[XMN] MAGNATOJ Untraceable payments. CryptoNote & ForkNote -CPU Minable [GAMING]

This should also be seen as Satoshi Nakamoto principle of "one-CPU-one-vote", which is explained in cryptonote whitepaper:

"2.2
The proof-of-work function
Bitcoin creator Satoshi Nakamoto described the majority decision making algorithm as “one-
CPU-one-vote” and used a CPU-bound pricing function (double SHA-256) for his proof-of-work
scheme. Since users vote for the single history of transactions order [1], the reasonableness and
consistency of this process are critical conditions for the whole system.
The security of this model suffers from two drawbacks. First, it requires 51% of the network’s
mining power to be under the control of honest users. Secondly, the system’s progress (bug fixes,
security fixes, etc...) require the overwhelming majority of users to support and agree to the
changes (this occurs when the users update their wallet software) [6].Finally this same voting
mechanism is also used for collective polls about implementation of some features [7].
This permits us to conjecture the properties that must be satisfied by the proof-of-work
pricing function. Such function must not enable a network participant to have a significant
advantage over another participant; it requires a parity between common hardware and high
cost of custom devices. From recent examples [8], we can see that the SHA-256 function used
in the Bitcoin architecture does not posses this property as mining becomes more efficient on
GPUs and ASIC devices when compared to high-end CPUs.
Therefore, Bitcoin creates favourable conditions for a large gap between the voting power of
participants as it violates the “one-CPU-one-vote” principle since GPU and ASIC owners posses
a much larger voting power when compared with CPU owners. It is a classical example of the
Pareto principle where 20% of a system’s participants control more than 80% of the votes.
One could argue that such inequality is not relevant to the network’s security since it is not
the small number of participants controlling the majority of the votes but the honesty of these
participants that matters. However, such argument is somewhat flawed since it is rather the
possibility of cheap specialized hardware appearing rather than the participants’ honesty which
poses a threat. To demonstrate this, let us take the following example. Suppose a malevolent
individual gains significant mining power by creating his own mining farm through the cheap
2hardware described previously. Suppose that the global hashrate decreases significantly, even for
a moment, he can now use his mining power to fork the chain and double-spend. As we shall see
later in this article, it is not unlikely for the previously described event to take place."

We are currently studying several options to satisfy this principle even more than it is already.