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Thank you very much for your attention. We will release a notice about the launch of the testnet within the next week.
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my point is that if we want to address the problem i outlined, we should take the route that is similar to the betterhash proposal instead of a route that is similar to what OP proposes.
The formation of the mining pool is a result of interest-driven, and the pool protocol such as stratum just designed a allocation mechanism to establish a stable relationship between the pool manager and the miners. If the POW protocol itself is not changed, any new pool protocol only changes the rules for allocation, and there are no substantial changes to the security of the network. |
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I'm not sure to fully understand your idea.
For the 4th part in your whitepaper, the difficulty function f(l) must be sensitive enough to l to satisfy E2(m)<E1(m), which means that f(max) must be much larger than f(min). How is f(l) designed?
I really don't understand the selfish mining attack in your whitepaper, and I don’t understand how the 1/m^2 was derived?
I think it can be understood like this. when two miners do not cooperate in mining, their luck l1 will be better, and the mining difficulty f(l1) will be lower; when they cooperate, their luck l2 will be worse, The mining difficulty f(l2) is higher. Although the power of their cooperation is *2, when f(l2)>2*f(l1), it can satisfy E2<E1. From another perspective, the variance of cooperation is greater than that of non-cooperation. one-cpu-one-vote is the result. Thank you very much. You are right. From the perspective of minimizing risk, the expected output of cooperation is low and the variance is large. Rational miners will choose to mine independently.  |
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While i don't understand much technical details and game theory of the paper, it doesn't solve the fact there are some wealthy individuals or company who have big mining farms (who usually have their own mining pool) and obviously have big contribution of network hashrate.
In this project, we obviously broke the monopoly of the mining pool's. There will be more independent miners in the network that have no connection with each other, rather than only a few scattered mining pools. |
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This is one of the flaws I'm talking about. If you can't determine the computing power, then how will any miner know how difficult it will be to mine, without using the difficulty value that you are proposing to replace? Computing power tells us what is the total hashrate in the bitcoin network, which secures it from miners trying to subvert it and creating a longer chain by forcing them to mine at a collective hashrate greater than that. In your method, which uses a function of luck (or think of it as a function of a "lottery number"), the function itself generating its own minima and maxima at arbitrary luck values, it is impossible to select a function to determine the second PoW difficulty that makes high enough difficulty for all luck values, because as you mentioned, an attacker can carry out a sybil attack against the first PoW to select the luck with the least difficulty, if he knows what the function of luck is. And everyone will know what that function is and determine its mathematical properties because it would have to be put in the open-source bitcoin core codebase.
Because the calculation of luck requires a lot of work, when the number of nodes in the entire network is large, the work of calculating luck will be much larger than that of the node with the best luck in the second phase of calculation. This also effectively prevents sybil attack in the first phase. |
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Thank you very much for your enthusiasm, we have received a lot of email feedback, we try to deal with each email in a timely manner.
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Mining pools collapsed the key value proposition of Bitcoin, namely, its decentralization. In turn, there has been considerable criticism and backlash. Many people in the community, including us, have called for technical measures to elemate large mining pools. In this post, we present a specific technical fix, called Two-Phase-Proof-of-Work (2PoW), to elemate large mining pools. In the Bitcoin network, as the computing power of the mining pool continues to increase, individual nodes can no longer independently participate in mining. Individual miners can only participate in mining by joining the mining pool, which completely deviates from "one-CPU-one-vote" vision. In essence, a mining pool is only equivalent to a node, monopoly mining is very terrible. In addition to unfair incentive, monopoly mining is possible for mining pools with greater computing power to be actively or passively carryed out attacks on the network, resulting in the collapse of the entire system. We believe that in the Bitcoin network, the formation of the mining pool is inevitable, because in the proof-of-work mechanism, the miner can outsource part of his work to other miners. The cooperative mining between miners is obviously superior to non-cooperative mining. The traditional view is that the formation of the mining pool is due to the ASIC. We believe that this is not the key reason. Many existing projects eventually formed the mining pool after adopting the anti-ASIC strategy. The strategy only limits the growth speed of the computing power of a single node, but the advantages of cooperative mining are still obvious. In the traditional proof-of-work mechanism, we believe that cooperative mining is inevitable. This is because there are no puzzles can’t be outsourced. We propose a two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism to solve the problem of cooperative mining. We introduce a concept of "luck" in each round of mining, that is, miners rely on luck to mine. We split each round of mining tasks into two phases of proof of work, the first phase is a lightweight task to complete the calculation of the luck , and then calculate the difficulty of the second phase of the mining task according to the luck, The higher the luck, the smaller the difficulty, the smaller the luck, the greater the difficulty. The second phase is to complete the corresponding work according to the corresponding difficulty. We can prove that under this two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, the expected output of miners' cooperative mining is lower than that of their non-cooperative mining. This is the key to achieving "one-CPU-one-vote". Whether each node belongs to the same miner, it will choose to mine independently. For more details about 2POW, refer to https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5254068.0Welcome to the Luck: https://lucknet.club Whitepaper: https://lucknet.club/doc/luck.pdfSome other media links: Discord: https://discord.gg/TN6XhcD Telegram: https://t.me/luck_cryptocurrency |
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So is there a test release for mining ? when is that date?
