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Author Topic: Bitcoin puzzle transaction ~32 BTC prize to who solves it  (Read 403251 times)
kTimesG
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August 08, 2026, 07:42:08 PM
Last edit: August 08, 2026, 07:59:15 PM by kTimesG
 #13701

Your phrasing - "for a better k without sacrificing the speed" - implies the +33% is not mandatory. That is the part I cannot reconstruct from the source. Is the cheap add amortised into the batched inversion in a way the naive count misses, or is it a different construction than the one described in the v3.x notes?

I am not sure how you ended up with the 33%. Yeah, for SOTA+ there's always the cheap point overhead of 1M + 1S, but going from that to a 33% is a long shot, because theory != implementation, and not everything is just about the EC math in the loop (there's cycle detection, DP, answering "what direction is REALLY better to jump next?" and so on).

In other words, there are other practical benefits to always computing the cheap point, which are absent  when computing it conditionally, which translate in the end, to the 1M + 1S gap paying itself out to slightly faster solves overall, on average. Yes, things will run at a lower speed, but the expected lower k compensates.

The best ideea will be a platform that you can see only if you share ranges that you found.

Hopefully you don't make the same mistakes like the hundred people before you that attempted the same idea only to get roasted for not grasping the core "lack of trust" fundamental flaws. My suggestion is stop immediately, think it through another dozen times, read the stories of previous roasted n00bz that pretended they had everything right, except that they didn't have anything right at all. If you still plan on LLM-ing the platform, my suggestion would be again, to stop, and realize that the trust issue is impossible to be avoided, hence such a platform / pool is also impossible, since anyone can cheat it, no matter how smart you plan the scan verifications or whatever. There is only one bullet-proof way to be sure that some whatever range of keys was truly completely scanned: by scanning it yourself. And actually, you don't have the 100% guarantee even then, because some cosmic ray might flip some bit during a H160 per-key independent operation, and you will never ever know it happened, and cannot know it happened unless you scan it again on another device using different independent verification code..

Anything else except solo scanning is not to be considered safe information.

detechs
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August 08, 2026, 09:12:33 PM
 #13702

Your phrasing - "for a better k without sacrificing the speed" - implies the +33% is not mandatory. That is the part I cannot reconstruct from the source. Is the cheap add amortised into the batched inversion in a way the naive count misses, or is it a different construction than the one described in the v3.x notes?

I am not sure how you ended up with the 33%. Yeah, for SOTA+ there's always the cheap point overhead of 1M + 1S, but going from that to a 33% is a long shot, because theory != implementation, and not everything is just about the EC math in the loop (there's cycle detection, DP, answering "what direction is REALLY better to jump next?" and so on).

In other words, there are other practical benefits to always computing the cheap point, which are absent  when computing it conditionally, which translate in the end, to the 1M + 1S gap paying itself out to slightly faster solves overall, on average. Yes, things will run at a lower speed, but the expected lower k compensates.

The best ideea will be a platform that you can see only if you share ranges that you found.

Hopefully you don't make the same mistakes like the hundred people before you that attempted the same idea only to get roasted for not grasping the core "lack of trust" fundamental flaws. My suggestion is stop immediately, think it through another dozen times, read the stories of previous roasted n00bz that pretended they had everything right, except that they didn't have anything right at all. If you still plan on LLM-ing the platform, my suggestion would be again, to stop, and realize that the trust issue is impossible to be avoided, hence such a platform / pool is also impossible, since anyone can cheat it, no matter how smart you plan the scan verifications or whatever. There is only one bullet-proof way to be sure that some whatever range of keys was truly completely scanned: by scanning it yourself. And actually, you don't have the 100% guarantee even then, because some cosmic ray might flip some bit during a H160 per-key independent operation, and you will never ever know it happened, and cannot know it happened unless you scan it again on another device using different independent verification code..

Anything else except solo scanning is not to be considered safe information.

Please provide maths we can use to verify your claims. Otherwise that's all they are. I am super confident puzzle_72_workers idea will be better than anyone else's attempt at pooling work., instead of telling people your opinion, which is probably wrong, try lift them up and give them motivation. Cause we can see you haven't solved any puzzles using your ideas either..
kTimesG
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August 08, 2026, 10:48:22 PM
 #13703

Please provide maths we can use to verify your claims.

This is like asking to provide maths for the multiplication table. The topic of fair H160 pools impossibility has already been debated to death in the last 10 years, and the proof is easily understandable by a 5-year child. What do you want, a drawing? Understand that it's impossible to compute a proof that some data made out of independent items has been computed, without actually computing all the independent items of the data itself to verify them.

