Bitcoin Forum
May 30, 2024, 06:45:04 AM *
News: Latest Bitcoin Core release: 27.0 [Torrent]
 
   Home   Help Search Login Register More  
Pages: « 1 2 3 [4] 5 6 »  All
  Print  
Author Topic: A basic question  (Read 5587 times)
jonald_fyookball
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1302
Merit: 1004


Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political


View Profile
April 21, 2015, 02:09:34 PM
 #61

Phew... people should keep in mind that there effectively is an infinite amount of private keys, so every public key (and thus also address) has an infinite number of private keys that can access that address! Scary, isn't it? If you look at the math, it isn't anymore!

well there's 2^256 private keys and 2^160 addresses so yeah there's many private keys for each address,
but that's not really what's being discussed.

Cryddit's post is enlightening, in revealing that even MD5 is subject to collisions but
not pre-image attacks.

I'm not sure exactly why collisions are that important if they would happen rarely,
or how you would use that to attack a target.

R2D221
Hero Member
*****
Offline Offline

Activity: 658
Merit: 500



View Profile
April 21, 2015, 03:25:31 PM
 #62

For what it's worth, the MD5 break is of a very particular kind.

MD5 has a collision vulnerability, but it does not have a meaningful preimage vulnerability.

What that means is that it is now easy to construct two  or more documents that have the same MD5 hash (a collision), but given a hash value it is still damned hard to construct something which hashes to that value (a preimage).  

It's preimage resistance isn't quite perfect mind you; an attack has been found that takes 2123.5 operations to find a preimage, when it ought to take 2128 if its preimage resistance were as good as it was supposed to be.  So MD5, while completely broken in terms of collision reistance, is only about 1/24 as hard to find a preimage as it ought to be. In practice finding a preimage is still far beyond the amount of computing power that could be produced by a computer the mass of Earth in a time less than the expected lifetime of the sun.  

Of course, attacks never get worse ... and it's possible that the preimage attack can be extended somehow.  

Interesting. I was under the impression that MD5 was vulnerable against preimage attacks.

An economy based on endless growth is unsustainable.
no-rice-peas
Newbie
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 14
Merit: 0


View Profile
April 21, 2015, 11:04:59 PM
 #63

"A 2013 attack by Xie Tao, Fanbao Liu, and Dengguo Feng breaks MD5 collision resistance in 218 time. This attack runs in less than a second on a regular computer."

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5

There seem to be quite a few different md5 cracks which were found independently.

It appears that the government and Microsoft both encouraged the use of md5 until it was exposed publicly by Iranian computer researchers.

If md5 were used for bitcoin it would be possible for anyone to steal bitcoin.

If sha2 is compromised as md5 was, and if the government is covering that up in order to exploit it, as they did with md5, what are the implications?

It is safe to say other governments also have cryptography programs.
Cryddit
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 924
Merit: 1129


View Profile
April 21, 2015, 11:20:47 PM
 #64

If MD5 were used for bitcoin it would not be possible to steal coins, or at least not directly.  That would require preimages.

What would be possible would be constructing txOuts that could be spent by any of several different keys.  Which could be interesting, but doesn't lead to any immediate capability of theft.

It could be used in some kind of scam or confidence game though; two different keys capable of spending the same BTC25 could coexist in a wallet and most software would think the wallet had BTC50 in it, for example because neither key would appear to be a multisig or shared key. 

no-rice-peas
Newbie
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 14
Merit: 0


View Profile
April 22, 2015, 02:41:05 AM
 #65

If MD5 were used for bitcoin it would not be possible to steal coins, or at least not directly.  That would require preimages.

What would be possible would be constructing txOuts that could be spent by any of several different keys.  Which could be interesting, but doesn't lead to any immediate capability of theft.

It could be used in some kind of scam or confidence game though; two different keys capable of spending the same BTC25 could coexist in a wallet and most software would think the wallet had BTC50 in it, for example because neither key would appear to be a multisig or shared key. 



