Interesting. Still not prediction markets. But how? Also, I don't see the no counter-party risk part unless there is a big backer like AIG or a secondary market like Marsh-Mac, or a big-ass escrow account. Or a bond-type thing. Which ... has a counter-party.
Anyway: I like your enthusiasm. I like the applications you are pondering. I can not but help think (and yes, I've read your paper) that you haven't thought through the hurdles of implementation. Or are you simply looking at this as a theoretical economic game-theory model framework?

I am a fan of prediction markets too, after the OP is there more developments on this issue

Voting as a Keynesian beauty contest. In this approach, each of N shares in a prediction market
confers one vote for market arbitration [7]. In the common case, a supermajority of voters ( k > 2N/3) vote
the same way, this is considered a consensus and the winning shares will be paid out.
Of course, voters holding losing shares have a nancial incentive to vote contrary to reality. To address
this dilemma, all market participants are required to post a bond in addition to the price of the shares
they purchase. Any voters who vote contrary to an outcome with reaches a 2N/3 consensus forfeit their
bond, disincentivizing voters to vote against the likely nal outcome. The market might still fail to reach
consensus if, for example, there are two possible outcomes and all participants holding shares in the losing
outcome form a coalition and refuse to provide any votes necessary for the market to reach consensus. To
disincentivize this, if the market fails to reach consensus after a certain time period then all participants
forfeit their bonds.

The functioning of such a system in practice is unknown. In the case of markets with a genuinely unclear
outcome, the system creates a \Keynesian beauty contest," with all participants incentivized to vote for the
outcome they believe others will consider correct, rather than their own fundamental beliefs.

Ignoring such cases though and assuming a market with a clear outcome, this system produces an iterated
game of chicken between coalitions of voters holding shares in each outcome. If either coalition is able to
convince the other that they are absolutely going to spend their
N/2 votes on their preferred outcome, the other side is incentivized to back down and concede to prevent losing their bond. It is only be repeated play, in which participants have a reputation to maintain that will be damaged if they vote for a patently incorrect
outcome, that this game can be avoided. Thus we think this approach is less desirable as it requires tracking
reputations for all participants in the market and not just a small number of adjudicators.

My concern with the name Stealth Address is that it will end up being a niche feature that most people will not use.  Peter's "Ohh, privacy is good!" argument makes sense among his peers, but will fall flat on most common users.  Most people "Have nothing to hide" and aren't threatened by privacy, even with all the leaks and damage done.  This should be viewed as a standard and non-scary option, and not something for criminals and troublemakers only.  Stealth has those connotations, and I have a feeling it will become put in a corner.  I think he is also a bit biased in that the super-plugged-in people (aka meetup attendees) have heard of this term and it's too late to change it.  I disagree that it's really that well known, even within the Bitcoin community.

Names seem to fall out of describing how something is used or describing what it does.  We should also focus describing traditional addresses as well, to see if there might be a way to relabel them.

ssshhhh you're giving away my secrets

Cool 

If I understand it correct, the sender must know the stealth address from the receiver and the receiver must know the nonce from the sender, so information need to be exchanged both way, comparing with the standard way of only providing a receiving address?

0 seconds.  Anything else is idiotic.

There is currently a block subsidy of 25 BTC.  Ever second you aren't hashing for that is a significant reduction in gross revenue.  Now maybe someday when the block subsidy is much much lower and fees are much much higher (say in 32 years = 8 block subsidy halvings) it may make sense for some miners to go offline but today the math is simple ... you wait 0 seconds.

Well it isn't so much "ignored" as worthless.  How much are losing lottery tickets worth?  Just about as much as Alice hashes which don't solve a block.  I guess because the idea of mining for day, months, years without solving a block is depressing sometimes people have a tough time realizing there is no "progress" towards a block.  You either solve it or you don't.  

If you attempt 1 trillion hashes and none of them solve a block you are no closer to solving a block then before you started.


Still you are right there is no concept of "merging" transactions.  Even if there was Alice would be better served still going for the highest fee tx (no matter how painfully slow she is).  If Bob solves a block, Alice validates the block and removes all the included tx from the memory pool.  Alice then reselects the "best" tx, builds the merkle tree, and starts hashing a new block.  The amount of effort in constructing the blockheader is negligible compared to the trillions upon trillions of hashes (proof of work) it takes on average to solve the block.  It doesn't save Alice any time or energy to NOT include the most profitable txs.

wot?

I think you don't understand how mining works-- there is no such thing as a "faster" miner, just miners with more or less chance of creating the next block.

OP you logic doesn't make sense.  The slowest miner is going to take the highest fees.  If a miner solves the block they get the block reward (subsidy + all fees) if they don't then they don't.  There is no scenario where it makes sense to NOT take the highest fees and go for the lowest fees.  From the largest TH/s miners down to the single processor miners, if it is economical to mine it makes no sense to do anything other than take the highest fee tx first.