for the non-upload specific currency, while upload specific currencies have a fixed number of total possible coins outstanding. 

It could be POS or POW.  That's really a question for the tech guys.  I believe either one could be used. 

Unlike any other currency, the main way to mine is by uploading valuable information.  If you want to make money as an early adopter, you could upload songs, movies, inventions, books etc. 

Of course, you could also make money through money (POW mining if used, purchasing IPO shares, mining as a seeder)

what are you talking about?  

Satoshi's currency is based off of computers solving cryptographic problems.  My idea is to base a currency off of people solving actual problems.  Please clarify your claim that I am increasing the centralization of power and using corporate fascism.  

I am proposing an intellectual property system that directly competes with the IP system made by the government, how is that fascist?

its outlining a digital economy.  In some ways I would agree.  It is clearly disconnected from real world, because the entire economy exists within cyber space. 

On the Lumsden Economy, Nemesis Contract, and Timeline of Uploads
A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash and Intellectual Property System

    A large feature of any economy is currency or a medium of exchange.  Currency is traditionally based on something of relative scarcity in order to maintain value.  Gold has been used as a basis for currency due to its intrinsic value and scarcity.  One criticism of gold backed currency is its inelasticity.  Government currency offers elasticity at the price of potential corruption.  Governments create artificial scarcity of their currency by limiting the supply in order to allow the currency to retain value.  As a result, users of government currency must have faith that the government will keep the supply of currency low.  Satoshi Nakamoto made an innovation for alternative, digital currencies by relating the introduction of new Bitcoins to the scarce resource of computational power through an intractable problem.  In this paper, another scarce resource is proposed for the basis of digital currency: innovation.  Rather than basing digital currency on proofs of work, the author proposes basing digital currency on proofs of innovation.

The author asserts the hypothesis that monetary compensation of an entity for generating intellectual property is governed on average by the following equation:


Where M represents monetary compensation
N is an integer representing the number of people involved in the organization
A is a constant > 0

The author asserts that this hypothesis is a logical conclusion of an entity’s ability to utilize an exploitive strategy in a competition to win a zero sum game, government granted monopolies.  The author proposes that if this equation is true, then this represents an unbalanced strategy in intellectual property.  By definition, an unbalanced strategy is exploitable.  A balanced strategy would be of the form:


    If the proposed hypothesis is valid, a certain intellectual property dilemma occurs as a result: the Lumsden Dilemma.  The Lumsden Dilemma is summarized as such: compensation for innovation is important for economic advancement, but the end result of a government intellectual property system is to remove the necessity of compensation paid to innovators.  The Lumsden Dilemma is dependent on the Lumsden Hypothesis; the more employees under contract in an organization, the more undeserved compensation that organization will receive through a government intellectual property system.  As a result, the most lucrative strategy for an organization is to be the largest organization.  

     A valid Lumsden Hypothesis results in an economy with a few massive organizations rather than a large number of smaller organizations.  Once the outcome of few large organizations has been achieved, these organizations can offer less and less compensation to their innovative employees, because financial compensation is largely dependent on the organization’s size rather than the innovations produced by the organization.  Once a certain threshold has been surpassed, the vast majority of profits attained through a government intellectual property system can be allocated to share holders and non innovative employees, rather than the innovators themselves.  


Game Description
The object of the game is to have more value than your competitor at the end of the game;
2 entities (EA, EB) are in direct competition;
Each party has a file (FA, FB) with respective values (VA, VB);
EA has a number of employees NA;
EB has a number of employees NB;
Once a constituent has been exposed to a message there is no way of proving the removal of the message from the constituent;
Public disclosure of a file (F) results in the loss of the associated value (V) for the controlling entity (E);

Strategy to Combat the Lumsden Dilemma
Competing parties are allowed to pay a competitor's constituents to publicly disclose a message through the use of anonymous payment methods;
Constituents can publicly disclose a message without risk through the use of anonymous internet access;
If a message is disclosed, the chance a given constituent disclosed the message is 1/N where N is the number of constituents exposed to that message;
Constituents make decisions based on the options with the highest expected value governed by the equation:

EV = Σ (i --> n) of [Pr(i) * Incentive(i)];

Result of Proposed Strategy with Game: The smaller the ratio of 1/N, the more likely an entity will have a file publicly disclosed by an employee to collect the reward;

    The use of original disclosure of an innovation as the basis for currency has the potential to transform a capitalist economy.  Deemed the Lumsden Economy, the value of the currency in circulation will scale on a 1:1 ratio with the value of innovations disclosed by citizens of the economy.  This solves the problem of an inelastic money supply, by allowing the value of outstanding coins in the system to grow proportionately to the growth of the economy.  The use of original disclosure of innovation as the basis of currency gives Lumsden’s Currency intrinsic value in the form of useful information.  Implementations of a novel intellectual property and currency system are utilized to provide incentive for economic growth through innovation.  This new intellectual property system is designed with open source file sharing in mind, while retaining value for innovators through the network effect.  Such a system should align with the future of manufacturing: distributed production by micro factories such as 3D printers.
 
    A proposal of the Ethereum Project is the creation of a turing complete block chain, meaning any program could be coded and executed within a block chain.  As a result, many types of contracts could be developed, along with many iterations of an essentially similar contract.  The proposed Nemesis Contract produces a cryptographic currency specific to a file upload, and allocates a percentage of that currency X% to the uploader(s), and the rest (100-X)% to a network of seeders who provide access to the file and prevent file deletion, censorship.
 