Among the several different md5 cracks is at least one that was used to forge a Microsoft certificate.

But you are saying that if md5 were used for bitcoin, it would be secure?

From Wikipedia
"In cryptography, a preimage attack on cryptographic hash functions tries to find a message that has a specific hash value. A cryptographic hash function should resist attacks on its preimage.

In the context of attack, there are two types of preimage resistance:

    preimage resistance: for essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is computationally infeasible to find any input which hashes to that output, i.e., it is difficult to find any preimage x given a "y" such that h(x) = y. [1]
    second-preimage resistance: it is computationally infeasible to find any second input which has the same output as a specified input, i.e., given x, it is difficult to find a second preimage x' ≠ x such that h(x) = h(x′).[1]

These can be compared with a collision resistance, in which it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x, x′ which hash to the same output, i.e., such that h(x) = h(x′).[1]

Collision resistance implies second-preimage resistance,[1] but does not guarantee preimage resistance.[1]"

---

It seems from the descriptions of the various md5 cracks that md5 lacks collision resistance, therefore you could find a second, or fabricated, input which would hash to a legitimate looking output
and
it lacks second preimage resistance which seems to equate to finding a second private key.

Considering the amount of bullshit that has been shoveled already in defense of md5 and sha2 my opinion remains that most likely they are cracked several ways by several governments and those overpaid slippery cunts are trying to drag the game out as long as they can.

The Bitstamp hack may be their undoing though. If that hack was actually a sha2 crack then you would think they would take pains to leave a fake forensic trail. More info will be coming out on that I imagine.
no-rice-peas
Newbie
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 14
Merit: 0


View Profile
April 22, 2015, 02:57:46 AM
 #66


Is it accurate that various government agencies were aware of flaws in md5 and yet continued to promote it as secure?

I don't know.  Do you have a reference for that?

Even if they were, it was private organizations that exposed the weaknesses so wouldn't that be a moot point anyway?


The malware that exposed md5 as weak was found by Iranians. It was evidently political malware that was created by several 'anti Iranian' governments.

Wikipedia has a timeline but if you look at actual forum posts on various sites it is clear that Wikipedia is presenting a distorted picture. Forum posts suggest md5 was actually considered quite secure until the Iranian issue.

The fact that private organizations uncovered it makes sense if governments were trying to keep the weakness secret.

Evidently a wide mix of governments were aware of flaws in md5 and used that knowledge for political games.

When Iranian researchers found the malware they gave it to Kaspersky to analyze and look for historical evidence and patterns. Kaspersky seems to have been a bit disingenuous, perhaps the Russian government was benefiting from the crack as well. At any rate, any Iranian can look at the evidence and decide how helpful the Russians actually were.

The bigger question is whether these putrid alphabet soup agencies engaged in a massive deception for years with md5, but then decided 'well let's start playing square now'?

Can we trust them now?
hhanh00
Sr. Member
****
Offline Offline

Activity: 467
Merit: 266


View Profile
April 22, 2015, 06:37:18 AM
 #67

Quote
It seems from the descriptions of the various md5 cracks that md5 lacks collision resistance, therefore you could find a second, or fabricated, input which would hash to a legitimate looking output

This is not what collision resistance implies. It would be true if it lacked pre-image resistance. Collision resistance means that you can find two messages that hash to the same value but you don't get to choose the hash value.

In the case of the MD5 certificate attack, they made two certificates that have the same hash: one is regular (SSL), the other is supreme (CA: Certificate Authority). They asked the root CA to sign the SSL one without problem. And then they put the signature in the CA certificate. Because they have the same MD5, the signature is valid for both of them.
They made a CA that appears to be trusted by the root CA. Their CA can issue SSL certificates that will be accepted by the rules of trust delegation.

