[2014-10-18] The Blacklist Debate: When is it OK to Meddle with Bitcoin’s Code?

[LiteCoinGuy]

The Blacklist Debate: When is it OK to Meddle with Bitcoin’s Code?

A row that broke out online this month has raised an important question about bitcoin: should people be allowed to code their own rules, and even opinions, into their own versions of the software that runs the network?

Dashjr had written a patch for Gentoo’s version of bitcoind that specifically blacklisted several gambling sites.

A code listing for the patch, which blocked other bitcoin addresses owned by organisations including Counterparty and BetcoinDice, can be found here.

...

However, the discussion raised some interesting questions. Some on the Gentoo bug discussion forum mused that coding a blacklist of addresses into an implementation of bitcoin constitutes censorship, and asked where that would stop, and who would decide what was blacklisted or not.

http://www.coindesk.com/blacklist-debate-ok-meddle-bitcoins-code/




so there cant be any blacklisting in my view.

[CoinMode]

One of the most important aspects of Bitcoin is that the entire infrastructure is accessible for everybody. Banks and regulators like to blacklist companies, and entire countries, from doing big business. Bitcoin never does this in any capacity. Not even in some weird gentoo version patch should we have any form of restriction directed at anybody or anything.

Bitcoin Neutrality is already a big issue with the BitLicense drama coming from the fat cats, and the last thing we need now are some of the core coders deciding who they want to let use the network.

[kjlimo]

I'm not sure it matters what anyone's views are other than the miners, right?  the system is setup to let the miners process or not process transactions...

So if we want to try to give oversight on that, then that puts us right back into the "old" system but with new technology.

Can't have it both ways.  Either, let the system do what it wants, or get ready for oversight, which would be focused on the largest of mining operations/pools.

We'll need to give incentives to those miners who we feel are doing what we want, otherwise, they'll just do whatever is most profitable/what they want, right?

[odolvlobo]

It is perfectly ok. Bitcoin is open source. You are free to change your copy in any way you want.

[Miracal]

I don't think it is a good idea to allow any individual code their own version of bitcoin core which will damage the single independent network of bitcoin. Some one may code the software to obuse bitcoin to get profit.

[kjlimo]

I don't think it is a good idea to allow any individual code their own version of bitcoin core which will damage the single independent network of bitcoin. Some one may code the software to obuse bitcoin to get profit.

It won't damage anything unless people choose to let it damage it, right?

[odolvlobo]

I don't think it is a good idea to allow any individual code their own version of bitcoin core which will damage the single independent network of bitcoin. Some one may code the software to obuse bitcoin to get profit.

There is no way to stop anyone from making changes to their copy of bitcoin core or from writing their own bitcoin client. That is an important feature of Bitcoin.

[teukon]

It's not a debate so much as an arms race:

• Camp A will develop blacklisting/tracking tools.
• Camp B will develop anonymising functionality.

Bitcoin's very life depends on Camp B's victory.

[rebuilder]

I don't think it is a good idea to allow any individual code their own version of bitcoin core which will damage the single independent network of bitcoin. Some one may code the software to obuse bitcoin to get profit.

I don't think it's a good idea to not allow any individual to code their own version of bitcoin core. The measures required to prevent it would be abhorrent and the bitcoin devs might "code the software to abuse bitcoin to get profit".

[occupier]

