If you are in the US, call your local FBI office (easy to obtain at http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field) they are very friendly and cordial. Also file with the www.ic3.gov they are the FBI's internet crimes division. I also encourage you to file with Action Fraud in the UK even if you are outside of the UK. Their filling process allows for complaints outside the UK in a very straight forward way. Unless this clown and all of the co-conspirators, that even includes Mr. Jason Yates who benefited from the overall transaction. If they do not make good on the BTCs taken there is no much they can do. Well, I guess they can be on the run for the rest of their lives and never return to see any of their family members, that is an option. -Andre this! |
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Why does my payment always say, "Paid btc: below the minimum"
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Who ever invented waypoint syncing parallax scroll should be shot and killed. makes navigating web pages difficult.
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I guess i am never going to earn a payment? I made a lot of posts but don't think i ever received a pay
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This is not very reassuring, nor would it want me to be comfortable trusting my hard-earned money at the marketplace. If an arbitrator must be "voted in" by existing arbitrators then someone could potentially buy up a lot of arbitrator accounts to create additional arbitrator accounts which would further the attacker's ability to scam. Seems pretty far stretched IMO. Keep in mind there will be a reputation system for arbitrator. Buying a lot of good reputation to make scams wouldn't last very long before any body figure it out and all reputations of these account will be affected. That would be a very costly and risky scam operation. Someone could buy up a bunch of accounts with positive reputation and these accounts with positive reputation would vote their "scam" accounts to be an arbitrator. The accounts that are purchased would continue to act honestly, but the accounts that were "voted in" would not be honest It would still require the scammer to highjack the whole voting pool. How many accounts would need a scammer to vote himself as arbitrator every single time? At what cost? It still seems far stretched to me. If the arbitrators that vote are chosen through a random process among the best reputations, that would make almost impossible such attacks. , use the accounts with good reputation "honestly", vote in additional accounts that can work as escrow, scam with the newly voted-in accounts, then sell the existing "honest" accounts at the same price they were purchased for (or potentially for more as they would have theoretically gained additional reputation by continuing to act honestly). This is a very similar vulnerability that PoS altcoins have  You still need to put a lot of money upfront taking the risk that you'll be able to sell all of them at the same rate. Again. It is pretty far stretch to assume someone will buy enough account to be able to highjack the whole pool. Excellent spelling there Einstein. you take the weight right out of your argument with poor spelling. |
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this is so freaking cool! great job dev!
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Lol, why wouuld you give away free btc? just feeling generous?
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Explain to them that bitcointalk is full of scammers and they should avoid it at all costs.
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Can't wait for this project to see fruition. It is a really exciting, unprecedented step in the right direction for decentralized technologies. Great job!
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The speed at which this has descended into bullshit is remarkable.
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I have heard that the new Mintpal exchange was running OpenEx backend. If this is true, we know that Moolah is not a serious company. No one would use OpenEx backend unless they were:
a) suicidal
b) stupid
c) capable of highly customizing it and fixing the security vulnerabilities(I'm looking at you Bittrex)
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saturday's game was sloppy, but inevitably the hogs find away to lose.
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That's great and all
I think I would have respected them more if they had just vanished. But to wait this long before making any kind of contact is just unbelievable. Even if they lost access to their forum account I'm sure there's some way they could have got the word out. Make a new forum account. Chat on any of the other sites where they know people. Anything but just sitting silent this long leaving everyone to sweat. My guess is they got cold feet, perhaps someone got an accurate dox on them and they wanted to paint themselves as victims and return a small % of the coins rather than exit the community as confirmed thieves. Otherwise I don't see why it would take them this long to reach out. of course. hackers dont' stick around to delete all your forum/social media accounts. they steal your coins and be gone. this whole thing smells of bullshit to me. |
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Is you snitchin or what ?