So you see that this isn't applicable to bitcoin.

no-rice-peas
Newbie
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 14
Merit: 0


View Profile
April 22, 2015, 06:00:46 PM
 #68

Quote
It seems from the descriptions of the various md5 cracks that md5 lacks collision resistance, therefore you could find a second, or fabricated, input which would hash to a legitimate looking output

This is not what collision resistance implies. It would be true if it lacked pre-image resistance. Collision resistance means that you can find two messages that hash to the same value but you don't get to choose the hash value.

In the case of the MD5 certificate attack, they made two certificates that have the same hash: one is regular (SSL), the other is supreme (CA: Certificate Authority). They asked the root CA to sign the SSL one without problem. And then they put the signature in the CA certificate. Because they have the same MD5, the signature is valid for both of them.
They made a CA that appears to be trusted by the root CA. Their CA can issue SSL certificates that will be accepted by the rules of trust delegation.

So you see that this isn't applicable to bitcoin.


Okay. But here is from a 2004 article. 2004
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2004/08/cryptanalysis_of_md5.html

"This year, Eli Biham and Rafi Chen, and separately Antoine Joux, announced some pretty impressive cryptographic results against MD5 and SHA. Collisions have been demonstrated in SHA. And there are rumors, unconfirmed at this writing, of results against SHA-1."

"In 1990, Ron Rivest invented the hash function MD4. In 1992, he improved on MD4 and developed another hash function: MD5. In 1993, the National Security Agency published a hash function very similar to MD5, called the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). Then in 1995, citing a newly discovered weakness that it refused to elaborate on, the NSA made a change to SHA. The new algorithm was called SHA-1. Today, the most popular hash function is SHA-1, with MD5 still being used in older applications."

Bold added by me.

At this point anyone who does not know what the weakness was is not paying attention.
jonald_fyookball
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1302
Merit: 1004


Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political


View Profile
April 22, 2015, 06:10:44 PM
 #69

I don't think anyone knows what the weakness is but that was 1995 and there's been other collision attacks published since with SHA 1. 

what is your point?

no-rice-peas
Newbie
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 14
Merit: 0


View Profile
April 22, 2015, 07:04:02 PM
 #70

I don't think anyone knows what the weakness is but that was 1995 and there's been other collision attacks published since with SHA 1.  

what is your point?

2004, but my point has to do with the culture of both cryptography and intelligence.

The "weakness" was that the NSA had not broken it yet".

Most cryptographers are academics. They play the common academic game of justifying their actions. My guess is that a lot of academic cryptographers feel that 'state of the art' should be half a step, not a full step, ahead of 'old'. In other words they have the Marie Antoinetteish posture that "we are doing something good, promoting some higher value others don't see, and so we have certain responsibilities and privileges to enforce". i.e. "We will use cryptography to develop math across borders" etc. i. e. "rather than to do the honest work of providing secure cryptography that can be protected from attacks by anyone, including us".

Specifically I am referring to Snowden type leaks that show deliberate weaknesses built into U.S. cryptography, as well as research showing such deliberate shoddiness, such as the cryptobang article mentioned earlier. If you are not able to find the article, or a copy, I will provide links.

Coin security may be fun and games for some people but I stand to lose quite a high percentage of the little I have if it turns out that governments are going to enforce their academic values on the altcoin economy.
jonald_fyookball
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1302
Merit: 1004


Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political


View Profile
April 22, 2015, 07:41:05 PM
 #71

I don't think anyone knows what the weakness is but that was 1995 and there's been other collision attacks published since with SHA 1.  

what is your point?

2004, but my point has to do with the culture of both cryptography and intelligence.

The "weakness" was that the NSA had not broken it yet".

Most cryptographers are academics. They play the common academic game of justifying their actions. My guess is that a lot of academic cryptographers feel that 'state of the art' should be half a step, not a full step, ahead of 'old'. In other words they have the Marie Antoinetteish posture that "we are doing something good, promoting some higher value others don't see, and so we have certain responsibilities and privileges to enforce". i.e. "We will use cryptography to develop math across borders" etc. i. e. "rather than to do the honest work of providing secure cryptography that can be protected from attacks by anyone, including us".