from https://www.bitjustice.org/Discussion/forumid/4/threadid/10/scope/posts

Common Misguided Arguments against Tainting or Blacklisting

1. It will ruin Bitcoin's fungibility
This flawed argument is largely based on the assumption that bitcoins are or should be as fungible as paper currencies. This is ignorant of the fact that bitcoins do not exist on their own right; rather they are simply properties or byproducts of the transactions recorded on the Blockchain - often referred to as the public ledger that does automatically and permanently record every single transaction with a unique ID. Paper currencies are inherently fungible since there is no automatic recording associated with each transaction as there is on the Bitcoin network. With or without blacklisting the transaction patterns and coin trails on the Blockchain can only be blurred through explicit effort such as laundering, mixing or excessive address hopping etc. Tainting or blacklisting is a reporting measure on a small sample of (stolen) funds, not a method for broad tracking. Reporting the serial numbers of stolen USD on websites would not be regarded as harming the fungibility of the dollar so why is the fear of blacklisting stolen bitcoins? Must be due to the fact that Bitcoin transactions are already chain tracked on the Blockchian thus making the currency much less anonymous as many had mistakenly believed before. Nonetheless, those using fungibility as an argument against tainting or blacklisting don't seem to be that much different than those who attempted to steal the bell while holding their own ears.

2. Somehow it will lead to more centralized authorities or control
Without an effective means of enforcement, any blacklist, whitelist or redlist is pointless one way or the other. This is exactly what happened to the tainting (tagging) attempt tried before. Any meaningful enforcement on the Bitcoin network will inevitably require the buy-ins from at least the majority of the network's participants. A blacklist published or approved by a central authority will unquestionably fail to gain such buy-ins. In other words, if enough people questioning the fairness or transparency of the listing process they will simply refuse to join force the enforcement technically, which will in turn doom the whole effort naturally. An opt-in blacklisting process could actually install long-term decision-making power within the people of the community. On the contrary, the concerted, flat dismissal of its potentials spells a word closer to authoritarian.

3. Illicit coins ill-begotten by innocent hands too will be frozen

The flaw in this argument (along with the misquote of a 1700s' Scottish monetary case) is to assume that a blacklist is to be used to invalidate coins when in fact it can only be used to aid in the potential reversal of some illicit transactions. Blacklisting an address known to be belonging to a perpetrator will in no way affect the coins sitting in a different address, however it does serve as a public alert before the innocent party receives the coins. Using the Scottish case as an analogy, blacklisting does not equate to saying the notes that the bank unknowingly received is invalid but rather can be seen as a simple public statement that a specific note had been stolen, thus all parties, especially banks need to be well aware when receiving notes.

4. This will be a futile effort
Coin tainting or blacklisting without speedy fund freeze certainly is a futile effort. Should we thus simply abandon the whole idea as an anti-theft strategy then? Should the public pursuit it the effort is deemed to be daunting. However, one outcome is already quite certain - it will never work if nobody believes in it.

[teukon]

Any meaningful enforcement on the Bitcoin network will inevitably require the buy-ins from at least the majority of the network's participants. A blacklist published or approved by a central authority will unquestionably fail to gain such buy-ins. In other words, if enough people questioning the fairness or transparency of the listing process they will simply refuse to join force the enforcement technically, which will in turn doom the whole effort naturally. An opt-in blacklisting process could actually install long-term decision-making power within the people of the community.

Such naivety.  Are AML/KYC regulations optional for major banks?  Are Google free to just ignore takedown requests concerning copyright or know-your-customer law?  If the technology of effective blacklisting in Bitcoin emerges and Bitcoin continues to grow then laws requiring mining firms to incorporate blacklists supplied by law enforcement will eventually appear.

[notthematrix]

If you use 1 adress one time there is no way to blacklist!
So what is the problem here?
let them blacklist , it will not be effective!

[DooMAD]

from https://www.bitjustice.org/Discussion/forumid/4/threadid/10/scope/posts

Common Misguided Arguments against Tainting or Blacklisting

1. It will ruin Bitcoin's fungibility
This flawed argument is largely based on the assumption that bitcoins are or should be as fungible as paper currencies. This is ignorant of the fact that bitcoins do not exist on their own right; rather they are simply properties or byproducts of the transactions recorded on the Blockchain - often referred to as the public ledger that does automatically and permanently record every single transaction with a unique ID. Paper currencies are inherently fungible since there is no automatic recording associated with each transaction as there is on the Bitcoin network. With or without blacklisting the transaction patterns and coin trails on the Blockchain can only be blurred through explicit effort such as laundering, mixing or excessive address hopping etc. Tainting or blacklisting is a reporting measure on a small sample of (stolen) funds, not a method for broad tracking. Reporting the serial numbers of stolen USD on websites would not be regarded as harming the fungibility of the dollar so why is the fear of blacklisting stolen bitcoins? Must be due to the fact that Bitcoin transactions are already chain tracked on the Blockchian thus making the currency much less anonymous as many had mistakenly believed before. Nonetheless, those using fungibility as an argument against tainting or blacklisting don't seem to be that much different than those who attempted to steal the bell while holding their own ears.

