Here is an interesting counter-point: IE
iswas
not vulnerable to CRIME attack; Firefox and Chrome
arewere vulnerable until recently.
"Basically, the attacker is running a script on Evil.com," Rizzo explained to Kaspersky Labs' Threatpost. "He forces the browser to open requests to Bank.com by, for example, adding <img alt=""> tags with the src pointing to Bank.com. Each of those requests contains data from mixed sources."
Each encrypted request includes an image file name - a constantly changing detail that is generated by the malicious script; the browser's identification headers, which don't change; and the login cookie, the target of the attack. When the file name matches part of the login cookie, the size of the message drops because the compression algorithm removes this redundancy.
"The problem is that compression combines all those sources together," Rizzo added. "The attacker can sniff the packets and get the size of the requests that are sent. By changing the [file name] path, he could attempt to minimise the request size, ie: when the file name matches the cookie."
I don't use IE, but things are not black-and-white, especially not today. Don't base your views on years-old information.