Is the blockchain explorer currently unavailable?
Sorry to hear that, can you show more details about your problems?
In the blockchain explorer page, when I click the "block" button, the latest blocks are not refreshed.
In addition, on the block page, there was one newest block missing.
Thank you very much for your support, we are fixing related issues. [moderator's note: consecutive posts merged] |
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I think the whole idea to stop large mining pools will just fail, because smaller miners are just naturally drawn to the large mining pools because of the higher potential for profits. A single miner will never be able to mine a block, but the collective pool will be able to do it and the gain is shared between the contributors.  Also, last time when there was a potential for a 51% attack, miners decided on their own to leave those large pools and to join up with other pools to prevent it. It is better to save the cow and to still get the milk...than killing it and getting no milk in the future.  In any way, centralization will be solved when more large pools in more countries would be established. The USA should start investing into the development of their own ASIC technology to compete with China. (Silicon Valley) The pools work like this: -->E --> Q --> ... --> X --> x1,x2,x3 A -->F --> R --> ... -->G --> ... --> I --> ... B --> J --> ... --> K --> ... The 2POW will work like this: A --> a1,a2,a3,... B --> b1,b2,b3,... C --> c1,c2,c3,... As shown above, under the pools model, there are multiple miners under each pool, and each miner has multiple sub-miners. In the end, each miner manages multiple nodes. Under the 2POW model, due to the infeasibility of cooperation, there will be multiple independent miners, and there is no incentive for cooperation between them. Each miner independently manages several nodes. The total number of miners will be affected by market environment and competitive. The total number of miners also reflects the degree of decentralization of the system. In fact, 2POW only broke the hierarchical relationship under the pools model, allowing miners to participate in competition more freely and fairly. Of course, the success of the project depends on many factors, such as community recognition, market environment, political environment, whether it is maliciously attacked when the system is not safe enough, etc. Therefore, everyone needs to be united.  |
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the idea of sharing work (pooling) is to have multiple workers that work in parallel to each other and not reply on other's solution. each worker gets its own work and submits the result of that work then gets the next parallel job.
if a worker has to wait for other worker to finish then it defeats the purpose and the optimization gained by parallel work.
Fair Point. I think you used a more concise and more logical way to express what I want to say. |
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The mining program of the testnet has been optimized and updated. Interested participants can download the latest program to participate in the test. Thank you
Test the COINS, will normal excavation be destroyed?
Yes, coins mined in the testnet will be destroyed in the mainnet. [moderator's note: consecutive posts merged] |
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I read your paper, and I don't think it would eliminate mining pools, but it probably would change how mining pools operate. A mining pool may have some miners calculate the first phase of the PoW, send the result to the mining pool, which in turn sends the result to other miners, who attempt to calculate the second phase of the PoW, and once solved will send the solved calculate back to the pool. Or individual miners calculate both phases of the PoW, sends the solution to the pool, which distributes the mining rewards to each miner.
I would also firmly reject the notion that one individual should be the only person who has contributed to finding a block. In the current implementation of bitcoin, there are 144 blocks found per day, and by some estimates, there are 400k daily users of bitcoin. This is far too few people controlling the confirmation of transactions for many people.
Sorry, I was busy with the testnet a while ago and did not reply to your message in time. It is very difficult for cooperation in the first phase. Since the completion time of the first phase is random and uncontrollable, the scheduler must wait for all collaborators to complete and then select the node with best luck to enter the second phase. But the time spent in the first phase is the longest. In addition, our difficulty adjustment strategy is designed in such a way that after the number of nodes in the entire network reaches a certain number, the difficulty of the first stage will be many times higher than the difficulty of the best luck in the second stage. Cooperation in the second phase is meaningless. |
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Sorry, we found a serious bug that is being urgently fixed, and the testnet will be restarted later.
Emergency bugs have been fixed.
Reply to related questions:
1 This testnet is only used to test mining logic and other systemic issues, the data will not be synchronized with the mainnet.
2 Since the mining mechanism is innovative, the interpretation of the mining parameters will be explained later.
Also need to explain.
Users who previously tested need to re-download the node wallet and run it again.
[moderator's note: consecutive posts merged]
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Hello, everyone We have just launched the testnet, and everyone is welcome to participate. If you have any questions, please leave a message at the forum or email us. Thank you all.  |
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Hello, everyone We have just launched the testnet, and everyone is welcome to participate. If you have any questions, please leave a message at the forum or email us. Thank you all. |
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Hello, everyone We have just launched the testnet, and everyone is welcome to participate. If you have any questions, please leave a message at the forum or email us. Thank you all |
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While I find the problem considered in the paper interesting, as bitcoin suffer from the threat of large mining pools.