2. Somehow it will lead to more centralized authorities or control
Without an effective means of enforcement, any blacklist, whitelist or redlist is pointless one way or the other. This is exactly what happened to the tainting (tagging) attempt tried before. Any meaningful enforcement on the Bitcoin network will inevitably require the buy-ins from at least the majority of the network's participants. A blacklist published or approved by a central authority will unquestionably fail to gain such buy-ins. In other words, if enough people questioning the fairness or transparency of the listing process they will simply refuse to join force the enforcement technically, which will in turn doom the whole effort naturally. An opt-in blacklisting process could actually install long-term decision-making power within the people of the community. On the contrary, the concerted, flat dismissal of its potentials spells a word closer to authoritarian.

3. Illicit coins ill-begotten by innocent hands too will be frozen

The flaw in this argument (along with the misquote of a 1700s' Scottish monetary case) is to assume that a blacklist is to be used to invalidate coins when in fact it can only be used to aid in the potential reversal of some illicit transactions. Blacklisting an address known to be belonging to a perpetrator will in no way affect the coins sitting in a different address, however it does serve as a public alert before the innocent party receives the coins. Using the Scottish case as an analogy, blacklisting does not equate to saying the notes that the bank unknowingly received is invalid but rather can be seen as a simple public statement that a specific note had been stolen, thus all parties, especially banks need to be well aware when receiving notes.

4. This will be a futile effort
Coin tainting or blacklisting without speedy fund freeze certainly is a futile effort. Should we thus simply abandon the whole idea as an anti-theft strategy then? Should the public pursuit it the effort is deemed to be daunting. However, one outcome is already quite certain - it will never work if nobody believes in it.

The response to all that is actually quite a simple one:  If you want a coin with the ability to blacklist or block certain transactions, by all means go and code that coin.  See how many people start using it.  We'll be here waiting with an "I told you so" when it fails miserably.

[LiteCoinGuy]

Exposed: Luke-Jr plans on forcing blacklists on all Gentoo bitcoin users by default, for the second time

In his words

Me: u plan to implement transaction blacklisting as the default on gentoo again?

Luke-Jr: Spam filtering has been a standard part of Bitcoin Core since 0.3. Please ignore the trolls who want you to think there's something nefarious going on.

previous thread with over 500 comments

(WARNING: Bitcoin Address Blacklists have been forced into the Gentoo Linux bitcoind distribution by Luke-jr against the will of other core devs. Gentoo maintainers are clueless and not reversing the change. Boycott Gentoo now. )

simply ridiculous. forcing blacklists on bitcoind users of a linux distribution? apparently luke-jr is steadfast in being against software freedom


http://de.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/2pfgjg/exposed_lukejr_plans_on_forcing_blacklists_on_all/

[Keyser Soze]

from https://www.bitjustice.org/Discussion/forumid/4/threadid/10/scope/posts

3. Illicit coins ill-begotten by innocent hands too will be frozen
The flaw in this argument (along with the misquote of a 1700s' Scottish monetary case) is to assume that a blacklist is to be used to invalidate coins when in fact it can only be used to aid in the potential reversal of some illicit transactions. Blacklisting an address known to be belonging to a perpetrator will in no way affect the coins sitting in a different address, however it does serve as a public alert before the innocent party receives the coins. Using the Scottish case as an analogy, blacklisting does not equate to saying the notes that the bank unknowingly received is invalid but rather can be seen as a simple public statement that a specific note had been stolen, thus all parties, especially banks need to be well aware when receiving notes.

And who would determine what is considered illicit, some central authority?