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Azael
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November 21, 2016, 07:48:58 AM |
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Central banks will adress the legitimate needs of people using cryptocurrency and leave the coins to fight over breadcrumbs. Which in the grand scheme of things is quite a lot anyway..
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twitter.com/erikledgers
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WhiteSkinnedFREAK
Member
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Activity: 67
Merit: 10
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November 21, 2016, 07:56:57 AM |
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The above is just an argument from authority, the self-professed 'authority' being yourself.
No it is reality as has been demonstrated over and over in 1000s of years of human history. Your ignorance of world history is not my problem. Never, ever has a prosperous civilization trusted a monetary unit (or even fungible unit-of-exchange) that could be created out of thin air by everyone. Now you go on Ignore. Goodbye. STOP SPAMMING MY THREAD WITH USELESS NOISE. GO CREATE YOUR OWN THREAD. Have a little respect to the person who put so much effort into this thread. Why do yall keep arguing? Is there any sources for reading material on this subject? I feel like someone much smarter than us may have figured this out |
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iamnotback
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November 21, 2016, 08:08:51 AM |
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I feel like someone much smarter than us may have figured this out
Yeah and he is myself. But you probably won't understand it when it is explained to you. |
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alkan
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November 21, 2016, 08:15:49 PM |
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My design combines both concepts but doesn't need PoW (formerly I had unprofitable PoW but hence replaced it with something better)! That is a very strong hint for you.
Would you mind telling us more about your discarded idea of unprofitable PoW? Some time ago, I came up with such a concept myself: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1591011.msg15981017#msg15981017My basic idea was to use PoW as means of "honing" your address/account, so that mining would become more beneficial for low-scale miners than for big players. |
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iamnotback
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November 21, 2016, 08:35:32 PM
Last edit: November 21, 2016, 08:58:08 PM by iamnotback |
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My design combines both concepts but doesn't need PoW (formerly I had unprofitable PoW but hence replaced it with something better)! That is a very strong hint for you.
Would you mind telling us more about your discarded idea of unprofitable PoW? Some time ago, I came up with such a concept myself: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1591011.msg15981017#msg15981017My basic idea was to use PoW as means of "honing" your address/account, so that mining would become more beneficial for low-scale miners than for big players. The only participants possibly motivated to do unprofitable PoW are those who are issuing transactions. If we argue for an “altruism-prime” motivation (and make the perhaps incorrect assumption that it doesn't matter that it is an undersupplied public good!), they will willingly burn the larger of: - A reasonable transaction fee burned as PoW.
- Their CPU PoW hashrate at fractions of their current electric bill.
Neither of those even with millions of users (and especially if you expect them to be on mobile) will be sufficient to secure the chain against powerful attackers such as botnets with gaming rigs and hijacked Amazon EC2 or other VPS cloud accounts. I also suggest these two References from my (yet unpublished) white paper: Also (even unprofitable) mining on CPUs enables 51% rented hashrate attacks! Kiss Monero's (and Zcash's) ass goodbye if they don't get an ASIC implementation. Komodo might possibly be a better bet because @jl777 adopted my suggestion to use Bitcoin's blockchain for security. |
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alkan
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November 21, 2016, 09:09:47 PM |
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Neither of those even with millions of users (and especially if you expect them to be on mobile) will be sufficient to secure the chain against powerful attackers such as botnets with gaming rigs and hijacked Amazon EC2 or other VPS cloud accounts.
Thank you for your quick answer and the references. That's a valid objection from a practical point of view. I'm not sure to what extent using the cumulative hashing power contained in the (meta) blockchain could help in that respect: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1570198.msg15972492#msg15972492. In such a setting you would probably need to run your botnet for months or years in order to build a longer chain (of the transactional blockchain). This is certainly more risky and costly than renting the computing power for some hours to build an alternative chain in traditional PoW currencies. How did you solve this issue in your version of unprofitable PoW? |
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iamnotback
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November 21, 2016, 09:35:03 PM |
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(Of course, this requires a selection process that is truly random and manipulation-proof).
You are right back where you started like a dog chasing his tail and not knowing it. Because you can't achieve that without proof-of-work, as I wrote 3 years ago: The other attacks you describe all derive from the fundamental reason I declared all non-proof-of-work systems to be insecure back in April.
My logic was mathematically fundamental. The input entropy set is quite deterministic and well known and thus can be preimaged. For example, accumulating a lot of coin-days-destroyed and then targeting them in clever ways to subvert the security.
The randomness (entropy) of each proof-of-work is fundamental and mathematical and it can not be preimaged. It can only be surely defeated with > 50% of the network hash rate. Note I recently offered what I believe to a solution to the selfish-mining attack (the one at hackingdistributed.com that claims 25 - 35% attack).
I am skeptical that you can characterize all possible attack vectors of proof-of-stake in one coherent mathematical proof. Thus you will not know formally what the security is; instead a list of adhoc attacks and counter-measures.
