I trust Nimiq team, amazing team, but they are weak at marketing, it seems they even don't know how cryptocurrency marketing works.

2 billion totally and 1 BTC = 3487 ZLD, what the f thing!

Just calm down, guys, I am an ICO investor of this coin, I still believe in the team and this coin.

Monero has implemented bulletproof monthes ago, what is the status of this coin?

USDT has many problems, USD is better.

As far as I know, many whales in China dumped most of their coins,they would not be back in years.

Fomo3D数据查询网站：https://fomo3d.eu/，所以数据都能看到。

Fomo3D 简介及操作教程
官方游戏界面https://exitscam.me/6856
前言：如果智能合约代码设计的无缝可击，那么这就是一个没庄的 zijinpan 游
戏，韭菜们完全不用担心被收割不用担心官方跑路。目前由于以太坊太卡，潜力
完全没发挥出来。个人觉得它会超越加密猫，成为一个现象级的应用，第一轮会
持续几个月甚至一年。此游戏一出，感觉吊打 3m，完全没玩其他盘的兴趣。前
期玩家的 key 光靠分红就会赚很多。但是不可能结束不了，后期 key 的价格很
贵，比如到 1eth 一个 key，风险收益比让玩家不敢再玩下去，游戏就结束了。
最牛逼的是一般这种游戏原本是最后一个玩家买单，fomo3D 却是最后一个玩
家能把资金池所有 ETH 都收了，非常有趣的博弈。
一、前期准备工作
1、安装Google 浏览器
2 、 下 载 metamask 钱 包 插 件 ，
https://github.com/MetaMask/metamask-extension/releases
选择最上面的 4.8.0.zip，然后解压到文件夹

3、在谷歌浏览器输入 chrome://extensions 进入扩展页面，将下
载的文件拖到这个扩展页面进行安装或者选择开发者模式，然后点击
加载已解压的扩展程序。安装完之后会在右上角生成一个新的狐狸头小
图标，类似如图所示。

4、点击 MetaMask 的狐狸头图标，安装后第一次使用时会出一些提
示，一直点接受，如图所示。

5、进入钱包登录界面，这里用户有两种选择，一种是创建一个新的
DEN（DEN 是在 MetaMask 用密码加密存储的钱包），另一种是导
入已经存在的 DEN。这里先以创建为例，在上面的两个密码输入框
中输入一密码， 点击图中 “CREATE” 图标， 就创建了一个
MetaMask 钱包。MetaMask 会为用户创建 12 个英文助记词，一
定要保存好这些助记词，一定要保存好这些助记词，一定要保存好这些
助记词，在其他钱包导入这个新创建的账户的时候有可能需要这些助记
词。保存好这些助记词之后，点击下面的按钮，进入钱包页面，
如图所示。最后就可进行充币了。

二、游戏简单操作方式
1、用装有 metamask 的 Google 浏览器打开官方游戏界面。
http://exitscam.me/6856  （教程编写不易，请尽可能用此链接注
册多多给予支持）。
2、游戏页面上会显示当前局奖金池累计的 eth 数量，当前每个 key
的购买价格，游戏的倒计时间等
3、各个按钮的解释如下。
4、以PC 电脑端操作为例，选择要购买的 key的数量（1,2,5,10,100）
后，点击“Send ETH”按钮，自动弹出 MetaMask 钱包的确认页面
5、点击“SUBMIT”后耐心等待此次交易被以太坊矿工确认。
6、买入key 后就坐等系统分红，持有key 的玩家会从系统每一笔
Key 的订单中获得收益。
7、只要有人买入 key，游戏倒计时间便会被重置。
8、选准时机做最后一个买入 key 的玩家，游戏倒计完毕，从而赢取
大奖（奖金池里 48%的 eth）