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BBJG  |
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thanks to this thread i made a decent profit on a small investment i made into goldcoin recently. trading straight alpha bro'z
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Interesting attack indeed but h4xx0r who did you quote with the idea of giving to the next miner a share of your coinbase tx? It's trivial to give to the next miner outside the coinbase transaction by sending the reward as a transaction using one of the current inputs. Sure, then you have to scrape the bitcoins from elsewhere. To recap the attack in laymen's terms: If somebody paid 10,000BTC in transaction fees, miners would not care about block rewards for the next 10,000/25=400 blocks. Any miner that thinks it could outrun the biggest other miner would try to do so. If there is a draw between the top miners, such a battle could take a long time. If the top miners hold 10% of the mining power, they might try even when the other had a head start and was slowly building a chain that's growing faster than the own chain as they could still call their friends of other pools to team up catch that guy, essentially to the point where all miners took one side or the other and the weaker group gives up. Also the attack does only work if the biggest selfish miner is bigger than the total of his run-up competitor with all non-selfish miners, so it assumes a pretty corrupt mining landscape. The attack's effects: During such an episode, massive re-orgs would happen, clients would act strangely, Finney attacks would be slightly easier etc. and we would have a slightly higher level of drama. And we will never know who sponsored that drama  but it would not be a cheap endeavor. In additional to Danny's point above, you also have the issue that someone would need to incur the financial burden to pay these TX fees in the first place. There would be little economic benefit for someone to offer such a large TX fee, especially considering that the benefactor of such attack is unclear (therefore anyone attempting to profit off of an attack may or may not actually benefit in the event such attack is successful in slowing down the network). IMO this attack vector would be something that is very easy to fix - simply fork the blockchain to institute a maximum TX fee on a per block and per TX basis, the max TX fee on a block basis could be a rolling average (plus some additional margin) of the last 'n' blocks and the max TX fee on a TX basis could be "x" times the min recommended TX fee, and if a TX would warrant larger then the max TX fee then the TX can be split up into smaller TXs. it would be a State actor or a someone who stands to lose alot to a technology like bitcoin who would carry out an attack like this. The purpose of the post isn't fear it's education. i think the goal is clear. a currency not controlled or easily defeated by malicious actors. Bitcoin does not pose a serious threat to any major government that would have these kind of resources. Also for the amount of money that it would take to start an attack (to give a large TX fee to the miners) would be better spent on miners (either buying them outright or renting hashpower) to be used to attack the network via other means as a lot would need to take place at once in order for this attack to work Well, so what you're saying is. the attack is possible, but its like getting struck by lighting or the stars aligning? we all know those things have never happened, so therefore we should do nothing about this attack. Shall bitcoin endure stupidity, at the hands of incapable curators? If so, then whoa is bitcoin. To say that this is possible is like saying that the miners could go "on strike" in a way similar to how unions go on strike. It is not a real threat. Again, that is not adequate justification for allowing the vulnerability to exist. you find a vulnerability, you patch it and you move on
In theory someone could get really lucky and guess the private key of all of the addresses that contain bitcoin, however the chances of this happening are very small. Do you think we should patch the possibility of people being able to "guess" someone's private key? no, because elliptic curve cryptography won't likely be broken in my lifetime, and further more the strength of the checksum in bitcoin makes bruteforcing very difficult. On the otherhand, the block subsidy will decay to a point to where the scenario laid out in this discussion becomes a serious possibility and reason for concern, although it would take a "perfect storm" to exploit it. I would rather it not be possible at all then relying on the perfect storm never occurring. |
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Not Andreas' best interview. He appeared very shrewd and dismissive, almost like he was averse to all forms of Goverment, but his technical analysis was on point and i think the committee noticed both what he said and what he didn't say. The canadian goverment will introduce regulation in the aspect of bitcoin to fiat trading, but bitcoin transactions will likely remain free of traditional regulatory control.
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Interesting attack indeed but h4xx0r who did you quote with the idea of giving to the next miner a share of your coinbase tx? It's trivial to give to the next miner outside the coinbase transaction by sending the reward as a transaction using one of the current inputs. Sure, then you have to scrape the bitcoins from elsewhere. To recap the attack in laymen's terms: If somebody paid 10,000BTC in transaction fees, miners would not care about block rewards for the next 10,000/25=400 blocks. Any miner that thinks it could outrun the biggest other miner would try to do so. If there is a draw between the top miners, such a battle could take a long time. If the top miners hold 10% of the mining power, they might try even when the other had a head start and was slowly building a chain that's growing faster than the own chain as they could still call their friends of other pools to team up catch that guy, essentially to the point where all miners took one side or the other and the weaker group gives up. Also the attack does only work if the biggest selfish miner is bigger than the total of his run-up competitor with all non-selfish miners, so it assumes a pretty corrupt mining landscape. The attack's effects: During such an episode, massive re-orgs would happen, clients would act strangely, Finney attacks would be slightly easier etc. and we would have a slightly higher level of drama. And we will never know who sponsored that drama but it would not be a cheap endeavor. In additional to Danny's point above, you also have the issue that someone would need to incur the financial burden to pay these TX fees in the first place. There would be little economic benefit for someone to offer such a large TX fee, especially considering that the benefactor of such attack is unclear (therefore anyone attempting to profit off of an attack may or may not actually benefit in the event such attack is successful in slowing down the network). IMO this attack vector would be something that is very easy to fix - simply fork the blockchain to institute a maximum TX fee on a per block and per TX basis, the max TX fee on a block basis could be a rolling average (plus some additional margin) of the last 'n' blocks and the max TX fee on a TX basis could be "x" times the min recommended TX fee, and if a TX would warrant larger then the max TX fee then the TX can be split up into smaller TXs. it would be a State actor or a someone who stands to lose alot to a technology like bitcoin who would carry out an attack like this. The purpose of the post isn't fear it's education. i think the goal is clear. a currency not controlled or easily defeated by malicious actors. State actors do not usually attack a currency that is not backed by an enemy of theirs. A country will generally only launch an attack against an economy or a currency as part of a war. Since bitcoin is not backed by any country no country will ever be at war with the country that backs bitcoin Again, that is not adequate justification for allowing the vulnerability to exist. you find a vulnerability, you patch it and you move on |
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