Specifically I am referring to Snowden type leaks that show deliberate weaknesses built into U.S. cryptography, as well as research showing such deliberate shoddiness, such as the cryptobang article mentioned earlier. If you are not able to find the article, or a copy, I will provide links.

Coin security may be fun and games for some people but I stand to lose quite a high percentage of the little I have if it turns out that governments are going to enforce their academic values on the altcoin economy.

You're basically saying cryptographers aren't terrible concerned about security.  Doesn't that sound a little silly?

Also, putting backdoors into hash functions isn't like putting backdoors into operating systems or something like that.
I'm not an expert but I don't think its very doable as MD construction has been around a while.
Of more concern to Bitcoin would be how the ECC is implemented.

no-rice-peas
Newbie
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 14
Merit: 0


View Profile
April 22, 2015, 08:54:48 PM
 #72


You're basically saying cryptographers aren't terrible concerned about security.  Doesn't that sound a little silly?

Also, putting backdoors into hash functions isn't like putting backdoors into operating systems or something like that.
I'm not an expert but I don't think its very doable as MD construction has been around a while.
Of more concern to Bitcoin would be how the ECC is implemented.


I was not speculating about whether or not cryptographers were interested in security.

I was pointing out that many high level cryptographers have cooperated with government efforts to deliberately put weaknesses into algorithms.

I offered some links as well but you are disinterested?

The basic question is whether or not the security of any bitcoin, or certain other altcurrencies a person might hold, is dependent on the whim of gangster scum hiding behind inflated college degrees and cushy jobs.

The evidence overwhelmingly says that is the case.

I will refer you again to the cryptobang article, which has disappeared so you have to look for archives, or the Snow den leaks, which I think refer to NSA attempts to force cryptography to use weakened random number generators, flawed libraries etc.
jonald_fyookball
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1302
Merit: 1004


Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political


View Profile
April 23, 2015, 01:41:39 AM
Last edit: April 23, 2015, 02:28:40 AM by jonald_fyookball
 #73

I understand what you're saying but disagree with your conclusions.  Cryptography is a widely studied field.  While somewhat technical to be sure, I don't think it is so esoteric that there's only a tiny group of academics who can understand it.   I myself have read about how these hash functions work and the rounds of calculation that occur using bitwise rotation etc, enough to get a feel of them and the nature of their one way function which would be difficult to create backdoors for.  Because cryptography is widely known and studied, such a grand and international conspiracy as the one you're hypothesizing seems quite implausible.

Most conspiracies foisted on the public are created by influencing of public opinion through misinformation and also there's usually an aware group of conspiracy theorists who have some evidence to back their counter arguments and theories.  If you think hash functions are broken or compromised, find me someone technical who can explain why.  Just saying there's "gangster scum" out there who may be in cahoots with big brother is certainly not evidence.  There's nothing in the links you provided to back up your wild theories.

no-rice-peas
Newbie
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 14
Merit: 0


View Profile
April 23, 2015, 02:54:03 AM
 #74

I understand what you're saying but disagree with your conclusions.  Cryptography is a widely studied field.  While somewhat technical to be sure, I don't think it is so esoteric that there's only a tiny group of academics who can understand it.   I myself have read about how these hash functions work and the rounds of calculation that occur using bitwise rotation etc, enough to get a feel of them and the nature of their one way function which would be difficult to create backdoors for.  Because cryptography is widely known and studied, such a grand and international conspiracy as the one you're hypothesizing seems quite implausible.

Most conspiracies foisted on the public are created by influencing of public opinion through misinformation and also there's usually an aware group of conspiracy theorists who have some evidence to back their counter arguments and theories.  If you think hash functions are broken or compromised, find me someone technical who can explain why.  Just saying there's "gangster scum" out there who may be in cahoots with big brother is certainly not evidence.  There's nothing in the links you provided to back up your wild theories.