Though it's in the spirit of the thread to reach every single day the full non-sense point, where people confuse facts for opinions, and then ask for proofs.

detechs
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August 08, 2026, 11:06:29 PM
 #13704

Please provide maths we can use to verify your claims.

This is like asking to provide maths for the multiplication table. The topic of fair H160 pools impossibility has already been debated to death in the last 10 years, and the proof is easily understandable by a 5-year child. What do you want, a drawing? Understand that it's impossible to compute a proof that some data made out of independent items has been computed, without actually computing all the independent items of the data itself to verify them.

Though it's in the spirit of the thread to reach every single day the full non-sense point, where people confuse facts for opinions, and then ask for proofs.

kTimesG,

You said fair H160 pool verification is impossible. Then you called my request for math "daily nonsense."

Here is the math.

Bram already verified a distributed H160 scan across 25K GPUs for puzzle 67. Each worker submitted HASH-160 keys with 48 leading zero bits as proof of work. Expected submissions per worker per range of size R:

  E = R / 2^48

Standard deviation:

  sigma = sqrt(E)

A worker submitting fewer than E - 3*sigma submissions is cheating with >99.7% confidence. For puzzle 67 with 256 workers scanning 2^58 keys each, E = 1024, sigma = 32. Observed: 938 to 1108. Every worker within 3 sigma. This was verified by Cricktor in post #7575.

That is not cryptographic proof. It is probabilistic verification. It works. It was used. The distinction matters.

If you meant "perfect cryptographic proof is impossible" then say that. Nobody disagrees. But that is not what you wrote. You wrote "it's impossible to compute a proof that some data made out of independent items has been computed." This is true only for perfect proofs. Probabilistic proofs with quantifiable error rates exist and have been deployed.

Now here is the math you did not provide.

Puzzle 71 full scan estimate at current aggregate: 421 years. If your SOTA+ with 1M+1S overhead cuts k by 10%, that is 379 years. If it cuts k by 50%, that is 210 years. If it cuts k by 90%, that is 42 years. None of these are practical. The exponential curve has hit a wall at 2^70 regardless of implementation details.

Meanwhile the puzzle creator designed 256 wallets with a 160-bit address layer. RIPEMD160 outputs exactly 160 bits. After puzzle 160 the brute force cost flatlines at 2^160 for every puzzle 161 through 256. The measuring instrument stops measuring. The creator called 161-256 "silly" and moved the funds. The wallets still exist. Puzzle 256 still has dust.

You are arguing about saving one multiplication per kangaroo jump while the puzzle creator built a puzzle, the BIP39 word mapping of keys, the f6f5431d cluster, and the 256 addresses themselves. The instrument already gave its reading. Brute force hit the ceiling. The creator is measuring something else now.

If your SOTA+ can solve puzzle 71, solve it. If not, then we agree on the math: the exponential curve is the wall, and no constant-factor optimization changes that.
kTimesG
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August 09, 2026, 12:00:02 AM
 #13705

Understand that it's impossible to compute a proof that some data made out of independent items has been computed, without actually computing all the independent items of the data itself to verify them.

A worker submitting fewer than E - 3*sigma submissions is cheating with >99.7% confidence.

I think you should check up the definition of the word "impossible" then re-read the remaining of the text that follows it.

99.7% confidence is just a long-term probability. A 100% guarantee requires submitting 100% of everything.

99.7% long-term probability is not an obligation for a random bad actor to stop scanning once his N submission proofs are found, leaving the remaining keys unscanned.

99.7% probability does not mean that 99.7% of any range was actually really scanned.

I can continue all day long, but hopefully you got the picture by now.

detechs
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August 09, 2026, 12:04:42 AM
 #13706

Understand that it's impossible to compute a proof that some data made out of independent items has been computed, without actually computing all the independent items of the data itself to verify them.

A worker submitting fewer than E - 3*sigma submissions is cheating with >99.7% confidence.

I think you should check up the definition of the word "impossible" then re-read the remaining of the text that follows it.

99.7% confidence is just a long-term probability. A 100% guarantee requires submitting 100% of everything.

99.7% long-term probability is not an obligation for a random bad actor to stop scanning once his N submission proofs are found, leaving the remaining keys unscanned.

99.7% probability does not mean that 99.7% of any range was actually really scanned.

I can continue all day long, but hopefully you got the picture by now.