三、游戏细节介绍
fomo3D 是一款部署在以太坊网络上的乐透游戏类（Dapp）。
游戏相关的智能合约代码完全公开，游戏开发人员对游戏没有修改和
作弊的权限。
这款 DAPP 是完全去中心化的，一直可以运行直到以太坊网络
挂掉。无论奖金池里的资金有多么诱人，系统只会按照智能合约写定
的规则来进行分配。
游戏规则：
1、一局游戏开始,系统自动按 24 小时开始倒计时。
2、玩家可以花eth 买入一个或者多个key，key 就是分红权,key 越
多，得到的分红越多。
3、只要有人成功购入 key 时，游戏倒计时便会被重置，即重新从 24
小时开始倒计时。
4、玩家购买 key 所花费的 eth 会充入奖金池，之前买入过 key 的玩
家会从奖金池获得分红。
5、随着游戏的进行，key 的价格会越来越高，购买一个key 所需的
eth 会变多。
6、没人购买 key 游戏倒计时便不会被重置，24 小时倒数完毕，游戏
结束。
7、游戏结束，最后一个购买key 的玩家为最终获胜者，其赢得资金
池里 48%的 ETH。
8、资金池里的 ETH 48%分配给获胜者， 2%分配给社区基金会，剩
余的 50%按照四种团队模式进行分配
四、游戏运行逻辑
1、为什么要买入key？
买入key 意味着拥有了分红权，拥有的 key 越多，能从奖金池获得
的分红就越多。
新人不间断分红不间断,分红可以随时提取。
2、怎么保证后来者甘心花高价买 key?
当 key 的价格高到咂舌时，还会有人买入 key 吗？
按照系统规则，当无人购买 Key，游戏时间倒计完毕，奖金池里剩余
的资金会全部归最后一个购买key 的玩家所有。
资金池剩余的资金是一个很可观的数字，这会刺激胆大的玩家搏一把。
3、游戏什么情况下结束？
当 key 的价格高到一定程度，再也没有人愿意买入 key 时，游戏倒
计时便也不会被重置了。
24 小时倒计时完毕，游戏结束，最后一个购买 key 的玩家为获胜者，
会赢得 48%的 eth。
获胜者拿走48%的ETH,社区基金拿走2%,剩余的50%按照团队模式
进行分配。
4、游戏结束后会怎样？
只是这一局结束了。新的一局会再次开启，周而复始。
隐藏细节：持有P3D 币获得游戏分成
当没人买入key，游戏倒计时耗尽，奖金池里累计的 ETH 开始分配。
48%分配给游戏获胜者，2%分配给游戏的社区基金，剩余的 50%按
照团队模式来分，四种团队模式对应的分配模式不一样，这 50%有
如下几种分配可能。

Original position paper linke is not valid, the new one is https://tezos.com/static/papers/position_paper.pdf

Many coins claimed that they are competitors to Ethereum like EOS,AE but Tezos is the most potential one.

Totally agree, price would go up along with more exchanges listing.

这几天听了李笑来的录音，虽然早就知道他不是什么好东西，还是被恶心到了，区块链之所以不同于郁金香泡沫，不同于传销，是因为它确实有实际的用途，确实能提高生产效率，目前虽然有泡沫，这也再所难免，就像当初的互联网泡沫一样，长期来看价值投资终将回归。

Tezos Beta版上线，虽然还是测试版，但是现在发生的交易可以带进主网，Gate.io上也能交易了。
非官方Telegram：https://t.me/tezosplatform

期货玩家的所有赌注平台一览无遗，想爆你仓分分钟的事，就看他们想不想了，这也是为什么期货平台都是政府信用背书的，现在问题来了，你觉得okex信用足够吗，你相信巨额财富摆在徐明星面前他毫不心动吗？

Grid+获得德州能源零售许可证，目前了解到的只有Grid+获得了这个许可证，有潜力成为下一个独角兽
https://twitter.com/gridplus_energy?lang=en&lang=en

In my opinion, Nimiq is a very potential coin, what's your opinion, did you heard of it?

The essence of the security of the QuarkChain ledger consensus system is presented in §3.4 Consensus Algorithm on pg. 19 of the whitepaper.

In 2015, I had contemplated this (c.f. also) exact design of a root (master) layer proof-of-work blockchain controlling numerous proof-of-work blockchain shards. I quickly discarded the design idea because it’s so egregiously insecure.

And sub-seconds confirmations aren’t possible in proof-of-work because the block period must be orders-of-magnitude greater than the network latency (and network latency isn’t scaling by Moore’s law). Otherwise the orphan rate becomes too high (c.f. the derivation) such that the chain might not even converge on a longest.

The QuarkChain whitepaper claims that the percentage of hashrate needed to double-spend drops from just over 50% in Bitcoin’s Nakamoto proof-of-work to (at worst1) just over 25%, which is already a horrible reduction in security (and selfish mining would be 17%). But the actual security is even worse.

There are numerous game theory security vulnerabilities related to incentives compatibility, transaction fees, and the ability of the miners to move their hashrate around at-will between root chain and any of the shards. Which include vulnerabilities similar to those that Byzcoin attempts but fails to fix about Nakamoto proof-of-work, as well as the failure modes of Byzcoin which I cited in my analysis of OmniLedger. Additionally I describe another vulnerability as follows.

Unlike with Nakamoto proof-of-work where all miners have a vested interest in not defecting and they all thus validate the blocks of each other, QuarkChain destroys that Nash Equilibrium because with control just over 50% of the hashrate of a shard, the attacker can censor shard transactions and/or extort high transaction fees. With 10 shards splitting 50% of the system hashrate that remains from the 50% for the root chain, the attacker would only need 5% of the system hashrate to wreck such havoc. With 50 shards, the attacker only needs 1% of the system hashrate. Rented hashrate attacks on proof-of-work altcoins are quite plausible. Verge is a recent example that such attacks aren’t just theoretical.