You have looked at the links on the cryptobang page and do not believe that the NSA is quite heavily meddling in cryptocurrency as well as deliberately fudging the trustworthiness of the cryptography they push?
jonald_fyookball
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1302
Merit: 1004


Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political


View Profile
April 23, 2015, 02:57:15 AM
 #75

link?

no-rice-peas
Newbie
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 14
Merit: 0


View Profile
April 23, 2015, 03:06:49 AM
Last edit: April 23, 2015, 03:16:53 AM by no-rice-peas
 #76

link?

The original page disappeared. The following might or might no be a faithful copy, I have not checked it.

https://criticl.me/post/what-nsa-created-cryptonote-2292

edit to add
I looked at the page enough to know that it contains much of the same material as the original but is not the exact page that was on cryptobang.
jonald_fyookball
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1302
Merit: 1004


Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political


View Profile
April 23, 2015, 03:19:39 AM
 #77

link?

The original page disappeared. The following might or might no be a faithful copy, I have not checked it.

https://criticl.me/post/what-nsa-created-cryptonote-2292

edit to add
I looked at the page enough to know that it contains much of the same material as the original but is not the exact page that was on cryptobang.

This is talking about "cryptonote" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CryptoNote

It is used in some altcoins.  Interesting (it uses ring signatures for greater anonymity) but irrelevant to the point you're trying to make, IMO.

no-rice-peas
Newbie
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 14
Merit: 0


View Profile
April 23, 2015, 03:27:29 AM
 #78

link?

The original page disappeared. The following might or might no be a faithful copy, I have not checked it.

https://criticl.me/post/what-nsa-created-cryptonote-2292

edit to add
I looked at the page enough to know that it contains much of the same material as the original but is not the exact page that was on cryptobang.

this is talking about "cryptonote" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CryptoNote

It is used in some alt coins.  Interesting, but irrelevant to the point you're trying to make, IMO.

Did you read any of the links? There are quite a few.

Two of them.

http://web.archive.org/web/20140912134430/https://cdt.org/blog/what-the-heck-is-going-on-with-nist%e2%80%99s-cryptographic-standard-sha-3/

http://web.archive.org/web/20141110221312/http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html



N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web
By NICOLE PERLROTH, JEFF LARSON and SCOTT SHANE
Published: September 5, 2013

The National Security Agency is winning its long-running secret war on encryption, using supercomputers, technical trickery, court orders and behind-the-scenes persuasion to undermine the major tools protecting the privacy of everyday communications in the Internet age, according to newly disclosed documents.
Enlarge This Image
Associated Press

This undated photo released by the United States government shows the National Security Agency campus in Fort Meade, Md.

This article has been reported in partnership among The New York Times, The Guardian and ProPublica based on documents obtained by The Guardian. For The Guardian: James Ball, Julian Borger, Glenn Greenwald. For The New York Times: Nicole Perlroth, Scott Shane. For ProPublica: Jeff Larson.
Multimedia
Document
Secret Documents Reveal N.S.A. Campaign Against Encryption
Graphic
Unlocking Private Communications
National Twitter Logo.
Connect With Us on Twitter

Follow @NYTNational for breaking news and headlines.

Twitter List: Reporters and Editors
Enlarge This Image
Susan Walsh/Associated Press

CITING EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT WEB James R. Clapper Jr., the director of national intelligence.

The agency has circumvented or cracked much of the encryption, or digital scrambling, that guards global commerce and banking systems, protects sensitive data like trade secrets and medical records, and automatically secures the e-mails, Web searches, Internet chats and phone calls of Americans and others around the world, the documents show.

Many users assume — or have been assured by Internet companies — that their data is safe from prying eyes, including those of the government, and the N.S.A. wants to keep it that way. The agency treats its recent successes in deciphering protected information as among its most closely guarded secrets, restricted to those cleared for a highly classified program code-named Bullrun, according to the documents, provided by Edward J. Snowden, the former N.S.A. contractor.

Beginning in 2000, as encryption tools were gradually blanketing the Web, the N.S.A. invested billions of dollars in a clandestine campaign to preserve its ability to eavesdrop. Having lost a public battle in the 1990s to insert its own “back door” in all encryption, it set out to accomplish the same goal by stealth.

