How much would you trust trezor?

[Quickseller]

Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1013586.0

Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive. 

You could also encrypt it and then print it out on paper or engrave it into durable metal...then lock it in a safe... you just have to remember your password to decrypt it.

Must have slipped my mind putting that into my post...

The other caveat is that if I split my private key into say 4 sections....engraved on to a durable metal (wont melt in a fire or get destroyed by weather easily etc) and put those 4 pieces of my private key in FOUR safe separate places or in 8 separate places with duplicates of each portion.

Draw back for encrypting your wallet: you forget your password

Draw back for splitting up your wallet in multiple locations: more effort and remembering where you hid each piece (if it isnt obvious).

there will be draw backs for either approach.

I would say that securing your bitcoin with that approach would have an extremely unlikely chance of allowing someone to steal your money. 

However at the end of the day, any wallet that is printed that you will use such printed version to spend is going to have additional attack vectors over using an encrypted file to store your private keys for when you plan on spending your BTC. For example if you were to have your private key encrypted and split up into four parts spread in diverse locations, then when you go to retrieve your engraved private keys then an attacker could potentially see each portion of the private key and attempt to crack the password after they follow you to each of the four locations as you retrieve your private keys. This attack would not be possible if you instead had your private keys stored on an encrypted USB drive or an encrypted hard drive, and had them stored in the same location.

The above scenario is highly unlikely, however the point is that there are additional attack vectors when using any kind of paper wallet (or otherwise "visible" wallet) verses using a wallet file that is encrypted on a hard drive/USB stick/other digital media. 

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[Quickseller]

I would personally suggest using electrum for both your cold and hot wallets (at least for your hot wallet on your computer). It takes up very little resources, is deterministic, and has all the same features that armory has.

One important feature Armory has that Electrum does not: transcations and/or extended public key data are kept private when using Armory, whereas using a Trezor with Electrum involves sharing your transaction history with public Electrum nodes. Those nodes are unlikely to be trying to use that information for antything, but it's better if that info is not made available to strangers in the first place.

It'd be really good for the privacy of Trezor users if:

• Electrum devs implemented an easy to use "full node" mode
• Armory devs integrated Trezor
• Bitcoin Core integrated Trezor

You don't have to have electrum connect to electrum servers when using electrum, as you can manually calculate the BTC addresses based on the xpubkey and then check the balances of each address manually on a block explorer that you trust not to infringe on your privacy, and check the addresses separately.

You can also run your own electrum server on a VPS and have your instance of electrum only connect to your electrum server.

Other options would be to connect to an onion electrum server via tor, or only have electrum open when you are connected to a VPN, although both of these solutions would result in the electrum server still knowing all of your addresses

[smoothie]

Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1013586.0

Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive. 

You could also encrypt it and then print it out on paper or engrave it into durable metal...then lock it in a safe... you just have to remember your password to decrypt it.

Must have slipped my mind putting that into my post...

The other caveat is that if I split my private key into say 4 sections....engraved on to a durable metal (wont melt in a fire or get destroyed by weather easily etc) and put those 4 pieces of my private key in FOUR safe separate places or in 8 separate places with duplicates of each portion.

Draw back for encrypting your wallet: you forget your password

Draw back for splitting up your wallet in multiple locations: more effort and remembering where you hid each piece (if it isnt obvious).

there will be draw backs for either approach.

I would say that securing your bitcoin with that approach would have an extremely unlikely chance of allowing someone to steal your money. 

However at the end of the day, any wallet that is printed that you will use such printed version to spend is going to have additional attack vectors over using an encrypted file to store your private keys for when you plan on spending your BTC. For example if you were to have your private key encrypted and split up into four parts spread in diverse locations, then when you go to retrieve your engraved private keys then an attacker could potentially see each portion of the private key and attempt to crack the password after they follow you to each of the four locations as you retrieve your private keys. This attack would not be possible if you instead had your private keys stored on an encrypted USB drive or an encrypted hard drive, and had them stored in the same location.

The above scenario is highly unlikely, however the point is that there are additional attack vectors when using any kind of paper wallet (or otherwise "visible" wallet) verses using a wallet file that is encrypted on a hard drive/USB stick/other digital media. 

Let's assume that it is encrypted and printed on paper/metal.

You can create a raw transaction offline and randomly select a computer to broadcast it from.