We will officially start testnet mining in July, and the mainnet will be officially launched a few weeks after testing |
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I do not think that a model like this will work. It's just turning the power monopoly into node monopoly. A miner who have more nodes, his monopoly remain unchanged.
Maybe I am wrong, I hope this mechanism works better.
The power monopoly is theoretically caused by cooperative mining. In this project, the cooperative mining is irrational, which will generate a large number of miners instead of mining pools. |
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The official website of the "luck" project has been officially launched at https://lucknet.club, and the recruitment plan for miners is also released immediately. Welcome everyone to pay more attention to it. I like to see this project in the announcement thread not here in the altcoin section, this is more like an announcement more than a discussion on the about what's happening in the altcoin, this project has more potential to get more supporters if they can move it in the announcement, checking on the website, miner and wallets are not available, I'll follow this thread for more interesting update. :)Thank you so much for your suggestion, we have moved the discussion to https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5254068.0 [ann] |
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What's new in luck:In the Bitcoin network, as the computing power of the mining pool continues to increase, individual nodes can no longer independently participate in mining. Individual miners can only participate in mining by joining the mining pool, which completely deviates from "one-CPU-one-vote" vision. In essence, a mining pool is only equivalent to a node, monopoly mining is very terrible. In addition to unfair incentive, monopoly mining is possible for mining pools with greater computing power to be actively or passively carryed out attacks on the network, resulting in the collapse of the entire system. We believe that in the Bitcoin network, the formation of the mining pool is inevitable, because in the proof-of-work mechanism, the miner can outsource part of his work to other miners. The cooperative mining between miners is obviously superior to non-cooperative mining. The traditional view is that the formation of the mining pool is due to the ASIC. We believe that this is not the key reason. Many existing projects eventually formed the mining pool after adopting the anti-ASIC strategy. The strategy only limits the growth speed of the computing power of a single node, but the advantages of cooperative mining are still obvious. In the traditional proof-of-work mechanism, we believe that cooperative mining is inevitable. This is because there are no puzzles can’t be outsourced. We propose a two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism to solve the problem of cooperative mining. We introduce a concept of "luck" in each round of mining, that is, miners rely on luck to mine. We split each round of mining tasks into two phases of proof of work, the first phase is a lightweight task to complete the calculation of the luck , and then calculate the difficulty of the second phase of the mining task according to the luck, The higher the luck, the smaller the difficulty, the smaller the luck, the greater the difficulty. The second phase is to complete the corresponding work according to the corresponding difficulty. We can prove that under this two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, the expected output of miners' cooperative mining is lower than that of their non-cooperative mining. This is the key to achieving "one-CPU-one-vote". Whether each node belongs to the same miner, it will choose to mine independently. In luck network, the systemic risk of the network is no longer a 51% computing power attack, but a 51% node attack, that is, a mine owner has mastered more than 51% of independent nodes in the entire network. Attacks are destructive to the system. But obviously, it is much easier to master 51% of the computing power than to master 51% of the nodes. In addition, for the two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, if the number of honest nodes in the whole network is enough, for example, more than 1000 nodes, even if a miner has mastered 51% of the nodes, he wants to make a profit through a fork, he needs on average to mine 1000000 blocks to catch up with the main network, which is a huge cost. We are looking for: 1. If you have experience in social media, we would like to talk with you about spreading the project. 2. Some miners who would like to paticipating in mining. Feel free to contact us at Sherlock.Holmes.luck@protonmail.comSome links:Welcome to the Luck: https://lucknet.club Whitepaper: https://lucknet.club/doc/luck.pdfSome other media links: Discord: https://discord.gg/TN6XhcD Telegram: https://t.me/luck_cryptocurrency NewsTestnet has been opened, Welcome to join.
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The official website of the "luck" project has been officially launched at https://lucknet.club, and the recruitment plan for miners is also released immediately. Welcome everyone to pay more attention to it. |
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This is a unique concept I must say but everyone knows that in the crypto space, having a unique concept is one thing while being able to bring it into action or existence such that it will benefit all and sundry is another thing; and this is where the problems starts, usually after listing on exchange. To me, this is good but will be better or I will be glad to see that the team is building this project adequately while ensuring it achieves its full potential. I believe with this, the project will be a valuable and attractive one.