Your contemplated design is essentially just Bitcoin-NG in disguise.
How did you solve this issue in your version of unprofitable PoW?
I discarded proof-of-work and formulated a consensus ordering design concept different than just proof-of-stake, DPoS, or a DAG. |
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alkan
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November 21, 2016, 09:59:20 PM |
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Your contemplated design is essentially just Bitcoin-NG in disguise.
I'm cannot see a big similarity between Bitcoin-NG and the concept of using a meta blockchain system. Perhaps you meant my last post https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1570198.msg15995725#msg15995725 which describes another design that in fact is somewhat similar to Bitcoin-NG as it makes use of hash puzzles for finer granularity (as opposed to microblocks), making it less difficult for low-scale miners to participate in mining. |
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iamnotback
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November 21, 2016, 10:06:06 PM |
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Your contemplated design is essentially just Bitcoin-NG in disguise.
I'm cannot see a big similarity between Bitcoin-NG and the concept of using a meta blockchain system. The similarity is as I wrote in my prior post, that you essentially must use PoW to obtain the randomness of whom to select as the delegate to order the transactions in next block. When you get to a high level of understanding, the taxonomy of generative essence possibilities becomes narrowed and designs that seem differentiated share the same category. Essence of Genius
“The essence of genius is to know what to overlook”— William James. To solve a problem or explain a phenomenon, analytical genius untangles the relevant from the irrelevant factors. Genius extricates the generative essence to the smallest set of fundamental factors from which the other factors derive. Genius is less dependent on extensive memory (although this aids in the search of possibilities) and more so on the ability to conjure a mental model.
Creativity derives from this ability to extricate the independent factors— those that are not redundant because they don't derive from or to those preexisting, i.e. divergent thinking.
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kiklo
Legendary
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Activity: 1092
Merit: 1000
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November 22, 2016, 12:09:18 PM |
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FYI: BTC Transactions Queue is overloaded. 16 hours and the guy can't get a confirmation, how can people not see BTC is failing, is beyond me. https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1689151.0What is the normal amount of bitcoins transactions in queue? Currently it is close to 30000 transactions. I have a transaction waiting for over 16 hours now. It has a fee, so am I guarenteed that it will be confirmed? view the queue length here https://blockchain.info/unconfirmed-transactions |
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sidhujag
Legendary
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Activity: 2044
Merit: 1005
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November 22, 2016, 02:46:11 PM |
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Probably didnt pass correct fee... totally fine |
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iamnotback
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November 22, 2016, 08:17:52 PM
Last edit: November 22, 2016, 08:29:54 PM by iamnotback |
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Here is the rough draft from my white paper for the section concerning transactions fees, block size, and the unavoidable monopolization of Proof-of-Work by a few: https://gist.github.com/shelby3/c0d6e0ed132be7e4577df3663c81ee09Applies to every proof-of-work coin which attempts to scale up, not just Bitcoin.
I edited it after proof-reading upon awakening. |
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alkan
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November 22, 2016, 09:30:41 PM |
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The similarity is as I wrote in my prior post, that you essentially must use PoW to obtain the randomness of whom to select as the delegate to order the transactions in next block.
That's certainly the case for the model I suggested. But what about the leader election procedure described in https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/889.pdf (chapter 4.2). Doesn't it ensure true randomness? Neither of those even with millions of users (and especially if you expect them to be on mobile) will be sufficient to secure the chain against powerful attackers such as botnets with gaming rigs and hijacked Amazon EC2 or other VPS cloud accounts.
Coming back to the problem of unprofitable mining, I just had the following idea: Instead of using PoW for making direct profit (as in Bitcoin) or decreasing transaction fees (as in the model I described), we could require each stakeholder to perform PoW in order to preserve his stake. Without producing the required number of blocks in a certain timeframe, the stakeholder would be levied a negative interest rate from his stake and thus lose a percentage of his coins (which would be burned). The amount of work would depend on the stake as well, so that small stakeholders with only a few coins could easily do the computation on their computers or even phones while large investors would need access to mining rigs or server farms. (Splitting the stake between several accounts wouldn't help to reduce the resources needed to prevent the sum from decreasing over time.). On the other hand, the amount of stake would serve as an upper limit on block creation for every stakeholder: Once a stakeholder has produced the required number of blocks, his blocks would be rejected by the other nodes and prevented from becoming part of the block chain. Letting aside the problem of granularity (i.e. block size/block creation rate which also impairs decentralization as it throttles the number of nodes who can participate in block creation), such a scheme would offer some interesting properties. - In order to attack the system (and make a double-spend), you would need to beat the network in terms of hashrate and stake at the same time. - Only big investors have an incentive to become high-scale miners with a lot of hashpower. Such investors have little interest to attack the system. Any thoughts? By the way, thanks imnotback for uploading the two chapters (which I've read with interest). |
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digaran
Copper Member
Hero Member
Offline
Activity: 1330
Merit: 899
🖤😏
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November 22, 2016, 09:45:06 PM |
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One thing you failed to notice could be that anyone in crypto can be the centralized figure, it doesn't limit you to do so like governments with fiat.