To prevent DoS attacks which destroy the scalability of the sharding wherein an attacker simultaneously issues a transaction to spend on every shard (note for scalability that shards don’t validate other shards and root chain miners don’t validate any shards), the hostage UTXO must only be spent on another shard after recording in the root chain a lock commitment. The committed shard can then validate the hostage UTXO lineage before accepting the transaction. Yet the attacker’s hashrate could move to the targeted shard to sustain the censorship/extortion indefinitely.

The double-spending protection claimed by the QuarkChain whitepaper is impotent against the above attack, because it only records the shard’s block hashes in the root chain. Only the shard’s miners validate and determine the contents of the blocks in the shard.

Merkle tree based fraud proofs issued by honest observers can’t prove anything about censorship of transactions.

Presumably as a coordination mechanism to override the above attack, QuarkChain proposes the mechanism of super-nodes in §5.1 Horizontal Anti-Centralization Scalability Expansion on pg. 24 with the union of super-nodes providing validation for the root and all shards. What the QuarkChain designers apparently don’t realize (or don’t want us to realize) is that these super-nodes must collectively possess just over 50% of the system hashrate for their decisions on validation to be adhered to. So in essence QuarkChain must be run by an oligarchy of whales who coordinate their validation of the entire system. Centralizing a ledger is a way of obtaining scalability, yet a distributed and centralized database isn’t accomplishing anything for trustlessness and permissionlessness. The antifragility vulnerabilities of centralized cartel control are:

a single-point of weakness that can be attacked, e.g. by the government regulators.

the cartel wants to maximize the extraction of rents from the system.

such maximization may turn against the best interest and desired features the users of the system want and need.

OmniLedger which I analyze below resolves this problem by creating shards which have a PBFT consensus algorithm instead of proof-of-work (which has a higher security threshold of 67%) and the set of validators is randomized2 so that the attacker can’t target a specific shard so as to weaken the security below that of the root chain’s 50% proof-of-work security threshold. One disadvantage of the OmniLedger design is that the liveness drops to 33% which is one of the weakness of any deterministic Byzantine agreement protocol such as PBFT.

As shocked as I am that (Ethereum's Casper design team lead by) Vitalik expended 3+ years to produce a totally flawed slashing proof-of-stake design (c.f. also), I am perhaps even more shocked at the blatantly obvious insecurity of the Quark[Quack]Chain design considering the number of PhDs listed in the §9 Development Team on pg. 35 and §Advisors on pg. 37. But really this should be expected from an opportunity cost economics analysis in the current gold-rush FOMO (fear-of-missing-out) race to extract a slice of the greater fool, agape n00bs speculative bubble. Even dozens of celebrities are pimped in the gold-rush.

Seriously, QuarkChain is more or less as useful as any of the series of shitcoin parodies such as the 100% Useless Token and those [ANN]ounced by the outrageously hilarious Gleb Gamow, which include the Bitcoin Pussy “The Wife of Dick” and YuTü.Co.in “Catering to YouTube 📷 Creators”.

As I proceed below responding to the QuarkChain whitepaper’s summary analysis of competing attempts to design a scalable, decentralized, secure ledger consensus system, I’ll explain the tradeoffs in the extant, published designs for other projects such as Bitcoin (Nakamoto proof-of-work), Lightning Networks, Ethereum, EOS (DPoS including STEEM) , OmniLedger, and other proof-of-stake derivatives such as NEM, Nxt, NEO, Qtum, etc.. And hybrids such as Dash and PIVX.

In a subsequent section I’ll cover the DAGs such as Byteball, Hashgraph’s Swirlds, Iota, and SPECTRE. And finally hopefully I will add a section on reputation-based designs such as Radix (formerly named Emunie) and Stellar’s SCIP consensus systems.

1 The 25% presumes a large number of reasonably equivalently hashrate weighted shards that divides the other 50% into a very small percentage. Thus the 25% rises to for example ~30% if there are only 10 shards. That is in the presumptions of their (incomplete and inadequate) conceptual security model.

2 Note it wouldn’t be secure to randomize the validator sets for the proof-of-work shards of QuarkChain because unlike deterministic Byzantine agreement protocols, proof-of-work isn’t one vote per cryptographic identity (i.e. per validator). There’s no way to limit or know the hashrate of each such identity and that’s why it’s useless to even assign identity to miner validators in proof-of-work.

区块链的这三个特性按重要性排序应该是
去中心化：这也是区块链存在的原因
吞吐量：要想支持大规模应用，吞吐量是必须跨过去的门槛
易用性：区块链普及的基础，就像DOS用的人很少，Windows开始普及一样
如果一个项目必须要在三者之间权衡折中的话，理想的权重是去中心化5，吞吐量3，易用性2。

四年。

从Hero里面随机挑选的。