Seeing Vitalik + Vlad push CASPER as the new consensus model for ethereum,
https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/01/introducing-casper-friendly-ghost/has made me revisit some of my own ideas about POS consensus.
Yes, you have to get a checkpoint from 'someone' when you first join the network (
Weak Subjectivity as Vitalik puts it), but other than that the consensus rules seem to work just fine.
And Neucoin's white paper
http://www.neucoin.org/en/whitepaper/downloadgoes a long way to showing that the grinding attacks that are always possible in POS chains, are actually not as easy to pull off as was originally thought. The combinations and numbers involved are as astronomical as cracking SHA256 itself.
Now - here is the bit that I wanted to have a brainstorm about..
I don't like the way the Stake, the currency of the system, is the same as your 'Mining' power. This means that the fees paid for transactions, are directly linked to the re-distribution of mining power. This seems like there are conflicting incentives ? The mining power could be worth much more / or less than the fees are producing.
What if you had a dual coin POS chain. There are 2 currencies on this chain. One is the currency, and the other is mining power (A fixed amount - 100%). You can trade on chain form one to the other.
When you send a txn, you pay a fee in the currency, not the mining power.
An empty block (I would consider this a rare event that only happens at the bootstrap period of the coin.), pays nothing. There are still ways to make this worthwhile for the miner, with PPLNS (Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares) type chains.
Now there is a Free Market for the value of the mining tokens, and simply leaving a miner running does not increase your ability to mine, which is the case with ALL current POS models.
I can't work out if this is actually different, or the same as current models, just a bit more complex.
Thoughts ?