What attack vectors exist now? The random computer you used to broadcast your raw transaction to the network?

Also assume the printer the key(s) were generated on had no wifi capabilities and never connected to the internet or any other computer than the air-gapped one. Then the printer is burned with a flame thrower. 

[smoothie]

You could also add the part of splitting the encrypted text into multiple places and that just adds another layer of security but also...work 

[Quickseller]

Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1013586.0

Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive. 

You could also encrypt it and then print it out on paper or engrave it into durable metal...then lock it in a safe... you just have to remember your password to decrypt it.

Must have slipped my mind putting that into my post...

The other caveat is that if I split my private key into say 4 sections....engraved on to a durable metal (wont melt in a fire or get destroyed by weather easily etc) and put those 4 pieces of my private key in FOUR safe separate places or in 8 separate places with duplicates of each portion.

Draw back for encrypting your wallet: you forget your password

Draw back for splitting up your wallet in multiple locations: more effort and remembering where you hid each piece (if it isnt obvious).

there will be draw backs for either approach.

I would say that securing your bitcoin with that approach would have an extremely unlikely chance of allowing someone to steal your money. 

However at the end of the day, any wallet that is printed that you will use such printed version to spend is going to have additional attack vectors over using an encrypted file to store your private keys for when you plan on spending your BTC. For example if you were to have your private key encrypted and split up into four parts spread in diverse locations, then when you go to retrieve your engraved private keys then an attacker could potentially see each portion of the private key and attempt to crack the password after they follow you to each of the four locations as you retrieve your private keys. This attack would not be possible if you instead had your private keys stored on an encrypted USB drive or an encrypted hard drive, and had them stored in the same location.

The above scenario is highly unlikely, however the point is that there are additional attack vectors when using any kind of paper wallet (or otherwise "visible" wallet) verses using a wallet file that is encrypted on a hard drive/USB stick/other digital media. 

Let's assume that it is encrypted and printed on paper/metal.

You can create a raw transaction offline and randomly select a computer to broadcast it from.

What attack vectors exist now? The random computer you used to broadcast your raw transaction to the network?

Also assume the printer the key(s) were generated on had no wifi capabilities and never connected to the internet or any other computer than the air-gapped one. Then the printer is burned with a flame thrower. 

The attack vector would be when you load the private key onto your offline computer, the (encrypted) private key would be temporarily exposed for someone to see. You can take precautions to protect yourself against loss from this attack, however no precaution is going to be 100% effective.

Also if you ignore the above, it would still be very expensive to be frequently destroying printers when reusing a USB stick/hard drive is going to offer the same amount of protection as a paper wallet (it will be the same if you ignore the above, however in reality it will offer greater protection).

[smoothie]

Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1013586.0

Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive. 

You could also encrypt it and then print it out on paper or engrave it into durable metal...then lock it in a safe... you just have to remember your password to decrypt it.

Must have slipped my mind putting that into my post...

The other caveat is that if I split my private key into say 4 sections....engraved on to a durable metal (wont melt in a fire or get destroyed by weather easily etc) and put those 4 pieces of my private key in FOUR safe separate places or in 8 separate places with duplicates of each portion.

Draw back for encrypting your wallet: you forget your password

Draw back for splitting up your wallet in multiple locations: more effort and remembering where you hid each piece (if it isnt obvious).

there will be draw backs for either approach.

I would say that securing your bitcoin with that approach would have an extremely unlikely chance of allowing someone to steal your money. 

However at the end of the day, any wallet that is printed that you will use such printed version to spend is going to have additional attack vectors over using an encrypted file to store your private keys for when you plan on spending your BTC. For example if you were to have your private key encrypted and split up into four parts spread in diverse locations, then when you go to retrieve your engraved private keys then an attacker could potentially see each portion of the private key and attempt to crack the password after they follow you to each of the four locations as you retrieve your private keys. This attack would not be possible if you instead had your private keys stored on an encrypted USB drive or an encrypted hard drive, and had them stored in the same location.

The above scenario is highly unlikely, however the point is that there are additional attack vectors when using any kind of paper wallet (or otherwise "visible" wallet) verses using a wallet file that is encrypted on a hard drive/USB stick/other digital media. 

Let's assume that it is encrypted and printed on paper/metal.

You can create a raw transaction offline and randomly select a computer to broadcast it from.