The agency, according to the documents and interviews with industry officials, deployed custom-built, superfast computers to break codes, and began collaborating with technology companies in the United States and abroad to build entry points into their products. The documents do not identify which companies have participated.

The N.S.A. hacked into target computers to snare messages before they were encrypted. In some cases, companies say they were coerced by the government into handing over their master encryption keys or building in a back door. And the agency used its influence as the world’s most experienced code maker to covertly introduce weaknesses into the encryption standards followed by hardware and software developers around the world.

“For the past decade, N.S.A. has led an aggressive, multipronged effort to break widely used Internet encryption technologies,” said a 2010 memo describing a briefing about N.S.A. accomplishments for employees of its British counterpart, Government Communications Headquarters, or GCHQ. “Cryptanalytic capabilities are now coming online. Vast amounts of encrypted Internet data which have up till now been discarded are now exploitable.”

When the British analysts, who often work side by side with N.S.A. officers, were first told about the program, another memo said, “those not already briefed were gobsmacked!”

An intelligence budget document makes clear that the effort is still going strong. “We are investing in groundbreaking cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat adversarial cryptography and exploit Internet traffic,” the director of national intelligence, James R. Clapper Jr., wrote in his budget request for the current year.

In recent months, the documents disclosed by Mr. Snowden have described the N.S.A.’s reach in scooping up vast amounts of communications around the world. The encryption documents now show, in striking detail, how the agency works to ensure that it is actually able to read the information it collects."
no-rice-peas
Newbie
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 14
Merit: 0


View Profile
April 23, 2015, 03:34:14 AM
 #79

The article minus links.

Despite the fact that the website www.cryptobang.com is no longer on the web we have strong intentions for this information to spread further across the internet. Knowledge must be available to everyone. Neither NSA, nor CIA, nor any government must influence the information flow.

We sincerely hope and believe that the information will not just vanish from this website. We would like to extend our invitation to an open dialogue.

http://web.archive.org/web/20141106091836/http://www.cryptobang.com/2014/10/05/what-nsa-created-cryptonote-for/

A few months have gone by since Edward Snowden started telling the world about the National Security Agency’s mass surveillance of global communications. A mass hysteria that ensued in the wake of his revelations had brought a justified wrath by users on such high-tech giants as Facebook and Apple. There is a point of view that cryptocurrency Bitcoin, which has experienced sudden growth in terms of usage and value, is a project run by the US National Security Agency. It’s hard to believe but apparently NSA possesses groundbreaking capabilities in terms of obtaining any kind of information in any point in time. So the idea may not seem as farfetched as it sounds.

Given its alleged use in drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorist financing and other anti-social activities, a number of countries across the world strongly suggest against using or relying on the decentralized money. But where the underlying idea of cryptocurrencies comes from and who’s the true inventor of blockchain based coins? The first efforts at ecash algorithms started as far back as 1998 and not without funding from the US government. Also, Tor (software for enabling online anonymity) is a product of collaboration by NSA and DARPA intended initially for protecting government communications. It was sometime later that NSA begun tapping into traffic to and from the directory servers used by Tor to scoop up the IP addresses of people who visited it. Some experts suggest that Bitcoin was intended to be the same kind of Trojan horse that Tor had turned out to be. The two of them would have made a perfect combination of eavesdropping tools. But since the collapse of Silk Road (online market operated as a Tor hidden service) where Bitcoin has become the preferred payment method for much of the online underground, the ensuing arrests of its users became a clear evidence of blockchain analysis being a perfect tool for identifying Bitcoin wallet holders.