It all goes back to the code and nothing more.
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🖤😏
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iamnotback
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November 22, 2016, 09:56:18 PM |
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The similarity is as I wrote in my prior post, that you essentially must use PoW to obtain the randomness of whom to select as the delegate to order the transactions in next block.
That's certainly the case for the model I suggested. But what about the leader election procedure described in https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/889.pdf (chapter 4.2). Doesn't it ensure true randomness? Just found this video about a modified PoS (Prof Kiayias) , partitioned into time slots and with a random selection of new stakeholders Shows nice graphs on theoretical central -> decentral and speed graph but missing full CAP theorem view. Watch at 15min: https://youtu.be/pjYDWWEkgN0At 35 min the new PoS model comes up. Guess, it won t work.... I already commented about that: IOHK has proved security for a PoS system, but the assumption remains that the majority of the stake is not colluding to violate the Nash equilibrium and a majority of the stake remain online at all times. I don't see what IOHK's PoS accomplishes which isn't already accomplished by DPoS? Is it more objective w.r.t. to violations of Nash equilibrium since in DPoS the majority of the stake can be offline so can't observe first-hand any violations? DPoS is presumably provably secure if a majority of the delegates adhere to the Nash equilibrium. So in summary, we can hide " wolverine federated systems in an illusory democratic sheepskin" and gain computational efficiency. But the security problems (or more realistically the economic centralization problem since large stake holders need insidious means as there isn't sufficient shorting liquidity for them to scorch their earth) shift to the power vacuum of political economics and the inviolable power-law distribution of wealth (beget by economies-of-scale). Yet Satoshi's design also has these centralization problems due to the power vacuum of political economics and the inviolable power-law distribution of wealth (beget by economies-of-scale). Will anyone find another class of solution which provides long-term stable resistance to the centralization inherent in the power vacuum of political economics and the inviolable power-law distribution of wealth (beget by economies-of-scale)? Is (D)PoS already more realistically resistant to insidious effects of centralization of vested interests "stake" than Satoshi's design? This is the Holy Grail we seek because centralized ecosystems don't scale due to the stifling politics and vested interests. In my opinion (which is probably an analysis many others share), this is what is holding back Bitcoin lately. |
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iamnotback
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November 22, 2016, 10:15:15 PM
Last edit: November 22, 2016, 10:44:02 PM by iamnotback |
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Afaics, you are rehashing cosmetic variants of either the nothing-at-stake, power-law (or exponential) distribution of stake/resources, or power vacuum of economies-of-scale problems. You can change the mask and lipstick on the pig, but it is still a pig. Coming back to the problem of unprofitable mining, I just had the following idea:
Instead of using PoW for making direct profit (as in Bitcoin) or decreasing transaction fees (as in the model I described), we could require each stakeholder to perform PoW in order to preserve his stake. Without producing the required number of blocks in a certain timeframe, the stakeholder would be levied a negative interest rate from his stake and thus lose a percentage of his coins (which would be burned).
And so when the majority PoW orphans the minority's PoW, then the minority ends up with no stake and the majority ends up with all of the stake. - In order to attack the system (and make a double-spend), you would need to beat the network in terms of hashrate and stake at the same time.
- Only big investors have an incentive to become high-scale miners with a lot of hashpower. Such investors have little interest to attack the system.
Any thoughts?
Other than rented hashrate double-spend attacks for the PoW coins that don't use ASICs, as I point out in detail in my white paper, the main concern is the 51% attack is not for issuing double-spends (which I agree they won't do) but the majority hashrate can have a monopoly on all the mining rewards in the system by orphaning the other blocks in the system (and in a decentralized minority case, this attack isn't even detectable!). That is an attack and it is insidious (harmless) enough that users of transactions probably won't care, especially given the "benefit" that 1 confirmation becomes a guarantee and can't be orphaned (because the network becomes controlled by a deterministic mining cartel). By the way, thanks imnotback for uploading the two chapters (which I've read with interest).
I am motivated by knowing that some people find it useful and interesting. |
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iamnotback
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November 23, 2016, 12:40:39 AM
Last edit: November 23, 2016, 12:55:21 AM by iamnotback |
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One thing you failed to notice could be that anyone in crypto can be the centralized figure, it doesn't limit you to do so like governments with fiat.
It all goes back to the code and nothing more.
Here is the rough draft from my white paper about invisible majority hashrate attacks on proof-of-work blockchains: https://gist.github.com/shelby3/e90a45604969f1ed64395b0b72a56487Very provocative! |
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