What attack vectors exist now? The random computer you used to broadcast your raw transaction to the network?

Also assume the printer the key(s) were generated on had no wifi capabilities and never connected to the internet or any other computer than the air-gapped one. Then the printer is burned with a flame thrower. 

The attack vector would be when you load the private key onto your offline computer, the (encrypted) private key would be temporarily exposed for someone to see. You can take precautions to protect yourself against loss from this attack, however no precaution is going to be 100% effective.

Also if you ignore the above, it would still be very expensive to be frequently destroying printers when reusing a USB stick/hard drive is going to offer the same amount of protection as a paper wallet (it will be the same if you ignore the above, however in reality it will offer greater protection).

The idea would be to generate everything you will need before you destroy the printer.

Also using a fresh install of BSD or another linux/GNU distribution on brand new hardware to create your raw transaction before broad casting...I'd say is pretty safe.

[Quickseller]

Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1013586.0

Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive. 

You could also encrypt it and then print it out on paper or engrave it into durable metal...then lock it in a safe... you just have to remember your password to decrypt it.

Must have slipped my mind putting that into my post...

The other caveat is that if I split my private key into say 4 sections....engraved on to a durable metal (wont melt in a fire or get destroyed by weather easily etc) and put those 4 pieces of my private key in FOUR safe separate places or in 8 separate places with duplicates of each portion.

Draw back for encrypting your wallet: you forget your password

Draw back for splitting up your wallet in multiple locations: more effort and remembering where you hid each piece (if it isnt obvious).

there will be draw backs for either approach.

I would say that securing your bitcoin with that approach would have an extremely unlikely chance of allowing someone to steal your money. 

However at the end of the day, any wallet that is printed that you will use such printed version to spend is going to have additional attack vectors over using an encrypted file to store your private keys for when you plan on spending your BTC. For example if you were to have your private key encrypted and split up into four parts spread in diverse locations, then when you go to retrieve your engraved private keys then an attacker could potentially see each portion of the private key and attempt to crack the password after they follow you to each of the four locations as you retrieve your private keys. This attack would not be possible if you instead had your private keys stored on an encrypted USB drive or an encrypted hard drive, and had them stored in the same location.

The above scenario is highly unlikely, however the point is that there are additional attack vectors when using any kind of paper wallet (or otherwise "visible" wallet) verses using a wallet file that is encrypted on a hard drive/USB stick/other digital media. 

Let's assume that it is encrypted and printed on paper/metal.

You can create a raw transaction offline and randomly select a computer to broadcast it from.

What attack vectors exist now? The random computer you used to broadcast your raw transaction to the network?

Also assume the printer the key(s) were generated on had no wifi capabilities and never connected to the internet or any other computer than the air-gapped one. Then the printer is burned with a flame thrower. 

The attack vector would be when you load the private key onto your offline computer, the (encrypted) private key would be temporarily exposed for someone to see. You can take precautions to protect yourself against loss from this attack, however no precaution is going to be 100% effective.

Also if you ignore the above, it would still be very expensive to be frequently destroying printers when reusing a USB stick/hard drive is going to offer the same amount of protection as a paper wallet (it will be the same if you ignore the above, however in reality it will offer greater protection).

The idea would be to generate everything you will need before you destroy the printer.

Also using a fresh install of BSD or another linux/GNU distribution on brand new hardware to create your raw transaction before broad casting...I'd say is pretty safe.

sure it is "pretty safe" and highly unlikely to have your money stolen, however your keys (or encrypted keys) would still be exposed while you load the keys onto your computer.

Also it would be expected that you need additional addresses as time progresses, so if you were to generate 10 (or however many) addresses with a printer prior to destroying it, then you eventually will need an additional printer to print the private keys to additional addresses

[yenxz]

Trezor is the first,and also the best, we all know that rrezor have more than good design,they have a good performance.

[Jeremycoin]

If I use(buy) it, then I should trust it. Because they're selling a hardware, not just an online service. And they're not a small company

[HeroCat]

Trezor hardware wallet is very good from safety point of view. You can not find any other hardware wallet like this. From the other point, if something happen with electronical part - you loose your BTC   

[megatron1337]

Is it waterproof?  The fear of having the electronic components fail is probably it's achiles heel.

[peonminer]

Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.

Depending upon your risk you can split the key into parts and store them separately or you can store multiple copies in different locations.