Some renowned cybercrime experts began to suspect the existence of backdoors in Bitcoin as far as 2012. For instance, Dorit Ron and Adi Shamir published their famous paper ‘Quantitative analysis of the full bitcoin transaction graph’ in 2012 causing quite a turmoil in the Bitcoin community. If we look at the charts from https://blockchain.info/ focusing on the time frame within which the paper got published we will see a rapid increase in number of transactions with transaction volume remaining unchanged i.e. the average size of a transaction became smaller. This can only indicate one thing; the users carrying out transactions with substantial amounts of bitcoins for questionable purposes became disillusioned with the currency and moved on to more sophisticated schemes that would allow them to avoid government agencies oversight. Meanwhile tech-savvy community members set about making new anonymous cryptocurrencies like AnonCoin or ZeroCash along with mixing services (sharedcoin and coinjoin).

Obviously NSA was able to grasp the repercussions of losing control over the digital currencies. To tighten grip over illicit financial flows they had to come up with an alternative to discredited Bitcoin. That is when CryptoNote enters the picture.

CryptoNote technology employs an extremely sophisticated cryptology that boggles the minds of everyone but the brightest scientist like Adam Back and Greg Maxwell. The founders of CN prefer to keep their names secret and that constitutes another mystery. Don’t they want recognition for their achievement? Or maybe they simply are not allowed to name themselves. After all, all the top notch cryptographers, to whom CN team could easily be attributed to, are either on the NSA watch list or have graduated from their IA programs.

Perhaps the name of the CN whitepaper author was supposed to tell us something. Nicolas van Saberhagen is a rare name that is hardly ever mentioned anywhere on the Internet. An attentive reader could pick out letters NSA in the name but that as well could be mere wishful thinking.

Having been completely mystified with CryptoNote and its first implementation Bytecoin, me and a few of my fellow researchers looked at the technical aspects of the CN technology and were able to identify a number of puzzling clues.

To begin with, a renowned cryptographer and mathematician Daniel J. Bernstein in his observation of elliptic curve, which is the core concept of the CN technology, states that signature generation algorithm should use a deterministic random (http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/ ). This method eliminates the dependency on random generation derived from external events. Also external libraries become unnecessary. But for some inexplicable reason, CryptoNote employs the same elliptic curve and matches it with nondeterministic random through the random_scalar function. random_scalar is used for signature generation within the code whereby the random function becomes linked with external libraries which in turn leads to possible vulnerabilities.

(http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/) Bernstein writes: “Foolproof session keys. Signatures are generated deterministically; key generation consumes new randomness but new signatures do not. This is not only a speed feature but also a security feature, directly relevant to the recent collapse of the Sony PlayStation 3 security system.” — The abovementioned clearly states the necessity of deterministic random; however CryptoNote opted in a potentially unsound scheme.

It’s been reported that one of the most frequently used randomization libraries Dual_EC_DRBG was implanted with a backdoor. This particular insight was provided by Edward Snowden. But whether there are more libraries with NSA implanted vulnerabilities remains unknown.

It is likely that CN developers deliberately neglected the Bernstein’s rationale in order to make the backdoor possible. By inferring malice aforethought on the CN developer’s part we may as well call them crooks. The vulnerability is exploited by allowing to whoever has the knowledge to recover users’ private keys thereby de-anonymizing them through ring signature and key image compromisation. Since the core user base of anonymous cryptocurrencies is likely to be individuals or entities aiming to hide, launder or transfer illicit funds, the abovementioned vulnerability may provide NSA with a tool to uncover their identities. According to some indisputable evidence, at least one CryptoNote based currency had been in circulation on deeb web before certain events made it go public. CryptoNote reappeared on Clearnet some time before Snowden’s shocking revelations got published in The Guardian newspaper. Exactly what use CryptoNote had been put to on deep web is not that hard to guess. Since NSA is able to tap into its network, the illicit transactions made with CN based currencies yielded all the necessary information on the parties involved.

According to Snowden’s disclosures, NSA has been purposely implanting backdoors in cryptographic protocols in order to gain access to users’ private data: link

We have also found one confounding detail about Keccak.

NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) has selected Keccak as the winner of the SHA-3 hash function competition: link

NIST is a long-standing partner of NSA and the chances are that Keccak has intentionally been made defective. Experts suggest that Keccak based systems are susceptible to NSA attacks: link

CryptoNote has adopted a significant part of its cryptography from Keccak. Moreover, every single candidate in SHA-3 hash function competition who made it to the final round (link) had been used as building blocks of CryptoNote hash function. What made us wonder is that Keccak was the last on that list. Now if you look at this chronologically, CryptoNote was officially announced in july 2012 and the competition winner became known in october of the same year which makes us assume that CN (or whoever controls it) somehow knew the results before they were even announced. And that may be seen as clear indication of NSA involvement in CN project.

The NSA goal, from a February 2012 document, as confirmed by Snowden, released on November 22, 2013, is to extract all data on “anyone, anytime, anywhere” by influencing (corrupting) the “global encryption market. – link

1996 NSA report surfaced, ‘predicting’ a crypto-cyber unit eerily close to Bitcoin (link) However, upon closer inspection it turns out that the crypto-cyber unit described by NSA is more akin to CryptoNote than Bitcoin. Section 2.3 (3 Untraceable Electronic Payments) outlines the necessity of using blind signatures in order to achieve anonymity. But this feature wasn’t implemented in Bitcoin. The CryptoNote technology, on the other hand, presupposes the use of ring signatures which are analogue of blind signatures in p2p currencies.

Besides, initially itcoin was supposed to maintain the egalitarian principle where 1 CPU = 1 Vote. As the user base grew it became obvious that Bitcoin could be mined with GPUs and ASICs that are capable of substantially higher hash power. Subsequent wide-scale proliferation of ASICs rendered NSA incapable of controlling the vast network of Bitcoin. CryptoNote, as opposed to Bitcoin, doesn’t give an edge to GPU mining therefore NSA can be in control of the network at any time. Moreover, NSA is capable of crashing any CN coin’s network at almost negligible cost.

We spent quite some time recovering all these pieces of data. Having weaved together enough technical proofs arguing in favor of NSA theory of CN origination we leave it up to you to make sense out of it. Meanwhile lets turn to more trivial things. For starters, there are scores of CN based coins but what purpose do they serve since there is hardly any service that accommodates them apart from exchanges? It’s very likely that these coins are being used on deep web chiefly for purchases of illegal articles. Another option would be money laundering and sponsoring of illicit activities. Bytecoin in that respect is the most likely candidate. It is by far the oldest CN based coin with proven track record of deep web exposure. Since CN coins are easily converted in fiat they can be put to any use imaginable, starting with financing the US-supported insurgency groups scattered across the world or even legalizing profits from international drug trade. One way or another, deep web is routinely monitored by NSA and it has been proved by multiple backdoors in Tor.

Whatever the case with CryptoNote, the Heartbleed bug that caused the disruption in the Tor network for several days along with loss of users private keys should not be forgotten. The possible involvement of NSA in creation of CN and collaboration with its developers leaves the door open for all sorts of security vulnerabilities. So if you are a CN user, be vigilant and keep track of your transactions, however secured and anonymous they are, because you never know who might be watching.
jonald_fyookball
Legendary
*
Offline Offline

Activity: 1302
Merit: 1004


Core dev leaves me neg feedback #abuse #political


View Profile
April 23, 2015, 03:37:25 AM
 #80

I wonder if YOU are reading it, or comprehend what you are reading.
 
The link you posted says:
"there hasn’t been any result that calls into question the soundness of SHA-2 at all."

Stuff like:  "hacked into target computers to snare messages before they were encrypted"
or "build entry points into their products." have nothing to do with the hash function.

No doubt the NSA are bunch of vipers that should not be trusted on any level,
but I don't think they have a preimage attack on SHA-256.

Saying that they might is just baseless speculation, and none of the articles
are suggesting that.

Pages: « 1 2 3 [4] 5 6 »  All
  Print  
 
Jump to:  

Powered by MySQL Powered by PHP Powered by SMF 1.1.19 | SMF © 2006-2009, Simple Machines Valid XHTML 1.0! Valid CSS!