Assuming the suggested construction is correct, I recommend the authors to extensively revise the paper to include a more convincing security analysis as well as benchmarks and comparisons with existing solutions.
Sorry for the misunderstanding. If you think there are some problems, you can put forward more detailed suggestions, thank you. |
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That requires a hard fork? Then I believe there should be support for the proposal to be tested/experimented on an altcoin, not on Bitcoin.
This is an altcoin, not on bitcoin |
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The testnet is about to open next week. After the test, we plan to design some bounty campaigns. Anyone have some relevant experience or ideas about bounty compaigns are welcome to make some good suggestions. |
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The risk of losing money is mainly the leakage of secret keys in memory. There have been vairous ways of protecting in-memory sensitive data. You can find a brief discussion on them in the Discussion section of VRF-based mining paper.
We are not going to discuss the risk of private keys. Thus, the equilibrium for this system is that, each miner mines by himself and gives no chance for other miners to steal his mining reward.
In this way, even though mining reward is not stable, cooperative mining is a worse strategy than solo mining.
For two miners A and B, A has two nodes and B has two nodes too. A lets these two nodes mined for an account, which means cooperation, and B lets the two nodes mine independently for two accounts, which means non-cooperation. Then the probability of A winning is 3/4, and the probability of B winning is 1/4. Regarding your solution, joining mining pools is still the best strategy for miners.
There is an optimal strategy for each miner. A miner can try first phase for lots of times until getting a small difficulty. The first phase can be run concurrently. A mining pool can spawn more concurrent executions of the first phase, so have more advantage on mining than solo mining. In this way, pooled mining is still profitable, and miners are still willing to join mining pools.
By 2POW, the probability of miner winning with cooperation is lower than non-cooperation. All A and B let their nodes mine independently, so the probability of A winning is 1/2, and B winning is 1/2. Miners with more nodes have a higher probability of winning, which is reasonable. Miners let their nodes mine independently, and the probability of a single miner winning is equal to the number of nodes it provides/total number of nodes in the entire network, which is essentially different from the current mining pool model. |
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Large mining pools are the biggest threat to decentralization. Any proposed weakened pools must be marked better.
Good luck.
You are right, good projects deserve more attention Somehow that is what is happening. BTC may look decentralize but there seem to be a central authority when it comes to mining the huge vote will disrupt consensus if there is something to decide. This project though may still now be very successful without support from big community. For it to have a community to begin with you will have to spend for bounty campaigns and promotions. Thank you for your attention. We do not plan to design pre-mining and ICOs, but after the test, we will still design some bounty compaigns. |
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What's wrong with BetterHash? What miners are really required to be doing is run their own full nodes, and remove the mining pool's political leverage on the network, right?
In fact, BetterHash does not increase the security of Bitcoin through increasing decentralization, it merely shifts the point of centralization. Because the pool operators still have a large amount of control, they may force miners to review certain rules under the threat of not being rewarded. 2POW proposed in this paper prevent cooperation between miners from the basis protocol, which make pools impossible. |
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In such solutions, non-outsourceable puzzles require miners to give private keys. If the private key signature is introduced into the puzzle, in addition to the risk of losing the funds, the problem of cooperative mining still exists, this will bring greater probability fluctuations to miners. If the private key signature is not introduced in the puzzle, We believe that there are no puzzles can't be outsourceable. because the puzzles required in the proof of work mechanism needs to have three conditions: Difficult to compute, easy to verify, and measurable difficulty. The puzzles that satisfies these three conditions must be outsourcable. |
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Right but you need to apply a reasonable "change" not a destructive one, your proposal is not helpful as long as it pushes small even medium range mining farms out of the business, just take a look at the link which I provided above-thread.
First of all, I agree with you. The most ideal strategy is the collaborator-takes-share strategy. However, for projects with an open consensus mechanism such as Bitcoin, participant competition is the strongest guarantee of network security, and the result of competition must be a winner-take-all. The disadvantage of the winner-take-all is that it brings large probability fluctuations to the participants. Excessive probability fluctuations will cause the participants to leave the network. In order to effectively reduce the probability fluctuation, we can use some methods such as: 1 Reduce the block time, as in the "luck" project, the block time is 10 seconds, which can reduce the risk of probability fluctuations to a certain level. 2 Many second prizes and third prizes can be set for each round of competition. It must be noted that any collaborator-take-share mechanism must be built on a second layer protocol. The basic protocol must be simple, so we will not design any complicated collaborative-take-share mechanism on the basis protocol. |
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