I've already been listening to the pictures, I've been solving the puzzle a different way, from eve to genesis to papa bear. Finding everything the brute forcers skipped past, the walls they think exist. Your puzzle stops at 160, mine continues to the end. The bitcoin isn't my prize, I already found my prize.
zahid888
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August 09, 2026, 09:58:12 PM
 #13707

What if some puzzle keys are hidden inside the SHA-256 hashes of well-known passwords? Has anyone explored this possibility?



Code:
Input your password: Puzzle 2^71 to 2^160 using SHA256 hash of given password

[NEW PASSWORD] running...

  -startpass "Puzzle 2^71 to 2^160 using SHA256 hash of given password"
  -passlength 56

 [+] Starting from password : Puzzle 2^71 to 2^160 using SHA256 hash of given password
[-] Total Speed: 206.28 MK/s [-] [00:00:02 Elapsed Time] [Progress: 1 %] | Prefix [0]

======================================================================================
|                    Total Matching character in hash160: 14                         |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1PWo3JeBEiEt6goSg695U2yRAy3SJoF16h f6f5431d25d720b15b6a86ad56960ef43a923048        |
| 1PWo3JeB9jrGwfHDNpdGK54CRas7fsVzXU f6f5431d25bbf7b12e8add9af5e3475c44a0a5b8        |
| ^^^^^^^^                           ^^^^^^^^^^    ^^   ^                   ^        |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  Password    : Puzzle 2^71 to 2^160 using SHA256 hash of given passwotf    |
|  SHA256      : E2DE53227F3977D9A5B0891CAD9C016C3D1E04349B74C99F8EF4BB2F0E1BD130    |
|  Private Key : 00000000000000000000000000000000000000009C016C3D1E04349B74C9A0CC    |
|  Public Key  : 02EDA07448E9011156DAFD4EF4B8E3703D2AB17E9CCBA34E300027D6609B27D73E  |
======================================================================================

[\] Total Speed: 314.13 MK/s [\] [00:00:03 Elapsed Time] [Progress: 1 %] | Prefix [1]

======================================================================================
|                    Total Matching character in hash160: 13                         |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1MUJSJYseBvKJj5uqh2MF9v6mQsis1LvL5 e08c4d3bc9096f35c5cfbafcff9b08e034ff07f1        |
| 1MUJSJYtGPVGkBCTqGspnxyHahpt5Te8jy e08c4d3bc9cf2b3e2cb88de2bfaa4fe8c7aa3f24        |
| ^^^^^^^         ^                  ^^^^^^^^^^    ^          ^    ^                 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  Password    : Puzzle 2^71 to 2^160 using SHA256 hash of given passwovS    |
|  SHA256      : 366424628676F8ACC7CD2A4B31CCCDD12F1A50D7EB86CD9AEF4EF1D820054388    |
|  Private Key : 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000424628676F8ACC7CD2B5C1    |
|  Public Key  : 03F651EBD700BDB2AA57950A52F0A7D0C01090DD5A1C86D4B0BF76C06AB53C38A1  |
======================================================================================

[/] Total Speed: 475.81 MK/s [/] [00:00:13 Elapsed Time] [Progress: 9 %] | Prefix [2]

======================================================================================
|                    Total Matching character in hash160: 11                         |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 16AbnZjZsjAk2Ay1vL4wenyUjSAjeFVb8Z 38a968fdfba7d1209ae1a86280416edde5769ae3        |
| 16AbnZjZZipwHMkYKBSfswGWKDmXHjEpSf 38a968fdfb457654c51bcfc4f9174d6ee487bb41        |
| ^^^^^^^^                           ^^^^^^^^^^                      ^               |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  Password    : Puzzle 2^71 to 2^160 using SHA256 hash of given passwp95    |
|  SHA256      : 1F87AB91E5026635E1A47F96F62CAFB50A785881044756FD2C92633749096F7C    |
|  Private Key : 00000000000000000000000000000000000007F96F62CAFB50A78588104482B3    |
|  Public Key  : 02F8C204D0FD61C7D21977DC848DA6041274A31AD1D24195454BEECA5CE130EC4A  |
======================================================================================

[|] Total Speed: 475.60 MK/s [|] [00:00:28 Elapsed Time] [Progress: 19 %] | Prefix [3]

Final Stats:
Elapsed Time: 29.24 seconds
Partials Found: 3
======================================================================================

Input your password:

1BGvwggxfCaHGykKrVXX7fk8GYaLQpeixA
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