Thank you for your attention. We are actively advancing the research and development of the project. We believe that it can be officially started in a short time. |
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There's a notion of non-outsourceable Proof-of-Work puzzles, and Ergo Platform cryptocurrency has Autolykos PoW algorithm which prevents pool formation ( see https://docs.ergoplatform.com/ErgoPow.pdf for details). However, if smart contracts are powerful enough, still miners can do coalitions for most of NO-PoW schemes using collaterals , see this paper of my co-authorship https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/044 (published @ FC'20). So please consider your scheme against smart-contract powered pools. If the private key signature is introduced into the puzzle, in addition to the risk of losing the funds, the problem of cooperative mining still exists. If the private key signature is not introduced in the puzzle, We believe that there are no puzzles can't be outsourced. because the puzzles required in the proof of work mechanism needs to have three conditions: Difficult to compute, easy to verify, and measurable difficulty. The puzzles that satisfies these three conditions must be outsourced. |
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Thanks for your help sharing. I like this mechanism of action. Does it look like it will be better than Bitcoin? I also don't understand 51% attacks, can you share more information about 51% attacks?
Regarding the 51% attack, here is a simple comparison with Bitcoin's mining model. In the Bitcoin system, for example, honest miner A has 1000 nodes, and a malicious miner B has 1100 nodes, then B has 10% more computing power than A. B selfish mining only needs 10 blocks to exceed A . In a two-phase-proof-of-work system, for example, honest miner A has 1000 nodes, and the malicious miner B has 1100 nodes. Because the total number of nodes in the entire network is relatively large, the work of the first phase is much larger than the second phase (the work of the second phase is the work of the node with the highest luck), B's block generation time in the first phase has no advantage, and B's block generation time in the second phase will only be reduced by 1/10 compared to A's block generation time in the second phase. In two phases, the advantage of B's block generation time is very small. If B wants to implement selfish mining, it needs a lot of blocks to exceed A. |
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We propose a two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism to solve the problem of cooperative mining. We introduce a concept of lucky in each round of mining, that is, miners rely on luck to mine. We split each round of mining tasks into two phases of proof of work, the first phase is a lightweight task to complete the calculation of the luck , and then calculate the difficulty of the second phase of the mining task according to the luck, The higher the luck, the smaller the difficulty, the smaller the luck, the greater the difficulty. The second phase is to complete the corresponding work according to the corresponding difficulty. We can prove that under this two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, the expected output of miners' cooperative mining is lower than that of their non-cooperative mining. This is the key to achieving "one-CPU-one-vote". Whether each node belongs to the same miner, it will choose to mine independently.
I'm not against new ideas, but don't you think that this would make everything worst? Just think about it, a pool can split its miners as a single CPU, wait until one with luck gets the block and the right to mine, then join the proccessing power of that one pool, mine the block and split again. The bigger the pools is, the higher the chance to have "luck" will be and if that stays the same some of these pools will have a lot of luck with a really low difficulty, until at some point a big enought pool can monopolized it. Thank you for your attention. You are right. The more nodes, the higher the luck. However, for the two-phase-proof of work, any two miners or any two nodes in a pool, the output of cooperation must be less than that of non-cooperation. So for independent nodes, there is no motivation for cooperation, and this is the key reason for the formation of mining pools. |
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As Dark points out above, the two-part mining puzzle doesn't change the expected payoff: miners will just switch from spending 100% of their CPU hashing to spending most of it generating privatekeys so they can "get lucky". It might be easier to get substantive feedback if you stopped talking about "luck" and just said "we're using a form of POW that requires miner signatures so people can't share work". Which makes the real question why you need multiple puzzles? Why not do what Saito ( https://org.saito.tech) does and have a mining puzzle where the POW output is a hash of a signed message? There are deeper problems with "privatekey mining" that Saito solves that you should look at too -- one issue with the existing setup is that you're basically paying people to generate keypairs that let them do brute-force attacks on user balances. Thank you for your attention. Mining with private keys can effectively prevent cooperation between miners, but there is a risk of private keys being stolen. On the other hand, if we don't introduce some mechanisms for resisting cooperative mining, A miner will let all nodes mine for only one account, so that the small miner has no advantage, he has to choose leaving. By introducing a two-phase-proof-of-work mechanism, the output of cooperative mining will be less than that of non-cooperation, so the power owned by miner is equal to the proportion of the number of nodes he owns (for two miners A and B, A has 100 nodes, B has 50 nodes, B has 1/3 chance to win), which is obviously fairer than the traditional POW. In addition, because the calculation of the luck also consumes resources, a single miner cannot calculate the luck of multiple accounts in batches. |
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I'm not very much into mining because you need the money and the technical knowledge to implement but I'd like to see how it goes, based on your thread this is going to be CPU minable, when can you make an official announcement of this project, so we can see it's potential.
At present, we are doing simulation testing and block difficulty adjustment test of the project to meet the theoretical assumptions. Further plans for the project will be announced soon. |
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In essence, the proof-of-work mechanism is an effective way to resist sybil attacks, but it is conducive to the formation of mining pools. The two-stage proof-of-work mechanism proposed in the luck project is an upgrade of the proof-of-work mechanism. It not only effectively resist sybil attacks, but also prevents cooperation between miners to effectively resist the alliance and make the network more secure.
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