I'm very wary when it comes to hardware wallets.

I like this idea. Very cool. Imagine in 30 years going metal detector hunting and finding someone's physical 'bitcoin bar' buried deep in the ground, with the keys engraved on it. I'd be rushing to check the balance!!

EDIT: To solve the problem you all are discussing of an open attack when you obtain said private key, develop your own personal coder and decoder. Encode your private key even futher.

Ex:

A=3P
B=eq
C=iv
D=9s
E=a4

So on and so forth. Memorize your code. The only way of attack then would be to hack your brain. (Which may be not far from the future.)

I realize it is near impossible for this scenario to work. Can anyone add/modify/take away from it to increase security?

[BitcoinNewsMagazine]

Trezor hardware wallet is very good from safety point of view. You can not find any other hardware wallet like this. From the other point, if something happen with electronical part - you loose your BTC   

Too much emphasis is placed on the device that allows you to work with your seed. The 24 word seed is your bitcoin, consider the plastic Trezor to be disposable. Step on your Trezor, lose it, whatever, as long as you have a spare you can access your seed again right away. Don't have a spare handy? Use Electrum instead. You only lose your bitcoin if you lose your seed phrase.

[BurtW]

Just something I've been thinking lately - I hold a sizeable sum in a trezor that I bought lately (after I did some review of the code and the protocols used), but I'm wondering about how much others would trust a trezor personally. I used to use Offline Armory exclusively but it's taking a toll on my SSD's by running a full client on my online computer.

I trust a vast majority of my BTC on my Trezor.

When Homeland Security "borrowed" all of my Bitcoins for 9 months they kept them on a Trezor.

[AtheistAKASaneBrain]

I will never trust something that has dependance of a mechanism to work be it mechanical or digital (electronic) above a simple paper wallet wrapped in fire resistant plastic. I mean who would? just get a paper wallet with BIP38 and wrap it on sturdy type of plastic, how doesn't this beat Trezor to be honest?

[Mobius]

I've been using a trezor for around 6 months now. As long as you keep your seed passphrase, you will be fine.

[BitcoinNewsMagazine]

I will never trust something that has dependance of a mechanism to work be it mechanical or digital (electronic) above a simple paper wallet wrapped in fire resistant plastic. I mean who would? just get a paper wallet with BIP38 and wrap it on sturdy type of plastic, how doesn't this beat Trezor to be honest?

People cock up paper wallets and lose their bitcoin more often than you think. See this post for a guy who lost 100 bitcoin stored in a paper wallet. Paper wallets are overrated. I will take a Trezor over a paper wallet any day. You seem to have a problem understanding that as long as you have the 24 word seed stored safely you can not lose bitcoin using a Trezor.

[virtualx]

Just something I've been thinking lately - I hold a sizeable sum in a trezor that I bought lately (after I did some review of the code and the protocols used), but I'm wondering about how much others would trust a trezor personally. I used to use Offline Armory exclusively but it's taking a toll on my SSD's by running a full client on my online computer.

It could be a great Christmas gift, but I am skeptical about buying a trezor. How is it protected from hardware failure? What are the advantages over cold storage?

[BitcoinNewsMagazine]

Just something I've been thinking lately - I hold a sizeable sum in a trezor that I bought lately (after I did some review of the code and the protocols used), but I'm wondering about how much others would trust a trezor personally. I used to use Offline Armory exclusively but it's taking a toll on my SSD's by running a full client on my online computer.

It could be a great Christmas gift, but I am skeptical about buying a trezor. How is it protected from hardware failure? What are the advantages over cold storage?

Trezor is cold storage. As long as you have your 24 word seed safely stored hardware failure is just an inconvenience. You just get a new one and restore from seed. If you are skeptical about Trezor you should read the owner's manual first before buying.

[calkob]

Another solution - print out private keys on paper or engrave them into a durable metal possession and store in a safe or bury under the ground and have them in multiple locations.

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1013586.0

Paper wallets are generally going to be less secure then an encrypted wallet. You would most likely be better off doing whatever you would do to protect your paper wallet, but omit the step that puts your private keys on paper and instead keep them encrypted on a hard drive. 

what about an encrypted paper wallet? i think the price is a big factor also, as far as i know its what about £100 for a trazor.  i would rather just use paper wallets, backed up in multiple places and spend the £100 on more bitcoin.......