    Inventors or uploaders submit files to a cryptographic ledger, forming a timeline of files.  Upon the upload of each file, an upload specific currency is generated.  The number of upload specific coins generated per upload is fixed.  X% of these upload specific coins will be transacted to the uploader(s) over time while (100-X)% will be transacted to seeding miners over time.  The author is proposing a crypto currency backed by the intrinsic value of files submitted by a network of uploaders, a new type of P2P currency miner.
 
    To provide incentive for users to both seed and upload files in exchange for an upload specific currency, that currency must have some scarcity.  One way to drive scarcity is through advertising revenue.  By hosting advertising slots in a region specific to an upload, and selling advertising rights through auctions of the upload specific currency, there will be demand for that upload specific currency as long as there is demand for upload specific advertising.
>I don’t believe this is necessary. In my opinion, the information has intrinsic value without forcing advertising to be sold in upload specific coins.  This does help to add definite value to the currencies.  
 
    The threshold for file uploading is dependent on the value paid to the uploader and the cost of uploading the file.  If the information of the file is worthless then uploading the file to the system will be a waste of the uploader’s time and payment for uploading, limiting reclaimed and frivolous claim submissions.  A small fee could be charged to the uploader to prevent the upload of small value files and spam uploads.  In general, it is good practice to keep this fee as low as possible to prevent giving an advantage to rich uploaders, whose information may not be any more valuable to the economy than a poor uploader.  Paying the uploader a fixed fee would create a fundamental inefficiency in the system as an upload’s value would drop due to an incentive to submit poor claims for the reward, hence the use of upload-specific currencies.  
 
    The block chain for such a system becomes a randomly generated, randomly changing sequence of uploaded information.  New uploads add information to the end of the timeline of uploads.  Elimination of the seeding network for an upload results in the redaction of the complete file from the “Timeline of Uploads” leaving behind only a hashed version of the uploaded file.

    One potential contract would pay upload specific coins between the seeding network and the uploader in a 1:1 manner.  Rather than giving 50% of all potential coins outstanding immediately, the uploader’s coins are vested over the life of the seeding process.
 
    Seeders are paid with inflation of upload specific currencies for the uploaded files that they seed.  Seeders provide a decentralized network of storage and hosting.  The value of such a network is related to its ability to survive an attack and its ability to provide the content to other users.
>Proof of storage miners could be used with the main goal of preventing censorship and deletion of the upload, then users who want to view content can separately negotiate a price for downloading the file from these miners or anyone holding the file based on the price of bandwidth usage, supply and demand.  
 
    The aforementioned system of currencies intends to directly monetize the creative process.  The system of currencies intends to bring equality to intellectual property markets by providing incentive for transparency and compensation for open sourcing information.  The system of currencies intends to provide incentive for uploaders to publish files.  The peer-to-peer intellectual property system intends to maximize the efficiency of the economy by allowing free markets to competitively value novel claims in the form of uploaded files, by giving the ability to claim inventions to a larger population such as people who can’t afford filing fees/enforcement of a patent, by allowing claimers to be rewarded for pseudonymously publishing claims such as trade secrets of an employer, by providing incentive to publish ideas of ingenuity immediately rather than after years of government deliberation and patent filings, by removing government bureaucracy from intellectual property, and by removing the need for lawyers in order to receive compensation for ideas.

References
Satoshi Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer to Peer Electronic Cash System.” https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
John F. Nash Jr., “Ideal Money and the Motivation of Savings and Thrift.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Je22xKQekCk
Vitalik Buterin, “Ethereum: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform.” http://www.ethereum.org/ethereum.html

I'm more worried about my ideas for contracts getting stolen. 

I'm so happy to know that you troll threads other than my own

I have a LEGITIMATE QUESTION.  I haven't seen this addressed but I also didn't read everything. 

Traditional Proof of Stake mining means whoever has the most money gets the most inflation, paid out of transaction fees.  Considering the "Ethereum foundation" is starting with .5x, they will have a considerable advantage in this.  Who controls this foundation/website and where that money goes?  …because even the inflation from POS will be a considerable amount of Ether. 

worst case: total failure, no block chain, no ether returned, all fundraising money is gone!!! HAHAHA

duh man

I will make a prediction for you:

In less then 2 years, there will be a total armageddon for government based intellectual property.  Is it possible that you would like to delay this outcome to save yourself money? 

THANKS FOR KEEPING MY THREAD BUMPED.  IF YOU HAVEN'T NOTICED, ALL THE IMPORTANT INFORMATION IS IN THE FIRST POST.  PEOPLE HAVE TO READ THAT BEFORE SEEING YOUR STUPID TROLL REMARKS.  YOU ARE A MORON AND HELP MY IDEAS GET SEEN BY MORE PEOPLE. 

Wait a second… you're a promoter of anarchist money and yet you deride people for partaking in illegal activities such as illicit substances.  shame on you!!!!

In one way it appears not to matter: "Oh well if we increase the price there will just be less ETH outstanding.  If we decrease the price there will just be more ETH outstanding"

The swindle here is subtle, and I am going out on a limb just theorizing how it will work:  There will be a fixed fee for transferring ETH just like there is with Nxt.  By increasing the price, the people with more ETH get more from proof of stake mining by way of transaction fees. 

I remember when I was 19 and these people leading this one organization (Pumps & Pipes, a 'collaborative technology conference') wanted to uphold me as "young 19 year old genius inventor going to save the world."  

Its a marketing strategy.  Everyone likes to think of some young mind who will revolutionize the world.  While all that was going on, the organization was looting all the profits from my inventions behind my back.  When I tried to sue them, my dad who was involved with the organization got involved to step up the coercion.  Its always a bunch of bullshit.  



Sorry Vitalik, you're probably screwed.  You will understand the value of the decentralized intellectual property system soon enough!!! (once you realize the people upholding you as a "creative genius" have walked away with the money of your innovation stuffing their pockets)